Ringing in the rents : policy drivers in Indian telecom by Balasubrahmanyam, Sandhya
Balasubrahmanyam, Sandhya (2015) Ringing in the rents : policy drivers in Indian telecom. PhD Thesis. SOAS, 
University of London.
http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/id/eprint/23588 
Copyright © and Moral Rights for this PhD Thesis are retained by the author and/or 
other copyright owners. 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non‐commercial research or study, without prior 
permission or charge. 
This PhD Thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the copyright holder/s. 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or 
medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders. 
When referring to this PhD Thesis, full bibliographic details including the author, title, 
awarding institution and date of the PhD Thesis must be given e.g. AUTHOR (year of 
submission) "Full PhD Thesis title", name of the School or Department, PhD PhD Thesis, 
pagination.
1 
 
Ringing in the Rents: 
Policy Drivers in Indian 
Telecom 
 
 
Sandhya Balasubrahmanyam 
 
 
 
Thesis Submission for the degree of PhD in 
Economics 
 
 
 
2015 
 
 
 
Department of Economics 
 
SOAS, University of London  
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Declaration for SOAS PhD thesis 
 
I have read and understood regulation 17.9 of the Regulations for students of 
the SOAS, University of London concerning plagiarism. I undertake that all the 
material presented for examination is my own work and has not been written 
for me, in whole or in part, by any other person. I also undertake that any 
quotation or paraphrase from the published or unpublished work of another 
person has been duly acknowledged in the work which I present for 
examination. 
 
 
Signed:  
  
  
3 
 
Abstract 
The growth of mobile telephony in India from its inception in 1995 has been 
remarkable considering the inconsistent policy directions and the high levels of 
corruption inherent in the sector’s development. Current analyses of the sector 
characterize the sector’s growth as having taken place in spite of poor and inconsistent 
policy choices. As a result, policy prescriptions focus upon appropriate auction design, 
to ensure that the correct market value of spectrum can be discovered, or upon 
regulatory independence, to ensure that the extraction by the state is curtailed to 
within levels that do not adversely affect the sector. 
 
This thesis argues that viewing the income streams in the sector from the perspective 
of rents generated through the creation of property rights in spectrum and using the 
analytical lens of a political settlement to study the rent distribution and outcomes can 
better explain the choice of policy as well as its impact on the sectors growth. 
 
This analysis allows us to draw conclusions that explain the underlying structural 
dynamics of the industry, as well as the evolution of policy. First, it indicates that the 
primary source of rents in this industry, spectrum scarcity, is itself policy driven. 
Second, the persistent domination of the three big telecom providers is a consequence 
of their access to differential rents from early access to better quality administratively 
allocated spectrum. Third, the seemingly inconsistent policy and high levels of 
corruption are better explained as arising in the context of a particular political 
settlement and then reinforcing or modifying the political settlement as an outcome of 
the rent streams they generate. Further, the analysis helps identify potential future 
directions of development of the political settlement and the impact these may have 
on policy effectiveness in the sector. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
“It is a narrow mind which cannot look at a subject from various points of view.”  
George Eliot, Middlemarch. 
 
India’s command economy, which was based on socialist ideals and which 
characterized the first 4 decades of growth after Independence in 1947, was 
blamed for its lack-lustre growth performance (labelled the ‘Hindu’ rate of 
growth). Academics and policy makers suggested that India’s policies of 
import-substitution and the numerous industrial policy restrictions of the 
planned economy stifled competition and innovation, created excessive 
monopoly rents for a few firms, and bred inefficiency and rent-seeking1 
(Panagariya 2004, Bardhan 1984, Rodrik and Subramanian 2004, Nayar 2006, 
Jha 1980).  
 
The liberalization of the economy introduced gradually from the late 1980s was 
seen as a cure-all for the ills that plagued the economy. Liberalization, along 
with its hand-maiden privatization, would remove state-created rents and the 
attendant corruption, and bring in competition that would drive efficiency and 
innovation. While it was not an easy ideological shift to sell politically 
(Chowdhary 1998), the government slowly began the process of opening up the 
economy. One of the first sectors to be targeted for liberalization was 
telecommunication. 
 
                                                 
1
 Note that there was an alternative perspective that argued that the state-led, import 
substituting planning phase helped India develop the nascent industries that could drive 
growth after liberalization (Khan 2000d)  (Basu 2004, Kohli 2006).  
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Indian telecommunication in the early 1990’s was the picture of a moribund 
state-run sector, beset by inefficiency. Until 1990 telecommunication was not 
listed as a priority sector for the government and the country had no 
telecommunication policy that explicitly listed increasing tele-density2 as a 
priority (Athreya 1996). The service – fixed line telephony and national and 
international long distance calling, was provided by a state-run Department of 
Telecommunications (DoT), created by splitting from the Department of Posts 
and Telegraph in the 1980s. Innovations in telephony – mobile phones, radio 
paging, texts, voicemail, that were beginning to be introduced in other markets 
had not yet made their way into India.  
 
The service was slow, inefficient, expensive and entirely inadequate to meet the 
growing demand. In 1948, the waiting lists for telephones numbered 20,000. In 
1990, 423,000 new connections were provided in the year but the waiting lists 
for telephones had gone up to 1.7 million. By 1995 it was 2.5 million and by 1997, 
3.3 million (Chowdhary 1998). Robin Jeffrey and Assa Doron (2013: 28) 
estimated that at Independence in 1948, there were a total of 100,000 phone 
connections in the country – one phone per 3400 people. By 1991 the number of 
phones had risen to 5 million, but this still meant 165 people to a phone!  In 
1996, India had a tele density of just 1.54 phones per 100 inhabitants in 
comparison to the UK’s tele density of 53, USA’s of 64, and Brazil’s of 9.75 
(Dash 2006). 
 
The state of the sector in India in the 1980’s was reflective of the widening gap 
between the developed and developing world in terms of telecom development. 
The Maitland Report (1984) had emphasized the importance of telecom growth 
for economic development and the need for the developing world to prioritize 
this sector in order to catch up with technological advances in the developed 
world.  This view of telecom development as essential for broader social and 
                                                 
2
 Tele-density is the number of phones per hundred people. 
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economic development gained currency (Wellenius 1977) and has been 
characterized as the ‘Telecom for Development’  view (Chakravartty 2004).  
 
As part of policy prescriptions to developing countries, the World Bank began 
to recommend telecom sector liberalization and private sector participation. 
Wellenius et al (1993) from the World Bank suggested that the preferred route 
to telecom growth in developing countries was privatization, and lowered 
barriers to entry combined with effective regulation. This would lead to 
increased competition that would drive innovation and consumer value. When 
India turned to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to finance a deficit in 
the 1990s this set of policy prescriptions was attached to the loan. India was 
encouraged to liberalize the sector, usher in private sector competition against 
the state-run incumbent and reap the beneficial effects of market driven 
growth. Liberalization and privatization, it was hoped, would drive sectoral 
growth and improve efficiency (Chowdhary 1998). 
 
In the 1980’s, mirroring  the changing world view of the importance of 
telecommunication in the process of economic and human development, India 
too had begun to prioritize telecommunication development. The biggest 
problem it faced in this endeavour was opposition from the Department of 
Telecommunications (DoT) which  was the incumbent operator of fixed line 
telephony as well as the policy making body in the sector. Going against the 
DoT’s 450, 000 unionized employees (and their links into the wider pool of all 
public sector employees) was a politically difficult move. As a first step the state 
decided to privatize the mobile telephony sector in 1995 as it was seen as a 
smaller luxury good that would not affect the operation of the DoT. Partial 
competition from the private sector was also planned for fixed line services. 
Athreya (1996) saw this as a bold move – a “paradigm shift” in the way the 
sector and the wider state was viewed. I will argue through this thesis that this 
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was a limited explanation for the growth that took place and that it can be 
better explained by considering the rents created in the sector.  
 
Barring some initial hiccups, telecom liberalization was a resounding success in 
modernising the sector and driving growth primarily through mobile 
telephony. By 2001 there were 37 million phones in the country or a phone for 
every 28 people. By 2011, there were 900 million phones, almost as many phones 
as there were people in the country (Jeffrey and Doron 2013). The vast majority 
of these were mobile phones: India, like many other countries in the developing 
world, seemed to have bypassed the growth of fixed line telephony for the cost 
and access advantages of the mobile phone. The resounding success of the 
telecom sector made it the poster boy for arguments favouring liberalization 
and the dismantling of state run companies in other sectors of the economy 
too.  
 
Before we evaluate the explanations for telecoms’ success it is pertinent to 
cover a brief history of the key milestones in the sectors development. A more 
detailed history of the sector from the perspective of the analytical framework 
used in this thesis is covered later in Chapter 6. This thesis will cover the period 
between 1995 and 2014. This period has been divided into six phases of the 
sector’s development that correlate to significant breaks in policy, and these 
breaks will continue to be used throughout this analysis. I will later show that 
analysing these breaks from the perspective of the changing role of formal and 
informal rents in the sector is a better explanatory for the evolution of the 
sector. However, the description here only seeks to underline the significant 
policy shifts. 
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Phase 1: 1995-1999:  
Based on the roadmap envisaged for the sector in the National Telecom Policy 
(NTP) 1994, mobile telephony was launched in India with the auction of 
licenses linked to  spectrum, first for the metros areas - Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata 
and Chennai and then for the rest of India (split into state-wise divisions called 
‘circles’3). There were some irregularities in the licensing process, with the 
government needing to change policy along the way and allegations of graft 
against the telecoms minister. Two private sector licenses were awarded in each 
state, creating a duopoly.  
 
While service provision began and the market slowly began to grow, it was 
hobbled by policy decisions in the sector. The Department of 
Telecommunications (henceforth DoT), which decided policy in the sector, 
chose to keep the license fees and the charges on the sector high in order to 
benefit its own incumbent fixed line business. The private sector telecom 
service providers (TSPs), suffering from high costs per call and depressed 
market demand, soon found that they were unable to meet their license fee 
obligations to the state. Pervasive defaults on license obligations and the 
threatened bankruptcy of the telecom service providers (TSPs) forced the DoT 
to reconsider its policies.  
 
The revised telecom policy NTP 1999 agreed to revise license fees to a revenue 
sharing agreement with the sector as long as the existing licensees  allowed to 
let the DoT rescind its duopoly policy and allow two more entrants – one, the 
incumbent state corporation and another, a private licensee in each circle.   
 
                                                 
3
 A map of India showing the circles is given in Section 3.2.2 of Chapter 3. 
23 
 
The phase also saw the establishment of an independent regulatory body, the 
Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI), although its actual authority 
was weak (Desai 2006). 
 
Phase 2: 1999-2003:  
The change in policy marked a significant turning point for the sector. The 
change to revenue sharing and the subsequent re-balancing of charges on the 
sector provided relief to the private sector service providers (TSPs). The 
increased competition and the pricing adjustments pushed down the costs of 
calls and gave the market a much needed fillip.  
 
However phase two is characterized by another development – that of the entry 
into mobile telephony by some fixed line licensees through a subjective 
interpretation of license rules. A couple of the big business houses and the state 
incumbent entered mobile telephony through the use of their fixed line 
spectrum using an alternative technology4. The existing licensees objected and 
took the DoT to court.  
 
The sector then saw several rounds of litigation and counter-litigation until the 
DoT changed policy once again to establish a Universal Access Service License 
(UASL) in 2003 that was technology neutral and migrated both existing service 
providers (on a technology platform known as GSM) and the new entrants 
(who had originally only been licensed for the fixed line sector but operated a 
mobile service on a technology platform known as CDMA)) to a uniform policy 
regime.  The DoT had again done an about-face on licensing policy in the sector 
and had implicitly expanded sector competition by allowing CDMA operators 
                                                 
4
 Called Wireless in Local Loop or WLL, this system used a different technology, CDMA, to the 
GSM technology that mobile service operators had been mandated to begin service with. The 
differences in technology will be explained in detail in the next chapter, Chapter 2, Section 
2.2.2 of this thesis. 
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to compete for the same subscribers. There were also murmurs that the DoTs 
policies unduly favoured a certain private sector operator of the CDMA service. 
 
Phase 3: 2003-2007 
After the regularising of the industry with UASL, the sector saw a period of 
uninterrupted growth and high profitability for both public and private sector 
Telecom Service Providers (henceforth TSPs). Prices of mobile handsets and the 
prices of the service dropped, leading to an explosion of the market. The period 
also saw the consolidation of the category with many of the smaller regional 
players selling out to the bigger ones and the establishment of a national 
presence by the six biggest players in the market. It was only at this stage that 
competitive pressures drove growth and investment in the sector.  
 
Phase 4: 2007-2009 
From 2007, under the leadership of a new telecom minister, policies governing 
the sector changed again. Additional spectrum that was awarded to existing 
operators based on subscriber numbers was stopped. Instead an auction was 
announced, avowedly to increase competition, in what was, by international 
standards, an already crowded sector.  
 
The auction was conducted in a highly irregular manner, and there were 
allegations that the auction procedures had been manipulated to benefit 
particular firms. The administratively set price for the spectrum was absurdly 
low, set at the level it was at six years previously, when the market was a 
fraction of its current size. The auction saw the entry of a surprising set of new 
firms into the sector, some with little or no prior experience in telecom. Some 
of them went on to bring in foreign equity partners at a significant profit. While 
it seemed obvious from the beginning that the auction process had been 
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irregular and that significant rent seeking was involved, it took two years before 
the details emerged in the public domain and this round of spectrum 
assignment began to be referred to as the ‘2G Scam’. 
 
Phase 5: 2009 -2012 
The government again changed its policy of spectrum assignment in 2010 when 
it auctioned 3G5 spectrum in 2010. This time around the auction was conducted 
in a transparent manner based on clearly defined auction rules and managed by 
external agencies. The auction was deemed a resounding success as the 
spectrum sold at rates significantly higher than had been achieved during the 
spectrum assignment in 2008.  
 
Meanwhile the details of the 2G scam had begun to emerge. It was suggested 
that the irregular process of assignment had cost the government exchequer a 
purported loss of $39 billion, a staggeringly large figure. It also became clear 
that a number of the new entrants had not met the eligibility criteria for the 
licenses. Ruling that the entire process had been invalidated, the Supreme 
Court cancelled all 122 licences that had been issued on the 2008 round of 
licensing. The new entrant firms had to reapply for licenses and repurchase 
spectrum if they wanted to continue operation in the sector. A number of these 
firms withdrew from the market. 
 
Phase 6: 2012-2014 
After the cancellation of the 2G licenses the sector entered a new phase in 
terms of policy. First, the state delinked the licensing process from spectrum, 
                                                 
5
 3G spectrum refers to spectrum in the 2100 MHz band that could support an advanced 
generation of technology from the previous rounds. Section 2.2 in the next chapter explains the 
different generations of technology in mobile telephony. The majority of the Indian market 
operates on 2G spectrum, although 3G is slowly gaining importance.  
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requiring firms to renew licenses and repurchase spectrum separately. Large, 
formal and transparent online spectrum auctions have become the method of 
choice for spectrum assignment. In conjunction, the state has begun to view 
spectrum auctions as a means of raising substantial funds to meet fiscal deficits. 
While competition in the sector has once again consolidated around the top 
few firms in the sector the government is not making any attempt to increase 
the number of sector participants.  The top three firms in the sector accounted 
for 71% of its revenue market share at the end of 2014 although there is credible 
threat from one new entrant to the sector in 2010, which has expanded its 
footprint in 2014.  
 
The history of the sector shows that while the sector has seen explosive growth 
in the last two decades since the inception of mobile telephony, it has also seen 
some downturns and several changes in terms of policy since liberalization and 
also evident throughout the sector’s history (Athreya 1996, Purkaysatha 1994, 
McDowell and Lee 2003, Sinha 1996). Further the levels of rent seeking have 
not come down in the sector but have actually increased.  In fact, as Singh 
(2000) points out, it is unclear whether the growth is due to or in spite of the 
reform process (emphasis added). It is a coherent and robust explanation of 
these frequent policy changes and their impact on the development of the 
sector that is the primary focus of this thesis.  
 
A number of studies have used cross country data to establish the benefits of 
privatization and the introduction of greater competition in telecom (Ariff, 
Cabanda, and Sathye 2009, Fink, Mattoo, and Rathindran 2003, Li and Xu 2004, 
Curwen and Whalley 2008). Curwen and Whalley’s (2008) study of 
telecommunication liberalization in Africa and Latin America suggested that 
liberalization expanded the involvement of foreign telecom players and brought 
in a greater degree of competition. However other studies have been more 
qualified on the benefits of privatization, suggesting that privatization is not 
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necessarily the best solution for service provision in all circumstances (Levy and 
Spiller 1996, Singh 2000). Biancini (2011) undertook an empirical analysis of the 
Indian telecom sector to suggest that competition seemed to stimulate 
development in the more developed areas but had no effect on the less 
developed circles. Dokeniya (1999) argued that privatization alone would not 
be effective unless backed by credible regulation. 
 
Unable to see the promised beneficial effects of privatization on the sector in 
India from 1995 to about 2003, a number of authors explored the role of 
regulation in the development of the sector. Levy and Spiller (1996) identified 
regulation as a critical component of the sector’s growth. Laffont et al (1998a, b) 
suggested that an effective regulatory framework is required for two reasons: 
first, it can ensure price competition by regulating behaviour in output markets 
and second, it curtails the monopoly of the incumbent to ensure that new 
entrants are allowed in. While the first of these benefits - that of competition 
on pricing - had been well established and not just in the telecommunications 
sector, it was the second - the curtailing of incumbent monopoly powers - that 
has received the most attention in studies attempting to explain India’s telecom 
trajectory. Two interlinked attributes of regulation received the most attention 
in these studies - regulatory credibility and regulatory independence. 
Regulatory credibility focussed on the stability of policy and the regulators’ 
ability to implement it. Dokeniya (1999, 2000) puts the initial lack of 
development in the sector down to the lack of “credible commitment” on the 
part of the regulator. Jain (2006) argued, based on India’s attempts to regulate 
interconnection pricing,6 that the regulator not only needed independence, it 
needed powers of enforcement in order to be effective. Samarajiva (2000) 
contended that stable and enforceable regulation was essential to curb 
                                                 
6
 Interconnection is the price paid by the originating network on a call to the terminating 
network on the call. Interconnection pricing can act as a barrier to entry for new entrants as it 
tends to favour incumbents with the largest number of subscribers on their own network.   
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incumbent power in order to reap the benefits of competition in Sri Lankan 
telecom development.  
 
Studies that focused on regulatory independence as the explanatory variable for 
policy performance in India were interested in the areas of interest group 
influence and processes of bargaining or conflict that this engenders. Studies 
from the early phases of the sector’s development came from the 
Institutionalist perspective and centred on the relationship between the 
regulator and the state run firm cum policy making body, the DoT. For 
Dokeniya (1999) the conflict in the sector from 1995-1999 was caused by the 
shift away from the high discretionary powers of the state to an independent 
regulator. Sinha (1996), Athreya(1996) and Singh (2000) all explore the 
relationship between the DoT (and the political powers that ran it) and the 
TRAI. Kathuria et al (2003) point out that doing away with the statutory 
guarantee of a 5 year term for the members of the TRAI in 1997 made them 
vulnerable to political influence. For all of these authors the problem was the 
absence of institutional safeguards against predatory politics. The solution lay 
in somehow providing the institutional structures that would help the regulator 
withstand pressure on its policy making, although none of the authors address 
exactly how this could be created.  
 
At an extreme, Smith and Wellenius (1999) contended that given weak 
regulators and uncertain governance in developing countries, regulatory risk 
would best be mitigated by bypassing the regulator and government as much as 
possible and setting up a framework that reduces the need for agency decisions. 
Similarly a report by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU 1999) 
suggested that the telecom industry will probably end up being regulated most 
efficiently by the market. These represent the strongly market friendly view 
that dominated the development policy discourse in the 1990s within 
International Aid Organisations such as the World Bank and the IMF. This view 
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has since been tempered by the more nuanced view of the limits to market-led 
growth and the recognition of market failures.  
 
In more recent years a couple of studies are noteworthy in that they take an 
expanded view of interest group politics and their influence on regulation in 
the sector. The first is an excellent book by Desai (2006) that explores the 
policy decisions of the sector and possible influences on them in a detailed 
manner. He traces the changing contours of the DoT - TRAI relationship and 
their relationship, in turn, with private players in the sector. He does not 
however explore the income flows that shape these relationships, and are the 
underlying cause of influences on policy. He also fails to explore the influence 
of the private sector on the process.  
 
While the telecom sector is predicated on the creation of rights of use in radio 
spectrum and therefore all licensing policy in the sector is the process of right 
creation similar to property rights, only Singh (2000) explicitly considers 
spectrum rights in his analysis of the Indian sector. He claims that property 
rights in the sector need to be “impartial, inclusive, transparent and 
enforceable” (ibid: 872) but does not address how to get there, and why 
spectrum right assignments may not often meet the stringent conditions he 
imposes upon them.  
 
McDowell and Lee (2003) widen the scope of their analysis beyond predatory 
political interests by examining different attempts at licensing policy as “a 
political and regulatory bargain among interested and powerful groups” (ibid: 
372). They also explicitly examine allegations of crony capitalism associated 
with ministers of telecommunication in India. They refer to the need to balance 
public objectives of generating high receipts from the sector with the need to 
provide sufficient investment incentives to private providers. While not 
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explicitly stated, they are referring to rents that the state could provide to the 
private players through policy to overcome market failures such as regulatory 
uncertainty or technological risk. They also suggest that these rents, in order to 
be effective, should be conditional on performance, a view of rents that this 
thesis concurs with. They do not however, address why this does not often 
transpire in the Indian context.  
 
Rohit Prasad and Varadarajan Sridhar (2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2009, 2014, Prasad 
and Kathuria 2014) have written extensively on the issues of spectrum 
assignment and pricing. While they explore the role of regulation in spectrum 
management, their key focus remains spectrum assignment pricing and 
mechanisms rather than the income flows that are determined by these. Their 
latest book (Prasad and Sridhar 2014) explores the relatively new area of 
spectrum commons. While, in the conventional view of the sector, it needed 
definition of rights over use in order to efficiently use spectrum, advancing 
technologies obviate the need for exclusivity in use, make effective sharing of 
spectrum between users a possibility in the future. Prasad and Sridhar explore 
the implications that this will have for the pricing of spectrum and spectrum 
right allocations in the sector in the context of existing legacy systems of 
spectrum assignment. Their analysis is internally consistent and detailed, and 
provides a fascinating perspective on possible future directions of development 
of the sector. However, their perspective does not attempt to link the policies 
that create rights in the sector to income or rent flows from the policy or to the 
underlying web of interests that aim to influence the policy and thereby the 
distribution of benefits from it. In this sense, it is a micro-economic analysis of 
spectrum as an economic good but treats as exogenous the influences that 
affect the allocation of the good.  
 
The mobile telephony sector uses radio spectrum to transmit signals. The 
bands of spectrum that can be used in mobile telephony are finite and the use 
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of the spectrum by one party does not preclude its use by another (within 
limits). An excessive number of users at the same time on a band of spectrum 
does however cause congestion. Therefore the good is partially rivalrous. The 
nature of the technology at present is such that if free access were permitted, it 
would cause interference in signals or require an intractable amount of 
coordination between providers of the service. Therefore, in practice, spectrum 
is an excludable good, where exclusions are created by restricting access within 
specified spectrum frequencies to licensed service providers. However, in 
defining access rights to spectrum, the policy creates income streams that 
accrue to the holder of the right. These income streams are effectively 
economic rents that flow from the definition of use rights in the sector. Rents 
here are defined as policy induced income streams.  
 
In New Institutional Economics, within which much of the literature reviewed 
above can be situated, it is recognized that spectrum right definition is required 
in the telecom sector due to the scarcity of the resource and the need for 
harmonization in order for it to be used efficiently. In this context, as in the 
case for natural resources, the prevailing view is that the spectrum right 
definition that restricts free access to the resource performs a useful function in 
the sector and adds to the social value of the good. Therefore the rent flows 
that arise from it are necessary for efficient use of the spectrum. However the 
rents create incentives for rent seeking, which in turn influence the types of 
rights created and their allocation.  
 
The auction is seen as the most efficient method of spectrum assignment since 
it awards the spectrum to the party that values it the most and is therefore 
willing to bid the highest for it. The price of the spectrum is then decided by 
the market through the auction process. This assumes of course that the buyers 
of the good (the spectrum), the Telecom Service Providers (TSPs), have perfect 
information and are able value the spectrum accurately. If the spectrum is 
32 
 
under-priced in comparison to its true market value and the TSPs are able to 
retain implicit rents for themselves, this is the fault of poor auction design that 
was unable to discover the true price of spectrum or extract a sufficient portion 
of the rents created. If on the other hand, the spectrum is overpriced, and the 
government extracts too high a share of the TSPs’ rent, it affects the viability of 
the TSPs and this too could be blamed on poor auction design or faulty 
regulative structures. 
 
So current academic and policy work in the sector focuses on two areas in 
particular – that of appropriate auction design, to ensure that the correct 
market value of spectrum can be discovered and the rights go to the operators 
that value them the most, and that of regulation and governance, primarily 
through the establishment of an independent regulator, to ensure that the 
extraction by the state and rent seeking by those who aim to capture a share of 
the rents are curtailed to within levels that do not adversely affect the sector.  
 
This thesis argues that the above perspectives miss an essential link that helps 
explain both the evolution of policy and the economic outcomes associated 
with the policy better, and this is the process of rent creation in the sector and 
the political settlement that sets the context in which the rent creation and 
allocation are taking place. Policies that assign use rights over spectrum give 
rise to rent streams as a consequence of that right. These rent streams have 
become more significant as the size of the Indian telecom market has grown 
and the spectrum becomes more valuable. The rights that give access to these 
rents have thus become more fiercely contested. The processes of spectrum 
right creation are therefore influenced by the contestation over rights.  
 
In order to deconstruct these influences on policy, we use the concept of a 
political settlement. Political settlements (henceforth PS) may be understood as 
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the structure of power within which institutional decisions are made and 
political compromises between powerful groups shape institutional and policy 
choices. Agencies and organisations in the political settlement attempt to 
influence the formulation of policy in such a way that the distribution of rents 
benefits them, but they are constrained by their power relative to other 
organisations. Over time, the distribution of rents from the policy is likely to 
reflect the relative power of the agencies and organisations in the political 
settlement. If the distribution of benefits is consistent with the distribution of 
power, the political settlement remains relatively stable. When the distribution 
of benefits differs from the distribution of power in a political settlement, either 
the policy is contested until the rents are redistributed in line with the current 
PS or the process of contestation results in a change in the distribution of 
organisational power that reflects the new distribution of rents. This dialectic 
relationship between the rents that are shaped by political settlements and the 
political settlements that are reinforced or modified by rents is derived from 
Mushtaq Khan’s (2000c, b, 2008, 2009a, 2010, 2011) work in the area of rents and 
political settlements and forms the core analytical framework that this thesis 
applies to the understanding of policy in the telecom sector. The application of 
this framework will show that rents and rent-seeking have been central to the 
evolution of the sector. Moreover, the configuration of forces and of the rent-
seeking processes explains both the early dynamism of the sector, and some of 
the challenges it subsequently faced.   
 
The application of this perspective to understand the evolution of Indian 
telecom policy is the original contribution of this thesis. There have been few 
longitudinal studies of telecom policy in India, and these have focussed 
primarily on the first few years of the introduction of mobile telephony. They 
are therefore focussed on the problems of curbing the monopoly power of the 
incumbent public sector firm by independent regulation. Other studies have 
taken a techno-economic view to address specific instances of spectrum pricing 
or auction design (Jain 2001, 2006, Prasad and Sridhar 2007, 2009, 2014). Jeffrey 
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and Doron (2013) do cover a similar time frame to this thesis, but theirs is an 
anthropological study that explores the pervasive influence that mobile phones 
have on lives in India.  There are studies by telecom sector consultants and 
analysts that have studied sector dynamics during this period but they do not 
explicitly address policy formation and are not readily available in the public 
domain.  
 
There is a need for a more comprehensive and robust analysis of rent creation 
policy in the sector from its inception to the present, and this is the gap that 
this thesis addresses. This thesis will first and foremost provide a framework 
within which to understand rent creation and the evolution of policy choices in 
the sector. Using this analysis it also seeks to explain structural features of the 
sector that have evolved through these policy choices. In doing so, the thesis 
also enables us to assess challenges in potential future evolution paths for the 
sector, inasmuch as they can be discerned from the current context. Finally, 
while the rents and political settlements studied herein are specific to the 
telecom sector and its implications cannot be transplanted to other contexts, 
the study nevertheless is of more general relevance as an application of the 
analytical framework of rents and rent-seeking in the context of evolving 
political settlements. The framework can potentially be used to analyse other 
sectors and contexts.    
 
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows. The thesis is comprised of two 
parts. The first part containing chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 seeks to establish the value 
of applying the analytical perspective of rents and political settlements to the 
case of the Indian telecom sector. The second chapter in this part will explore 
some of the structural features of the telecom sector. In addition to the shape of 
the sector and international trends in its growth, the chapter will also explain 
why the technology and the economics of the sector make a rent analysis a 
particularly relevant perspective to take.  Chapter 3 lays out specific features of 
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the telecom sector in India that make it both rent-rich and prone to 
contestation over rents. Chapter 4 is an examination of the theory on rents and 
political settlements. Chapter 5 lays out the research method and discusses the 
strengths and limitations of the methodology.  
 
The second part of the thesis applies this analytical framework to the evolution 
of the telecom sector from 1995-2014 to demonstrate the value that this 
analytical perspective can add to the understanding of the sector and its 
evolution. Chapter 6 is a revisionist view of the evolution of the sector from the 
rents perspective. It shows that an analysis from a rents perspective provides a 
more nuanced understanding of the effects of policies driven by rent creation 
incentives of different agencies and organisations, and the rent distribution 
arising from these policies. Chapter 7 examines the contestation over rents that 
take place in each phase in greater detail using a political settlements analysis. 
The analysis examines the evolution of the sectoral Political Settlement in 
Telecom that influenced the policy choices in each phase of the sectors 
evolution. Chapter 8 draws out some structural outcomes of the evolution of 
rents in the sector on the organisations in the sectoral political settlement. 
Specifically it interrogates the nature of spectrum scarcity in the sector and its 
role in policy formation by the State. It explains the consolidation and 
dominance of the three biggest private sector firms despite frequent attempts 
to introduce greater competition in the sector. Finally it examines the 
implications of the lack of effective consumer lobbying on the policy 
imperatives of the state. The final chapter concludes by drawing together the 
findings from part 2 and looking at the implications of these for potential future 
directions of the sector’s evolution. 
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Chapter 2: A Note on Telecoms 
 
This chapter seeks to establish the specific features of the telecom sector that 
drive the creation of rents in it. The telecom sector is underpinned by fast 
changing technology that drives the contours of the sector as well as the rents it 
can generate. Therefore, an understanding of the sector’s dynamics has to begin 
with an understanding of the technology that underpins it. This technology not 
only defines the structure of the sector, it also determines its economics. This 
chapter, therefore, aims to elaborate the general characteristics of telecom as a 
sector and explain the terminology that will be used in the rest of this thesis.  
 
The first section will briefly describe the telecom sector and delimit the sector 
in terms of this discussion. The second section is a description of the 
technology underlying mobile communication. It describes the process of 
transmission of mobile signals, the infrastructure required to operate a service 
and the differences in generations of mobile technology. The third section lays 
out the economics of the sector and the factors that drive it to agglomeration. 
These sections will serve as a background understanding of the sector’s 
characteristics within which to study the specifics of the Indian case. 
 
2.1 Sector Boundaries: 
 
The telecom sector the world over can be divided into two main groups driven 
by the method of transference of the signal to the consumer (or in the ‘last 
mile’ as it is known) – either fixed line (also known as wireline) or mobile (also 
referred to as wireless) communication. In the past, the sector would be 
further subdivided into ‘Voice’ vs. ‘Data’ where the former refers to transfers 
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that are voice-driven (phone calls in the traditional world) and the latter are 
data transfers (or internet access). Today, this is an artificial division since in 
terms of the technology or the mode of transference there is no difference 
between voice transfers and data transfers. The difference usually lies in the 
size of the transfer and the amount of bandwidth required for the transfer – 
which is significantly higher in data than in voice. Both voice and data use the 
same channels for transmission, but data requires a far greater bandwidth in 
wireless and a broader ‘pipe’ in wireline than voice does. Earlier the market was 
largely made up of voice calls but with increasing digital content of all sorts, the 
demand for wireless and wireline data has increased exponentially and it is now 
the fastest growing part of the market.  Figure 2.1 depicts the sector.  
Figure 2.1: The Shape of the Telecom Sector 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Fixed line voice was the traditional form of telephone communication in most 
markets. Fixed line telephone networks, also called wire line, were largely seen 
as public goods, to be provided by the state; therefore, most traditional telecom 
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sectors were state owned monopolies. However, with the increasing neoliberal 
pressure for the withdrawal of the state, many of these have since been 
privatized but in many cases, the incumbents (in spite of privatization) remain 
influential in terms of regulatory policy (e.g. BT in the UK or AT&T in the US).  
 
Generally, the mobile telephony sector tends to be largely privatized (with 
notable exceptions such as China) and dominated by international players 
(including several of the earlier fixed line incumbents from the developed world 
e.g. T-Mobile (Deutsche Telecom) and Orange (France Telecom). In the 
developing world, the growth of mobile telephony is often advocated with 
messianic fervour since it tends to be a high growth category that drives market 
penetration at a much lower cost than fixed line. This is because it overcomes 
the fixed line cost barrier of what is known as the ‘last mile’ in access terms. 
The cost of laying a fixed telephone line tends to be highest in the ‘last mile’ – 
the distance from the telephone cable on the street to the individual 
instrument in a home, mostly because the laying of the last stretch of cable 
needs to allow for pre-existing built-up area.  Since this last mile is transmitted 
by radio signals instead of wires in mobile telephony, these wireless voice calls 
can be cheaper, quicker to set up, less demanding of upfront investment and 
faster to implement in far-flung or widely dispersed markets than wireline. The 
chart in Figure 2.2 compares the growth in fixed and wireless telephony 
worldwide.  
 
While fixed line subscriptions have declined in all markets worldwide, wireless 
subscriptions have increased in both developed and developing markets. In 
developing markets particularly, there are nine times more wireless 
subscriptions per hundred inhabitants than fixed line subscriptions. 
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Figure 2.2: Fixed Line vs. Wireless Subscriptions per 100 Inhabitants 
 
* Estimated 
Source: ITU World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators database.(ITU 2014) 
 
Wireless technology is also changing the way the data market operates. The 
delivery of data through telephone lines tended to be dominated by fixed line 
for technology reasons. Increasingly, however, data is being offered by mobile 
telephony players as a market differentiator. Figure 2.3 below shows the steep 
growth of the market for data through broadband subscriptions. The wireless 
broadband market is most developed in mature developed markets but with 
dropping prices of smart phones and increasing availability of faster mobile 
broadband speeds, the market in the developing world for wireless broadband 
access through mobile phones has shown a significant upward swing since 2010.  
 
Wireless data offers many of the same benefits as wireless voice. In the 
developing world, where the number of wireline connections is small, wireless 
data is often the only feasible way for consumers to access the Internet. The 
improvement of transmission technologies in the past 20 years coupled with a 
decline in the price of data-capable ‘smart phones’ has resulted in an explosion 
of the sector the world over, but especially in developing countries like India. 
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While this sector is still small in terms of size, it is a high growth category and 
is increasingly influencing choices made by wireless sector players. 
 
Figure 2.3: Fixed Line vs.  Active Wireless Broadband Subscriptions per 
100 Inhabitants 
 
* Estimated 
Source: ITU World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators database.(2014) 
 
While four distinctive sub-sectors have been identified here, the development 
of technology has often blurred the lines of difference between them and most 
players tend to operate in more than one sector, at least between mobile voice 
and data. The focus of this study is on the mobile or wireless sector, both voice 
and data, primarily because the greatest number of changes in terms of 
spectrum right creation and rent generation has occurred in this sector. 
However, fixed line voice or wireline sectors are inextricably linked to the 
wireless sector for a number of reasons.  
 
First, the same regulatory framework tends to cover both wireline and wireless 
regulation. Second, the firms that are significant in the wireless market tend to 
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have strong wireline antecedents or operate in both markets. Third, both 
wireless and wireline players are increasingly offering data as part of their 
bundle to customers and therefore data needs tend to influence preferences of 
market players in the contest for spectrum rights. The high bandwidth demand 
for spectrum in the wireless sectors is driven by data and affects the price of 
spectrum and the rent it commands.  However, the development of data is a 
relatively new phenomenon and most of the initial developments in the sector 
took place on the basis of wireless voice being the key market. Finally, wireline 
services form the basis of comparison as the existing status quo from which to 
study the changes that mobile telephony wrought.   
 
Therefore this study will focus on rent creation strategies in the wireless or 
mobile sector in India but will take account of the strategies and policy 
decisions of the wireline or fixed sector in terms of voice and data inasmuch as 
they affect the strategies and policy decisions in the wireless sector. These areas 
of primary and secondary focus are illustrated in Figure 2.1. 
 
2.1.1 The Structure of the Sector 
 
Mobile telephony is provided by Telecom Service Providers (TSPs). They are 
assigned a particular band of spectrum within which they may operate. And 
they are responsible for creating and maintaining the infrastructure needed to 
transmit the calls that originate from a phone number on their network to 
another number on any network. In general, they maintain their own 
infrastructure. In India, due to the pressures on the margins of the TSPs, the 
sector has been allowed an innovation – the out-sourcing of infrastructure. 
Tower firms are allowed to own and operate the infrastructure and lease it to 
the TSPs. The TSPs are allowed to create products in terms of pricing offers and 
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add-on benefits for consumers that they then market in order to attract more 
subscribers to their base.  
 
The hardware required to transmit the voice or data signals – mobile phone 
handsets, call switching mechanisms etc. are manufactured by equipment 
manufacturer firms (OEMs) e.g. Nokia, Qualcomm. These are the research 
hubs in terms of technology development in the sector. Since they create the 
technology that the sector runs on, they are influential in the direction of 
technological development in the sector. In addition, since the 
telecommunications industry requires a high degree of coordination across 
national borders, there are international organizations that help coordinate 
cross-border research and standard setting such as the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) or the Groupe Speciale Mobile Association 
(GSMA). 
 
The spectrum assignment, licensing and overall policy-making takes place at a 
national level for the sector, by a government agency. In the case of India this is 
handled by the Department of Telecommunications (DoT). India also has a 
quasi-governmental independent regulation agency, the Telecoms Regulatory 
Authority of India (TRAI) and a separate tribunal to deal with legal disputes in 
the telecom sector, the Telecom Disputes Settlement Appellate Tribunal 
(TDSAT). Figure 2.4 is a pictorial representation of the structure of the Indian 
telephony sector.  
 
 
 
 
43 
 
Figure 2.4: The Structure of the Indian Telephony Sector 
 
 
Source: Authors Own 
 
2.2 Technology 
 
An understanding of what rents are created and how they are created in the 
telecom sector is impossible without at least a basic understanding of the 
underpinning technology. Technology drives the growth of the sector. It is fast-
changing and often hard to predict, and this uncertainty has implications for 
the need for rents in the development of the sector. A comprehension of the 
basic science underlying the transmission of voice or data through a phone is 
also essential to understand the discussion of the sources of rent creation in the 
sector.   
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This section will attempt a brief and very simple discussion of the technology 
and the component parts of a mobile network. It will be restricted to the 
specific technology choices and modes of transmission common in the Indian 
telecom sector during the period of this study. The first sub-section deals with 
basic network architecture, explaining how calls are transmitted and received. 
It also briefly explains the key differences between the technology choices of 
GSM vs. CDMA, the most commonly used technology platforms in India 
today. The second sub-section gives a simple account of the differences in 
transmission mechanics of 2G and 3G connections, the two forms of 
transmission available to the Indian consumer base. This section lays out the 
technical terminology that will be used in the rest of this study. A basic 
understanding of the underlying technology also helps establish the 
technological constraints on the sector’s operation today, and the technological 
possibilities that could ease constraints in the future.  
 
2.2.1 Basic Network Architecture 
 
The mobile phone works similarly to a radio. However, unlike a radio, where a 
single transmission from a single source uses the bandwidth for transmission, 
the mobile network operates by dividing up the area to be covered by a number 
of cells (conventionally of a hexagonal shape) and using much lower power 
signals for each transmission. That way, the capacity of the network is 
increased since each non-adjacent cell can use the same frequency bands to 
carry multiple calls at the same time. It uses specified frequency channels to 
transmit voice and data transmissions from the sender’s phone, through a local 
tower – a ‘base station’, to a switching centre and then back out through an 
appropriate base station to the receiver’s phone. The frequency available at 
each cell is divided into different channels or pipes, each assigned to a 
particular user at any point in time.  
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 Each phone is identified by the network using a unique number, its IMEI 
(International Mobile Equipment Identity) number that is burned onto the 
phone by the manufacturer, and this allows the network to direct the call to the 
appropriate receiver.  
 
Each cell is serviced by its own base station (BTS in Figure 2.5) or mobile tower 
for each service provider. The size of the cell can vary from 1 sq. km to 30 sq. 
km, depending on the density of the population. Many standard cells cover an 
area of 10 sq. miles. Physically, a cell is limited by the number of calls it can 
simultaneously cover at a given moment. As the population density, and 
therefore the number of simultaneous calls increase, the cell size needs to get 
smaller to accommodate the calls and avoid congestion or ‘dropped calls’. On 
the other hand, if the cell size becomes too small, or if BTSs are positioned too 
close to one another, the chance of signal interference increases.  
 
Cell sizes are also impacted by the frequency being used. The lower the 
frequency, the longer the wavelength and therefore the longer the signal will 
carry. Therefore a cell defined for 900 MHz spectrum is larger than one defined 
for 1800 MHz spectrum. If the 900 MHz cell is too small, it will cause 
interference with neighbouring cells since the signals carry a longer distance. 
On the other hand, if a cell for 1800 MHz spectrum is too large, the signal won’t 
carry far enough, and result in dropped calls. 
 
The BTS comprises an antenna loaded on top of the mobile phone tower. Each 
antenna can cover a 120 degree sector of the cell so most towers will have 3 
antennae to cover all 360 degrees of the cell shape. Each BTS has a specific 
identity defining its location and contours. A number of adjacent BTSs are 
connected to each other and to a Base Station Controller (BSC). The BSC is a 
collection of transceivers, controllers, switches and routers that helps route a 
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call that originates within its area to the main hub switching unit, the Mobile 
Switching Unit (MSC).   
 
The BSC is not only a router to the switching centre it also acts as a funnel, 
reducing call volume to the switching centre. If a call originates and ends 
within the same BSC then it can be routed directly without needing to be 
routed through the switching centre.  
 
The nerve centre of the mobile network is a Mobile Switching Centre (MSC). It 
handles the main call routing and call switching functions. It coordinates 
between BSCs and other MSCs.  The network requires significant and complex 
data handling capacities to not only deliver the signal but at all times keep 
track of the location of the connected instruments (mobile phones) such that if 
instruments move geographically across cells during the course of the call, then 
a channel of spectrum is made available to continue the call and prevent it from 
dropping.  
 
 
Figure 2.5: A GSM Mobile Network 
 
Source: COAI (2015)  
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The diagram in Figure 2.5 shows a typical GSM network. GSM networks are by 
far the more popular of the networks in India. However at inception, the 
Department of Telecommunications (DoT) chose to allow technology-neutral 
licenses and therefore there were a few operators who launched CDMA services 
instead of GSM. The systems are similar but differ primarily in the way in which 
they transmit the data. The following section covers the differences between 
GSM and CDMA networks from a technology point of view. It then looks at the 
differences in transmission mechanics between the various generations of 
technology: 1G, 2G, 3G and 4G.  
 
2.2.2: Technology Choice: GSM vs. CDMA 
 
A key distinction in technologies in the sector is based on the way the spectrum 
is used to carry the signal. To increase the carrying capacity of the spectrum, it 
is divided into frequency bands of channels. There are 3 main ways in which 
these channels can be configured.  
a. Frequency Division Multiple Access (FDMA): this is the earliest form 
of mobile transmission used in Analogue systems. In this system, each 
user was assigned a separate channel 25 KHz wide that was used only for 
that call. It was not a particularly efficient system but was the only one 
capable of being supported by the computing power available at the 
time.  
 
b. Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA): This is the system that is 
used by GSM systems the world over. In this system, the channels are 
wider (200 kHz) but instead of being assigned to a single user, the 
channels are divided into time slots (8 in the case of GSM) and only one 
time slot is issued to a specific user at a particular time. The next 
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transmission on the call requires another time slot and therefore the 
demands made on the switching system are higher than in FDMA. This 
allows a single channel to carry multiple calls.  
 
c. Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA): Here, instead of dividing the 
available frequency into channels. The entire frequency is used by all 
simultaneous calls. However, each individual call is assigned a code that 
allows it to find the particular signal associated with that call and ignore 
all other simultaneous signals as noise.  
 
 
Gruber explains the difference between GSM and CDMA with an analogy:  
 
“TDMA is like everybody speaking sequentially one after another; with 
CDMA, everybody speaks at the same time but with a different voice pitch 
that can be unambiguously captured by the receiver” (Gruber 2005: 23).  
 
CDMA is more efficient and more cost effective than TDMA because it can use 
the same frequency in adjacent cells without fear of interference.  
 
 The USA started off as a CDMA7 only market, although it has increasingly 
moved to GSM. Europe is a GSM only market. There are a few markets that use 
GSM and CDMA technologies – India, Brazil and China are examples. In India’s 
case, the state did not specify a technology platform at the start of the sector, 
allowing licensees to buy separate GSM or CDMA licenses from 2001.  
 
The world over, GSM is the more popular technology despite its being less 
efficient than CDMA. This is because GSM (Groupe Systeme Mobile) was a 
coordinated development by countries in Europe to generate an internationally 
                                                 
7
 CDMA was originally developed for US Defense communication (Gruber 2005) 
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harmonized standard. The advantage of a harmonized standard is that handset 
ecosystems could be developed around such a standard in a cost effective 
manner. The consolidation of the handset ecosystem around the GSM standard 
made it the more attractive option across more markets. This is an example of 
what Gruber calls a “tipping market” technology. In India too, the GSM 
subscriber base is substantially higher than the CDMA one (Figure 2.6). 
 
Figure 2.6: GSM vs. CDMA in India 
 
Source: (TRAI 2014b) p.19. 
 
2.2.3: Transmission Mechanics: 2G vs. 3G   
 
The second important classification of technologies in the telecom sector is by 
generation - 1G, 2G, 3G and so on, that refer to how efficiently the system is able 
to carry the transmission - effectively transmission speeds. The 1G systems were 
the analogue systems that were used in the 80s in the developed world. They 
were usually non-harmonized and locally restricted. Also they were not very 
efficient on carrying capacity and could only support voice transmissions.  
 
Digital transmission marked the start of 2G systems. Early 2G systems 
transmitted at low speeds and were also only able to support voice calls. 
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Technological advances referred to in the industry as GPRS (General Packet 
Radio Service) and EDGE (Enhanced Data GSM Environment) allowed for 
transmission speeds of up to 100 kbps8 for both voice and data transmission, 
although the data transmission at those rates was frustratingly slow. This forms 
the majority of the Indian market.  
 
The 3G systems allowed for transmission speeds of up to 3 Mbps9. 3G 
technology is offered in India by some of the TSPs. While the majority of the 
current voice market lies in 2G, 3G is better suited to data because of its 
superior speeds and so the ratio of 2G to 3G calls in India is about 75% 2G to 
25% 3G calls but 55% of data is consumed on 3G vs. only 45% on 2G.  
 
The fourth generation of mobile technology 4G, also known as LTE (Long Term 
Evolution) has been introduced in some markets across the world10. There are 
two principal transmission mechanisms in LTE  - TDLTE (Time Duplexing LTE) 
and FDLTE (Frequency Duplexing LTE). The latter is more common. In India, 
two TSPs have 4G capability11 but as of 1st January 2015, neither had launched 
yet. 
 
Two factors can be held primarily responsible for the phenomenal global 
growth of the telecom sector. The first is the strides made by technology in 
continuously improving the amount and quality of transmission over the years 
as discussed above. The second factor that helped create relevance for the 
offering and its global dissemination was international harmonization.  
                                                 
8
 Kilobits per second 
9
 Megabits per second 
10
 S Korea, for example, practically skipped the 3G phase and has almost complete 4G coverage. 
It operates its 4G on the 850 MHz spectrum range. 
11
 Reliance Jio has bought 2300 spectrum and has laid fibre cable backhaul (i.e. the connection 
between the mobile transmission towers and the rest of the core network) in 800 cities. This 
will give them a significant speed advantage over other TSPs. Airtel has the capability to launch 
4G on its existing 1800 MHz spectrum using FDLTE. 
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Instruments are designed to read particular frequency bands and work with 
particular technologies, so the greater the harmonization across borders the 
more focused the radio transmitter and handset development can be, resulting 
in technological advances and lower prices. This complementary group of 
handsets, technologies, switching hardware etc. is referred to in the industry as 
the device ecosystem. Harmonization is often complicated by the need to 
move existing users of the spectral bands to other bands in order to free up the 
right spectrum ranges for mobiles.  
 
Table 2.1 gives the spectrum ranges that are used for mobile operations in 
India. This thesis will often refer to the 900 MHz and 1800 MHz bands of 
spectrum that are the most heavily used bands in India as of 2014. Both of these 
are bands that operate under 2G technology. However technological advances 
have meant that with some modification of equipment, the 900MHz band can 
be used with 3G technology and the 1800 band can be used to run 4G systems. 
This has meant that the 900 and 1800 bands have continued to remain the most 
valuable spectrum bands for mobile telephony even with technological 
advances. 
Table 2.1: Spectrum Ranges Allocated for Indian Wireless 
Communication 
800 MHz 900 MHz 1800 MHz 2100 MHz 2300 MHz 
CDMA 2G GSM  2G GSM 3G GSM 4G BWA
12
 
(TDLTE) 
Reusable for 
4G GSM UMTS 900 
(3G) 
4G (FDLTE)   
Source: Discussions with sector experts. 
                                                 
12
 Broadband Wireless Access 
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2.3 Economics of the Sector 
 
The telecom sector is a network market, where the utility derived from the 
service by a consumer is greater with a greater number of users of the service. It 
displays positive network externalities, defined as the increasing utility that a 
user derives from consumption of a product or service as the number of other 
users who consume the same product or service increases (Katz and Shapiro 
1985). The externalities could be caused by direct effects on value (as in the case 
of telecom, where the service is more valuable, the greater the number of its 
users) or through indirect effects on complementary products or services. The 
quality of after sales service for example may be affected by the size of the 
network. Katz and Shapiro show that network markets therefore have an 
internal logic propelling them to aggregation and consolidation. They suggest 
therefore the need to study network externalities in an oligopolistic setting.  
 
Gruber claims that it is the constraint of radio spectrum scarcity that creates an 
oligopolistic structure (Gruber 2005: 3). However this is complicated by the fact 
that it is a network industry. The network externalities would lead to a “tipping 
market” where one winning technology takes the whole market (ibid: 4). GSM 
winning over CDMA as the more popular technology worldwide is an example 
of this. 
 
This thesis argues that the nature of technology and the need to define separate 
spectrum bands for each operator drives individual right specification in the 
sector. The scarcity of spectrum and the allocation rules influence the value of 
rents that arise from the creation of the right. Network externalities would 
result in monopoly in a closed telecommunication system, but as long as the 
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system is allowed to connect easily with other systems, the primary network 
effects do not apply. In other words, the network effects operate at the level of 
technology but not at the level of individual service providers within a market. 
However, the high fixed costs required in infrastructure development create 
economies of scale that could result in an oligopolistic structure.  
 
Sridhar points to economies of scale, scope and density being present in the 
telecom sector (Sridhar 2012). Establishing a telecom service (especially in fixed 
line) requires a large initial upfront investment in infrastructure that is a sunk 
cost (i.e. cannot be put to other use). Economies of scale arise from the much 
higher fixed costs and negligible marginal costs such that “it is often cheaper to 
provide services to the one millionth customer than the one thousandth 
customer” (Neuchterlain and Weiser 2005, c.f. Sridhar 2012:6).  
 
Economies of scope arise from the efficiencies gained in offering 
complementary products and services. Product bundling becomes a cost 
effective way to gain incremental revenue from a customer while maintaining 
the cost of access – i.e. the marketing and distribution costs. Thus, mobile 
telephony firms with a well-established network have an advantage when it 
comes to reaching their primarily voice consumers with product bundling 
offers on data usage. The larger the network, the lower the costs of reaching the 
consumer and therefore the higher are the revenues to be made from 
economies of scope.  
 
There are in the case of telecom networks (and, in fact, any network that 
requires the creation of physical geographical infrastructure to support it such 
as railways) also economies of density. The more densely populated the area is, 
the lower the costs of reach of consumers within it and therefore the higher 
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revenues that can be made from it. The impact of economies of density is 
particularly felt when servicing rural areas etc. where the higher the density, 
the more cost effective and better the coverage is likely to be. The presence of 
these economies of scale, scope and density drive the market towards an 
oligopoly.  
 
Sridhar suggests that the most important factor that prevents the formation of 
a monopoly in the sector is a regulatory interconnection obligation. It allows 
smaller players to offer the same service as long as they are able to connect to 
open networks. If connection was only possible within a closed loop, only one 
provider could efficiently service the need to offer maximum benefit. This 
underscores the need for harmonization in this industry and complementary 
industries to a very high degree in order to provide consumer value. There are a 
number of international standards in the sector that direct development of 
technology and services in the sector. These are rooted in industry alliances 
where, by and large, the benefits of coalition far outweigh the negative 
externalities of coalition such as an increase in competition (ibid). 
 
However there are other network effects that drive aggregation. First, the 
consumer tends to prefer the supplier who they judge or estimate to be likely to 
become the largest player.  And second, because a firm has the power to charge 
an interconnection cost for calls that terminate on their network, the greater a 
firm’s subscriber base, the more cost effective their offering is to their 
subscribers. Both these factors tend to drive greater network benefit to larger 
firms. Regulation therefore becomes important to ensure the limitation of 
oligopoly benefits in the sector. Asymmetric regulation can influence firm size 
and ensure that oligopoly effects are balanced. Regulation can also mandate 
levels of interconnection charges.   
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Regulation has a number of other choices to make for the establishment of the 
industry. For instance, the jury is still out on whether governments should 
regulate the choice of technology (with advantages of harmonized costs and 
product development) or should let the market decide (with advantages of 
technology innovation for efficiency) (Gruber 2005). The regulator also faces 
choices on number of players and spectrum assignment technique. Each of 
these is explored below. 
 
2.3.1 Competition: 
 
The benefits of competition as the most efficient way for the market to bring 
down prices and increase consumer value drives the push to increasing 
competition in the sector. Mobile wireless technologies allowed the sector to 
part-privatize13. In contrast, there are also some studies that point to the 
oligopolistic nature of this market, asserting that too much competition will 
destroy consumer value in the sector. Gruber and Verboven (2001) assert that it 
was not competition but the concurrent introduction of digital technologies 
and standardization that drove growth in the European Union telecom 
markets. There have been studies suggesting the highest number of players that 
can be supported by the telecom sector (Prasad and Sridhar 2008b). Telecom 
markets worldwide tend to support between 2 and 4 large players in the 
market. In comparison, India’s market sees a large number of players. 
Comparative data from telecom markets across the world indicates a higher 
level of overcrowding in India than elsewhere (PWC 2011: 26).  
 
The network nature of the telecom sector is such that rapid dissemination of 
technological changes is beneficial to the sector as a whole. It builds scale and 
                                                 
13
 Chapter 6 will explore the political economy behind the privatization decision worldwide and 
specifically in India 
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international markets for device ecosystems. Since technology changes are 
rapidly disseminated, there is often little opportunity for product 
differentiation and the sector tends to have a high level of price competition 
(Gruber 2005).  
 
As penetration levels for the service increase, a greater number of low volume 
users enter the market, driving down volumes and revenue even as subscriber 
numbers grow. At the same time however, the increasing price competition 
drives down prices, increasing volumes among existing users. The balance and 
interplay of these two factors determines the growth of the sector. 
 
2.3.2 Spectrum Assignment: 
 
As spectrum is the resource both essential for the operation of the telecom 
sector and limited in availability, the method of spectrum allocation has 
important effects on the dynamics of the sector. It not only determines the 
distribution of allocation of use rights to the sector, it is also one of the 
principal means whereby the state is able to extract rents from the sector. The 
price of the use rights, or the rents arising from spectrum sale form a significant 
component of the costs of telecom service providers and have also become an 
increasingly large and important source of rent extraction for the state. Over 
the last three decades, therefore, there is a growing body of research and 
analysis in academia and among policy makers on the process by which these 
spectrum rights can be most efficiently assigned.  
 
The view on the most efficient method of spectrum assignment has changed 
over time. Initially, with fixed lines, the supplier tended to be a single firm, 
most often in the public sector. This incumbent was often the first player in the 
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mobile telephony space and was, in most markets, given spectrum for free or at 
low rates in the initial stages. Early allocations of spectrum in mobile services 
were, in most countries in Europe, administratively allocated through a tender 
process (called “beauty contests” in the literature). Some countries also chose to 
follow an auction method for the allocation of spectrum.  
 
There is a wide body of literature suggesting that the auction method is better 
as it allows the market to self-select the more efficient firms. Importantly, from 
the perspective of governments, in the face of spectrum scarcity, the auction 
method has been better at generating larger receipts. Spectrum auctions in 
India have been the largest source of government receipts outside of taxes. This 
section maps out the developments in the theory surrounding spectrum 
assignment in telecoms.   
 
Spectrum sales, in terms of the number of licenses, the size of licenses, the 
winners of license rights and the price of the licenses were conventionally 
decided by bureaucratic design. The state, as the ultimate custodian of the 
resource, tended to decide, in consultation with technocrats and the industry, 
the number of licenses to be given, their size and the price of a block of 
spectrum. In a pure administrative allocation the State may decide the price 
and size of blocks and allocate them to their preferred service provider. The 
service provider in many early cases was a state run incumbent in the telecom 
sector and the state could even charge a nominal rate for the assignment of 
rights to them.  
 
In other cases, once the state set certain minimum guidelines for valuation of 
the spectrum, bidders were then invited from industry to demonstrate their 
business plans using pre-announced criteria. This process is often referred to in 
the literature as a “beauty contest”. At other times, the winning bid was 
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determined by lottery, where all bidders met the minimum stipulated criteria. 
In either of these cases, the state provided guidelines for spectrum value, but 
allowed the bidding process to determine final sale value. While the state did 
not fix the final price of the spectrum, the price benchmark set by the state did 
determine the price band of the bids. Peter Cramton (2009) argues, based on 
the US experience in the 1980s, that beauty contests as a method of spectrum 
allocation were slow and costly, prices were assigned rather than market 
determined and the lack of competition harmed innovation in the sector. 
Cramton does not directly address the need for rents in the sector to overcome 
market failures due to the risk of innovation. Under such conditions, the beauty 
contest may be the more efficient method of allocation.  
 
Initial allocations of spectrum tended to be free or at a very low cost, often to 
state-owned companies. However, as the sectors that used spectrum became 
privatized and the rents that these sectors enjoyed became obvious, there has 
been a concerted move to extract and transfer some of these rents to either feed 
into state budgets or to consumers. Given the size of these rents, there is also 
increased rent-seeking and rent capture. 
 
An alternative to the beauty contest was a market auction. This was perceived 
to be superior at allowing the market and the users of the spectrum to 
determine its value. More importantly, it achieved allocative efficiency by 
ensuring that the highest bidders got the rights. However this is a static view of 
allocative efficiency, and, as argued in this section, allocating the rights to the 
highest bidders may not ensure dynamic efficiency since no rents are left to 
incentivize innovation, learning, etc. In theory, the State can extract rents by 
directly pricing the spectrum. However, the State may suffer from 
informational failures in pricing the right, either over-pricing the right to 
extract maximum revenue from the sector, or underpricing it, resulting in a 
notional loss for the State. Appropriate auction design was suggested as the 
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best way to correct for market failures and determine optimal spectrum price. 
Administrative allocation was seen to be dangerous in that it may be unable to 
price the spectrum effectively and also be susceptible to rent-seeking.  A well-
designed auction was therefore the preferred route in most conventional 
analyses.   
 
Ronald Coase (1959) first suggested the use of auctions in radio spectrum 
allocations. He argued against administrative allocation by saying that the 
administering authority lacked an accurate cost–benefit analysis and adequate 
information to efficiently allocate broadcast spectrum. He argued instead that 
it should be managed through a market price mechanism, as long as property 
rights in the allocation were clearly defined. Vickrey’s (1961) research used 
Game Theory to suggest that Simultaneous Ascending auctions would result in 
the most economically efficient allocations. Auctions were adopted by New 
Zealand to assign wireless licenses in 1989, and began to gain popularity after 
their use by the US FCC (Federal Communications Commission) in 1994. This 
last auction raised $20 billion in revenue, twice the expected level, and garnered 
significant media attention for its success (Binmore and Klemperer 2002). 
McAfee and Macmillan (1996) in an early evaluation of the 1994 FCC auctions, 
claimed that it was, by and large, a huge success, primarily for the amount of 
revenue it generated. Later analyses were more qualified, pointing to signs of 
collusion and signalling among bidders.  The UK’s first use of auctions instead 
of beauty contests came as late as 2000, with their 3G auction.  India first 
auctioned radio spectrum in 1995 (Jain 2001) with a single stage bidding process 
for non-metro licenses but reverted to administrative allocation until 2010. 
Since 2010, all spectrum including those that have come up for renewals have 
been auctioned.    
 
Since the majority of the literature on spectrum auctions proceeds from the 
perspective that auctions, if well-designed, can mitigate for market failure and 
60 
 
would be the most efficient way to allocate spectrum to the parties who value it 
most, the articles focus on the design of particular auction formats that yield 
the most efficient allocations. No market failures or special characteristics of 
the sector (other than prevention of monopoly and collusive behaviour) are 
built into the design of the auction process. 
 
There is however some dissent on the view that auction is the best mechanism 
of allocation. The following two sections will review auction formats and then 
consider the literature that qualifies the benefits of a competitive auction. 
 
2.3.2.1 Auction Formats 
 
The Simultaneous Ascending Auction (henceforth SAA) or the “English” 
auction, the simplest form of auction design, was the basis of early 
recommendations for spectrum auction form. In this open auction form, all lots 
are auctioned at the same time. The lots have a reserve price and a high bidder. 
A new bid is accepted only when it surpasses the existing high bid. The auction 
ends when there is no further bidding on any lot. The highest bidder on the lot 
wins the bid and pays the maximum bid price. The Anglo-Dutch form, was a 
combination of the English open auction and the Dutch sealed bid auction 
format. Here, an open ascending auction is first conducted till only two bidders 
remain, and the final stage of the auction is decided by a sealed bid stage 
(Klemperer 2002). The Vickrey auction (or its modification for non-
homogenous goods and multiple bidders, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) 
design) is a sealed bid SAA, but the winner pays the price of the second-highest 
bid, or in other words, the opportunity cost for the units won. The second-price 
format removes the incentive of a bidder to underbid and is therefore said to 
establish the true worth of the spectrum. It reduces the likelihood that the 
bidder will overpay (‘winner’s curse’) while simultaneously maximizing seller 
revenue (Ausubel and Milgrom 2006).  Under this format, the dominant 
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strategy for all bidders is the bidding of true value as no bidder can individually 
affect the price he/she pays and goods are allocated efficiently because final 
prices represent social opportunity costs (Loertscher and Wilkening 2011). 
 
Several evolutionary enhancements have been made to the basic design to deal 
with specific weaknesses, but the durability of the design, according to 
Cramton (2009), reflects its many strengths. The simplicity of the auction 
process and the transparency of price discovery are key strengths of the SAA. 
To encourage price discovery, most auctions have an activity rule that demands 
that bidders can only bid on lots on which they have been active for a specified 
number or percentage of bidding rounds in order to prevent ‘bid sniping’ – 
where the bidder waits until the end of the auction to reveal his true demand. 
Pre-determined reserve prices are also often a feature to prevent under-bidding.  
However, the SAA is susceptible to various collusion strategies by bidders 
(Ausubel and Milgrom 2002, Cramton 2009, Cramton and Schwartz 2002). 
 
The key problem with the Vickrey design for spectrum auction, however, is the 
limited substitutability that it allows, since lots are bid for individually. The 
VCG design can theoretically allow for package bidding but allowing the 
market to determine the packages would result in an infinitely large number of 
options and complicate the auction process considerably. This requires the 
regulator to determine auction lots, which in turn requires the regulator to be 
in a position to make decisions on lot sizes which may then constrain the 
technology options available to bid winners. A design modification to allow 
technology neutral auctions is the Package Clock Auction or the Combinatorial 
Clock auction. Here, the auctioneer begins with a Clock auction, where he/she 
names a price for each product and the bidders respond with their preferred 
package. After this process of package and price discovery, the bidding follows 
on the combinations with excess demand and each bidder is allowed to submit 
top-up bids on the packages that interest them. The design is further simplified 
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by specifying generic lot sizes (e.g. the UK 3G auction specified generic 5MHz 
lots)(Cramton 2006).  
 
However, this design is not without its flaws either. Cramton (2009) argues 
that, especially in network industries with oligopolistic structures, incumbents 
have an incentive to protect their oligopoly rents by blocking competition. 
Thus, even with an auction, incumbents tend to be the winning bidders since 
the value of the bid for them incorporates the additional value of preventing 
competitive entry. This lack of competition will have detrimental effects on the 
level of innovation fostered in the sector.  
 
Finally, Milgrom (2000) questions whether the form of auction design is at all 
important if secondary trading is allowed after the completion of an auction. 
Theoretically secondary trading would allow the market to ensure optimal 
allocation of spectrum. However he argues that in practice spectrum allocations 
which are, in effect, use right allocations, are difficult to change and therefore it 
is important that auction sales get as close to the market optimal allocations as 
possible through good design.    
 
All the above discussions of auction formats are predicated on the assumption 
that the auction not only discovers the true value of the spectrum, it then 
allows the State to extract this value from the bidders in return for the 
spectrum right. Since the only market failure to prevent here is that of 
monopoly or collusion, there is therefore no need, from this perspective, to 
allow some of the rent from the specification of the right to remain with the 
owner of the right. However, as the next sub-section argues, this ignores many 
other possible market failures that could exist and that may benefit from rents 
for their resolution. 
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2.3.2.2 Auctions vs. Administrative Allocation 
 
While recent economic literature and a number of recent spectrum sales have 
tended to focus on the use of the auction mechanism, there have been some 
who have questioned the value of auctions over administrative allocations of 
spectrum. Even early literature that favoured auctions as the method of 
allocation suggested that administrative allocations may be more efficient if 
“the costs of relying on the market mechanism exceeded the costs of 
administrative allocation by a sufficient amount” (Coase 1959, c.f. (Madden and 
Morey 2013)) but most of this literature suggested that the advantage of 
administrative allocation was, in general, highly unlikely.   
 
Colin Campbell and Dan Levin (2006) show that if the independent private 
values assumption is relaxed, i.e. if buyer valuations are interdependent, then 
auctions lead to sub-optimal allocations and perform worse than other more 
transparent allocation methods such as posted price. In such cases, when there 
is adverse selection, the competition promoted by auctions may be detrimental 
to efficiency. The VCG design is not sensitive to the assumptions about the 
interdependence of buyer knowledge but is unable to cope with the rising 
technological complexity of spectrum auctions (Ausubel and Milgrom 2002). 
 
Madden and Morey (2013) claim that in terms of numbers of 3G licenses issued 
between 1999 and 2007, the assignment was evenly split between auctions and 
administrative allocation, in spite of a theoretical preference for auctions. They 
suggest that this is because administrative allocations allow for additional 
flexibility in objective setting, permitting for the inclusion of welfare objectives 
that a National Regulatory Authority (NRA) may have. They construct a model 
to empirically establish the objectives that influence regulator decisions for 
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administrative allocation and find that a number of social welfare objectives 
such as population coverage obligations, the time allowed to achieve the 
desired coverage and whether or not infrastructure sharing is mandated by the 
NRA are relevant in administrative allocation and the initial spectrum price and 
licence fee seem to play less of a role where the license is assigned by the NRA. 
In contrast, as Dykstra and van der Windt (2004, c.f. Madden and Morey 2013) 
argue, price is usually the only endogenous outcome of auctions.  Auctions 
maximize price, speed and efficiency of allocation and transparency but are 
unable to endogenize quality.  
 
Another article that posits a similar argument is a paper by Hazlett and Munoz 
(2009) that argues for the evaluation of auction design not merely on the 
amount of revenue raised. There are welfare impacts of auction decisions that 
are not effectively incorporated into the costs of the system in the analysis of 
auction design. Hazlett and Munoz use data on spectrum sales for wireless 
telephony in 28 countries for the period between 1999 and 2003 to identify the 
price and welfare effects of spectrum policy. They identify two welfare effects 
they believe are especially important in the context of wireless telephony – the 
time cost of unused spectrum and impact of spectrum policy on market 
structure outcomes. Their quantitative study suggests that the amount of 
allocated spectrum and the degree of market competitiveness fostered by the 
sale provide social welfare gains that could offset the gains from license rent 
extraction. Under these conditions, auction rules that focus on revenue 
maximization rather than ex-post market effects do not maximize social 
welfare. “Competitive bidding mechanisms are not exogenous to market 
outcomes when they alter the structure, capacity, timing or firm composition of 
the wireless sector” (ibid: 438). Cramton (2013) argues that one of the key 
challenges facing a regulator in the administrative allocation of spectrum is the 
ability to keep up with rapid changes in the technological environment. Note 
that Hazlett and Munoz are themselves not arguing against the use of auctions, 
they merely suggest that there are conditions under which the use of auctions 
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may not maximize welfare. They do however raise the important issue of the 
effect of auction design on ex-post market structures and, by extension, social 
welfare, a view also reiterated by Klemperer (2002).  
 
Prior to the operation of the 3G auction in India in 2010, Manas Bhattacharya 
(2008) analysed the results of a number of spectrum auctions worldwide for 
learnings that could be applied to the Indian auction.  He claims that auction 
sales have not exhibited consistent and optimistic results on a sustained basis.  
The FCC auctions of December 1994, while exceeding revenue expectations, 
were a result of collusive and gaming behaviour. The 3G auctions in the UK 
held in 2000 again raised revenues well in excess of expected levels but 
Bhattacharya (citing(Cramton et al. 2011) suggests that a number of external 
factors such as the fact that it was the first mover in Europe and the 
coincidence of a high tech stock market bubble may have had something to do 
with its record-breaking revenue of £22.5 billion. There is however a theory 
(speculative in the absence of counterfactuals) that incumbents overbid for 
spectrum and then delay payments and roll-out as a way of blocking 
competitive entry, while continuing to operate in their existing spectrum 
bands. A number of other auctions (the WCS auctions of 1997 in the US, the 3G 
auctions in Switzerland, Belgium and Denmark) did not raise the expected 
levels of revenue. Bhattacharya concludes that while most analyses of auction 
success attempt to lay the blame on specific aspects of auction design, success 
at auction appears to be less predictable and more influenced by extraneous 
factors than is normally credited.   
 
Auctions may also be inefficient in practice rather than in design. Auction 
design in practice does not incorporate any understanding of political 
constraints faced by the regulator from lobbying, or from special interest 
groups (Loertscher and Wilkening 2011). This is all the more relevant when one 
considers that spectrum allocation represents the creation or reassignment of 
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use rights in a very profitable sector.  The conventional argument would be that 
this is precisely the reason that one should use a transparent auction 
mechanism, to avoid opportunities for rent seeking.  
 
However, underlying this is the assumption that the market would operate 
most efficiently in the absence of these rents. If instead, the sector required a 
certain proportion of the rents to be left on the table for the players in the 
sector in order to manage growth and protect against the risks (market 
discovery risks, technological risks and regulatory risks) of operating in a 
nascent telecommunications sector, this then begins to raise a set of very 
different objectives for spectrum allocation and auction design.  Auction design 
would then need to focus on neither revenue maximization, nor competition 
maximization, but on providing some measure of rent protection to the sector.  
 
This view that maximizes the extraction of all rents from the spectrum right 
assignment by the state is a static view of efficiency. It is predicated on the 
assumption that the provision of a competitive market will deal with most 
market failures and is therefore the single most important criterion for 
efficiency in the allocation process. However, there may be a number of other 
failures that this perspective does not address. The high upfront investment 
costs and low gestational period of the sector may involve an investment risk. 
Overcoming failures in credit markets or sharing/ subsidizing investment costs 
may be required to drive efficiency in the sector. Similarly, the speed of 
innovation in the sector also presents a significant risk in long term 
investments, especially when the sector is relatively inexperienced. Innovation 
(Schumpeterian) rents and rents that subsidize learning and catching up may 
help overcome these failures. Regulatory and policy uncertainty also result in 
market failures constraining investment in the sector.  In a sector with 
pervasive market failures, maximizing the extraction of value through auctions 
does not lead to dynamic efficiency outcomes. Instead, allowing some rents to 
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remain in the sector to address market failures may lead to far greater 
efficiency. 
 
What will determine the efficiency of these rents is the ability to target these 
rents to address the specific market failures that face the sector. Rents that are 
based on specific performance conditions have been used in many sectors and 
markets to address specific failures that constrain those markets(Khan 2000c, 
Chang, Rowthorn, and WIDER. 1995). However, in order that they remain 
dynamically efficient, these rents need to be monitored and the threat of 
withdrawal on non-performance needs to be credible(Khan 2000c).  
 
The arguments on auction vs. administrative allocation need to be viewed from 
the perspective of dynamic efficiency. Under the circumstances, there may be 
conditions where the auction is not the most efficient method of allocation. 
The above perspective is particularly relevant in the Indian context where the 
state has moved from auction to administrative allocation and back to auctions 
for spectrum assignment. The policy since 2010 to assign spectrum only 
through auctions and to maximize rent extraction for the state has had 
implications for the evolution of the sector in India and the dynamic 
implications for the sector’s profitability, as we will see in this thesis. 
 
2.5 Summary 
 
This chapter has described the contours of the telecom sector and the 
technology that underpins it. These factors also influence the economics of the 
sector and its levels of competitiveness. While the market is predominantly in 
voice calls based on 2G technology in the 900 MHz and 1800 MHz bands of 
spectrum, mobile data access, mirroring worldwide trends, is becoming 
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increasingly important in the sector in India. With this emerging trend, 3G and 
4G technologies will play an increasing part in shaping sector dynamics. There 
appears to be a natural tendency towards agglomeration in the sector, and the 
sector worldwide appears to consolidate into 2 or 3 main players in mobile 
telephony. Most of the work on spectrum allocations takes the view that 
auctions are the most efficient method of allocation since the right goes to the 
player who values it the most and is therefore willing to bid the highest. 
However this is a very static view of allocative efficiency. A more dynamic view 
must take into account the possible market failures such as risk or barriers to 
innovation and learning that need to be overcome in an emerging, fast 
changing and technologically advanced sector like mobile telephony. If auction 
design cannot be modified to ensure that these objectives are met, the more 
efficient system of spectrum allocation may well be administrative. 
Understanding the sector from the perspective of rent flows allows us to 
interrogate the objectives behind the allocation more robustly rather than 
apply an automatic assumption of static efficiency.   
 
The following chapter will explore the specific characteristics of the Indian 
telecom sector. It will show that the particular dynamics of development of the 
Indian market make it both a greater source of rents and more intensely 
contested than many other telecom markets worldwide.  
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Chapter 3: India’s Sector Dynamics 
 
3.1 Introduction:  
 
The objective of this chapter is to establish some critical dynamics of the Indian 
telecom sector that impact the level of rent and the intensity of contests over 
rent that can be seen in the sector. In the introductory chapter we have argued 
that the phenomenal growth of the sector is hard to explain by looking at the 
changing policy stances in the sector and the high levels of corruption. The 
Good Governance model would suggest that these policies should have been 
detrimental to the sector. In fact the growth of the sector is often characterized 
as having happened in spite of sectoral policy rather than because of it. 
Explaining these policy choices as a result of either incompetence or 
malfeasance of state officials is insufficiently robust, as attempts to improve 
governance do not translate into either policy stability or the removal of 
corruption. We have argued that viewing the development of the sector as a 
process affected by the rents created during the process of right definition in 
the sector may give us an alternative way to explain choice of policy as well as 
the impact of the policy chosen on the evolution of the sector.  Before we 
explore the theoretical basis for a rent analysis of the sector in a subsequent 
chapter, however, this chapter will attempt to establish the characteristics of 
the sector that make it a rent-rich sector and how this drives contests over rent 
in the Indian context. 
 
The first section of this chapter explores why some of the income flows in the 
sector have a rent-like nature and why these rents are not only useful but 
essential for the operation of the sector. We argue that policy that allots rights 
of use of spectrum create income flows that are rents and that these rents are 
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necessary since the use rights that underpin them are essential for the efficient 
operation of the sector. We also explore the other roles that rents in the sector 
may perform specifically in the Indian context. In this we have used Khan’s 
(2000c, b) theorization on the efficiency of rents.  
 
The next section of this chapter looks at the growth of Indian telecom in the 
context of the worldwide development of the telecom sector. It will show that 
the growth of mobile telephony in India has been extremely strong even in the 
context of strong growth for the industry the world over, and the lower-than-
average tele-density and mobile phone penetrations are evidence of untapped 
market potential. While the sector generally tends to be oligopolistic with a 
maximum of 3 or 4 players in each market, the Indian market is unusually 
crowded. Also, despite the high subscriber base, the average spend per 
consumer in India tends to be much lower than world averages. The peculiar 
structure of the sector in India that developed for historical reasons has also led 
to greater levels of competition and a larger number of small and marginal 
players in the sector. This combination of factors puts pressure on service 
provider margins and increases the intensity of contests over rents in the 
sector. The size of the sector in terms of revenues gives an indication of the 
potential scale of rents in the sector. The revenues that flow from the sector to 
the state’s budgets are also indicative of the size of the sector.  
 
This chapter will also consider the economics of the service providers in this 
industry. A cursory glance at the balance sheets of service provider companies 
is enough to establish the importance of rents for the economics of operation in 
this business. Large parts of the costs of operation and therefore the 
profitability of the business is determined by factors shaped by regulation. The 
biggest source of rent in the sector arises from the specification of use rights 
through the assignment of spectrum licenses. The state also determines pricing 
in the sector. Pricing, and therefore firm profitability, in turn impact the level 
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of investment in technology and therefore impact the dynamic efficiency of the 
sector.  
 
A look at the role of rents in the sector, the particular features of the Indian 
sector that cause high rents and intense contests for the rents, and an analysis 
of the economics of the firms within the sector all confirm the importance of 
rents in the telecom sector. It also marks the value of an analysis that begins 
from the perspective of rents to explain the policy shifts in the sector and their 
impact on sector outcomes. 
  
3.2 Rents, Spectrum Rights and Policy 
 
An economic rent is an income “higher than the minimum that a person would 
have accepted, the minimum being usually defined as the income in his or her 
next best opportunity” (Khan 2000c: 1). While rents can arise in different 
contexts – monopoly, natural resources, policy, etc. – this study is particularly 
interested in the rents that arise from the policy that creates use rights in the 
telecom sector. For the purpose of this study, we are applying Khan’s (ibid) 
definition of policy-created rents as the income that is associated with 
particular institutional or policy changes or alternatively, an incremental 
income that would not exist in the absence of these policy changes.  
 
The rights assigned in spectrum are not property rights in the strictest sense, as 
they do not assign ownership over the resource, merely the right to use it. 
However, the concept is analogous to property rights, and the development of 
the theory in terms of property rights can be applied to use rights in spectrum. 
This chapter will therefore consider the elements of theory that apply to 
property rights as applicable to our thesis.   
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Let us consider why these income streams have the character of rents. When a 
resource is finite and non-replicable, then free and open access to the resource 
causes a welfare loss due to the free access problem. A lake is susceptible to 
over-fishing and depletion of fish stock in the absence of rules governing 
access. Natural resources in general and non-renewables in particular are 
susceptible to the free access problem. To overcome the free access problem, 
use rights, i.e. rights that specify the access or use of the scarce resource need 
to be defined. In restricting access for some however, the right gives rise to 
income streams that accrue to the holder of the right. These income streams 
that arise, not from production but from the ownership of a right, are economic 
rents. The policy or institutional change that specified the right therefore also 
gave rise to rent streams.  
 
Property rights that are defined in such a way so as to restrict the access to the 
resource to only one or very few recipients could give rise to a monopoly and 
the monopoly rights allow the recipients to make monopoly rents. These 
monopoly rents are the form of rents most often considered when rents are 
discussed in a neo-classical analysis. Monopoly rents are perceived to be 
inefficient since the monopolist has the market power to manipulate prices 
away from the most efficient price. However, in the case of natural resource 
rents, rights are necessary for the effective use of the resource and therefore the 
rents do not signal inefficiency.  
 
The crucial resource in the telecom sector is spectrum (radio waves). Mobile 
telephony is restricted in terms of the wavelengths it can operate in. In order to 
prevent interference and so that the wavelength can be used most efficiently, 
the specific frequency bands within which each network transmits also need to 
be separate. Chapter 4 will explore in more detail the exact nature of the 
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restrictions on spectrum use, the market failures they arise form and the rents 
that the allocation of rights create, but for the purpose of our discussion here it 
is sufficient to note that spectrum is a scarce resource although it does not get 
depleted with use and is therefore renewable in that sense. The access to 
spectrum therefore needs to be restricted and the bands within which each 
network operator can transmit signals needs to be specified in order for the 
sector to be operable.  
 
In other words, the spectrum can only be efficiently used through the definition 
of use rights in the sector that govern its access. Not specifying separate bands 
for each operator to transmit in is theoretically possible but would require a 
very high degree of coordination between the different service providers. 
Having a single TSP for the entire market would, in theory, minimize these 
high costs of coordination but the beneficial effects of competition would be 
lost. It would also require a high degree of regulation on the part of the state to 
protect against monopoly pricing and to ensure innovation and development. 
In the absence of the state capacity to manage this system, the preferred market 
structure would be one that allows a limited number of service providers to 
operate within pre-assigned and mutually exclusive bands to avoid interference. 
The service provider needs to purchase the right to operate in this band of 
spectrum in the form of a spectrum license from the state. The state asserts a 
monopoly in the allocation of spectrum as it is able to close down unlicensed 
transmissions. Inasmuch as spectrum allocation defines the right (of an 
individual or firm) to use an intangible resource to the exclusion of others, the 
allocation of spectrum creates use rights. Therefore the income that flows from 
the specification of this right can be regarded as a rent. Thus one characteristic 
of the spectrum rent is very analogous to the natural resource rents that are 
created when a free access resource like a lake or a pasture has use rights 
defined over it. 
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If spectrum licenses are rights to operate within the sector, the owner of the 
right has access to an income that would be absent or much lower in the 
absence of the exclusive right, and thereby enjoys a rent that can be shared in 
different proportions with the state and other stakeholders. The price of the 
spectrum license, which depends on the mechanism of allocation, determines 
the way in which the rent is split between the operator and the state, and this 
determination can have important effects on the strategies of investment and 
pricing of the operator. In addition, the determination of the rent and its 
allocation can be determined by the political and policy imperatives of the 
state, and may in turn influence the evolution of political and policy 
imperatives. This is particularly important given the very significant rents that 
the state can potentially capture through the pricing and allocation of spectrum 
licenses.  
 
The access to spectrum may also need to be restricted to a few players to create 
monopoly rents since investment requirements in an infrastructure sector such 
as telephony tend to be high. While the infrastructure investment in mobile 
telephony is not as high as fixed line, there is nevertheless a substantial 
investment required to operate in the sector. Thus restricting entry to one or a 
few players may be necessary to create monopoly rents that justify investments 
in the sector. It is theoretically possible to calculate, based on technical and 
economic conditions, the optimal number of service providers in the sector. 
Worldwide, the long run tendency in most mobile telecom markets is the 
profitable existence of three or four big players in each market.  
 
However, other types of rent may also be required to ensure the efficient 
development of the service. Khan (2000b, c, d, 2009b) explores common 
market failures in developing country contexts that may require rents to be 
allowed to producers in order to overcome these failures. In the early stages of 
the evolution of the telecom sector, for example, TSPs needed to make 
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significant infrastructural investments under a high degree of uncertainty 
regarding the size of the market. India’s evolving policy and regulatory 
framework also gave rise to policy risks. The pace of change of technology also 
adds to the level of uncertainty in the sector. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, from the perspective that market failures are pervasive rather than 
limited to small and specific features of the market, there is a much greater role 
for rents in ensuring the dynamic efficiency of the sector.   
 
As with a natural resource rent, the distribution of the rent between the state 
and holders of the right is determined by the leasing, sale or other policies 
through which the rights are created and allocated. The rents that are created 
from the right accrue to the holder of the right, in this case, the network 
operator firm in the telecom sector. However, the state can claim a share of 
these rents for itself, or ensure that a portion of these rents are dissipated by 
being passed on to consumers through a variety of rent management 
mechanisms such as auctioning, taxing or extorting. An auction of these rights 
(i.e. an auction of spectrum) is, in effect, a transfer of some of these future rent 
streams from the private sector to the state. Price setting and setting of 
interconnect charges14 are other mechanisms of rent management by way of 
which the state ensures that the rent is either dissipated to consumers in the 
former or, in the latter case, is extracted by the state-run fixed line incumbent 
in the early stages of development of the sector (since in a nascent mobile 
telephony sector, the interconnect charges collected by existing fixed line 
networks is the highest). State policies therefore, both create rents for the 
sector, and also determine the share of the rents that the state extracts from the 
sector in ‘return’ for ensuring the future stream of rents going to the firms 
enjoying an allocation of spectrum and other rights in the sector. 
 
                                                 
14
 Interconnect charge refers to the charge to the originating network for use of the terminating 
network or the charges that a telecom service provider firm pays other market players for the 
use of their network to reach one of their subscribers. 
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As discussed earlier, auction designs which develop from a static view of 
sectoral efficiency and do not take into account the pervasive market failures 
that the sector faces are likely to extract a larger portion of the rent for the 
state, leaving less on the table for producers. This could impact the 
development of the sector. On the other hand, rents which remain in the hands 
of the producers but are not necessary to overcome market failures, may add to 
the profitability of the sector but may imply a notional loss in terms of social 
benefit. 
 
Thus an understanding of the economics of the sector and the policy options 
available has to begin with a discussion of the rents that characterize the 
operation of the sector. However, rents in telecom have not received much 
attention in analyses of the functioning of the sector. This is possibly due to the 
fact that the mobile telephony sector is largely privatized, and the competitive 
aspects of the sector can hide the fact that it is characterized by the presence of 
significant rents. It is argued here that studying the rent flows as a result of 
policy decisions in the sector may provide a better understanding of the reasons 
behind changes in policy. The following section examines the particular 
features of the India telecom sector that indicate not only a high level of rent 
creation but also a significant level of contestation over rent. 
 
3.3 Sector Structure and Dynamics 
 
3.3.1 Telecom growth metrics: Putting India in perspective 
 
Across the world, mobile telephony has grown since its introduction in the 
1990s and has completely changed the face of telecom markets worldwide. The 
number of mobile subscribers has grown at 15% per year and there were 6,600 
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million mobile subscribers worldwide, as compared to 1,150 million fixed line 
subscribers at the end of 2013, and mobile tele density levels worldwide stood at 
93% (ITU 2014: 6) as compared to a paltry 16% for fixed line.  
 
The Indian telecommunication market is no different. If anything, the 
comparison between mobile and fixed line growth is starker (Figure 3.1).  
Table 3.1 gives the current figures for India. At the end of March 2014, India 
had a total of 933 million connections with a tele density of 75%. But 97% of 
these connections were wireless or mobile connections. In fact fixed line 
connections have declined since 2005. 60% of all telephone connections are 
urban and 87% of all connections are private connections rather than public 
phones. 
Figure 3.1: Indian Market Split by Wireless and Wireline 
 
Source:  Indian Telecom Service Performance Indicators (TRAI 2013a) (Oct –Dec 2013) 
 
The mobile sector has grown continuously if not steadily since its inception in 
1995 both in terms of number of subscribers and in terms of total revenue 
(Figure 3.2). Market penetration seems to have slowed since 2012 but the 
market has continued to grow strongly in revenue terms. 
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Table 3.1: Indian Telecom Statistics Summary 
 
Source: DOT Annual Report (DOT 2014) p.2. Available at 
http://www.dot.gov.in/sites/default/files/AR%202013-14%20English%20%282%29_1.pdf 
 
Figure 3.2: Growth of Indian Wireless sector – subscribers and revenues 
 
Source: Various TRAI quarterly reports. Available at 
http://www.trai.gov.in/Content/PerformanceIndicatorsReports/1_1_PerformanceIndicatorsRep
orts.aspx 
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In terms of number of subscribers India is now the second largest market in the 
world after China and is nearly three times the size of the third largest, USA. 
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 compare India with a set of 22 other countries in terms of 
subscriber base and tele density. Both India and China show significant growth 
potential from the perspective of tele density. However, urban tele density in 
India has been flattening in the last couple of years while rural tele density 
continues to grow (Figure 3.5). The dip in urban tele density in 2012 was due to 
a government regulation that imposed more stringent guidelines on proof of 
identity and address to apply for a new connection. This resulted in a 
significant drop in the number of multiple sim cards with the same user15. 
 
Figure 3.3: Subscriber Base - Country Comparisons 
 
Source: TRAI Study Paper (2012b) p.6. 
 
                                                 
15
 In many markets, phone users tend to have multiple sim cards from multiple service 
providers in order to access the different benefits of product or coverage offered by them. Many 
modern smartphones come with a capability to hold multiple sim cards that allow the user to 
choose the service he wants to use for a particular call.  
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Figure 3.4: Tele-density – Country Comparisons 
 
Source: TRAI Study Paper (2012b: 6) 
Figure 3.5: India – Tele-density Trends 
 
Source: DOT Annual Report (2014: 3), Available at 
http://www.dot.gov.in/sites/default/files/AR%202013-14%20English%20%282%29_1.pdf. 
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The cost of calls in India is among the lowest in the world. In terms of the 
number of minutes of usage (MOU) 16 per user per month, India is among the 
highest in the world (Figure 3.6).  In spite of high usage, the exceedingly low 
cost of calls means than average revenues per user (ARPUs) are very low in the 
Indian market (Figure 3.7).  
 
Figure 3.6: Comparison of Minutes of Use (MOUs) across markets 
 
Source: Data Accessed from GSMA database on mobile telephony (GSMA 2014) 
Figure 3.7: Comparison of Average Revenues per User (ARPUs)  
 
Source: Data Accessed from GSMA database on mobile telephony (GSMA 2014) 
                                                 
16
 Minutes of Use (MoU) is the number of voice call minutes used per user per month. Average 
Revenues per User (ARPUs) is the average revenue received per user per month. These are 
commonly used comparison measures in the telecom sector.  
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Thus while India has emerged as a key telecom market in terms of size and 
potential for expansion in the last decade, it is also characterized by very low 
levels of average spend in the category when compared to markets worldwide. 
The market stood at Rs.1,58,041.86 Crores (US $ 25 Billion)17 at the end of 2014. 
Tele densities of 75% overall and only 45% in rural areas indicate a vast 
untapped potential in the sector. The lack of existing wireline infrastructure 
makes the potential for wireless growth more attractive. The rights of use in 
this sector therefore constitute an extremely valuable prize. However, the 
spend levels in the category appear under pressure, despite high subscriber 
number and high usage levels because of very low costs per call reflected in low 
ARPUs. TSPs in the sector therefore face a downward pressure on their 
revenues in spite of growing market volume. This has implications for sector 
profitability as will be shown in a later section. 
 
3.3.2 The Shape of the Market   
 
A peculiar feature of the Indian telecom market is that it is divided into 
separate markets called circles. Licenses to operate have to be bought 
separately for each circle and spectrum bands are assigned separately too. This 
section examines the consequences of this particular market structure on the 
dynamics of its development. 
 
                                                 
17
 Conversion Rates taken at prevailing rate on 31
st
 Dec 2014: $1 = Rs.63.19.  
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Figure 3.8: India Circle Map 
Source: COAI website. Available at http://www.coai.com/statistics/mobile-coverage. 
 
The different states of the country have been classified into metro/A/ B/ C 
circles based on their size and market potential. India currently has a total of 19 
A/B/C circles and 4 metro city circles (Figure 3.8). The Chennai metro license 
has been clubbed with TN resulting in a total of 22 circles. Mobile telephony 
licenses in India have historically been sold by circle and spectrum bands to the 
same operator may vary by circle.  
 
The circle architecture that loosely corresponds to state boundaries is similar to 
the market system in the USA. The difference is that in India, all circles are 
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subject to the same rules and regulations. Circles were used in the organization 
of mobile telephony since fixed line networks were organized using a similar 
circle classification. Even the categorization of the class of circle was actually 
based on fixed line revenues for that region. The assigning of frequency bands 
also differed by circle since the same frequency bands were not available 
throughout. In fact one interviewee (who wished to remain anonymous) 
referred to the process of allocation of frequency bands in the period before 
mobile telephony as chaotic. Until mobile telephony, the scarcity of spectrum 
was not felt acutely and thus there was no focus on the efficient and orderly 
allocation of spectrum. The uncertainty of potential at the time of launch and 
the large infrastructure investment required of the first entrants to the market 
also made it more prudent for them to purchase licenses for specific regions 
rather than for all of the country. 
 
This system of market organization has had the effect of increasing the level of 
competition in the sector. A number of early entrants to the sector had regional 
focus areas. Over time many of these have been bought out by the national 
players but some have transitioned to develop a national footprint themselves.  
 
Each circle has 6 to 10 service providers licensed in each market. Appendix 1 
lists the Telecom Service Providers (TSPs) licensed by circle. Of these one is a 
state telecom firm (BSNL/MTNL (in the Metros)), typically one or two are 
CDMA operators and the rest are GSM operators18. This number of market 
operators is unusually high when compared to telecom markets worldwide.  
 
                                                 
18
 CDMA and GSM are different technology platforms for mobile. Section 2.2.2 covered their 
differences. 
85 
 
Figure 3.9 uses the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (H-H Index) 19, a common 
measure of the level of market concentration to show that the level of 
competition in the Indian telecom sector is higher than a number of 
comparative markets. The lower the index value, the higher the level of 
competition. India’s telecom market is the least oligopolistic of the markets 
compared. This is at least in part a result of the circle architecture in the sector. 
At various times in the development of the sector, policies have also 
encouraged greater participation in the sector. 
 
Figure 3.9: Comparison of Market Concentration in International  
Telecom Sectors using H-H Index 
 
Source: H-H Index calculated using market share data from GSMA Database (GSMA 2014). 
 
 
                                                 
19 The HHI is calculated by squaring the market share of each firm competing in a market, and 
then summing the resulting numbers. The HHI number can range from close to zero to 10,000. 
The HHI is expressed as: HHI = s1^2 + s2^2 + s3^2 + ... + sn^2 (where sn is the market share of 
the nth firm). The U.S. Department of Justice uses the HHI for evaluating mergers. It considers 
a market with a result of less than 1,000 to be a competitive marketplace; a result of 1,000-1,800 
to be a moderately concentrated marketplace; and a result of 1,800 or greater to be a highly 
concentrated marketplace.  
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Figure 3.10 outlines the current market share at an all-India level. While the 
Indian market has an unusually large number of service providers, the big three 
– Airtel, Vodafone, and Idea – account for a majority of the market. This is not 
unusual in the telecom sector worldwide. In fact, the H-H index calculated 
above indicated that India is less oligopolistic than comparable markets 
worldwide. However, as market share trends show (Fig 3.11), the top three firms 
have consolidated their position in the last 5 years, moving from a 65% share of 
the total market in 2010 to a 72% share of the total market by the end of 2014.  
 
Figure 3.10: Revenue Market Shares of all TSPs 2014 
 
Source: Revenue Market Shares based on Gross Revenue data for FY2014-15 Q1 TRAI(2014b) 
report. 
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Figure 3.11: Market Share Trends of Top Three Players in India 
 
Note: Revenue Market Share of Airtel+Vodafone+Idea 
Source: Revenue Market Shares based on Gross Revenue TRAI reports from 2010 to 2014. 
  
The overall picture of the market that emerges is one tending to oligopoly, 
albeit at a far lower level of concentration than comparable markets worldwide. 
The structural features and the historical development of the telecom sector led 
to a greater number of marginal players. The higher levels of competition in the 
sector could imply that any rents in the sector are competed away and 
dissipated as lowered prices for consumer. Certainly, the low costs per call in 
India are indicative of a high degree of price competition in the sector.  
 
However, the high numbers of competitors also creates a greater scarcity of 
spectrum and leads to intense contests for access to the scarce resource. A 
higher number of competitors should indicate a more level playing field in 
terms of market shares. Despite the unusually high number of TSPs in the 
Indian market however, the top three seem to control the lion’s share of the 
market and have shown a steady growth in market share over the years. This 
market dominance by a few players also gives them a disproportionate power to 
influence policy in the sector. The source of market dominance of the top three 
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players will be explored by looking at their rent flows in Chapter 8. What the 
structural features indicate, however, is that there is a high degree of 
competition over resources in the sector, as well as a high degree of 
concentration of power in the sector in the hands of the three biggest players. 
 
3.3.3 Sector’s Contributions to National Product 
  
The previous section has established the presence of significant rents in the 
sector and the likelihood of intense competition over the rents due to the 
higher-than-average levels of competition and the lower-than-average returns 
in the sector. In this section we will explore another source of pressure on rents 
in the sector: that which arises from the state.  
 
The state extracts rents from the sector through several different means. 
Ramachandran (2015) identifies at least nine different revenue streams that 
accrue to the state from the sale and use of spectrum. Apart from the sale value 
of spectrum at auction, the state also collects a percentage of revenue as license 
fee and spectrum usage charge. The license fee and spectrum usage charges 
collected in 2010 amounted to Rs. 136 billion (Figure 3.12). The state also 
collects service tax from the sector, estimated at around 10% of revenues 
(Figure 3.13). In 2011, Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC) estimated that the 
telecom sector contributed 17% to the GDP of the Domestic IT sector.  
 
Since a large proportion of these state extractions are revenue linked, it is in the 
interests of the government to maximize growth in the sector. However, since 
receipts from spectrum sales have become such an important source of 
government funds, the state also views the pricing of spectrum as an immediate 
source of revenue. Thus the state policy needs to manage two contradictory 
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pulls – the need to maximize receipts from spectrum auctions vs. the need to 
ensure that pricing is such that the sector continues to maintain a healthy level 
of growth.  
 
Figure 3.12: License Fees and Spectrum Charges Extracted by the State 
 
Source: PWC (2011) pg. 10.  
 
Figure 3.13: State Extraction through Tax Revenues 
 
Source: PWC (2011) p.10 
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3.4 Economics of the Firm: 
 
Firm level economics of TSPs are influenced by the particular nature of the 
sector’s technology and economics. The most significant feature is the structure 
of costs facing firms in the sector and the amount of regulatory influence on 
firm costs. Appendix 2 gives selected P&L data for the top three firms in the 
sector today. It compares costs as a percentage of revenue for the three largest 
operators. 
 
Apart from operating costs that are approximately 25% of gross revenue, the 
other key costs facing the sector are a regulatory license fee of 12% of revenue 
and some additional spectrum charges of 2–3%. These are set by the DoT and 
are applied to every TSP. Figure 3.14 below shows the growth in license fees 
and spectrum charges over the last decade.  
 
Figure 3.14: License Fees and Spectrum Charges 
 
Source: Various Annual Reports published by DoT 
The License Fee for FY 2003-04 includes one-time entry fee for UASL 
For FY 13-14, the figs are based on the reports published by TRAI 
 
 8,421   6,816   6,624   7,038  
 8,855   9,511   9,779   10,286  
 11,791   11,456  
 14,628  
 677  
 1,040   1,396   2,090  
 3,056   3,455  
 3,810   3,433  
 5,192   5,679  
 6,815  
 -
 5,000
 10,000
 15,000
 20,000
 25,000
2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14
(Prov.)
License Fee Spectrum Charges
91 
 
TSPs have argued that license fees and charges on the sector in India are among 
the highest in the world. In comparison to China at 3–3.5% of sector revenues, 
India’s total levies and duties on the sector can add up to nearly 30% of sector 
revenues. (See Table 3.2) 
 
Table 3.2: Regulatory Charges Compared 
 
Source: (PWC 2011) p. 19 using data from TRAI and DoT. 
 
Total operating expenses comprise between 60–70% of gross revenue. While 
mobile telephony has lower fixed costs than fixed line telephony, it still 
requires the set up and maintenance of passive (tower maintenance) and active 
(electronics and switching equipment) equipment. Network operating costs 
comprise 25% of gross revenue. This would cover the day to day operation of 
mobile phone towers, including power, water, etc. A further 14–17% is the 
depreciation and amortization cost associated with fixed infrastructure and 
spectrum. In 2013, the top three companies also spent between 11 and 15% on 
Capex for new infrastructure.   
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3.4.1 Evolution of TSP Profitability 
 
The different stages of sectoral evolution were briefly covered in the 
introductory chapter. The profitability of TSP firms has also evolved through 
these phases.  From near collapse through to periods of greater profitability to a 
squeeze on margins after 2010, the viability of the sector has been primarily 
influenced by policy implementation. The firm’s profitability in turn, affects its 
willingness to invest in infrastructure and its ability to compete for rents in the 
sector. This section will lay out the firm economics through the 6 phases of 
evolution defined previously. The policy drivers and the impact on the sector 
will be considered in greater detail in Chapter 6, which lays out the history of 
the sector from a rents perspective.  
 
The first phase of the sector from 1995 to 1999 was a difficult one for sector 
operators. Burdened by high debt from the spectrum auction and investment in 
greenfield infrastructure, and struggling to generate revenues in the face of a 
nascent market, very high cost per call rates (effective cost per call rates were 
around Rs.14 per minute in 2000 - in comparison prices offered today go as low 
as Rs.0.01 per minute) and high duties and levies on the sector, most firms in 
the sector were defaulting on their loans by 1998. Interest on loans was as high 
as 27% for some firms. Even the operators in the metros, who have the highest 
demand and, are therefore theoretically the most profitable, posted significant 
losses. There is evidence from one of the studies conducted in 1998 on the 
sector’s profitability that of all the operators in the sector in 1997–98, only 
Bharti Airtel made a profit (Desai 2006).  
 
The years between 1999 and 2003 saw a reversal of fortunes for the players in 
the sector. By 2000, there was widespread recognition that the TSPs’ 
profitability was so poor that the sector risked collapse. The failure of the firms 
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would hit the financial sector, since it had an exposure of around Rs. 100 billion 
(COAI 2007b) invested in debt in the telecom sector.  Thus 1999–2003 was a 
period of course correction for the sector in terms of TSP profitability. A 
number of measures starting with NTP 1999 reduced the license payouts of the 
TSPs, increased competition and allowed them to cut down the prices of calls 
in order to grow the market. This phase saw an improvement in profitability of 
TSPs and allowed some market consolidation by key players.    
 
The period 2003 - 2007 has been referred to by an interviewee from a TSP as 
the ‘Golden Age’ of Indian telecom. The top six players in the sector 
consolidated market share gains. The dropping of costs per call led to a sudden 
explosion of subscriber numbers from 2003 onwards. Although Average 
Revenues per User (ARPUs) were declining (Figure 3.16), the declining ARPUs 
were a function of the decline in the average cost per call (Figure 3.15). 
However ARPUs did not fall as steeply as the rate per minute, showing the 
benefit of a relatively good set of subscribers – the cream of the crop, the higher 
spenders on mobile telephony. Firm profitability increased.   
 
Figure 3.15: Dropping costs per call 2000-2006 
 
 
Source: COAI (2007a: 4) citing PWC Benchmarking study 2006 
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Figure 3.16: Declining ARPUs but at lower rates than declining cost per 
call 
 
Source: COAI (2007a: 4) citing PWC Benchmarking study 2006 
 
This picture of strong sector profitability began to change after 2007. The 
incumbent firms in the sector faced increased competition in the period 
between 2007 and 2009, arising from new licensing in 2008. Price competition 
became more severe as a result. Incumbent players were pushed to increase 
investment in infrastructure in the face of competition, especially from the 
entry of international telecom firms. New entrant firms were under pressure to 
begin operations in the sector and were also investing in infrastructure. Debt 
levels in the sector increased. The number of competitors also drove greater 
competition for spectrum.   
 
The 3G licensing in 2010 further increased debt holdings of most TSPs (Figure 
3.17). After 2012, although competition levels came down, the debt burdens 
faced by operator firms was so high the operators began to cut back on 
investment in infrastructure. Capital expenditures dropped as a consequence of 
debt pressure on balance sheets (Fig 3.18).  
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Figure 3.17: Debt Trends 2007-2012 
 
Source: (TRAI 2013b: 12)  
 
Figure 3.18: Dropping Capex 
 
Source: (PWC 2011: 13)  
 
As discussed earlier, the high degree of technology transfer in the industry 
make product differentiation difficult. TSPs in India compete on coverage 
(where the larger players have an inherent advantage) and price (where smaller 
players can undercut price more strongly but larger players may have deeper 
pockets). The increase in competition after the 2008 allocation had a downward 
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impact on revenue per minute. The continuing pressure on call prices 
combined with dropping minutes of use led to stagnation in ARPUs (Fig 3.19).  
 
Figure 3.19: Dropping call volumes leading to stagnating revenues per 
user 
 
 
Source: (PWC 2011: 5-6). 
 
Declining ARPUs and high debt impacted sector profitability up to 2012 (Table 
3.3). However, the sector appears to have seen a slow recovery from 2013 to the 
end of 2014.  In spite of profitability issues from 2007, it is interesting to note 
that the top three players – Airtel, Vodafone and Idea – have consolidated their 
position and improved profitability in the last couple of years. The annual 
reports of these firms for 2013–14 show that EBITDA (Earnings before Interest, 
Tax, Depreciations and Amortization) margins are back up above 30% for the 
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top three players (Appendix 2). There are two big reasons for this 
improvement. First, the withdrawal of the 2008 licenses in 2012 reduced 
pressure on pricing and second, the growth in the data market allowed the big 
players to gain revenue share from data usage. The impact of data will be 
considered separately in the following section.  
 
Table 3.3: Declining Profitability up to 2012 
 
Source: (TRAI 2013b: 30)  summarized from Table 23. 
 
The establishment of 3G required renewed investment in new active and 
passive infrastructure. The top three firms in the sector have increased their 
capex since 2010, helped by better financial performance and better bottom 
lines.  
 
Spectrum costs are reflected in P&L statements through amortization. Until the 
3G auction of 2010, most of the spectrum that the TSPs held had been given 
Statement of  Revenue and Profitability of 5 Access Service 
Providers (Rs. in Crore)  
Particulars  
2007-
08  
2008-
09  
2009-
10  
2010-11  2011-12  
Total Revenue  75,031  92,051  99,895  1,13,150  1,24,133  
Opex  49,231  64,635  74,204  88,257  96,657  
EBITDA  25,800  27,416  25,691  24,893  27,476  
EBITDA Margin  34%  30%  26%  22%  22%  
PBIT  15,838  16,536  14,376  12,264  11,886  
PBIT Margin  21%  18%  14%  11%  10%  
Source: TRAI Analysis Five access service providers are Bharti, Vodafone, Idea, Reliance and Tata (as 
per table 23 of TRAI’s study paper on “Shareholding pattern, financing pattern and capital structure of 
Indian private telecom access service providers” dated 19
th 
November, 2013.  
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through administrative allocation20. Most of the initial allocation of spectrum 
was administratively allocated to producers rather than though a multi-stage 
competitive auction, in other words, the spectrum allocation was bundled free 
along with the purchase of a license. The auction of 1996 was a pressure on 
company balance sheets at the nascent stage of the industry but by 2010, the 
impact of spectrum debt on company balance sheets was minimal. The 3G 
auction however signaled to the government that spectrum auctions raised 
much higher receipts than administrative allocation. Since 2010, all spectrum, 
including the earlier administrative spectrum that has come up for renewal, has 
been unbundled from the license and needs to be bought at auction. Spectrum 
cost has therefore become a large part of producer debt and is set to continue 
to rise as more spectrum comes up for auction or re-auction in the coming 
years. 
 
Figure 3.20: Debt Equity Ratios of key Players 
 
Source: Data accessed from company balance sheets. Charts authors own. 
 
                                                 
20
 Administrative allocation is the term used in the Indian telecom sector to refer to the 
spectrum that was assigned at state determined prices rather than an open market auction. All 
spectrum assigned until 2010 falls in this category.  
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The EBITDA (Earnings before Tax, Interest, Depreciation and Amortization) 
does not reflect the increasing cost of either spectrum or investment in 
infrastructure. Debt to equity ratios (Figure 3.20) may be a better measure of 
the pressures faced by telecom firms. Given the high infrastructure costs of the 
sector, it has traditionally enjoyed higher EBITDAs to support capital 
investment requirements.  
 
The measure of Return on Capital Employed (ROCE = EBIT/Debt+Equity) 
shows the impact of both spectrum costs and increasing investment in active 
and passive infrastructure. Figure3.21 below shows that ROCE for the industry 
is declining and this remains the key challenge for the growth of the sector.  
    
Figure 3.21: Declining Return on Capital Employed (ROCE) for the 
sector 
 
Source: Data accessed from company balance sheets. Charts authors own. 
 
In sum, the profitability of the firms in the sector is highly dependent on policy. 
Although the sector benefits from large volumes and untapped potential, the 
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low revenues per user and high costs of both spectrum and infrastructure 
investments exert a downward pressure on sectoral profitability. While 
profitability levels have varied throughout the sector’s history, recent auctions 
of spectrum at very high prices have placed a high debt burden on the sector. 
TSPs claim that their survival requires regulatory support. The reduction in 
capital expenditures is a consequence of the debt levels caused by spectrum 
auctions since 2010.  
 
3.4.2 Data 
 
The pressure on voice revenues has been somewhat compensated in India by 
the phenomenal growth in data revenues. With improving technologies, data 
access over mobiles has become faster21. Given India’s patchy network of 
landlines and fiber to the home and the physical breadth of distribution of 
population, it seems likely that India’s growth in internet access and usage will 
come from mobile internet access rather than fixed line. 
 
India has the third largest base of internet users. The top five internet user 
populations are ranked below. India has also among the lowest penetrations in 
this group, indicating a huge potential growth segment. (Figure 3.22, Figure 
3.23)  
 
 
                                                 
21
 Note that the speed of data access in mobiles is only partly governed by the technology. 
Transmission in mobiles is only wireless up to the tower. Between the tower and the switching 
centre, the transmission is carried by fixed lines. However in 2G and 3G the slowest part of the 
network is the wireless section and therefore the transmission technology makes a difference to 
speeds achieved on a mobile network. 
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Figure 3.22: Internet Market Potential in India 
 
 
Source: Internet Live Stats (www.InternetLiveStats.com)  
Elaboration of data by International Telecommunication Union (ITU), United Nations 
Population Division, Internet & Mobile Association of India (IAMAI), World Bank.  
July 1 2014 Estimate 
Internet User = individual, of any age, who can access the Internet at home, via any device 
type (computer or mobile) and connection. 
 
Figure 3.23: Internet Penetration by Country 
 
Source: Internet Live Stats (www.InternetLiveStats.com)  
Elaboration of data by International Telecommunication Union (ITU), United Nations 
Population Division, Internet & Mobile Association of India (IAMAI), World Bank.  
July 1 2014 Estimate 
Internet User = individual, of any age, who can access the Internet at home, via any device 
type (computer or mobile) and connection. 
 
However, in spite of the low penetration of internet use in the country, there is 
growing demand for internet digital content. Narasimhan (2011) suggests that 
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the average Indian consumer consumes 4.5 hours of digital material daily 
through offline channels. Much of this is through standard offline channels 
such as TV, DVDs, and CDS, etc. But a recent phenomenon of using a smart 
phone to access offline digital content that has been previously downloaded 
and is packaged, loaded onto phones and sold to individual consumers with no 
internet access is gaining in popularity in both urban and small-town India. Not 
only does this overcome issues of lack of digital access, it also allows the user to 
bypass issues such as lack of uninterrupted electricity supply (Jeffrey and Doron 
2013). In fact, more than 70% of India’s urban consumers already spend about $1 
a month on content and services through offline, unorganized retail channels – 
a market estimated to be worth more than $4 billion annually.  
 
Table 3.4: Internet Subscribers in India (in millions) (as on 31st Dec 
2014) 
Category Narrowband Broadband Total Internet 
Wired 3.64 14.86 18.50 
Fixed Wireless 0.04 0.40 0.44 
Mobile Wireless 187.04 45.61 232.65 
Total 190.72 60.87 251.59 
Source: TRAI Data 
 
Data revenues are thus predicted to be a big source of future growth for TSPs. 
Data growth also does not cannibalize voice revenues and is seen as 
incremental revenue in the sector. It is also currently restricted to the upper 
end of the urban consumer segment and is therefore less price sensitive than 
voice. 
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Figure 3.24: Wireless Internet Potential 
 
Source: (Narasimhan 2011: 3) using 2010 McKinsey Digital Survey Data, Mc Kinsey and Company 
research estimates. 
 
3G technology has made data usage more attractive and the proliferation and 
price reduction of smart phones have made mobile data usage more accessible. 
The increasing demand for wireless data on 3G has also helped in the 
consolidation of the market since only the top 5 players in the segment have 3G 
capability. Only these TSPs were able to service the top-end demand for holistic 
products across voice and data. This has led to a weakening of the marginal 
players (Fig.3.25). However, data is far more spectrum hungry than voice. The 
data growth in the segment is therefore likely to drive up demand for spectrum 
and consequently, its price in the coming years.  
 
Thus data growth in the sector has a two-fold effect. On the one hand, it 
improves TSP profitability, but on the other, it increases the demand for 
spectrum and drives up spectrum price, therefore negatively impacting TSP 
profitability.  
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Figure 3.25:  Wireless Internet Service Provision by TSP 
 
Source: TRAI quarterly report July-Sept 2014. 
 
3.5 Summary: 
 
The purpose of this chapter was to establish the factors within the Indian 
telecom sector that impact the level of rent and the intensity of contests over 
rent. To this end, we examined the specific structural features and the 
particular policy choices that impacted the historical evolution of the sector in 
India and its current economic viability.  
 
From its tentative beginnings in 1995, the Indian telecom market has grown 
into one of the largest and most dynamic ones around. Subscriber figures are 
the third highest in the world today but there is further potential to grow, 
evident in the lower levels of rural penetration. The very low levels of revenue 
per minute make the sector accessible to much of the population even with 
India’s low per capita income levels. One of the reasons for the low cost per call 
is the level of competition that the sector has sustained.  
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While conventional wisdom on the sector worldwide sees it developing as an 
oligopoly, the Indian market is unusually crowded. The level of competition in 
the sector was a product of both the structural features of the sector as well as 
particular policies that drove competition by licensing new service providers, 
especially in 2008 (the policy of 2008 came later to be known as the 2G scam 
and will be considered in detail in Chapters 6 and 7). While the sector in India 
is still less oligopolistic than comparable markets worldwide, there have been 
clear signs of continued consolidation in the sector. Today, only the top 3 
players are profitable and control more than 70% of the revenue share between 
them. However the sheer number of players drives up the demand for 
spectrum. 
 
Profitability of TSPs has varied through the different phases of growth in the 
sector. From initially over-estimating growth levels in the sector to the point of 
collapse, to a period of consolidation, followed by a period of very profitable 
growth, a setback on profitability with the entry of competition and increasing 
levels of debt to a further consolidation and improvements in profitability, 
sector economics have shown as many ups and downs and arounds as a 
fairground attraction. What makes this particularly interesting from our point 
of view is the amount of impact government policy has on the growth and 
profitability of the sector. The state influences prices for the sector either 
through the setting of interconnect charges or by managing competition levels 
that have driven down the cost per call. The state has also set a number of 
duties and levies on the sector, which are at a higher level than in most other 
telecom markets. 
 
However, the cost structures of the firms in the sector are also impacted by 
regulation in another crucial way. The costs of the sector are heavily weighted 
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towards spectrum costs and network operating costs, which are highly 
regulation dependent. The cost of spectrum licenses were earlier largely 
administratively set but are nowadays more likely to be auctioned. This adds to 
the long term debt holdings of the firms, as can be seen from low Return on 
Capital Employed (ROCE) figures for the sector. The levels of debt are likely to 
rise in the coming years as more of the administratively held spectrum comes 
up for re-auction and new frequencies get released for the sector and come 
under the hammer. There is a concern being voiced by a number of sector 
players that  greater indebtedness will cause a reduction in investment in the 
network, investment that is critical to developing the quality of service, 
especially given the likelihood of new technology (4G) being introduced in the 
market in the near future. Driving rural penetration of the voice segment will 
also be capex-heavy as sheer distances in India need a far higher level of passive 
infrastructure than many other markets. 
 
The rainbow on the horizon in terms of TSP profitability is data. With the 
introduction of 3G allowing data to be used in an effective way on a wireless 
device, the data market has shown strong growth, but more importantly, has a 
huge latent potential due to lack of existing wireline infrastructure in India. 
Unlike more developed markets in the West, it is likely that, for a greater 
number of users in India, wireless will become the primary means of accessing 
the internet. Data shores up the profitability of the TSPs by providing 
incremental revenue that is less price elastic than voice. Data growth has 
helped market consolidation around the larger players. However, data also 
critically impacts the demand for spectrum since it is more spectrum hungry 
than voice. Thus data growth could both improve TSP profitability and increase 
their level of indebtedness by pushing up spectrum prices.   
 
The critical factor that will influence the direction of development of the sector 
comes down to spectrum. The debates in the sector today revolve around 
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whether the sector is spectrum-starved and whether players are utilizing the 
spectrum they have currently been assigned efficiently enough. The potential 
for growth of wireless-based applications in a country like India is immense – 
newspapers are filled with reports of mobile banking – an example of an 
extension to the services telecom firms provide today. The telecom firms in 
operation have moved well beyond their tentative beginnings. But the pace and 
scale of growth will continue to be influenced by the rents created through 
spectrum sales and their distribution among the various players in the sector 
will determine regulatory direction. It is therefore more important than ever to 
understand the process by which these rents are generated and the factors 
affecting their distribution – the task of the following chapters.  
 
Chapter 6 in this research will explore the history of the sector from the 
perspective of a rents-based analysis to explain policy choices and their impacts 
on the direction of development of the sector. The conflicts that arise from the 
distribution of these rents will also be examined to understand the influence of 
these distributional conflicts in shaping policy choices and ultimately the 
growth of the sector. Before going on to an empirical exploration of the sector’s 
development from the perspective of rents and contests over rents, the next 
chapter will lay out the evolution of the theoretical debates surrounding rents. 
This will help us identify the theoretical streams which we believe will have the 
greatest explanatory power in the context of the Indian telecom sector.  
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Chapter 4: Rents and Political 
Settlements  
 
 
“It is not …. the rent of the land that determines the price of its produce, but it is 
the price of that produce which determines the rent of land…” 
    James Anderson 1777, (c.f. Keiper et al. (1961: 20) 
 
“If air, water, the elasticity of steam, and the pressure of the atmosphere were of 
various qualities; if they could be appropriated, and each quality existed only in 
moderate abundance, they, as well as land, would afford a rent, as the successive 
qualities were brought into use.” 
    David Ricardo (1821: Section 2.16) 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The evolution of the telecom sector indicates the important role played by 
policy in the pace and direction of development of the sector. However, policy 
changes in the sector have been inconsistent in terms of direction. Policies in 
the sector have driven increasing competition in 1995, 2003 and 2008 but, 
paradoxically, increasing consolidation of the sector in 2002 and 2010. The firms 
in the sector have demanded both increased regulation in 1999, with a 
strengthened independent regulator, and reduced regulatory intervention since 
2007. The sector has been perceived to have been negatively impacted by high 
levels of corruption through a large part of its development. Policy prescriptions 
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to counter this trend have tended to focus on good governance issues such as a 
greater regulatory independence, transparency and rules-based spectrum 
allotment but these have gone hand in hand with excessively high prices for 
spectrum that have been detrimental to the sectors growth.  
 
The conventional wisdom on the sector tends to attribute the phenomenal 
growth of the sector to the intrinsic value of the service. The view is that the 
growth has taken place in spite of the absence of features of good governance 
for large parts of the sectors development. I have argued that the good 
governance perspective does not seem to provide a way to understand the 
contradictory policy changes and varied rent outcomes observable in the sector. 
This chapter seeks to provide an alternative theoretical construct with which to 
study the creation and outcome of policy. All these policies have economic 
impacts. Therefore another way to understand particular policies is to 
understand the income streams that these policies create, in other words the 
‘rents’ that these policies create. 
 
The mobile telephony sector is characterized by significant rents because of the 
way in which radio spectrum for communication is allocated. These rents are 
analogous to natural resource rents in many ways but can also have 
characteristics of other types of rents such as monopoly rents, Schumpeterian 
rents and rents supporting investments in capability development and learning 
(Khan 2000c) depending on the conditions attached to the allocation of these 
rents. The significant rents created by the spectrum allocation process can be 
appropriated by the state, the producers of the service or dissipated by being 
passed on to consumers through lowered prices.  
 
Where there are rents, there will be rent-seeking, as contended by Anne 
Krueger (1974) and Jagdish Bhagwati (1982) since rent-seekers will spend 
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resources to directly influence state policy-makers in their rent creation and 
allocation decisions. This explains the high levels of rent-seeking observable in 
the sector. This rent-seeking is characterized as “unproductive” (Bhagwati 1982) 
and inefficient. This, I have argued earlier, is a static view of efficiency that does 
not take into account the pervasive market failures that may need to be 
overcome in the development of the sector. Additionally, the sector requires 
the creation of use rights in order to function effectively. The rents are 
therefore inevitable. The distribution of these rents could tell us a lot about 
why policies were created in particular ways and explain their effectiveness.  
 
Rents have been discussed in economic theory from as early as the 17Th century. 
While originally used in the context of land, the use of rent in the economic 
sense has become more precisely defined, and its use broadened to cover 
income flows other than those from land alone. Chapters 2 and 3 have 
established that there are significant rents in the Indian telecom sector. This 
chapter seeks to assess the characteristics of rents in the telecom sector from a 
theoretical perspective. To do this, the historical development of rent theory is 
examined.  
 
The economic theories of rents began to be developed more than a century ago, 
and were initially focused on rents in agricultural land. The Ricardian view of 
rents points to two principles, scarcity and differential quality, to locate the 
sources of rents. The Marxian development of the analysis of rents established 
the importance of considering the political economy context in which the rents 
arise in order to explain both their value as well as their distribution.  
 
With the development of neo-classical economics, the theoretical analysis of 
rents changed. In this analysis, rents initially emerged as a signal of inefficiency, 
but more nuanced developments of the analysis of rents have occurred within 
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neoclassical economics that identify the need for rents under particular 
conditions of market failure.  
 
The developmental state theorists showed how under certain conditions the 
existence of significant rents could be compatible with industrial growth. New 
Institutional Economics (NIE) approaches explored the link between property 
rights and rents that had remained implicit in much of the earlier analysis of 
rents.  
 
The chapter then elaborates the theoretical approach that will be used in this 
thesis. Khan’s approach begins with a neo-classical definition of rents similar to 
approaches in NIE, but uses a Marxian view of property right transitions 
combined with a more nuanced analysis of developing country contexts. Our 
understanding of rents in the telecom sector is impoverished if we do not 
consider the origin and movements of spectrum right structures within the 
sector. These, in their turn, can only be understood by considering the social 
relations and power structures that govern their creation and modification. 
Khan (2000b, c, 2009a, 2010, 2013, 2011) provides an expanded view of property 
rights, rents and political settlements that provides the analytical apparatus for 
these questions. I argue that this approach has the best explanatory power for 
an analysis of policy in Indian telecom.  
 
To describe and examine the context in contemporary developing countries in 
which the policies and spectrum rights are determined that lead to telecom 
sector rents, the concept of the ‘political settlement’ developed by Mushtaq 
Khan will be extended to consider the political settlement at the sectoral level 
in Telecom as distinguished from the national level political settlement. The 
last section of this chapter will elaborate this difference. 
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4.2 Theoretical Perspectives on Rent 
 
The term ‘Rent’ was first and, even today, most often used in the context of 
land rent.  It originates from the French ‘rente’ or Latin ‘rendita’ which meant a 
return or a yield. For classical economists like Ricardo, land rent was a puzzle 
because it appeared to be a transfer to land owners without being related to any 
productive activity that they were doing. This is at the heart of all subsequent 
definitions of rents that, despite their differences, are essentially identifying 
income flows that are associated with specific property right arrangements.  
 
The initial concept of land rents were further broadened to economic rents not 
restricted to the returns from land alone. Gemmil (1935: 80) c.f. (Bye 1940: 3) 
expands the definition of land in the context of rents to include “natural 
resources created without the assistance of labour”. Under this definition, 
returns on the sale of radio waves would qualify as rents. Later developments in 
the theory of rents expanded the definition even further to include rents from 
other sources and  denoted some form of unearned income, or returns that 
were greater than the recipients would get in the market in alternative 
activities.  
 
Keiper et al. (1961) suggest that the historical interest in land rent as a 
theoretical concept has not been constant. From initial consideration by 
mercantilists in the 17th century and Physiocrats in the 18th century as ancillary 
to their primary interests, through a position of primary importance in 
economic theory for the 19th century classical economists, to a waning of 
interest again in the 20th century, the interest in rents within economic theory 
has suffered many fluctuations. There is less frequent mention of rent theory in 
contemporary economic analyses in the 21st century. However, as the authors 
point out in the preface to their book on the development of rent theory (ibid), 
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an analysis of the creation and distribution of ‘unearned income’ is a very 
powerful tool in a world where conflicts over income distribution are still sharp 
and persistent. 
 
The following section of this chapter will trace the development of the theory of 
rents in greater detail, to establish what factors give rise to rents and what 
factors determine their distribution. This section will draw from Keiper et al. 
(ibid) to sketch the historical evolution of the theories concerning rent. While, 
for a large part, these theories traditionally restricted themselves to a discussion 
of land rents, we will explore which of these perspectives can best be used in 
explaining the development of the telecom sector in India.  
 
4.2.1 Early Theories of Rent 
 
4.2.1.1 Mercantilists: 
 
The Mercantilists in the late seventeenth century first established the concepts 
of land rent in their analysis, although their focus on land rents was secondary 
to their primary interest in establishing the broader monetary and fiscal 
principles associated with the establishment of nation states. Sir William Petty, 
in his work, a Treatise on Taxes and Contributions in 1662 (c.f. (Keiper et al. 
1961)), defines rent as a net surplus that arises from land used for growing crops 
or raising livestock. Complementary to this view of rent as the net yield of land, 
Petty adds an understanding of the differential nature of land rent by 
recognizing that soil of better fertility, or land closer to population centres 
commanded a higher rent.  
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While Petty did not explicitly recognize diminishing returns to land, the 
concept of basic yield or return on land is effectively a scarcity rent. This arises 
from the scarcity of any capital asset that can yield income and land rent is not 
a unique or distinguishable source of surplus. Differential rent on the other 
hand, arises from the specific ‘natural’ properties of the land and is therefore 
different to rent which arises from other ‘man-made’ capital assets. While these 
two concepts espoused a different view on the nature of rent, Petty’s work 
viewed them as complementary and internally consistent. Subsequent 
theorization of rents by other mercantilists, however, emphasized one or the 
other of these two views of rent, and more often the former or scarcity view of 
rent.  
 
Nicholas Barbon (ca 1640–1698) and Sir Dudley North (c.f. (Keiper et al. 1961)) 
both focused on the basic yield or scarcity concept of rent and therefore 
asserted that land rents were identical to the return on other capital assets (all 
natural or “unwrought” capital assets for the former and all (natural and man-
made) capital assets for the latter).  
 
However this misses the essential difference between land and other capital 
assets. The supply of land is fixed and not reproducible. This distinction was 
made later by Ricardo.  If a capital asset is in short supply and commanding a 
high price, it only earns quasi-rents because the supply can increase, whereas 
the supply of land can only be increased by moving to inferior quality land so 
the rent is permanent. Spectrum is therefore like land in that the supply is 
notionally fixed. Therefore it garners a rent arising from its scarcity and non-
reproducibility. Also, since within the usable bands of spectrum for telecom, 
some bands are more effective and efficient of telecommunication than others 
they could, in addition, command a differential rent based on their specific 
“natural” properties. 
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4.2.1.2 Physiocrats: 
 
Composed of a heterogeneous group of economists writing in France in the 
mid-18th century, the Physiocrats were united by a common belief in laissez 
faire economics. Again, the discussion of land rents was peripheral to their 
central concerns, but Keiper et al. (ibid) aver that they did contribute some 
notable progressions in the conceptualization of land rents. Francois Quesnay, 
as part of his description of a wider macroeconomic system, suggests that rent 
is the return that accrues to a specific group in his description of the economic 
system, the proprietary class, as compensation for earlier and permanent 
improvements to agricultural land. This is significant in that it is the first 
discussion of the distribution of rental income.  
 
It views rent as a composite, accruing both from the natural properties of the 
land but also from earlier capital investments in the land (Weldon 1988: 36). 
This perspective conflates rent on land with the profit arising from 
improvements to the land. The latter are merely returns to reproducible capital 
investments made in the land and therefore do not have a rent-like character. 
However, Quesnay’s contribution of considering the distribution of rental 
income was recognition of the link between rents and property rights and a 
precursor to later explorations of rent distribution by the Classical economists.  
 
4.2.2 The Classical Economists: 
 
The classical economists based their theories of income distribution upon the 
economic and institutional reality of their times (Weldon 1988). While their 
work spans almost 200 years, they were analyzing economies that combined, to 
different extents, an industrial sector with a more traditional agrarian 
production system. At the centre of their analytical systems was the concept of 
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a surplus. Described in agrarian terms, the production of this years’ crop from 
the seeds set aside from the previous year produced an amount greater than the 
inputs used up, including labour and other inputs like seeds, fertilizer and 
equipment, and this constituted the surplus. The amount of this surplus and 
the laws governing its distribution were what classical economists attempted to 
explain.  
 
Essentially, the only direct claimants of this surplus were the owners of capital 
and land, i.e. the classes of capitalists and landowners. Thus the surplus could 
be divided into profit and rent. Wages, in classical economics, were an input 
into the production process and were predicated on the concept of a 
subsistence wage that was historically, socially and culturally determined and 
varied in time and space. Profit was thus the surplus that capitalists and 
landlords were able to appropriate. Rent was determined by the quality of the 
land and accrued to the landlord who had appropriated the land in the 
historical past and who therefore possessed property rights to the land and had 
the right to determine its use. 
  
4.2.2.1 Adam Smith:  
 
Smith was the first of the classical economists to engage with the concept of 
land rent extensively in ‘The Wealth of Nations’ (Smith 1937). Smith views rent 
as “an unearned surplus which is appropriated by landlords through the 
exercise of their monopoly power” (Keiper et al. 1961: 13). Weldon (1988: 36) 
suggests that the term monopoly sometimes used to describe the rights of the 
landlord in this context can be confusing. He differentiates between the use of 
the term ‘monopoly’ to describe the unique right of a landowner to the services 
that his parcel of land can provide, and the more contemporary use of the term 
which refers to a situation when a single landowner owns the land in general. 
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The former is the meaning more commonly referred to by classical economists. 
In other words Smith is alluding to the property rights that make the landlord 
the sole claimant to the returns on the property rather than “monopoly” in the 
contemporary sense. 
 
Smith suggests that a portion of the rent may be considered interest since it is 
the legitimate return to the landowner on improvements made to the land, but 
believes that this is only a small part of the rent since most improvements to 
the land are made by the tenants rather than the landlord. Smith here is 
identifying all returns to land as rent in line with its common usage in day to 
day English. However, in terms of our more technical definition of economic 
rent, interest would not form a part of rent. While there appears to be some 
inconsistency in his view of whether the level of rent is determined price or the 
other way around, he is clear that the existence of rent is predicated on the 
existence of demand. He mirrors earlier work in identifying locational 
advantages and fertility determining land rent, but adds to the analysis with a 
consideration of the effect of improvements in transport, which is, effectively, 
technological change. He contends that improving transport facilities would 
reduce rents near urban centres and increase rents in more far-flung areas.  
 
He does not yet recognize diminishing returns in agriculture, a feature that is 
central to Ricardian rent theory that follows.  However, he was the first to treat 
rents in a dynamic context and within a wider context of economic growth. His 
work was an important precursor to work by subsequent classical economists 
who considered land rents more centrally in their analyses of economic growth. 
He also clearly adds at least two dimensions to the rent creation debate – the 
importance of demand factors in determining rent levels and the effect of 
technology on rent levels, particularly on differential rent. This thesis will apply 
these factors in the analysis of outcomes in the sector in Chapter 8. 
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4.2.2.2 Ricardo 
 
Building on earlier work by Adam Smith and the Physiocrats, Ricardo first put 
forward a complete theory of rent in his work “Principles of Political Economy 
and Taxation” (1821), first published in 181722. While Ricardo’s attempt was not 
merely to explain rents but to provide a wider theory of economic 
development, it gave rents a far more important place in economics than they 
had had in the past. Rent is an important analytical tool in Ricardo’s theory of 
economic development since a central premise of his theory was what he 
viewed as a historical fact –diminishing returns in agriculture. 
 
This work, like its predecessors, primarily referred to rent in terms of land rent.  
Ricardo defines rents as follows:  
“Rent is that portion of the produce of the earth, which is paid to the landlord for 
the use of the original and indestructible powers of the soil”. (ibid, section 2.2, 
p.5). 
 
He differentiates it from returns that arise from the application of capital or 
labour to production from the soil, which he defines as profit. In other words 
                                                 
22
Keiper (ibid, p.19-23) shows that Ricardo was not the first to put forward the differential 
theory of land rent that he is associated with. Thirty-five years prior to Ricardo’s seminal work 
on rents, a Scottish farmer, James Anderson, wrote an article on the Corn Laws proposed for 
Scotland, where, in a footnote to the main text, he makes the first analytical link between the 
diminishing returns to land and rents, as evidenced by the quote at the start of this chapter. 
Thirty-five years later and just days before the publication of Ricardo’s first essay exploring rent 
and the price of corn, another essay written by Sir Richard West, a lawyer, that linked the 
diminishing returns in agriculture to the rent of land was published. However, Ricardo’s 
attempt to explain not just rent but present a new theory of economic development, made for a 
more comprehensive exploration of the concepts involved, hence the contemporary referral to a 
‘Ricardian theory of rents’.    
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rent is the surplus over the cost of production that accrues to the landowner. 
For Ricardo, rent was revenue transfer rather than profit.  
 
Ricardo argues that rent arises only because of the differential quality and the 
scarcity of land. “If all land had the same properties, if it were unlimited in 
quantity, and uniform in quality, no charge could be made for its use, unless 
where it possessed peculiar advantages of situation”(ibid, section 2.4, p.5). Since 
land quality is heterogeneous and land quality at the margin of cultivation is 
inferior, the use of land of higher quality results in a differential rent being paid 
for that land. These rents only exist because not only is the land of different 
qualities, it is also limited in quantity. The differential quality of the land allows 
differential rents to be charged for that land. This is effectively the application 
of a marginal productivity principle to land rents. The differential rent that a 
land earns is equal to the intra-marginal differences in produce obtained from 
the application of equal amounts of capital and labour.  
 
Beyond differential quality, the scarcity of the land also commands rents that 
could be characterized as scarcity rents. According to Ricardo, the relative 
scarcity of land will drive up rents conflicting with profit, until a stationary 
state of absolute scarcity is achieved and profits fall to zero (without technical 
progress). In this way, rent is caused by scarcity but demand determines the 
magnitude of rents. Note that rents for Ricardo are a feature of the inherent 
quality and quantity of the land and therefore emerge as a consequence of, 
rather than as a cause of, the price of the output. 
 
As an economy progresses, the availability of fertile land falls, raising the rent 
for remaining land and requiring increasing capital inputs on existing land. 
Thus, with progress, the rents increase both in absolute terms and in terms of 
the ratio of capital employed on the land. This ever-increasing rent puts the 
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interests of the landowner in contradiction with the interests of all other 
classes, according to Ricardo. Over time, rising food prices would cause a rise in 
nominal wages, a rise in rents and a decrease in profits and capital formation. 
His schema thus contained a political attack on land-owning classes.  
 
While the focus of the discussion was on land rent, Ricardo expanded the 
notion of rents to include rents from natural resources such as coal mines. 
“Mines, as well as land, generally pay a rent to their owner; and this rent, as well 
as the rent of land, is the effect, and never the cause of the high value of their 
produce.” (ibid, section 3.2). In fact Ricardo points out that “(I)f air, water, the 
elasticity of steam, and the pressure of the atmosphere, were of various qualities; 
if they could be appropriated, and each quality existed only in moderate 
abundance, they, as well as the land, would afford a rent, as the successive 
qualities were brought into use” (ibid, section 2.16). In other words, rent is 
created as long as the principles of scarcity and differential quality hold within 
the benefits appropriated from Nature. 
 
It must be noted that, in this view, rents arise when Nature’s bounty is 
exploited. It is not earned in the same way that profits are (producer surplus 
can be an ‘unearned’ differential rent). It is also not dissipated by free market 
competition. In theory free market competition should, in the long run, 
dissipate any returns above the returns necessary to sustain the necessary 
investments to maintain the required assets. However, since rents arise from 
scarcity of the resource, they cannot be competed away. To Ricardo, rents were 
not unique to a period of time or history, nor were they restricted to a static 
state with technology assumed to be constant. Diminishing returns were a 
‘natural’ economic phenomenon.  
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Historical diminishing returns rests on the underlying assumption that the 
supply of land is limited and that technological gains are offset by increases in 
population, such that the demand for produce rises continuously and puts 
increasing pressure on available land, forcing inferior lands into cultivation. 
Ricardo’s theory is ultimately based on the principles of scarcity and non-
replicability. Since land is scarce and “non-reproducible” increasing demand 
pushes lower quality land into cultivation leading to differential rents in higher 
quality lands. Ricardo’s theory was criticized for his assumption of diminishing 
returns to agriculture which did not hold except at the intensive margin. 
Richard Jones (1831) c.f. (Keiper et al. 1961: 37-40) debated the evidence that 
Ricardo based his diminishing returns on, at both the empirical and analytical 
levels. Without diminishing returns and the possibility of no-rent lands, 
Ricardo’s theory reduces to a statement that rent differentials can be ascribed 
to differential yields. However it does not explain rent that is paid even in the 
absence of differential land quality.  
 
The confusion is between differential land quality explaining why some land 
earns a higher rent than other land and diminishing returns on any particular 
piece of land due to the diminishing returns on that land, which is the source of 
the free access problem. Ricardo puts his argument in terms of differential rents 
but the modern argument of natural resource rents is based instead on the free 
access problem as discussed earlier. In the case of natural resources, because of 
the non-replicability of the asset, creating rights to limit the access to the asset 
is socially beneficial. Thus, for natural resources and for spectrum, diminishing 
returns do hold. And similar to land in Ricardo’ theorizing, different spectrum 
bands have differential effectiveness as transmission media for mobile 
telephony. Therefore differential rents exist in spectrum due to inalienable, 
natural properties of spectrum airwaves. The differential rent is static in the 
sense that it exists with constant technology and is changed or even completely 
destroyed with changes in technology that allow different spectrum bands to 
come into use.  
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The existence of these differential rents has been crucial in determining the 
structural outcomes in the Indian sector. Chapter 8 will apply the Ricardian 
view of differential rents to argue that the differential rent afforded on 900 
MHz spectrum explains the advantage that the incumbent firms had, which 
allowed them to achieve market dominance. 
 
4.2.2.3 Marx: 
 
In contrast to the Ricardian view, the Marxist view situated rent creation firmly 
within the social context of capitalism. Marx traces the development of rent to 
the process of the capitalist transition. During the transition, commonly held 
nature is transferred to private hands through the establishment of property 
rights. This definition of public as private property is, for Marx, the genesis of 
land rent and therefore rent is a manifestation of a specific underlying social 
relation within the capitalist transition.  
 
Unlike for Ricardo, for Marx rent is not naturally given and universally 
occurring. Rent is historically specific to the capitalist transition. It therefore 
follows that rent could not be considered in isolation to the context of social 
relations in which it was situated. For Marx, the process of private property 
right establishment over land concentrates land ownership in the hands of a 
numerical minority, as against a majority that does not own the property rights 
to the land and need to work on it to earn a wage. Rents therefore are based on 
monopoly, the monopolistic rights to property held in the hands of a few 
parasitic landlords who could fritter away their monopolistic gains in 
consumption rather than invest it in improving productivity. In this, Marx has 
adopted and expanded Adam Smith’s conception of rent that arises from an 
inherited monopoly over ownership. 
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Marx referred to this element of rent – the monopolistic gain that arose from a 
monopoly over the property right on the land – as Capitalist Ground Rent. The 
monopoly over the property right on the land allows the landlord to withhold 
the amount of land available for production unless the land produces a surplus 
over the price of production, where the price of production is the capital outlay 
plus an average rate of profit. Were the land in the hands of capitalist 
producers then they would be willing to use the land as long as it generated the 
price of production. This surplus that is required over the price of production in 
order for production to take place arises purely from the existence of landed 
property concentrated in the hands of a few (in general) non producers, and is 
what Marx terms Capitalist Ground Rent.  
 
Capitalist ground rent is based on the social relations that produce it. In 
Marxian terms, “the exchange value of the resource, in which is embedded the 
social relations of production and exchange, rather than the use value, 
determines capitalist ground rent” (Bina 1985). The existence of rent acts as a 
barrier to expansion of production since it places the demand of a surplus 
above the price of production before production can be expanded.  
 
It is, to Utsa Patnaik, “inherently a highly subversive concept, subversive of the 
existing social order” (Patnaik 2007: 16) since it raises the question of why the 
minority of land owners should benefit from the efforts of the actual investor 
and producers who work the soil. It suggests the need for radical land reform.  
In contrast, she argues that Ricardo’s conception of rent was entirely 
disconnected from land ownership structures. The differential quality of the 
land in the context of its diminishing returns gave rise to rents, regardless of 
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who the rents accrued to. This “completely sanitises the discussion of rent of all 
socially critical content” (ibid: 33)23.  
 
Marx describes Ricardo’s differential rents as a surplus generated by the 
variable quality of capital. In other words what Ricardo calls rents, Marx would 
classify as varying surplus profits. Where the producer is a tenant, these varying 
surplus profits are extracted by the landowner. However the existence of landed 
property rights is not necessary for these surpluses to arise. Also it follows that 
the direction of utilization of the natural resource did not follow the artificially 
created progression from best to worst quality.   
 
Marx’s perspective on ground rents can also be critiqued from the perspective 
of a modern rent analysis. According to Marx, capitalist property rights create 
rents through a monopolization of land. Therefore the rents are monopoly 
rents and do not have a social function. However, I have argued here that the 
property rights in the case of natural resources do increase welfare by 
preventing the free access problem. In other words the capitalist property rights 
are not entirely dysfunctional. For Marx however they were just another means 
by which capital subordinates labour.  
 
There are examples in the literature of applications of Marxian rent theory to 
natural resource rents in more contemporary contexts. Ghosh, Sen and 
Chandrasekhar (1995) have presented an interesting analysis of the sale of 
natural resource as a means of primitive accumulation. They interrogate why 
the sale of natural resources to private hands in the current conservative 
ideological climate is considered desirable and efficient. The capitalist sector 
has always used the state as a mechanism to channel surpluses and thereby 
                                                 
23
 This is contrary to Keiper ’s (1961) view that Ricardo, in suggesting that rents would rise 
indefinitely, squeezing profit, was mounting an indirect attack on the landowning classes. 
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drive primitive accumulation to potentially fund capitalist growth. The distress 
sale of natural assets is a means for the rich and powerful among the capitalist 
class to drive accumulation. In parallel, especially where the capitalist sector is 
nascent, the state may also use the process to create its own capitalists or for 
clientelist payoffs. And finally, international capital is also often particularly 
interested in owning natural assets that are often non-reproducible. The 
authors illustrate this with reference to several distress-type sales or 
agreements in the minerals sector. The property right creation in natural assets 
as a means to drive primitive accumulation is applicable to spectrum 
allocations in the telecom sector as well.  
 
Another example of Marxian analysis of natural resource rents can be seen in 
the work by Cyrus Bina (1985), who uses the Marxian approach in his analysis of 
the rents created in the oil sector. He argues that, in the same way that Marx’s 
theory of rent was reconditioned on his theory of landed property and its social 
relations, a theory of oil rent also needs to be based on an analysis of property 
rights within the oil industry. His analysis is interesting in its mapping of power 
in the creation of property rights in the sector. This has similarities to the 
political settlements approach described later, which will be applied to the 
telecom case in this thesis. However Bina limits his characterization of the 
underlying exchange relations to Marxian categories of capitalist relations, 
whereas the characterization using political settlements allows for a broader 
conceptualization of the underlying drivers.  
 
Marx’s view of rents provides a very interesting application to understanding 
telecom sector rents. As in Marx’s theory, the origin of the rent in the telecom 
sector arises from the creation of use rights in the sector, concentrated in the 
hands of a few powerful actors. Thus the restricted access to spectrum rights 
impacts the rents that can be created and sustained. By this definition, the 
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rents will be determined by the exchange relations (or the relations of power) 
in which they are embedded.  
 
The need to understand the historical embedded nature of property rights and 
rents was an insight that was lost in the Marginalist theory that followed and 
has only be revived in more recent NIE and heterodox views of rents. A later 
section in this chapter examines a theoretical construct – the ‘political 
settlement’ – to help describe these exchange relations. The political settlement 
expands the exchange relations as described by Marx by suggesting that sources 
of power within these relations could arise from sources other than purely 
economic ones.  
 
4.2.3 The Marginalist Revolution:  
 
From the period 1870–1935, two trends are distinguishable – first, an increasing 
dissatisfaction with the economic perspective of classical economics and a 
greater use of microeconomic analysis in economic theory, and as an extension, 
the increasing use of marginal utility functions to explain income distribution.  
This trend in economic thought – labelled Neo-Classical Economics – applied 
the principles of marginal returns to explain the existence and level of rent, 
which was a natural extension of Ricardo’s work on differential rents. However, 
the extensions of general economic theory that followed the static marginalist 
perspective did not consider rent to be an analytically unique category or that 
natural resource scarcities needed separate treatment(Quadrio Curzio and 
Pellizzari 1999). 
 
Jevons (1835-1882) established the first concise geometric exposition of rent 
theory. In Figure 4.1, if the x axis measures amount of labour and the Y axis the 
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marginal product of the labour, then the line APC is the marginal productivity 
of labour. If the wage rate is expressed in terms of product units as the line 
RPQ, then APR represents the amount that can be extracted from the labour as 
rent. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Jevons’ Geometric Representation of Rent  
Source: (Keiper et al. 1961: 80) 
 
Menger and Clark debated the Ricardian proposition that land needed to be 
treated as an analytically separate factor of production. Their contention was 
with the Ricardian assumption that the value of rent arose from the powers of 
nature rather than as a return to factor of production like any other. Wicksteed 
formulated a more general theory of productivity, suggesting that under 
assumptions of perfect factor substitutability, perfect competition and 
homogenous production functions, all factor inputs (not just land) are subject 
to static scarcity and could be treated with the same analytical apparatus. In 
effect, the marginal productivity of each factor would determine the 
remuneration of that factor, and land rent was simply the remuneration to land 
based on its marginal productivity(Quadrio Curzio and Pellizzari 1999: 15). 
Therefore, as long as the assumption of constant returns prevails, the total 
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product could be expressed as the sum of the individual factors of production, 
each multiplied by its marginal product (Keiper et al. 1961). However these are 
very stringent assumptions. The particular nature of scarce and non-replicable 
natural goods do not satisfy these general conditions.  
 
Marshall (Quadrio-Curzio 1999: 15) saw rent as simply one part of the producer 
surplus that need not be differentiated from profit. He espoused the view that 
rents could arise from factors other than land or natural resources, that showed 
differential qualities and scarcity in the short run even if not supply constrained 
in the long run. He used the analytical category of quasi-rents (as distinguished 
from true rents), that arise from temporary (or inter temporal) scarcities thus 
freeing rents from the limitation of being restricted to arising from land or 
natural resources. Marshall’s concept of quasi-rents is interesting in the context 
of the telecom sector. If spectrum scarcity is determined by the current state of 
technology in the short term but contains the possibility of being expanded 
with technological advances in the longer term, these rents may be considered 
to be quasi-rents, arising from inter-temporal scarcities, rather than a natural, 
absolute scarcity. 
 
Marshall also examined differential and scarcity rents. He identified two types 
of decreasing returns that could cause rents to arise – extensive (lack of land) 
and intensive (decreasing fertility). This therefore gives rise to two types of 
rents – extensive (where a higher quantity of land will be required to produce 
the same output on marginal land) and intensive ( where a higher quantity of 
labour and capital inputs will be required to produce the same output on 
marginal land). Thus Marshall (1997: Book 5, Chapter 9) famously pointed out 
that, in a sense, all rents are scarcity rents and all rents are differential rents. It 
may be more useful to examine the rents as arising from scarcity in some 
contexts and differential quality in others, but there is no fundamental 
difference between them.  
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This is an important extension to Ricardo’s work. Ultimately rents arise from 
the creation of property rights. The rights are required to restrict access in the 
context of scarcity. Increasing demand may bring different quality grades of the 
asset into production, leading to differential rents in a marginal analysis. In this 
context the line between rents caused by scarcity and rents arising from 
differential quality is  blurred. However Marshall’s analysis does not make 
explicit the link between rents and property rights and in this it was inferior to 
the work by the classical economists. 
 
By focusing on marginality in the Ricardian theory, this view of rents does not 
address the question of who the claimants to this rent are. Again, underlying 
this theory is an implicit assumption of ownership or property rights but this is 
not spelled out. Property rights are assumed to be exogenously given.  
 
This neo-classical view of rents is the one most commonly applied to telecom 
sector rents in contemporary analyses. The Marginalist view explicitly 
recognizes the extension of the concept of rents to factors of production other 
than land. Spectrum rent is merely the marginal productivity of that particular 
band of spectrum. In fact, as it is not differentiated from other factors of 
production, it does not need separate classification as rent at all.  
 
4.2.3.1 Market Failure and Property Rights in Neo-Classical 
Economics 
 
Quadrio-Curzio (ibid, 16-23) argues that extensions of general economic theory 
that followed the static marginalist perspective did not consider rent to be an 
analytically unique category or that natural resource scarcities needed separate 
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treatment. The constraint of static scarcity of resources was seen to be removed 
by the expansion of technological progress and therefore did not constrain the 
production equation. Joan Robinson (1933) summarized the neo-classical 
position on rents as “a surplus earned by a particular factor of production over 
and above the minimum earnings necessary to induce it to do its work.” 
(Robinson 1933: 102).  Keiper et al. (ibid, 94) suggest that the rent for a factor of 
production in an industry is the surplus above transfer costs or returns that the 
factor would earn in another industry.  In other words, a rent is an income in 
excess of what the asset would receive under free market conditions. Under the 
assumptions of perfect competition and a free market these rents are, by their 
very nature, inefficient since they move prices from the market determined 
optimum. This discussion often considered rents arising from monopoly to 
characterize rents as welfare-reducing. However, as Stiglitz states in his 
foreword to Polanyi’s book ‘The Great Transformation’ (2001), few economists 
today believe in the myth of a perfectly free and self-regulating market.  
 
Market failures are universally recognized, arising because of externalities, 
public goods, common pool resources, asymmetric information and market 
power. In addition natural resources may be either exhaustible or renewable 
with very different implications for the solutions to their market failures. H. 
Hotelling’s  (1931, c.f. (Quadrio Curzio and Pellizzari 1999: 16-17)) work 
concentrated on optimizing the exploitation of non-renewable resources. There 
was also work on the optimal rate of utilization of renewable resources based 
on their laws of growth and regeneration. Natural Resources may suffer from 
one or more of these market failures. Spectrum, for example, as a rival but non-
excludable good, suffers from the problem of Common Pool type market 
failure, leading to the free access problem or the Tragedy of the Commons. It 
may also exhibit the failure of Market Power, having elements of a natural 
monopoly since the production of a telecom service is better provided by a 
restricted number of users.  
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The development of the market failure literature recognized that market 
failures often stemmed from ill-defined property rights. The solution to the 
failures lay in better defined property rights over the resource. NCE economists 
suggest that incentive-based policies could help overcome market failure, by 
creating rents to deter welfare-reducing behaviour or encourage welfare-
enhancing behaviour. Therefore rents were recognized as welfare-enhancing 
where the underlying policy was aimed at correcting a particular market failure. 
Under this construct rent was defined as the excess value that an asset gets over 
its next best use (North 1981)24.  Other studies that looked specifically at natural 
resource rents define rents as “supernormal profits”, the surplus over normal 
costs and profit (Collier and Hoeffler 2005) (Rothman 2000). 
 
However, implicit in the Neo-Classical theory is a particular view of property 
rights that flows from the Marginalist tradition. While not explicitly stated, a 
necessary assumption within the NCE analysis is that property rights (i.e. rights 
that define the use of any asset) are complete. They are unambiguously defined 
and there is complete clarity and exclusivity regarding the claimants to the 
right. They are specified, negotiated and transferred within the market 
mechanism in a costless way (Roy 2013). In other words, there are no 
transaction costs in the specification of rights within the NCE framework. 
These conditions need to hold in order for the perfect market to function 
efficiently. Therefore, while NCE recognizes the importance of property rights, 
and the absence of properly defined rights as the source of market failure, it 
fails to explore why incomplete property right specification exists in the first 
place. Nor does it consider the costs of creation and maintenance of rights and 
the dynamic links between property right modification and rents. 
                                                 
24
 Note that this was a definition suggested by North (1981), an Institutionalist, but it fits well 
with the Neo Classical assumptions on rent and is used frequently in studies that are from Neo 
Classical, Regulation theory and New Institutionalist schools of thought.  
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Also, while the rents themselves may be potentially welfare-enhancing under 
conditions of market failure, the very existence of the rents gave rise to rent-
seeking behaviors. Rent seeking is the unproductive waste of resources used to 
capture or protect rents (Krueger 1974) (Bhagwati 1982). It was argued that the 
cost of rent-seeking could far exceed the allocative inefficiencies (in the case of 
welfare-reducing rents) of the rents themselves. The analysis of rent seeking 
introduces the discussion of the distribution of rents and rent capture but in a 
limited manner through two extensions of neo-classical theory – Public Choice 
Theory and Regulation Theory.  
 
Public Choice Theory 
Public Choice Theory, an extension of NCE that explicitly attempted to 
introduce politics into economic analysis, recognizes the likelihood of market 
failures, for example, in public service sectors where natural monopolies tended 
to exist. Many other market conditions could also result in market failure, such 
as missing or incomplete markets. Here a benevolent and omniscient 
government (the contractual state) intervenes to distribute public goods so as 
to maximize social welfare. State-run water, electricity or telecommunication 
boards are common examples of such interventions. In other words, the state 
intervenes to create and manage the monopoly rents that are created through 
the natural monopolies or to address the free rider problems associated with 
private provision if the good has characteristics of a public good.  
 
The effectiveness of such intervention is contingent on two factors – state 
ability (reflective of information asymmetries faced by the state) and state 
capacity (reflective of the state’s capacity to rise above economic and political 
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interests), and is more likely to lead to government failure25 (Saraswati 2007: 
53). The further realization that, in many of these cases, the natural monopoly 
did not exist through the entire vertical production chain, combined with 
technological advances meant that there was, in many cases, at least the option 
of part-privatization26. States (or parastatal bodies) were still expected to 
regulate these sectors for reasons of both productive and distributive 
efficiencies. But any regulation or the rents that it created tended to be prone 
to capture by interest groups.  
 
Regulation Theory 
Regulation theory also begins with the recognition that market failures can 
justify the creation of some rents. Beneficiaries of these rents are then likely to 
want to ensure that the market failure is maintained and the rents directed 
towards them in perpetuity. The easiest way to maintain these inefficient rents 
is by protecting them through regulation. Thus regulation is believed to be 
captured by interest groups in order to sustain the market failure that feeds 
them (See(McChesney 1997: 7-20) for a review). 
 
A number of theories suggesting possible sources of regulatory capture have 
been forwarded. Stigler (1971) applied public choice theory to the regulation of 
firms to suggest that all regulation will be captured by industry for its benefit. 
This was broadened to include other interest groups such as banks, trade 
unions, etc. (Peltzman 1976) (Posner 1974) (Becker 1983). The rent-seeking 
theories were an extension of these models, arguing that regulation protects 
monopoly rents and therefore causes rent-seeking. Therefore the presence of  
rents not only reduced the allocative efficiency of the market, the regulation to 
                                                 
25 On the other hand, Toye (1993)argues that if markets are, in reality, as imperfect as 
governments, then there is no rational reason to suppose that the former will allocate resources 
more efficiently than the latter. 
26
 The development of mobile technology in the telecom was an example of this perspective.  
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protect these rents encouraged further waste of economic resources through 
unproductive rent seeking (Krueger 1974, Bhagwati 1982).  
 
Others such as De Soto(1989), Shleifer and Vishny (1994)  and McChesney 
(1997) have argued that the state (not benevolent but itself captured by vested 
interests) is an active creator of inefficient regulation in order to create 
opportunities for rent extraction from the private sector (Srinivasan 1985)27. A 
third set of theories focus on the role of the regulator in actively or passively 
colluding with the state or interest groups to reduce social welfare. The 
Principal–Agent theory (Laffont and Tirole 1991, 1999) and the Life Cycle 
Theory (Martimort 1999) are examples. 
 
  
These theories did attempt to include non-economic variables in economic 
analysis, using the “economic approach” (Fine (2006), paraphrasing Gary 
Becker) of methodological individualism to understand political factors. 
However, the analysis remained rooted in the paradigm of free market primacy, 
and politics was “simply the pursuit of economic self-interest in an ‘as if’ 
marketplace for votes” (ibid, 66). Power continued to be defined in purely 
economic terms and the market mechanism was seen as a sufficient lens 
through which its influence could be understood.  
 
In sum, the perspective on rents and rent seeking in neo-classical analysis were 
expanded significantly from classical analyses but were also limited in some 
crucial ways. First, while the market failure literature recognized the potential 
welfare enhancing role of rents and their links to underlying property right 
                                                 
27
 Often referred to as neo-classical political economy, this school portrays all state intervention 
as the deliberate action of rent-seeking coalitions of the government. 
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specification in more explicit ways, property right definition remained 
exogenous to the economic  system and the process or costs of right creation 
and maintenance were not considered. Second, NCE analyses are rooted in the 
theoretical ideal of a perfect market. While market failures are recognized, they 
are treated as exceptions rather than the norm (Stiglitz 2007). If one was to 
consider market failures as pervasive, then the importance of rents as a way to 
address them becomes more salient. Third, the focus on rent-seeking obscured 
the potential welfare-enhancing role that rents could play. Rents arose from 
policy responses to market failures, where the market failure was a deviation of 
the market from its ideal state of a perfectly free market. Given that market 
failures by definition resulted in suboptimal resource allocation, the 
intervention that created the rents could potentially have improved resource 
allocation. However, specific failures of regulatory capture and rent-seeking 
resulted in poor outcomes and this is presented as a general case.  Finally, in 
terms of the distribution of rents, the regulation theory school began to explore 
the underlying political factors that could shape regulation, but since 
regulation was not defined as central to the creation of rents, this could only 
lead to an analysis of possible configurations of interest groups seeking rent, 
rather than a holistic understanding of the process of rent creation and its 
effects on efficiency and distribution.  
 
Fine (1982, 1996) suggests, in fact, that NCE lacks an adequate theoretical 
distinction between rents and profits. In a similar vein, Chang (1994) argues 
that the reason that rent seeking is seen as negative and profit-seeking as 
positive in NCE is the underlying assumption that profits will be productively 
deployed through the market whereas rents will not. Khan28 (2000a) also 
questions the NCE view of rents as being limited. If rents are income flows 
created by any change in the underlying structures of rights of ownership, then 
the effectiveness of rents and the costs of rent seeking will need to be 
                                                 
28
 Khan’s view of rents will be considered in greater detail in the following sections as it forms 
the basis of the analytical framework of this paper.  
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considered within an understanding of the political structure driving the 
creation and management of rents. 
 
4.2.4 Developmental Statist Perspectives 
 
Theories of the Developmental State gained support in the 1960s as a counter to 
the hegemony of the orthodox neo classical view of market primacy. Stemming 
from a re-appraisal of the economic success of the East Asian Newly 
Industrialized Countries (EANICs), primarily South Korea, it placed a much 
greater emphasis on the role of the state in directing and facilitating growth. 
The state, rather than the market, was seen as the principal driver of the growth 
process in Developmental State theories. The EANIC States took an active 
interventionist role in addressing market failures in the areas of coordination 
and learning  that constrained their growth process though the creation of 
targeted rent-creating policies. Chang (1995) (2002) suggests that the effective 
state played two key roles in the formulation of industrial policy – a more static 
role in reducing risk to new entrants by coordinating complementary 
investments and a more dynamic one in developing appropriate linkages and 
modifying policy over the business cycle.  
 
These rent-creating policies were applied with stringent conditionalities of 
performance and the credible threat of withdrawal on non-performance. For 
example, specific heavy industry firms were allowed to benefit from monopoly 
rents to incentivize investment over a long time horizon. However, the 
maintenance of monopoly rent was conditional on achieving certain 
investment targets and was removed if these were not met. Wade (1990) has 
examples of where the state was able to withdraw a rent-creating policy when 
performance targets were not met. This meant that the rents were used to 
overcome specific market failures but were not allowed to become inefficient.  
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A vast body of empirical research (Amsden 1989, Chang 2005, Wade 1995, 
Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985, Ranis 1989, Wade 1988, 1990) showed 
that contrary to earlier claims, the EANIC states were interventionist in the area 
of economic policy, created specific institutions that were crafted to fit specific 
institutional contexts and government capabilities and these context-specific 
interventions could be shown to be the key factor in their economic success.  
 
State-created rents, according to this view, can be seen as the result of policy 
options that the state exercises in order to drive economic growth. Some rents 
were monopoly rents but there were many other types of rents that were 
created to aid the process of economic development. Some examples were rents 
that aided technological assimilation, or rents that provided compensation for 
higher levels of risk inherent in the development of a new industry. The 
distribution of these rents was decided by the policies that created them and 
were targeted towards specific business owners in specific industries in order to 
create incentives for behaviour and investments that were believed to be pro-
growth. Effectively, the distribution of rents were a tool (and a source of power) 
in the hands of the state (the creator of the underlying policy) to influence the 
direction and pace of growth by mitigating growth-reducing market failures. 
 
While the literature by and large does not explicitly consider the question of 
property rights, the creation of a state policy has the effect of creating or 
changing underlying property rights. So, to an extent, according to this 
perspective as in neo-classical economics, property rights remain implicit in the 
discussion29.  However, unlike neo-classical economics, the specification of the 
right or policy is endogenous to the system. It arises from the developmental 
                                                 
29
 Later work by Amsden (2010) looks more explicitly at property rights and explores how ruling 
elites may be able to manage unstable property right phases to actually drive growth. The work 
is similar to the developmental state perspective but addresses the institutional changes in 
terms of property right instability and state ability in terms of elite power. Its perspective on the 
process of property right creation and change is still limited in that it does not consider the 
costs of conflict. 
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state that consciously creates or changes the specification of rights or policies 
and targets their allocation in order to achieve developmental objectives.  
 
The application of these policies by an interventionist state did not lead to 
growth in every context. Pakistan initiated industrial policies very similar to 
South Korea but did not achieve even a fraction of their success. Interventionist 
policies followed in South Asia descended into inefficient ring-fenced rents that 
once given could not be withdrawn and that were accompanied by significant 
rent-seeking that exacerbated their inefficiency (Khan 2000d, b, 1998). 
Therefore, what made a Developmental State? This brings us back to 
discussions of interest groups and power.  
 
The key feature of a developmental state was considered to be its relative 
autonomy – understood as its ability to remain above interest groups that seek 
to undermine its agenda, often through rent seeking. Fine and Rustomjee (1996: 
58) argue that in statist perspectives, “(t)he autonomy of the state is taken as an 
analytical starting point in order to explain why some states can intervene more 
successfully than others”. The objectives of the state were seen as economic 
growth (arising from objective self-interest on the part of rulers) – a very 
contractual view of the state, but its effectiveness was determined by the extent 
to which the state was able to rise above the predatory interests that attacked it 
from the outside. Success could then be ascribed to the states’ relative 
autonomy from economic and political interests – South Korea was a success 
because of greater state autonomy that meant it was better able to manage its 
interventions (Kohli 1994), while Pakistan was a less autonomous state unable 
to maintain efficient policy interventions or abandon inefficient interventions 
and their concomitant rents (Khan 2000d). 
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The question of what made a state developmental was usually analyzed by an 
ex-post investigation of the characteristics of successful states and suggested 
the importance of historical factors that shaped the underlying socio-political 
network through which power was exercised by the state (see for example, 
Kohli (1994) for an analysis of the different colonial impacts of the Japanese in 
Korea and the British in India, and the difference this made to the independent 
states’ relative autonomy, or Rodrik (1997) who explores the impact of greater 
formal education in South Korea and Taiwan in creating a stronger 
bureaucracy, and the more even income distribution resulting in fewer 
powerful groups).  
 
Different descriptors of state autonomy have been forwarded to identify what 
makes one state developmental and not another. For example, Political 
Economy analysts Lloyd and Suzanne Rudolph (1987) classify India as a weak–
strong state, displaying both autonomous power (through its centrist ideology 
and secular democracy consensus) and weakness (evidenced by its capture by 
fragmented but mobilized social forces). These types of descriptors attempted 
to broaden the concept of autonomy to incorporate underlying cultural, 
political or bureaucratic conditions that influence states decisions, embedding 
them within a societal framework – ‘Embedded Autonomy’. However the 
perspective is one of the state managing change from above, and at its most 
effective, being distanced from the political realities below (Whitfield et al. 
2015). This flaw restricts its applicability - the analysis was better at ex-post 
rationalizations of performance rather than providing ex-ante predictors of 
success.  
 
The Developmental State approach has a broader conception of rents than that 
of NCE. First, the approach explored the use of policy and the rents they create 
as tools to drive growth rather than merely as a way to correct market failures 
and approximate a perfect free market. This meant that a wider variety of rents 
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could be seen as welfare-enhancing given specific contexts.  The efficiency of 
the rent depended on the appropriateness of the underlying policy addressing 
growth. The approach also explores the specific conditions that make the rent 
efficient or otherwise, and in this, introduce an understanding of the 
underlying social, political, economic and cultural contexts that determine the 
efficacy of rents. Further, because rents were purposively directed to specific 
beneficiaries and could fall prey to predatory interests, there was an exploration 
of underlying power structures and their varied impacts on rent creation and 
distribution. The attempts to identify the characteristics of embedded 
autonomy provided many interesting strands of analysis that focused on 
understanding historical societal relations underpinning the creation and 
effective enforcement of policies or rights.  
 
However, the perspective of a contractual state that is prone to capture, views 
the state as separate from the political settlement that it is shaped by. This 
makes it harder to see how a state could achieve the ‘embedded autonomy’ 
required to make it developmental. In reality, no state is able to achieve perfect 
autonomy and all states, to a greater or lesser degree, need to manage policy 
creation through a coalition of interest groups that have agency over it 
(Whitfield et al. 2015). If so, all processes of property right creation will entail 
contestation and conflict from the losers in the process and the costs of these 
needs to be considered for the effectiveness of policy.   
 
4.2.5 New Institutional Economics 
 
New Institutional analysis drew its theoretical inspiration from both 
Institutional Economics and Neo-Classical Economics. Institutional economists 
centred their theories on explaining divergent economic performances among 
countries, despite similarities in factor endowments, by looking at institutional 
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structures to determine the institutions and conditions that produced 
economically efficient outcomes.  
 
North (1990) defines institutions as ‘the humanly devised constraints that 
structure political, economic, and social interactions. They consist of both 
informal constraints–sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of 
conduct, and formal rules–constitutions, laws, property rights’. Institutions 
defined the rules of the game that structured the behaviour of organizations, 
the associations of players in the game. Institutions could arise through the 
market or outside of it. The set of institutions that merited the greatest 
attention in institutional economics were property rights.  
 
Institutionalists argue that the process of running the economic system, of 
creating, changing or maintaining institutions such as property rights are not 
costless. This was its most significant departure from the theorizing of property 
rights in Neo Classical Economics. This cost of creating, changing, maintaining, 
transacting or interacting with institutions was referred to as a Transaction 
Cost (Allen 2000). Transaction costs as a category subsumed a variety of costs 
related to creating and enforcing institutional contracts – “the costs of acquiring 
information, reaching agreements about how to organize collective activity, 
observing that these agreements are upheld, and subsequently enforcing these 
agreements” (Khan 2009a: 35).  
 
New Institutional economics (NIE), which gained prominence in the 1980s, 
acknowledged the pervasive existence of market failures and focused on 
“strategic behavior by individuals and organized groups in the context of 
incomplete markets” (Thorbecke 2007: 17). While NIE continued to be based on 
the underlying principles of NCE such as rational individual utility 
maximization, it represented a significant departure in the emphasis placed on 
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market imperfections. According to Fine (2006: 74), “the puzzles are about how 
the market…works imperfectly, rather than how it diverges from perfection 
because of externally imposed constraints (especially through the state)”.  
 
Bates (1995), in his excellent critique of NIE, explains that the need for 
institutions arises from social dilemmas. Social dilemmas are caused when 
rational self-optimizing behaviors for individuals lead to a sub optimal social 
welfare outcome. Then, “institutions provide the mechanisms whereby rational 
individuals can transcend social dilemmas……Non-market institutions enable 
individuals to escape the tensions between individual and social rationality 
created by the perverse incentives that produce the failure of markets” (Bates 
1995: 29).  
 
Property rights are institutions that arise in response to the presence of market 
imperfections in the shape of production externalities. Property rights can 
extend time horizons for the investor and enable contracting to take place by 
reducing the transaction costs of the contract. The emphasis on and modeling 
of transaction costs and the link between property rights and transaction costs 
were key contributions of NIE to the understanding of the functioning of 
institutions. In the NIE analysis, reducing the transaction costs that create a 
market failure would help overcome the failure and thereby improve efficiency. 
Transaction costs could be reduced by enhancing the degree of clarity in the 
definition of property rights, and by strengthening enforcement institutions 
responsible for enforcing the rule of law. Thus, property right clarity and 
enforceability are seen as key to driving down transaction costs.  
 
NIE applied this institutional analysis to the NCEs conception of market 
failures. Arising from the view of market failures as a deviation from a 
theoretical optimum, NIE suggested market failures exist where property right 
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definitions for an asset are ill-defined or incomplete. Incomplete property 
rights make the cost of transacting with that asset too high. A more complete 
specification of the underlying property right would reduce transaction costs 
and remove the market imperfection. However, the specification of more 
complete property rights was not a costless process and involved transaction 
costs. Therefore one reason market failures persisted could be that the 
transaction costs involved in the changing and enforcing of property rights to 
mitigate the market imperfection were too high. From this perspective, a 
monopoly may exist because the particular specification of property rights that 
sustains the monopoly persists because the transaction costs of redefining 
property rights over the monopoly to allow competition are higher than the 
efficiency benefit that would be gained from the institutional intervention. 
Thus NIE is able to explain not only the source of the market failure, but also 
why those failures may persist.     
 
Thorbecke (2007) suggests that appropriate institutions were seen not just as 
instruments to reduce transaction costs but as routes to reducing opportunistic 
behavior and corruption. The state is prey to interest groups and rent-seeking 
and this increases the role for regulation. “The accumulation of distributional 
coalitions increases the complexity of regulation (and) the role of government” 
(Olson 1982: 73). Institutions performed the role of regulation to ensure that 
incentives were not distorted in the absence of fully functioning markets. In 
other words, appropriately defined institutions would not only reduce rents but 
could also affect rent-seeking, an analysis that has some parallels to theoretical 
developments in the neo-classical stream. North (1981) also points to the 
possibility that property rights institutions may be created not just to reduce 
transaction costs but also for the personal political gain of the members of the 
state, a view that echoes Neo-classical Political Economy theorists like 
McChesney.  
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The puzzle was how ‘good’ property right institutions were developed and what 
the factors were, that led appropriate growth enhancing institutions to thrive in 
certain contexts (Rodrik 2008). While the classical economists and early 
institutional economists explored politics as a determining factor, most of 
modern NIE theory is more static in that it considers the institutional 
framework as separate from the political one.  
 
One approach to the creation of the appropriate institutional framework is the 
‘Good Governance’ agenda which was recommended by International Aid 
Organizations. The view here was that developing specific growth-enhancing 
institutions such as increased competition, democracy, accountability, 
transparency, rule of law, etc. that strengthened property rights was universally 
valuable and could be created through policy change. However, the failure of 
many attempts by Governments and Aid organizations to force fit a set of ‘one 
size fits all’ policies points to the fact that the perspective does not adequately 
recognize either the transaction costs involved or the political costs and conflict 
involved in a change of property rights.  
 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson provided a different explanation of property 
right development. Linking settler mortality data with institutional structures, 
they claimed that ‘good’ institutions and property right clarity was imported 
and established in countries that colonizers were keen to settle in, as compared 
to other countries where their ambitions were purely extractive (Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Robinson 2001). The problem with this approach is that it reverses 
the direction of causality running between economic growth and property right 
clarity, asserting that the latter came first. It also does not explore the process 
of property right creation (no rights are created in a costless and conflict-free 
manner) and makes no mention of existing property right structures prior to 
the arrival of the colonizers, or the forced property right modifications that 
allowed colonizers to conquer and rule their colonies – extractive or otherwise. 
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In their subsequent book ‘Why Nations Fail’ (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012) 
they expand this hypothesis more generally to suggest that stable and inclusive 
economic institutions (such as property rights) are contingent on the existence 
of stable and inclusive political institutions to support them. While this does 
recognize a link between property right changes and political institutions, it 
does not go far enough in explaining what these links are and what they arise 
from.  
 
North (1995) argues that while NIE drew from NCE the fundamental concepts 
of scarcity and competition, it extends the discussion by dropping a crucial 
implicit assumption of NCE – that of instrumental rationality, which assumes 
that the real world is identical to the decision makers perception of it, and that 
the decision maker has all the knowledge and computational power required to 
make decisions. In such a world, there is no information asymmetry, no costs to 
transactions, and no need for institutions. NIE’s critical contribution was the 
understanding of the ubiquitous existence of transaction costs and therefore 
the need for institutional analysis. However, while property right definition is 
endogenous to the economic system in NIE, political factors are not, in any real 
sense (Bates 1995).  
 
In reality, property right changes are heavily conflict ridden and highly 
contested processes since they change an individual’s access to productive and 
valuable assets. The conflict inherent in the Capitalist Transition that Marx 
based his analysis on is a case in point. By ignoring the distributional 
implications of different institutions, NIE ignores the underlying political 
reality and the real impact this could have on the effectiveness of institutional 
performance. The objective was to identify blueprints for universally applicable 
institutional forms that will overcome key market failures as well as protect 
against the harmful side-effects of intervention. Yet, the actual processes 
through which institutions evolve are specific to the political conditions of 
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particular countries. Most of NIE is, in effect, a best practice analysis of policy, 
rather than a deeper understanding of underlying institutional processes. As a 
result, while it approaches a more complete view on the creation of rents, it 
fails to adequately represent the contestation over rent that drives institutional 
evolution and thereby economic growth. 
 
The central critique of both the neo-classical and new institutional views of 
rent theory is that they do not consider adequately the context in which the 
underlying property rights are created or modified. Fine (1994) suggests that 
different rent theories were based on different and specific views of how landed 
property is organized. Viewing rent theory as abstracted from its view of landed 
property robs it of its analytical power. According to this critique, rent theory 
has languished as a result of this insufficient understanding of landed property 
that underpins the theory. For the expanded view of rents not necessarily 
arising from land, the same principle holds. Abstracted from the context that 
governs the creation of the property right, the analysis of rents loses 
explanatory power. 
 
4.2.5.1 Limited Access Orders 
 
There is however a recent development in the NIE space that considers political 
and economic evolution using rents and property rights in a much more 
nuanced fashion. In their book Violence and Social Orders in 2009, North, 
Wallis and Weingast (henceforth NWW) presented a new theoretical construct 
to understand historical development of societies that combines an 
understanding of rents and property rights from NIE with other strands of work 
that have looked more explicitly at political factors in economic development 
such as Bates (2001)and Khan(2009a, 2010, 2012).  
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In Prosperity and Violence, Bates (2001) expressed the role of the state in the 
growth process as one that centralizes the capacity of violence and thereby 
reduces the risk of expropriation that deters investment with long time 
horizons. The problem with this perspective is that, like the Developmental 
State view, it promotes a Weberian (Weber 1948) view of a strong, autonomous 
state.  
 
The NWW theory of Open and Limited Access Orders is a far more nuanced 
view of the state and the domestication of violence. The authors identify two 
predominant types of social orders or patterns of social organization based on 
different ways of dealing with violence. The Open Access Order (OAO) 
approximates to the modern Weberian state with impersonal affiliations to 
organizations, secure property rights, the predominance of formal 
organizations, etc. In contrast the Natural State, the Limited Access Order 
(LAO) is characterized by limited access to organizations based on personal 
affiliations, smaller numbers of organizations, hierarchy, insecure property 
rights, vulnerable economies and small centralized governments. However, 
unlike the modernist view, the authors do not characterize this as a necessary 
progression from LAO to OAO, nor a normative direction of growth.  
 
The authors’ characterization of the LAO, and its applicability to economic and 
political contexts such as India, is of most interest to us. The LAO reduces 
violence by forming a dominant coalition of interests. This coalition creates 
organizations that generate, protect and distribute property rights and rents 
that they benefit from. The dominant coalition acts as a group of shared 
interests, since the failure to protect the interests of any part of the coalition 
leads to a loss of rents for the whole. The double balance leads to stability in 
society. However no coalition is permanently stable and when destabilized 
through external shocks or unintended consequences, requires a renegotiation 
of the distribution of rents. This has some similarities to Khan’s framework of 
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political settlements considered in the next section. However, Khans’ analysis 
sees the coalition as a much more fluid and temporary agreement between 
various factions that do not necessarily include all the elite, and organizations 
in the LAO are more likely to compete than collude, in Khan’s view (Roy 2013).  
 
NWWs view of rents also differs from Khan’s perspective. According to the 
former, rents exist in LAOs because of the limited entry to organizations but in 
OAOs rents are competed away. However, there is substantial evidence of rents 
and rent seeking in advanced capitalist economies, just in a more formalized 
manner. As Developmental State theories showed, the process of transition to 
capitalism requires the provision of rents for a variety of purposes – learning 
rents, Schumpeterian rents for innovation, rents to overcome coordination 
issues, etc. There are also significant redistributive rents – rents required as 
pay-offs to maintain political stability. These requirements exist in advanced 
economies as well, but the difference is that while in advanced economies 
(OAOs) these can largely be formalized, for reasons that will be explored in the 
next section, they remain informal in LAOs or developing economies. 
   
4.2.5.2 Latin America and Reform Coalitions 
 
Some authors in New Political Economics have applied frameworks that start 
with an analysis of the underlying socio-economic structures. Schamis (1999), 
in his study of reform and the role of distributional politics in Latin America 
shows that all conceptions of power in terms of interest group coalitions only 
view this influence in a negative light.30 There is no account of how 
distributional coalitions may actually work together with the government to 
support a reform agenda since it operates in the interests of the coalition to do 
                                                 
30
 For example see (Acemoglu and Robinson 2000)for an account of how losers are likely to 
block reform and institution building. 
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so. He points out that most liberalization agendas, rather than being opposed 
by key interests, tend to be supported by proactive collective action by them 
since liberalization creates immense new opportunities for rents. His analysis 
“regards capacity and choice as rooted in power relations among socio-economic 
groups” (ibid :238). He points to the lack of recognition in conventional 
analyses of the fact that economic agents tend to be informed of the 
distributional implications of government policy and will therefore work to 
block or support it depending on the distribution and on their influence. This 
explanation of policy evolution shares some similarities with Khan’s work on 
political settlements, which we review next, but it is limited by the fact that it 
assumes that the asymmetries between interest groups can be explained largely 
by their differences in market power. This reduces all interest group coalitions 
to marketised distributional coalitions and does not consider groups whose 
source of power, and therefore preferred route of redistribution or 
compensation, lies outside the market. 
 
Etchemendy (2001) applied Schamis’ theory to a study of reform coalitions in 
Argentina to understand the construction of processes of compensation by the 
state in order to continue to maintain coalitional support for the reform 
agenda. His study shows that the Argentinean state managed compensations to 
interest group coalitions in a horizontal manner across different sectors during 
reform. The process of coalition forming was one of political bargaining among 
the winners, rather than compensation to the losers.  His analysis explains the 
differential level and speed of reform across different sub-sectors. It also brings 
out the complex bargaining processes involved in decision making and 
implementation that reflects underlying power balances.  However it suffers 
from the same weaknesses as the previous study. 
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4.3 Khan’s View of Rent Creation and Political 
Settlements 
 
The theoretical framework that I have chosen to apply in this thesis is one 
developed by Khan(1996, 1998, 2000b, c, 2008, 2009a, 2010, 2012, 2013). Khan’s 
work uses a neo-classical definition of rents as “policy induced income flows” 
arising from the creation or modification of a property right. He incorporates 
the transaction cost analysis of NIE and the extended view of rents from the 
Developmental State literature. However he extends the analysis by exploring 
the costs and conflict involved in property right creation and the processes of 
elite bargaining that accompany it. He also embeds this analysis in a nuanced 
and historical materialist characterization of the underlying political, economic 
and social context that conditions the creation of organizations and the 
effectiveness of institutions that he calls a Political Settlement. 
 
4.3.1 Property Rights, Transaction Costs, Transition Costs  
 
Khan begins by using concepts developed in Institutional Economics and 
shared with NIE. His analysis defines rents as incremental income flows 
associated with the creation or modification of specific property rights. As with 
the market failure literature, Khan agrees that market failures arise by 
definition from high transaction costs. However, unlike NIE economists, Khan’s 
view is that the creation or realignment of property rights may reduce some 
transaction costs while simultaneously increasing others, and feasible 
improvements in the definition and enforcement of property rights are 
generally insufficient for ensuring growth and structural transformation in 
developing countries. The structures of property rights are constantly evolving 
and in addition, the structures that drive growth under one set of conditions 
will not be the same under a different set of conditions. Thus enhancing the 
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rights of some types of asset owners may have a far better impact on growth 
than strengthening the rights of others. What then becomes relevant for a state 
in terms of growth objectives is to minimize the transaction costs that have the 
maximum impact on growth, what Khan refers to as the “growth-constraining 
transaction costs” (Khan 2009a: 37).   
 
But institutions such as property rights do not just define the rules of asset use 
and the costs of the contracting and enforcement. They also define the 
distribution of benefits arising from the specific definition of the right. In other 
words, property rights determine the distribution of rents where rents are 
defined as “policy-induced income flows that would not exist in the absence of 
that policy”(Khan 2008: 21). The point of a property right is that it benefits 
particular constituencies or groups and not others i.e., where there are winners, 
there are also losers. And where there are losers, there is also the possibility of 
contestation over these allocations. The creation or realignment of property 
rights is thus inherently conflict-ridden and driven by the rent-seeking 
activities of different groups of organized interests. Property right changes 
could have a huge impact on the wealth-generating ability or social status for 
generations to come, and with so much at stake, are often hotly contested. For 
analytical clarity, Khan defines these costs of conflict as “transition costs”,  “the 
costs of creating new rights or altering or destroying existing rights” and 
distinguishes them from transaction costs that are the costs of operating with 
and enforcing existing rights (Khan 2009a: 53).  
 
Transition costs can be the most significant costs of changing property right 
structures. These costs may be those of organizing negotiated transitions or, 
more importantly, the political contestation costs of overcoming the resistance 
of losers during processes of restructuring rights. The size and scale of these 
transition costs depend on the power and political relationships between actors 
both within the state and in society. Therefore, the actual evolution of property 
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rights is not always driven by growth considerations but rather by the 
calculations and organizational power of different organizations of rent seekers.  
 
The outcome for growth therefore depends critically on the types of 
organizations that exist in a society and the distribution of organizational 
power across them. The configuration of organizational capabilities and powers 
can determine the path of institutional evolution and the particular types of 
rents that are created. These may not necessarily be growth-enhancing, and in 
many cases they are not. Sustaining or raising growth requires the reduction of 
growth-constraining transaction costs, but the maintenance of political stability 
might sustain inefficient institutions and high transaction costs. The state’s 
responses can therefore be analyzed in terms of the ‘management’ of trade-offs 
between growth and political stability, twin pressures on institutional evolution 
at any point in time (Khan 2009a).  
 
4.3.2 Political Settlements 
 
It is in the analysis of transition costs that Khan begins to disaggregate 
organizations within the state and in society into distinct constituent players 
with different political and organizational power, with shifting alignments and 
relationships with each other, and it is this organizational context which 
defines the growth–stability trade-offs facing particular paths of institutional 
evolution. The central organizing concept used here is the Political Settlement. 
Political settlements (PS) may be understood as the structure of power within 
which institutional decisions are made and political compromises between 
powerful groups shape institutional and policy choices. Khan (2010: 4) defines a 
political settlement more specifically as “a combination of power and 
institutions that is mutually compatible and also sustainable in terms of 
economic and political viability”.  
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The market is not viewed as a space consisting of atomized individual 
constituents, nor the state as the Weberian single actor. Instead, the rent-
seeking activities that drive institutional change are typically driven by 
relatively small numbers of individuals or organizations with significant 
concentrations of economic and political power. A finite number of large 
business houses dominate particular sectors and their size and importance in 
the economy can give some of them asymmetrical access to and influence over 
the political and decision-making arms of the state machinery. Similarly, unlike 
the Weberian view of the state as a single unified entity with a common goal, 
this analysis recognizes that the state is comprised of a multitude of political 
and bureaucratic organizations. At the national and regional levels, political 
organizations compete for power to constitute the ruling coalition. In 
developing countries, these political organizations often use different types of 
patron–client networks to mobilize supporters and distribute rents to them. 
Unlike the LAO framework that suggests that there are fewer organizations in 
LAOs, Khan argues that, on the contrary, mature developing economies 
(mature LAOs) are characterized by a proliferation of informal organizations 
that use their power to compete for rents.  
 
Power is defined in a specific way: the relevant concept of power here is 
Holding Power, defined as “the capability of an individual or group to engage 
and survive in conflicts” (Khan 2010: 6). An individual or group’s holding power 
is determined by his/their ability to impose costs on others in a conflict and 
his/their ability to absorb the costs imposed by others in a conflict. This in turn 
depends on the success of an organization in raising funds and mobilizing its 
supporters, both to contribute to the cause, and to absorb the cost of conflict 
when required. Khan suggests that the power of an organization could arise 
from economic power but this is not a necessary condition. Holding power 
could also come from political power, from access to formal authority (the 
154 
 
power of position), or from organizational strength (the power of numbers). 
The relevant factor is the ability to use this power to sustain conflict. Di John 
and Putzel (2009) emphasize that it is the bargaining outcomes between 
contending elites, rather than elite collusion that forms the basis of the political 
settlement.   
 
The political settlement, if relatively stable, will define the distribution of 
benefits for the dominant coalition. The stability of the settlement rests in its 
ability to distribute rents in line with the distribution of power within the 
settlement. The settlement will thus resist any distribution of benefits that is 
not in line with the current distribution of power and attempt to change it. This 
maintains the distribution of power, and stabilizes and strengthens the political 
settlement. However, the very distribution of these benefits can have the 
impact of changing the distribution of power in unforeseen ways. It is in this 
that the dynamic nature of the political settlements analysis lies. Even when 
stable, the political settlement is never static, as each distribution of benefits 
has to be negotiated. But the settlement is also prone to instability, caused by a 
change in the distribution of power of its members. Any instability of the 
political settlement gives rise to conflict and contestation over rent 
distributions until the settlement is renegotiated.  
 
Conflicts or contestation over the evolution of property rights arise when 
particular groups feel that the distribution of rents that changes in property 
rights imply are not consistent with their expectations, given their assessment 
of their relative power, or when the distribution of power changes as a result of 
ongoing organizational activities, whereby groups perceive that they are 
stronger and demand changes in rights to reflect their power. Contestation and 
conflicts are likely to continue until the distribution of benefits or the 
distribution of power is realigned so that the two are roughly in balance again.  
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This characteristic, the attempt to align the distribution of rents with the 
prevailing balance of power or to change the balance of power to reflect the 
distribution of rents is a critical feature of the political settlement. At a macro-
level the balance of power across organizations (in a society without escalating 
levels of violence) is therefore likely to be supported by the distribution of rents 
created by its institutions, and this describes the political settlement. The 
macro-level description of the political settlement then helps to assess the 
likelihood of institutional and policy evolution in particular directions as the 
distribution of organizational power determines the transition costs of 
institutional evolution in different ways. Political settlements defined in this 
way are not static but are continuously evolving, either gradually, or in some 
cases, discontinuously. Therefore, distributive arrangements based on 
institutions need to be flexible enough to allow for changes in order to 
maintain political stability.  
 
Some commentators have argued that inclusionary political settlements have a 
greater degree of stability (North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009, Whaites 2008). 
Khan’s analysis would lead us to the conclusion that wholly inclusionary 
political settlements are neither possible nor necessarily stable. The former 
suggest that there is a group of ruling elites that are relatively stable over the 
long run and ensuring a settlement that does not challenge any groups of these 
ruling elite should lead to less challenge and greater stability. However, if we 
apply Khan’s perspective of a factional grouping that comes together for 
temporary gain then it is less easy to see a permanent and stable coalition of 
the ruling elite, and shifting boundaries between gainers and losers in the 
process are bound to lead to distributive conflicts. A high level of inclusion is 
unsustainable since resources are limited and the potential claimants are many 
– those with not just political clout but other sources of holding power. Under 
these circumstances the settlement is not likely to be inclusionary.  
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However, what leads to relative stability is either a small group with well-
established sources of power that is not easily challenged (such as a stable and 
powerful government) or a greater balance of power among different claimant 
groups and a distribution of benefits that mirrors this balance of power. A 
stable political settlement and one that is evolving without an escalation of 
violence requires a minimum level of economic performance to sustain the 
rents that are politically necessary, and it also requires a maximum bound of 
political conflict to sustain economic performance (See Figure 4.2). This view 
of a political settlement is more fluid and is therefore better able to explain a 
change in policy and a consequent change in the distribution of benefits in one 
period by examining the effect of policy on the political settlement of the 
previous period. 
 
Figure 4.2: Political Settlements Impact Growth-Stability Trade-offs 
Source: Khan(2010: 21). 
 
While the political settlement is a useful analytical tool it is an inexact one. The 
distribution of organizational power cannot be mapped in its entirety nor can 
all institutional and policy changes be explained by the relative power of 
organizations. Indeed, if that was the case there would never be conflicts in 
society because all institutional changes would be consistent with the 
distribution of power. Rather, the use of the political settlements framework is 
precisely to evaluate the growth–stability trade-offs associated with policies and 
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institutions that are introduced as a result of all sorts of contingent 
opportunities and factors. The argument here is that the macro-level 
distribution of organizational power will determine the sustainability of 
particular incremental institutional changes and can help to explain why 
apparently inefficient structures of rents can survive. I extend this argument to 
look at the structures of power at a less aggregated level of the sector in the 
following section. The analysis also suffers from the weakness of being easier to 
rationalize ex-post that identify ex-ante. However the identification of the 
potential dynamics of a particular settlement allows policy formulation to 
better predict institutional effectiveness.   
 
Political Settlements theory and similar characterisations of elite bargaining 
have been receiving increasing attention in academia and policy (Di John and 
Putzel 2009, Evans 2012, North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009, North 2012, Fritz 
and Rocha Menocal 2007, Gray and Whitfield 2014, Whitfield et al. 2015, Kelsall 
and Seiha 2014, Sen 2012). The applicability of the theory is predicated upon a 
detailed and nuanced understanding of the specific political settlement that 
impacts the institutional context under study. This understanding could 
operate at two levels of aggregation.  
 
The first is a set of more general characteristics of developing country political 
settlements that effect their organizational composition and institutional 
context and that in turn condition the types of rents created and their 
distribution. Khan characterizes the political settlement in South Asia 
somewhat differently to the characterization of mature LAOs. The relevant 
characteristics that determine this difference are clientelism and informality. 
The next section will consider these in detail. 
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While Khan’s work uses a political settlement defined at a national level, I 
argue here that a disaggregation to a sectoral level political settlement, and the 
understanding of how it relates to policy making in the sector, as well as how it 
interacts with the macro political settlement at the national level provides a 
better understanding of the effects on sectoral policy. This is laid out in the 
subsequent section.   
 
4.3.3 India’s Political Settlement – Clientelism and Informality 
 
The Political settlements in developing countries are different from those in 
advanced countries in some crucial ways. The differences can be explained by 
considering the type of patron–client network prevalent in society and the 
persistence of informality.  
 
Khan (2010) identifies 4 types of patron–client relationships in his typology of 
settlements based on whether a) holding power is based primarily on formal 
institutions or not, and b) whether the formal institutions are growth 
enhancing or not (Fig. 4.3). A patron–client network describes a network 
involving a patron as an organizer organizing several clients who offer 
organizational support in exchange for benefits. The clients in turn can be 
patrons for lower-level clients. The structures of patron–client networks vary 
greatly across regions and over time and tend to be historically determined. 
The type that is most relevant to our discussion and that tends to characterize 
developing societies like India is the clientelist political settlement.     
 
The central characteristic of a clientelist settlement is one where the 
distribution of holding power lies significantly outside the formal productive 
sectors of the economy (Khan 2010: 53). The exercise of power often takes 
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personal and informal forms but growth-enhancing formal institutions can 
often co-exist with these. However, the majority of the power does not come 
from formally institutionalized sources. In theory clientelist settlements could 
achieve a variety of economic outcomes depending on how well the alignment 
of the ruling coalition can benefit from policies that are growth-enhancing in 
the wider sense.  
 
 
Figure 4.3: A Typology of Political Settlements  
Source: (Khan 2010:49) 
 
In clientelist political settlements the patron is typically a political entrepreneur 
and the clients tend to be faction members who constitute a faction within 
political parties and other organizations that may appear to be formally 
constituted, but which operate in significantly informal ways. The organization 
of the faction is based on the patron providing the clients with rents 
commensurate with their political or organizational support. The clients’ 
membership of a faction is purely based on his/her expected returns rather 
than on any shared belief system or objective. This factional rather than class-
based organization of politics makes political support more transient and more 
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vulnerable to changes in rent distribution strategies through patron–client 
networks (Khan 2007).   
 
The patron relies on informal rent distribution as he or she typically lacks the 
resources for a broader and more formal distribution of benefits and even if she 
did not, would not be able to justify its distribution to broad electoral 
constituencies through formal budgetary and other institutions. Wade (1984: 
12), in his analysis of state and bureaucracy in some south Indian states, 
indicated that the cost of achieving and maintaining political power was very 
high and resources often  needed to be raised by the incumbent through 
different forms of corruption, rather than being granted by the party. The high 
cost of politics and the transient nature of factional politics combine to place a 
high degree of pressure on the ruling coalition to attempt to maintain political 
stability. Thus informal transfers of rents and rights are used to maintain the 
organization and this ensures significant informal rent creation in such a 
political settlement. However, the use of informal redistributions is not 
necessarily detrimental to growth as assumed by mainstream analysis. In this 
context, the informal redistributions may be necessary to maintain political 
stability given the characteristics of the political settlement. The resource 
redistribution may even result in accelerating the emergence of a class of 
nascent entrepreneurs with productive capabilities and these would drive the 
development of more formal institutions to protect their benefits over time. 
 
Figure 4.4 provides a visual depiction of resource flows at a very general level 
in the clientelist political settlement of the Indian type. Within India, there 
would be further significant regional variations in the types of organizations 
that dominate the ruling coalition and this too would have an effect on local 
institutional and policy evolution.  
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Figure 4.4: A Representation of Resource flows in the Indian Clientelist 
PS.  
Source: Khan (2000:22) 
 
Informality is thus a key feature of clientelist PS. While the LAO/OAO 
framework contends that a distinguishing feature between the two is the 
number of organizations present, Khan argues in contrast that LAOs often have 
a multitude of organizations, with a greater predominance of informal 
organizations. The source of this informality can be traced to the inability of 
the formal sector to generate sufficient rents. In advanced economies, the 
source of rent for redistribution can be raised by the ruling coalition through 
the formal economy. Tax revenues can provide the rents needed to ensure 
political stability and social redistributions. Khan contends that in developed 
countries with a large productive capitalist sector political and economic 
powers converge. The political settlement reflects the distribution of power 
based on formal capitalist institutions and the ruling coalition seeks to protect 
these institutions. In contrast, in developing countries the formal productive 
capitalist sector is too small and underdeveloped to dominate society and to 
provide the resources for adequate redistributions through formal budgetary 
processes to maintain political stability. In these cases, formal institutions alone 
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are not likely to be sufficient as these institutions mainly allocate rents to 
formal organizations that are by definition not the dominant ones in 
developing countries. As a result, it is not surprising that informal institutions 
and modifications of formal institutions that allocate rents to informal 
organizations play an important role in developing countries. This may explain 
why countries in the process of Capitalist Transformation are likely to 
demonstrate unstable property rights, and high levels of off-market transfers 
and corruption. And it may also explain why Good Governance policies 
designed to weed out corruption through greater transparency and rule-based 
formal institutions are likely to fail as they don’t take into account the context 
within which informality thrives.  
 
Khan suggests another reason for the predominance of informality in post-
colonial developing states. He contends that colonial power structures created 
a class of intermediate interests whose support of the colonial state was 
maintained through the provision of rents from the state. This intermediate 
class continued to exert the same pressure over the newly formed independent 
state. The State was unable to afford such redistribution on a large scale and 
unable to justify limited redistribution to specific intermediate groups. As a 
result, much of this redistribution took place through informal means. 
Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) have argued that the political power of elites in 
post-colonial states stem from the unequal asset distributions of the colonial 
period. This view suggests that the source of power was economic. Khan’s view 
suggests instead that the source of intermediate class power is organizational.  
 
Kalecki (1972) is credited with the first analysis of intermediate classes and the 
role they play in the transition to capitalism31. A number of authors have since 
                                                 
31
 Note that Kalecki saw the rise of the power of the intermediate classes as a transient 
phenomenon, losing its relevance with economic growth. However, Harriss-White (2003) 
persuasively argues that the evidence indicates that they are still a numerically powerful 
coalition in India, with the ability to impact economic policy to their own ends. 
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explored the importance of intermediate classes in development in the Indian 
subcontinent. Each has defined these in slightly different ways. Bardhan (1984) 
claims that a mix of inter-class alliances were created from coalitions Gandhi 
encouraged during the independence movement in India. He refers to a 
coalition of rich farmers, emerging industrialists and the intelligentsia or 
bureaucrats as the “Dominant Proprietary Classes”, who, he believes, have had 
the greatest negative impact on India’s growth32. Desai (1981: 390), for example, 
identifies the petty-bourgeois haute-proletarian classes (the “petty proles….with 
little education and less property”) as the strongest political force in India.  
Partha Chatterjee (1994) and Sudipta Kaviraj (1988) see the over-extended 
bureaucracy created by the ideology of state planning as the most powerful 
influence on policy.   
 
The common thread to these differing descriptions is a class or group of people 
with power stemming, not from their economic power, but from their 
organizational capabilities. These organizational abilities in non-capitalist 
sectors are the source of their holding power. Harriss-White (2003: 71) quotes a 
Tamil saying: 
  ‘What Thangam (gold/bribes) cannot do, Sangam (organization) can do’. 
 
The source of holding power in clientelist PS is often organizational power, 
specifically that stemming from powerful informal organizations that are 
outside the formal capitalist sector. As a corollary the institutions and forms of 
redistribution in the PS are also informal in nature. Informal organizations are 
thus critical to understanding the operation of the political settlement and its 
impact on policy. This organizing framework of a Clientelist and informal 
                                                 
32
 Bardhan did not explicitly define which groups made up the intermediate classes but referred instead to 
the dominant group who held significant property rights in land and industry and the government 
bureaucrats who could award these.  
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political settlement gives us a context within which to view the creation of 
property rights and the distribution of benefits that accrue in the formulation 
of policy within a sector.  
 
Sen (2012) suggests that Khan’s framework of political settlements is better at 
describing the political drivers of growth accelerations than the political drivers 
of growth maintenance. He believes that Khans framework is based on informal 
rather than formal organisations and more advanced growth transitions will 
move to less clientelist and more hybrid political settlements where formal 
institutions and organisations become more important. This thesis considers a 
sector in its growth acceleration phase where both formal and informal 
institutions have had an impact on the growth of the sector. As long as holding 
power reflects both the power that comes from informal as well as more formal 
sources, the PS analysis should be as useful in characterizing the growth 
maintenance phase of the sector.  
 
4.3.4 The Sectoral Political Settlement in Telecom 
 
The description of the relevant organizations in a political settlement will 
depend on the particular institutions or policies that are the focus of a 
particular analysis. The relative capabilities and powers of these organizations 
can then help us to understand the combinations of formal and informal 
institutions that generate rents in the system, and the likely directions in which 
they could evolve.  
 
Khan’s work refers to a single political settlement governing all policy at a 
national level. In his sectoral studies, he then looks at key sectoral influences 
and how they operate on the national political settlement. The political 
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settlements approach as elaborated in Khan’s work, and used in other studies 
(Kelsall and Seiha 2014, Whitfield et al. 2015) describes the political settlement 
at the national level between ruling elites and powerful interests. These sectoral 
studies do explore the impact of a political settlement at a sectoral level but the 
organizations and agencies enumerated in their political settlement tend to be 
able to influence the national level settlement. Thus an agency is considered to 
be part of the settlement only when it is able to demonstrate sufficient power 
over the overall settlement at the national level. However, there may be other 
organizations or agencies in the political settlement that are not powerful 
enough to have an impact at the national level but do affect outcomes at a 
sectoral level through informal means.  
 
This thesis uses the political settlement at a further level of disaggregation – a 
sectoral political settlement. The use of a sectoral political settlement allows us 
to explore the impact of agencies that do not have the power to influence a 
national level political settlement but nevertheless could have an impact on the 
outcomes at a sectoral level. The sectoral political settlement allows us to 
disaggregate the organisations and agencies within the national political 
settlement, and consider the ones that have a specific role with the sector. For 
example, the ruling coalition or the state could be further disaggregated into 
the Ministry of Telecommunications and the Department of 
Telecommunications (DoT) at a sectoral level as well as the Ruling party, the 
Opposition and Regional Political parties at a national level. This will allow us 
to not only look at the agencies that are relevant to the specific sector in 
question, but also help us understand the interactions between the different 
agencies within the ruling coalition.  
 
The sectoral PS is distinct from but linked to the national PS. Agencies or 
organizations in the political settlement will attempt through contestation to 
grab a greater share of the rents, using their relative power in the PS. This is 
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likely to result in the rent distributions in the sector being aligned to the 
distributions of power in the sectoral political settlement. However, if there is a 
large enough rent capture by certain organizations in the sectoral PS, and a 
threat to the stability of the national PS, then the agencies with power at a 
national level could intervene to re-establish stability at the sectoral level. 
Additionally, exogenous changes that de-stabilize the national level PS may also 
affect the stability of the sectoral level PS.  
 
The sectoral PS is particularly useful to explain policy shifts in the telecom 
sector as it reflects the fluidity and the mutability of the underlying 
relationships. The sectoral PS is better able to reflect smaller changes in the PS 
that would not be captured at a national level but could nevertheless influence 
outcomes in the sector. The next chapter will map out the particular agencies 
and organisations that make up the sectoral political settlement in the telecom 
sector with a view to studying policy changes from this perspective.  
 
4.4 Summary 
 
We have discussed why policy-created rents are a significant part of the flow of 
funds in the Telecom Sector. Chapter 3 has established that the rents in the 
Indian telecom sector are both large and heavily contested. This thesis 
contends that an analysis of the sector’s policies from the perspective of the 
rents generated and their distributions will help explain policy choices in the 
sector better than current analyses of the sector that focus on Good Governance 
prescriptions.  
 
To this end, this chapter explored the literature on rent theory to identify the 
analytical framework that would best apply to our current problem. Early 
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theoretical work on rents was focused on land rents and established the 
importance of resource scarcity as the underlying reason for the existence of 
rents and the fact that the differential quality of the resource gave rise to 
differential rents. While the early work hinted at the property rights that 
defined rent distributions, the conceptualization of property rights remained 
implicit in most of the analysis.  
 
Marxist analysis brought in the importance of considering the context of power 
relations within which these property rights were defined and this strand of 
thought was further developed by Institutional economists. Advances in Neo-
classical economics and NIE contributed the concept of market failures and 
established the existence of transaction costs that needed to be reduced in 
order to overcome particular market failures. This reintroduced property rights 
to the discussion on rents in a more explicit fashion, but the emphasis in most 
of the literature on the need for property right stability as a precursor to 
economic development misses the point.  
 
NIE also broadened the scope of the discussion around how policy is made and 
what influences it, and there has been a greater focus on the role of elites in 
decision making although, in a majority of the studies, the impact of elite 
influence on policy is believed to be invariably negative. The neo liberal 
consensus on policy could be summed up by the “Good Governance” approach 
to policy, that emphasizes the need for base factors such as stable property 
rights and rule of law, and then increased transparency, independent regulation 
and a greater devolution of power to lower-level community-based formal 
organizations.  
 
There are however, more recent efforts to understand the process of property 
right creation in greater detail by heterodox economists. These views suggest 
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that stable property rights are unlikely to exist during the process of 
development as the capitalist transition taking place is predicated on changing 
property right structures. However, all property right definition is bound to 
involve contestation since property right definitions create winners and losers.  
 
Khan’s framework of rents and political settlements provides the more detailed 
and nuanced way at looking at the process of property right creation and its 
consequent rent streams. Khan establishes that while property rights may be 
required in a sector and the rents they produce may help overcome specific 
market failures that hold back the development of the sector, the policies that 
define property rights also create transition costs, or costs of contestation of the 
property rights themselves. Which rights are defined and who they benefit is 
determined by the underlying substructure of power that Khan refers to as a 
political settlement. The rent flows from policy in turn can impact the political 
settlement over time, either strengthening it or changing it to better reflect the 
new distribution of benefit from policy.  
 
The framework of rents within the context of a political settlement helps 
identify both the source of the significant rent flows in the telecom sector as 
well as explain the choice of policy that directs the distribution of these benefits 
within the political settlement that influences policy making in telecom. Khan’s 
extended view of rents and rent seeking provides a basis for understanding the 
role that policy rents play in the development of the sector. However the rent 
flows cannot be explained adequately without the application of the analytical 
lens of the political settlement. The Political Settlement delineates the network 
of power relationships that determines the policy that drives the quantum and 
direction of the rent flows. The changes in the PS from these rent flows in one 
period help explain the policy choices of the subsequent period. The previous 
section argued that applying the analysis at a greater level of disaggregation – 
that of the Sectoral Political Settlement could enhance the detailed 
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understanding of the influences on policy at a sectoral level as well as the fluid 
reflection of policy outcomes on the sector.  
 
The next chapter will apply this framework of rents within political settlements 
to the Indian telecom sector. The chapter will define the rent flows we shall 
consider in our analysis and define the parameters of the specific political 
settlement in the telecom sector. The chapter will also lay out the limitations of 
this framework and the likely biases in the data. It will sketch out the research 
methodology and sources of information before proceeding to the data analysis.  
  
170 
 
Chapter 5: Research Methodology 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This thesis began with the premise that current analyses of the telecom sector 
in India have been unable to satisfactorily explain the various policy changes 
driving the development of the sector as they are based on static definitions of 
efficiency and hence unable to map the dynamic implications of policy. As a 
result, explanations characterize the growth of the sector as taking place in 
spite of poor policy choices. Earlier chapters argued that specific features of the 
Indian telecom sector make it a rent-rich sector and one that is likely to see 
intense contests over rent due to its competitive structure and economics. 
These contests over rent often include the state, which views the sector as a key 
resource for rent extraction. After a review of rent theory and political 
settlement theory, Chapter 4 suggested that analysing the development path of 
the sector from the perspective of rents and political settlements will more 
robustly explain the reasons behind particular policy choices and their 
consequent effects.  
 
The next three chapters will apply this analysis of rents and political 
settlements to the telecom sector in India from the period 1995–2014. Chapter 
6 provides a revisionist reading of the policy history of the sector, examining 
the different phases in the sector’s development from the perspective of rents 
created and distributed in each. Chapter 7 examines the changes to the 
political settlement through each of the phases of development of the sector to 
explain policy choices and the impact of the outcome of the policy on the 
evolution of the political settlement. Chapter 8 explores structural implications 
on the sector, which arises from the analysis using rents and political 
settlements. The analysis interrogates the source of spectrum scarcity in the 
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Indian context. It also uses the rents analysis to explain the source of market 
power of the largest telecom players and their consolidation of market share.  
 
However before we apply the rent analysis to our question, this chapter seeks to 
clarify the methodology we will use in the subsequent chapters. The first 
section will explain the need to consider both rents and political settlements 
together for a robust analysis. It will also consider the strengths of the research 
method used. The following sections will deal with rents and political 
settlements in terms of conceptualization, data sources and data gaps. A robust 
political settlements analysis requires a richly detailed and granular 
understanding of the specific political settlement and the agencies within it. To 
this end, Section 5.3 introduces the key agencies and organisations in the 
Sectoral Political Settlement for Indian Telecom. The ways in which these have 
interacted over the history of the sector’s development forms the substance of 
the following chapters. Finally, this chapter will also lay out the limitations of 
this study in terms of its scope, its research methods and the applicability of its 
findings to other contexts.  
 
5.2 Methodology:  
 
This thesis seeks to apply existing theory in rents and political settlements to 
the analysis of policy in the Indian telecom sector during the period 1995–2014.  
 
Analysing policy in the telecom sector from the perspective of rents generated 
and distributed is justified given the magnitude and significance of policy-
generated rents on the sector. Spectrum allocation policy creates significant 
rents for TSPs and the portion of rents extracted by the state form a substantial 
proportion of the costs facing service providers. It is therefore not surprising 
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that these rents are severely contested for and that these rent contests can 
influence the policy that allocates these rights.  
 
The previous chapter has elaborated an analytical construct – the Political 
Settlement to decode these influences on policy making. The argument used is 
that underlying political settlements influence the creation of policy and the 
direction of rent streams as a result of the policy. The framework also posits 
that the consequence of rent distributions that do not complement the 
distribution of power in the political settlement is a change in either the 
distribution of rents or a change in the political settlement over time.  
  
The academic literature on the subject has few examples of the rents 
perspective being applied to the analysis of the sector. Deepak Lal (2011) uses 
rents to explain that telecommunication in India has grown post-liberalization, 
despite the presence of significant “composite quasi rents”. He claims that these 
rents have not been detrimental to growth, since they do not affect productive 
efficiency but merely have a social opportunity cost. The analysis is limited by a 
static perspective of efficiency engendered by free competition and does not 
take the nuanced perspective on rents for development in the context of 
pervasive market failures.  
 
Singh (2001) and Levy and Spiller (1996) have taken an NIE perspective and 
examined right creation in the sector. They have argued that property rights 
created in the sector need to be “impartial, inclusive, transparent and 
enforceable” (Singh 2001). However, this view of spectrum right creation does 
not really engage with the process by which the rights are created or the 
influences that are brought to bear upon the creation of rights. In other words, 
rights are seen as being created and enforced in a vacuum, rather than as part 
of a political settlement.  
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Desai (2006) undertakes a comprehensive history of the sector until 2006 which 
explores the myriad influences on policy. It is as close to an analysis of the 
underlying political settlement as the sector has had to date, but it does not 
incorporate the analysis of the actual rents that are being created and 
distributed. This makes it a fascinating read on the early history of the sector, 
but is subject to the criticism that it studies the policy without considering the 
considerable economic rent flows that have an impact on the formation of the 
policy itself.  
 
Studies in other sectors have combined an analysis of rents and political 
settlements. Apart from Khan’s work, Whitfield et al. (2015), Gray and Whitfield 
(2014), Kelsall and Seiha (2014) and Roy (2013) are examples of studies that have 
applied Khan’s methodology of considering rents and political settlements in 
conjunction, to understand economic development  or institutional 
performance.  Kelsall and Seiha’s (2014) study is particularly interesting as it 
considers the telecom sector (among other sectors) in its analysis of political 
settlements in Cambodia. The study is at an overall national level rather than a 
detailed sectoral study, The section on the telecom sector is interesting from a 
comparative perspective on policy and sector evolution, and shows that the 
issues facing the sector in Cambodia – excessive competition and low 
regulatory independence, have many similarities with the Indian sector.  
 
The need to consider both rents and political settlements together forms the 
core of the research methodology in this thesis. Analysis of one without the 
other ignores the dialectic relationship between rents and political settlements 
where the rents flow from policy shaped by the political settlement and the 
political settlement in turn is shaped by rent flows to its members. Therefore an 
analysis that incorporates both rents and political settlements is more robust in 
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being able to explain both the causes and the outcomes of policy. This is 
especially important in the case of the telecom sector where rights limiting use 
of spectrum are essential for the effective operation of the sector. Here rents 
play a doubly important role.  
 
5.2.1 Research method 
 
The research method used here is a rich case study method that allows us to 
collect in-depth and detailed information on the case. Yin (2003: 13) describes a 
case study as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between 
the phenomenon and the context are not clearly evident”. Odell (2001) outlines 
the strengths of a case study method over large n statistical methods in the 
study of International Political Economy. While the case study method could 
suffer from issues of generalizability, it also allows for a richer contextual study 
of processes and is a superior method for validating or extending theory. This 
thesis uses the case study method to critically apply a new frame of analysis to 
an existing problem. Yin (2003) refers to this as a Theory Evaluating Case and 
Odell calls it the Disciplined Interpretative Case Study, where the case applies 
“known theory to a new terrain” (Odell 2001: 163).  
 
The limitations of this type of case study often revolve around generalizability 
and applicability in other situations. It may also suffer from bias in terms of 
selective choice of data that supports the hypothesis. Odell (ibid) suggests the 
rigorous use of supporting data and the interrogation of alternative hypotheses 
at each stage, especially in the use of counterfactual statements.  
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The method of data collection, involving triangulation of data sources and 
cross-checking of information from interviews, has been used to address the 
issue of selection bias. As for the generalizability of the findings, the thesis 
attempts to extrapolate some broader policy trends that could be applicable to 
other sectors in other contexts. This thesis uses one particular analytical 
perspective to characterize the evolution of the sector, in the belief that this 
perspective provides insights that are different to those already provided on the 
sector. It could also provide a way to consider policy evolution in other 
contexts. 
 
5.2.2 Methods of Data Collection 
 
In order to obtain as much detail as possible, the study used a variety of data 
sources – secondary data analysis, secondary sources and interviews with key 
stakeholders in the sector from the private sector and the bureaucracy. The list 
of all interviewees is given in Appendix 3.  
 
Quantitative data on the sector was accessed from the GSMA database for 
worldwide telecom data and from the DoT, TRAI, COAI and AUSPI websites for 
India specific data. While a significant amount of the recent data in the sector 
is available easily for these sites, some of the early data on the sector was harder 
to access. Private sector interviewees were generous with sector data that was 
not commercially sensitive. The COAI website was also a useful source of 
analytical reports on the sector. Financial data was collated from publicly 
available Company Annual Reports.  
 
The history of the sector was gleaned from secondary sources, including 
journalistic sources, but the detail was collected through interviews with key 
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stakeholders in the sector. While reports from COAI and TRAI provided some 
details of the outcomes, the process of contestation was better elaborated by 
interviewees who had been part of the sector’s early development. Since their 
view of events could have been biased by their role in them, the information 
was triangulated with information from the press as well as from other 
interviewees.  
 
Spectrum prices and allotments are available from the TRAI and accessible on 
their website, albeit not in a consumer-friendly form. They were ratified with 
the data held by service providers who were willing to share the information.  
 
One of the most challenging aspects of this study was the need for the technical 
understanding of the technology behind telecommunication required to make 
sense of the policy choices and implications. Interviews with service providers 
and with telecom consultants yielded detailed information on the technology 
behind the operation of the sector and the sources of constraint on its 
operation.  
 
The information on rent-seeking and political influence on the sector was the 
hardest to obtain for obvious reasons. Some of it was accessed from secondary 
sources. India’s long tradition of a free Press has meant that some information 
and much speculation is actually reported in the media and can be publicly 
accessed. Attempts were made to restrict journalistic sources to the better-
established newspapers and media firms. Multiple journalistic sources were also 
accessed on the same event to ratify the information used. Other elements of 
the rent-seeking story came from interviews with stakeholders who asked to 
remain anonymous. Although many interviewees were quite forthcoming on 
information related to possible corruption, they were unwilling to be quoted 
directly. However, every attempt was made to triangulate information and data 
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from interviews with other interviewees, secondary data on performance 
indicators or with several different journalistic sources. I have indicated where 
the data or information is only alleged, not proven.   
 
5.3 India’s Political Settlement in Telecom  
 
As emphasized earlier, the more detailed and granular the understanding of the 
constituent elements of a political settlement, the better its ability to explain 
the influences on policy and outcomes. The PS analysis in the following 
chapters will refer to various organizations or individuals that appear to have 
influence over policy in the sector. This section seeks to introduce these various 
elements of the PS. To refer to these constituent elements of the PS I have 
adopted the term “agencies” used by Fine and Rustomjee (1996). Agencies could 
be formal organizations, informal organizations or even individuals. Fine uses 
the term “agency” in his Linkage-Agency approach so as not to privilege the 
institutional structure but its influence or agency on the process. This 
perspective and terminology has been applied to describe the ‘agencies’ in the 
political settlement. This differs slightly from the Institutionalist use of the 
term agency to denote state organisations.  
 
The previous chapter argued that looking at a sector-specific PS in the telecom 
sector allows us to study influences at a sectoral level in greater detail and 
incorporate greater fluidity into the characterization of the political settlement 
and its influence on sector-specific policy. However agencies in the broader 
national political settlement do impact the sectoral political settlement in some 
periods, especially when the rent distributions in the sector are large enough 
threaten the stability of the wider political settlement. Below is an introduction 
to the key agencies in the Indian Telecom Political Settlement that will feature 
in the discussions of the following chapters. It identifies whether the 
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organisation or agency involved operates largely at a sectoral level or is also 
part of a wider national political settlement.  
 
5.3.1 Political Agencies: 
 
India’s crowded and chaotic political space is well recognized (Jayal and Mehta 
2010, Hasan 2002, Kohli and Singh (eds.) 2012). The fact that multiparty 
coalitions have become the only viable ruling solutions since at least the 1990s, 
is indicative of the number and variety of competing pulls on the state in terms 
of managing its support base.  
 
The two major national level political parties (the Indian National Congress, 
referred to hereafter as the Congress and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)) 
which may claim to be organized along ideological lines have needed to align 
with a shifting and varied network of regional parties organized around caste or 
sub-caste, language, region or other smaller organizational factions. This has 
been temporarily at least reversed with the BJP victory of 2014, but for most of 
the period of this study, the government at the centre has been a loosely-knit 
factionally organized multiparty coalition, with allegiance to the coalition 
maintained by the disbursement of political rents and favours. The telecom 
sector is a prime example of this, with both the government at the centre and a 
regional party that demanded the post of the minister of telecom as payback for 
political support being important agencies in the PS. 
 
The different agencies may not have aligned objectives when it comes to the 
telecom sector. We need to therefore examine the competing pulls on policy by 
the different organizations within the state apparatus. The following section 
disaggregates the state into different agencies, some of which are influential in 
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the sectoral political settlement, and others that operate at the level of the 
wider national settlement.  
 
a. Central Government:  
 
In 1995, the Congress Party led a majority government under the Prime 
Ministership of PV Narasimha Rao. However it lost support due to allegations 
of corruption in the 1996 general elections. The 1996 elections resulted in a 
hung parliament. After a 13-day government headed by BJP leader Atal Bihari 
Vajpayee had to resign since it was unable to garner support, a coalition of 
parties (including, among many others, the DMK, a regional political party 
from Tamil Nadu) headed by Janata Dal leader H. Deve Gowda and supported 
from the outside by the Congress gained power.  
 
The threat of loss of Congress support led to a change in Prime Ministership to 
I.K.Gujral in 1997 (Hasan 2002). In November 1997, the Congress withdrew 
support from the coalition demanding the United Front drop the DMK from 
their coalition since the DMK was implicated in the assassination of Rajiv 
Gandhi (a Congress leader) in 1991.  The assembly was dissolved and fresh 
national elections were called in 1998 (Sharada Prasad 1997). Again the results 
were inconclusive; leading to a BJP-led alliance of parties at the centre with Atal 
Bihari Vajpayee as Prime Minister but this National Democratic Alliance (NDA) 
government also fell in late 1998, when a regional party (AIADMK) withdrew its 
support for the centre.  
 
Fresh elections were called in 1999. This time however, the BJP-led NDA was 
able to achieve a majority and form a government that lasted the full 5-year 
term. It was still a coalition and needed to ensure that its alliance members’ 
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support was bought through clientelist payoffs. The BJP campaigned 
aggressively on its platform “India Shining” in 2004 but lost the general election 
(Hasan 2002).  
 
The Congress came back to power with a coalition called the United 
Progressive Alliance (UPA –I) led by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, a 
respected economist. Sonia Gandhi, Congress party President declined to lead 
the government although it was claimed that she remained the power behind 
the throne. While the UPA did not have a clear majority, it managed to 
complete its full 5-year term by securing support from several other parties at 
various times. In 2009, general elections were held again. The UPA alliance 
emerged victorious for a second full term. However UPA II also had to form 
outside alliances with regional parties who agreed to not give the NDA their 
support during the period of the assembly.  
 
The UPA II alliance lasted its second complete term but by the end of its 
second term was mired in several corruption charges, one of which took place 
in the telecom sector – the infamous ‘2G Scam’, that will be covered in later 
chapters. The Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, was seen as at best 
incompetent, and at worst complicit, in the corruption. The loss of faith in the 
government was reflected in the results of the 2014 election which gave the BJP 
an absolute majority, with Narendra Modi taking over as Prime Minister. 
 
The ruling political party (the Congress, for most of this study) and the 
Opposition (the BJP, for most of this study) are both agencies in the National 
PS but have had an impact on the Sectoral PS during various phases. The need 
for the Congress-led UPA I and II governments to keep their coalition intact 
has led to agreements with regional parties that affect the sectoral political 
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settlement. The Opposition has also used events in the sectoral PS to exert 
pressure on the ruling party at the national level.  
 
b. Regional Political Party – DMK 
 
The Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) was a regional political party set up 
in Tamil Nadu in 1949, as a breakaway party of the Dravidar Kazhagam, a pre-
independence party set up to fight for secession of the Madras Presidency from 
the Indian nation. The DMK first came to power in 1967 in Tamil Nadu, and 
since then has alternated with a splinter group AIADMK (headed by J 
Jayalalitha) for power in the state (Kohli and Singh (eds.) 2012).  
 
The DMK was part of the Congress-led UPA I and UPA II alliances for power at 
the centre. During most of the period of the UPA government at the centre, the 
DMK won state assembly elections in Tamil Nadu and formed the state 
government. They were thus in a strong position to extract returns from the 
UPA for their support. In both governments, they demanded the post of the 
Telecommunications Minister go to a DMK appointee.  
 
The Telecoms Minister during the UPA I period was Dayanidhi Maran. He was 
replaced by the DMK with A.Raja. The reasons behind the removal of Maran 
are discussed in Chapter 7. Raja’s tenure from 2007 was made notorious by his 
involvement in the large scale corruption referred to as the ‘2G scam’.  In the 
2009 national elections, on the eve of formation of the UPA II government, the 
DMK threatened to withdraw from the alliance unless its demands on ministry 
posts were met, including the reappointment of Raja as Telecoms Minister 
(BBC 2009). The UPA II government acquiesced, and Raja was made telecom 
minister again. The press coverage of the 2G scam finally forced the UPA II 
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government to remove Raja from his post. The DMK also lost state assembly 
elections in 2009 on the back of this.  
 
The power of the regional party came from its ability to impose costs upon the 
ruling coalition at the level of the national political settlement during this 
period. With the majority BJP government in power since 2015, the regional 
party has lost its relevance at the national level.  
 
c. Ministry of Telecommunications 
 
This is the primary political agency that affects the Sectoral PS. Its links with 
the national PS relate to the power of the ruling coalition in the appointment of 
the Minister, and the power of the Regional Party over the ruling coalition to 
influence the appointment in order that they may benefit from informal rents. 
 
While the ruling party (and the DMK from 2006–2009) have had power over 
the appointment of the minister of telecommunications, once the appointment 
has been made, the history of the sector has shown that the minister himself 
has been able to operate with a great degree of freedom. The history of the 
sector covered in Chapters 6 and 7 will show that several of the individual 
ministers were accused of corruption, and of having made policies to favour 
one or the other of the private sector players, presumably in return for some 
consideration. Indeed, through the period under study, the Telecom Ministry 
was coveted, probably for the very reason that significant rents could be 
extracted for personal or political gain.  
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The power of the Minister comes from the formal institutional power of his 
post, but also from his personal political allegiances and the strength of his 
contribution to the holding power of his political party. The power of the 
Minister appears to be checked by the executive only when the Minister’s 
actions threaten to de-stabilize the national political settlement. The list of all 
telecom ministers from 1995–2014 is listed in Appendix 4. 
  
d. Ministry of Finance: 
 
While the Finance Ministry is not directly responsible for telecom and therefore 
does not operate at the sectoral PS level, it has played a pivotal role on 
decision-making in the sector during a few occasions in its history. Again, these 
relate to when the outcomes in the sector threaten to de-stabilize the national 
PS.  
 
The Finance Ministry has been interested in the health of the telecom sector for 
two reasons. First, the firms in the sector have significant borrowing from the 
domestic financial sector. As was described in Chapter 3, the levels of debt in 
the sector are high and rising. A collapse of the telecom sector could have a 
knock-on effect on financial markets. Second, the sector is a significant 
contributor to central government funds. Policies that decide not just spectrum 
allocation but the prices of spectrum that the state can extract from the private 
sector have a considerable impact on the national government’s fiscal position. 
The ministry of finance is therefore keenly involved in spectrum pricing during 
allocation. During recent spectrum auctions a high level Group of Ministers 
(GoM) including the Finance Minister has often been constituted to advise and 
oversee policy decisions regarding spectrum.  
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5.3.2 Bureaucratic agencies 
 
a. Department of Telecommunication (DoT) 
 
As the original incumbent body in the telecom sector and the monopoly 
operator of the country’s fixed line business prior to the advent of privatization 
in mobile telephony, the DoT remains a formidable source of power in the 
Sectoral PS.  
 
It is a large and bureaucratic organisation with a rigid class hierarchy (Desai 
2006). It is run by generalists from the Indian Administrative Service but is 
staffed by engineers who manage the telecommunications equipment. It is a 
large employer in the public sector. Desai (ibid) records more than 400,000 
employees in 2004. It is also highly unionized. This numerical strength of 
unionized employees is its source of holding power and Telecom Ministers are 
careful to be seen as working in their interests.  
 
As Chapter 6 will show, the DoT was resistant to change and suspicious of the 
growth of mobile telephony in its early years. It also had a high degree of power 
over the outcomes in mobile telephony, as it was the owner of existing fixed 
line infrastructure, the regulator, the policy-maker and the operator, all rolled 
into one. Its efforts to block mobile growth waned after it realized that it had 
more to gain from its growth in terms of shared revenues. Its power in the PS 
has also slowly eroded, as private sector firms have become market leaders. 
However, it still retains a crucial role that is the source of its power: it is 
responsible for the release of spectrum for the purposes of mobile telephony, its 
allocation and pricing. 
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b. Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) 
 
Prior to the setting up of the TRAI as a separate regulatory body, the DoT was 
the regulator, the incumbent public sector operating firm in the sector and the 
political and policy-making body. In 1997, as a check on the power of the DoT, 
TRAI was set up but lacked any authority to overrule the decisions of the DoT. 
The near-collapse of the sector in 1999 engendered a rethink, and the role of 
the TRAI was strengthened in 1999 and again in 2000. Desai (2006) shows that 
the relationship between the DoT and TRAI was very confrontational in its 
early phase as it fought to gain more authority in the sector. However after its 
powers were strengthened and its board reconstituted to include more pro-
incumbent members, the relationship between the two agencies has improved.  
 
While the TRAI has more regulatory authority in the sector and has 
increasingly taken positions against the rulings of the DoT, it still remains 
subject to the Ministry of Telecommunications on many issues and is therefore 
mindful of the government’s interests and, by extension, the interests of the 
public sector operational arm of the DoT – BSNL/MTNL. It thus is powerful, 
but only in the sectoral PS. 
 
c. Telecom Dispute Settlement Appellate Tribunal (TDSAT) 
 
The TRAI was originally envisaged as the authority for dispute resolution 
within the sector. However, soon after its constitution in 1997, the orders of the 
TRAI were challenged by both private operators and the DoT, who took the 
cases to the Delhi High Court and the Supreme Court of India. The oft-
changing policy stances of the DoT also created space for frequent disputes and 
the sector was very litigious in its early years.   
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In order to create a separate body to deal with dispute settlement between the 
various agencies and bypass the high courts, the TDSAT was set up in 1999 to 
adjudicate disputes and hear appeals against TRAI. Appeals from TDSAT 
hearings would go straight to the Supreme Court.   
 
The relationship between TDSAT and TRAI is not a supportive one, with 
TDSAT often going against the rulings of TRAI. However, the Supreme Court 
has also often reversed TDSAT rulings thereby adding to the policy confusion 
and litigation prevalent in the sector (Desai 2006). The TDSAT operates at the 
level of the sectoral PS but its power in the PS is muted by the fact that the 
Supreme Court from the National PS can override its judgements.    
 
5.3.3 Lobbying Agencies 
 
a. Cellular Operators Association of India (COAI) 
 
Instituted in 1995 to represent the private cellular operators in their dealings 
with the policy maker, the regulator, and each other, the Cellular Operators 
Association of India was a very active lobbying body for the very early stages of 
development of the sector. It soon came to represent the GSM operators in the 
sector (those that were originally licensed to operate in mobile telephony) and 
some of its biggest battles were in questioning the validity of the CDMA 
operations that MTNL and Reliance commenced in 1997. In fact many of the 
early litigations in the sector were initiated by COAI against the DoT or TRAI.  
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In providing a unified voice for TSP demands however, the COAI has become 
an agency with significant power in the Sectoral Telecom PS. Since the 
inception of the sector, the DoT and TRAI have often held consultations with 
COAI, not only on TSP demands, but on a variety of policy issues and 
discussions related to efficient sectoral development.  The COAI was an 
important part of the negotiations between the industry and the government in 
1999 and was the prime mover on CDMA-related issues till 2003. The COAI is 
still an active lobbying body, reflecting current concerns of the TSPs to the 
government in the area of spectrum availability, for example.  
 
b. Association of Universal Service Providers in India (AUSPI) 
 
In response to representations by COAI to the government on the GSM 
operators’ interests, the CDMA and fixed line operators formed a parallel 
agency that would represent their interests. The license has become technology 
neutral since Universal Licenses were issued in 2010 rendering different CDMA 
and GSM lobbies unnecessary. Of the two lobbies, COAI is definitely the more 
powerful and has been engaging with the sector longer.  
 
5.3.4 Private Sector Agencies 
 
Business houses such as the Tata’s and Birla’s have existed prior to the creation 
of the independent state of India and their links to the political machinery have 
been documented since the independence struggle (Mitra 1998: 75). Others, 
such as the earlier unified Reliance group33 grew with active support and 
concessions from Indira Gandhi’s government as well as succeeding 
                                                 
33
 The Reliance Group will be covered in this section as it remains among the most influential 
business houses in the country. Despite a split into 2 separate firms following a family feud, 
both firms are key agencies in the Telecom PS.  
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governments (Mitra 1998: 92-94). Business–government relationships have 
therefore continued to influence the formulation of policy. Their relative power 
is often, but not always, determined by their economic size. Historical 
relationships and specific patronage links may also be relevant in explaining 
their influence on policy.  
 
Firms in the sector include large multiple interest business houses, firms that 
grew only with the Telecom sector, and International telecom players. While 
this isn’t a comprehensive list of all players in the sector, the section below lists 
some key agencies in the sectoral PS.  
 
a. Bharti Airtel 
 
Airtel, the leading brand in the Indian telecom sector was promoted by an up-
and- coming businessman from small-town India, Sunil Mittal. Bhandari(2012) 
tells a classic rags-to-riches tale of Mittal’s rise. Sunil Mittal, who had been 
dealing with the import and domestic assembly of touch tone and EPABX 
phones in India saw the potential of the sector and bid for and won an 
important licence in the Delhi metro circle in 1995. Today the Bharti group is a 
conglomerate with a revenue of $16.5 billion and interests in retail, insurance, 
digital TV and real estate, other than their core business – telecommunication. 
Mittal is reputed to have good and long-standing relationships with the DoT 
but his dealings are reputed to be above board. He is known to be relatively 
media-shy. 
 
Airtel’s source of power in the sectoral PS comes from its market dominance. 
The Bharti group, as one of the earliest entrants into telecom has also been one 
of the founding members of the COAI. Therefore from the very early stages of 
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sectoral evolution, Airtel has been a key agency in the sectoral PS. However, as 
its size has increased, it is beginning to have a greater influence on the national 
settlement. Industry analysts claim that Airtel’s international partner, Singtel 
prefers not to involve the organisations in the National PS.  
 
b. Vodafone  
 
Vodafone India was originally Hutchison Whampoa Group that started 
operations in India in 1994. Hutchison bought stakes in Usha Martin Telecom, 
Sterling Cellular, Max Telecom and Essar Teleholdings to become Hutchison 
Essar, a national player. Vodafone, a global telecom player bought a 67% stake 
in Hutchison Essar in 2007 for $11 billion and launched the Vodafone brand in 
India. Vodafone PLC increased their stake in the Indian business to 74% in 2011 
and 100% in 2013. 
 
 As a 100% subsidiary of a global telecom giant, Vodafone has the benefit of 
deep pockets. However as an international firm, it lacks the network of 
relationships in politics and bureaucracy that older Indian business houses 
have. Therefore while it has limited power in the sectoral PS, it has little voice 
at the national level. It has run afoul of the government over a disagreement 
about retrospective taxation in 2012 (Desai 2006, company website, market 
information). It is currently the second largest telecom player in India. 
 
c. IDEA 
 
Idea Cellular was incorporated in 1995 as a joint venture between 2 large and 
well-respected Indian industrial houses with multiple interests – the Birla 
group and the Tata group, along with their foreign equity partner, Bell South 
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(later Cingular Wireless, the USA’s second-largest telecom provider). Tata sold 
back its stake to the Birla group when it entered the CDMA market with its 
own subsidiary and Cingular sold its share back to the Birla group in 2006. In 
2009, Axiata of Malaysia, a leading Telecom group in Asia with multiple 
regional brands bought a 20% stake in the company (Desai 2006, company 
website and market information).  
 
It is currently the third largest player in the Indian wireless market in terms of 
revenue share and is seen as one of the most dynamic in the sector. The Aditya 
Birla Group are an Indian Fortune 500 conglomerate with a $41 billion revenue 
and interests in textiles and yarn (their oldest business), retail clothing, and 
supermarkets, in addition to telecom.   
 
d. Reliance Infocom:  
 
The Reliance group of industries, one of India’s largest conglomerates, was built 
from scratch by patriarch, Dhirubhai Ambani in 1966. From trading in spices 
and yarn in 1966, the conglomerate grew to establish itself as India’s largest 
business house, with a combined family fortune of $60 billion and interests in 
Oil and Natural Gas, Communication, Retail, Insurance, Banking, 
Telecommunication and many others. The group applied for licenses to the 
sector in its inception under the name of Reliance Infocomm, a group company. 
 
 
In 2002, the patriarch and businessman extraordinaire who had set up and 
grown Reliance Industries, Dhirubhai Ambani, died without leaving a clear 
successor. Mukesh Ambani, the older son, took over the business as chairman, 
with the second son, Anil Ambani, acting as vice-chairman. In 2003, rumours of 
disagreements between the brothers begun to emerge and by November 2004, 
their disagreements became public. By December 2005 they agreed to split the 
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original business among the two brothers, with the older brother retaining the 
lion’s share of their key businesses and the younger brother Anil getting some 
of the new businesses, including telecom.  
 
The business was rebranded Reliance Communication (RCom), part of the 
Anil Dhirubhai Ambani Group (ADAG). Chapters 6 and 7 will show that this 
firm had a significant impact at the sectoral level on the PS and many of the 
policy shifts in the sector can be attributed to RCom’s attempts to establish a 
significant presence in the sector. However, unlike the larger Reliance 
Industries, run by older brother Mukesh, this firm has less power over the 
National Political Settlement. 
 
Reliance Infocom has therefore moved from being a very influential firm in the 
sectoral and national political settlements prior to the split in 2005, to less 
influential in the national political settlement but very active in the sectoral 
political settlement after 2005.  
 
e. Reliance JIO 
 
The older brother’s firm, Reliance Industries re-entered the telecom sector in 
2010, with the purchase of 2300 MHz wireless access spectrum. Launched under 
a separate brand Reliance Jio, the firm intends to enter the mobile telephony 
sector with the launch of a 4G offering. In the following chapters, this firm will 
be referred to as Reliance Jio specifically to differentiate it from the other 
Reliance business. While, at the time of writing, the firm had not yet launched 
a product in the market, the sheer size of the firm and its reputed strength in 
the national political settlement make it a significant agency, one that operates 
at the sectoral level but has many links at the national level as well.  
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5.3.5 State Owned Telecom Service Provider:  
 
In 1986, prior to the advent of mobile telephony, the government chose to hive 
off part of the fixed line telephony business into a separate government-owned 
business (following Britain’s model with BT). Two sections of the business were 
corporatized – Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd (MTNL) which covered 
telephony in the urban centres of Mumbai and Delhi, and Videsh Sanchar 
Nigam Ltd. (VSNL) which was the international fixed-line calls business. The 
DoT’s operational arm was also corporatized in 1999 and renamed Bharat 
Sanchar Nigam Ltd. (BSNL). Today MTNL operates a fixed and mobile 
telephony network in Mumbai and Delhi and BSNL operates a fixed and mobile 
telephony business in the rest of India.  
 
While they are in theory corporatized in order to give them greater autonomy 
from the DoT, Desai (2006) argues that the DoT’s hold on their operation 
continues and that the policy decisions of the DoT have often been designed to 
ensure that the interests of MTNL/BSNL are paramount. For the rest of this 
thesis, MTNL and BSNL will be considered as a single agency since their 
interests and fields of operation are complementary and non-competitive. 
 
5.4 Limitations of the study  
 
While we have so far argued that our analytical framework of using the 
dialectic of rents and political settlements adds value to our understanding of 
policy choices in the telecom sector, the study has some key limitations that 
need to be recognized in order that its results may be used appropriately.  
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The first and most important limitation is that the study is neither an 
exhaustive enumeration of all rents in the telecom sector, nor is it able to map 
out completely, all the influences and agencies in the Telecom PS and 
understand in entirety their impact on all policy. The sector has seen the 
implementation of several policies in its 20-year history, many of which created 
rents. I have chosen here to focus on a specific set of spectrum allocation 
policies and their effects in terms of rents. There may be other economy-wide 
policies that also affect the sector. These are not considered in this thesis.  
 
Similarly, describing the PS in its entirety, mapping and measuring all the 
sources of power in the PS and identifying all their impacts on policy is an 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, task and has not been attempted in this 
thesis. It is therefore important to guard against a tendency to retrofit all policy 
decisions to our description of the PS since this articulation of the PS itself may 
have gaps and therefore may not provide a complete explanation of policy 
choices. This thesis merely identifies some of the salient features of the 
Telecom PS that are discernible from a study of the sector and uses these to 
analyse the implementation of some spectrum allocation policies in the sector 
and the effect of their outcomes on the evolution of the sector. The aim is to 
provide a ‘thicker’ analysis of the factors underlying policy choice and their 
effects.  
 
It could also be argued that the PS and its impact is most easily identifiable ex-
post. It is certainly true that a history of the sector can be retold using political 
settlements much more easily than the future foretold with any certainty. The 
PS is more completely identifiable ex-post. This does not mean that it is 
impossible to use ex-ante however. An in-depth understanding of the sector, its 
historical choices and existing PS is essential to constructing possible future 
scenarios of policy effectiveness.  
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The analysis covered in Part II of this thesis does not restrict itself to an ex-post 
analysis of the evolution of the sector. The study, which can be argued to be 
valuable in that it provides a more complete explanation of event, also lets us 
draw out structural implications for the sector. The behaviour of agencies 
within the sector is shown to be shaped by these outcomes. This reiterates the 
belief that the effectiveness of policies is context specific and path dependent. 
Even with this in-depth contextual understanding, the PS approach is not 
meant as an exact predictive tool. It may not provide certain judgements but it 
can illustrate a set of probabilistic scenarios.  
 
This conception of the PS is also not a closed system but an open system that is 
constantly evolving. Agencies that are external to the PS may become relevant 
due to entirely exogenous circumstances. The description of the PS will need to 
be modified to reflect these changes in order to remain useful. This underscores 
the fact that as analytical tools, rents and political settlements merely provide 
us with another way of examining economic development. They are only as 
useful as their ability to reflect the changing, multi-faceted and complex reality 
of dynamic growth.  
 
More so in this sector than in others, the speed and impact of technological 
change could be profound. Technology is not only fast-changing; the speed of 
change is also accelerating in data- and information technology-based sectors 
such as Telecom. A change in technology such as the ability to use another 
bandwidth in spectrum could have a profound impact on the rents that can be 
generated from existing as well as new rights in the sector. The advantage of a 
dual approach that considers rents as well as political settlements is useful in 
that it captures changes in current and potential future rent flows.  
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The use of a sectoral political settlement was to allow for the analysis of factors 
such as technology, which make changes at the sectoral level but which may 
not be reflected in a significant change in terms of the National PS. While I 
have argued that this is a useful extension of the theorizing on political 
settlements in this case, understanding the links between the sectoral and 
national level settlements and its usefulness will benefit from application to 
other contexts. Keeping in mind the above limitations, the next chapter seeks 
to recast the developments of the telecom sector from 1995 to 2014 from the 
perspective of our analytical method.  
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Chapter 6: Rent Creation and 
Distribution in the sector 1995-
2014 
 
“What is history, but a fable agreed upon?” 
 – Attributed to Napoleon Bonaparte 
 
6.1 Introduction: 
 
Part One of this thesis laid the foundations for considering the evolution of the 
Indian telecom sector from the perspective of rents and political settlements. 
We have argued that there is a gap in terms of current analyses of policy being 
able to explain the frequent shifts and the high levels of corruption that the 
sector has seen since the inception of mobile telephony in 1995. The 
characteristics of spectrum right creation in the sector make it a good 
candidate for an analysis from the perspective of policy created rents. However 
an analysis of the rents created in the sector is enhanced by placing it within 
the context of the political settlement that gives rise to the policy and affects 
the distribution of rents from it. We have also argued that rents in their turn 
affect the political settlement, especially at the sectoral level, either reinforcing 
it or modifying it to reflect significant changes in rent distributions.  
 
The remainder of this thesis is devoted to applying this analytical framework to 
the Indian telecom sector. This chapter considers the rents that were created 
though policy during the various phases of the sectors development. The next 
chapter will consider the underlying political settlement that influenced the 
198 
 
distributions and the policy outcomes in each phase, which then shaped the 
political settlement in the subsequent phase. The separation of rent 
distributions and political settlements into two distinct chapters is an artificial 
one. As we have argued earlier, rents and political settlements need to be 
understood in conjunction with each other. For ease of analysis they have been 
looked at individually and sequentially in this analysis.  
 
This chapter is divided into the phases of evolution that we have used earlier in 
this thesis. The phases mark significant changes in rent creation policy in the 
sector. They are therefore also marked by significant contestation over the rents 
created and their distribution.  This analysis is not an exhaustive list of all 
policy in the sector. It merely focuses on the key policy shifts in terms of 
spectrum assignment and licensing that impact the creation of sector rents.  
 
In each phase of the sectors evolution we will look at the changes in the policies 
that assigned rights over spectrum. These changes in rights also created 
changing rent streams. The rent that the policy created usually accrued to the 
producer of the service (the TSP) as the holder of the right. However, the state 
as the policy maker was able to extract a greater or lesser part of this rent for 
itself during the process of rent creation or spectrum right definition in the 
form of the price for spectrum and licenses, either administratively allocated or 
through auctions. It could also, through policy, ensure that some of the rent 
was dissipated to consumers by the producer, either by setting the price or the 
parameters of service. In a competitive market situation, the rents could also be 
competed away.  
 
We can discern some patterns of rent distribution in the different phases of 
evolution of the sector. The sector has moved between high formal extractions 
of rents by the state, to phases where the rents remained largely in the hands of 
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producers. The analysis of each phase below attempts to identify, first, what 
rights were assigned and second, how the rents were distributed among 
producers, consumers and the state. A table in each section summarizes the 
spectrum rights created and characterizes the broader pattern of rent 
distributions from it.  
 
While our focus is on the period between 1995 and 2014, this chapter begins by 
tracing the history of the telecom sector in India from just prior to the 
introduction of mobile telephony in 1995.  The policy choices at different stages 
of the sectors development can only be understood in the context of the path 
dependent development of the sector. Tracing the factors that led to the 
establishment of mobile telephony establishes key policy choices that shaped 
the evolution of the sector and its underlying political settlement.  
 
6.2 Prior to Mobile Telephony: 
 
This section begins with a characterization of fixed line infrastructure prior to 
the advent of mobiles in India. It explores the decision-making behind the 
advent of privatization with mobile telephony. The current policy view on the 
Telecom Sector is that privatization and the attendant increase in competition 
in the sector was the driver of sectoral development. It reduced cartelisation, 
lowered prices and inefficient rents and increased consumer value. Competitive 
markets are believed to have maximised allocative efficiency, productive 
efficiency and dynamic efficiency. However, earlier policy on 
telecommunications viewed it as an essential infrastructure sector, where social 
benefit would be maximised when it was run by the state or a quasi- state 
monopoly. In fact, prior to the advent of mobile telephony and ICT, most 
telecommunication firms the world over were state-run.  
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The generally accepted view is that the changes in technology (and the 
lowering of the costs of technology provision) have allowed the privatization of 
the sector. This has led to a huge increase in the universal availability of the 
service. The choice of strategy was also influenced by the prevailing global 
discourse that shaped the development doctrine of the period. India’s historical 
political framework of democracy and global trends in policy discourse framed 
the space within which policy was considered, and limited the modes of 
operation for the agencies within it34. Understanding the context within which 
this change in policy took place is instructive in placing in context all further 
debates and characterizations of the sector. Indeed, the current policy 
discourse in the sector finds it hard to pull away from this neoliberal view that 
sector goals will be best achieved through increasing competition. 
 
6.2.1 The Telecom Dark Ages 
 
Telecommunications were first introduced to India by the British in 1851 (Dash 
2006: 11) and initially operated through private companies but consolidated 
under the Ministry of Communications in Independent India. At the time of 
Independence in 1947, when the new government of India took over the 
provision of telecom services, India’s network had only 82,000 subscribers in 
321 exchanges (Sethi 2006: 6). It remained either wholly government-owned or 
run through public sector companies till 1992. Telephone services were only 
wireline, and run by the Department of Telecommunications (DoT). In 1966, 
the number of registered DELs35 in the entire country were only 623,000 with a 
waiting list of 734,000 (Dash 2006: 14-16). By 1982, the number of DELs had 
risen to 2.3 million, and by 1992 to 5.81 million (Desai 2006: 42) but still covered 
                                                 
34
 Thorbecke (2007) demonstrates that the adoption of a development strategy at any time 
depends on the evolutionary state of current economic theory, the development objectives 
faced by the state and the underlying data systems and the methods of analysis.  
35
 Direct Exchange Lines, equivalent to individual fixed line telephones. 
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only a very small proportion of the total population36. Until the 1980’s, there 
was no indication that this was going to be turned on its head by a new 
technology. 
 
By the 1980’s, under the Prime Ministership of Mrs. Gandhi, telecom began to 
be seen as essential infrastructure. The Sarin Committee Report of 1981 
recommended splitting of posts and telegraphs for greater focus on telecom 
(Mukherji 2004). In 1984, domestic private production of terminal equipment 
was first permitted in India. Under the Prime Ministership of Rajiv Gandhi 
(1984-1989), Telecom received even greater priority. It was listed as a major 
developmental priority in the 7th Five Year Plan (FYP) (1985-90). Outlay 
towards telecommunication investment in the 6Th FYP jumped nearly 300% in 
the 7Th FYP (Sridhar 2012: 22).   
 
A separate Department of Telecommunication under the Ministry of 
Communication was set up in 1985. A technology mission was set up and led by 
Sam Pitroda, a telecommunications expert, to focus on driving development in 
the sector. Despite severe protests from the strong labour unions present in the 
state run telecom department, parts of the DoT were corporatized in 1986, with 
the setting up of MTNL (to cover telephony in Mumbai and Delhi) and VSNL. 
Mukherji claims that the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) wanted to bring in 
change to the state-run sector but it met with strong resistance from the 
ministry. For Mukherji the private wireless sector owes its launch in India to its 
support from the PMO (ibid). In 1989 a separate and powerful telecoms 
commission was set up but shut down within the year when VP Singh became 
PM, again because of ministry opposition. Chandrasekhar (following Singh) in 
1990 set up the telecom restructuring committee, the Athreya Committee.  
 
                                                 
36
 See Appendix 5 for international tele-density comparisons in 1996. 
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This government focus was mirrored by an increasing consumer demand for 
better telecom services and more competitive pricing. There was also external 
pressure building on the reform of the telecom sector through liberalization 
and privatization from external sources through the WTO and GATT 
agreements. The combined effect of these pressures resulted in pushing India 
inexorably towards privatizing wireless markets despite significant resistance to 
change from within the DoT itself.  
 
The following section explores this policy move towards privatization in greater 
detail, as it was the initial policy decision with the single greatest impact on the 
future shape of the sector. 
 
6.2.2 The Decision to Privatize  
 
While current mainstream research in the area posits privatization and 
competitive markets as given best practice, this analysis takes a more historic 
approach to understanding the changes in policy in the sector. This section 
explores the economic logic behind the earlier policy and the reasons for the 
policy shift. These broader policy choices are still relevant in that they shape 
the current structure and economics of the sector.   
 
The traditional view of telecommunications was one of an essential 
infrastructure, best provided by a state monopoly. It was an essential service, 
one that helped the connected individuals and helped business operate more 
efficiently. However, the costs of setting up the infrastructure were too high to 
be borne by a private investor. Traditional fixed line telephony required the 
laying of cables and wires to reach individual homes, a process that required 
the utilisation of public spaces and property, the service needed standardisation 
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in order to be universally accessible, and the cost of the last mile (i.e. the costs 
of connecting each individual telephone unit to the network) were high. In 
effect, it was the textbook definition of a sector needing public provision of the 
service.  
 
Telecommunication as a public sector could be a source of revenue for the State 
(Mody, Bauer, and Straubhaar (eds.) (1995: xxi).  Public ownership of telecom 
protected the newly developing nations from the pressures of international 
states and multi-national corporations. It was also prompted by national 
security concerns (Straaubhar 1995). Government ownership of telecom would 
also ensure universal access to telecom services. Given the essential nature of 
telecom infrastructure, private provision of the service ran the risk of only 
supplying those sectors and routes that were profitable. It might leave out large 
sections of the rural or the poor, where revenues did not justify their access to 
the service.  Public provision was more likely to be able to invest in the 
infrastructure with the explicit aim of universal access (ibid). Most important 
from the perspective of this thesis,  the size of these sectors and the significant 
levels of employment in the sector encouraged the use of the sectors’ jobs as a 
way to distribute political patronage in many developing countries’ newly 
formed states, post-independence (ibid: 7). 
 
The Telecommunication Sector pamphlet of 1971  (WorldBank 1971), issued by 
the World Bank as a policy document for developing nations makes no 
reference to privatization at all. By 1987 however, a paper by Roth (1987) from 
the World Bank begins to suggest the possibility of private provision of public 
services in telecommunication, among other sectors. The suggestion at this 
stage is still tentative in regard to the suitability of private provision. Roth 
simply suggests that private provision may work as effectively in some 
developing country contexts. He suggests selective private partnerships such as 
subcontracting, franchising, but also privatizing specific areas – such as 
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equipment supply, private local services etc., rather than wholesale 
privatization. He also recognizes that privatization may encourage the 
formation of private monopolies (due to the sector’s tendency to economies of 
scale) therefore will need some form of government regulation.  
 
But the tide towards increasing privatization seems to have turned in the 
1980’s. Curiously, the timing coincides with a worldwide move towards 
liberalization and privatization, and the withdrawal of the active state in 
ideological terms and across sectors.  
 
Roth (1987: 6) argues that three changes led to a change in the policy view on 
privatization in telecommunication. First, the change in technology had 
restructured the nature of costs in the telecom sector. Mobile telephony did 
away with the costs of the last mile – the cost of connecting each individual 
house to the network. Since it worked off spectrum, it did not need the laying 
of miles of cable. Some capital costs remained – in the setting up of tower 
infrastructure etc., but these were small in comparison to the capital intensity 
of fixed line services.  
 
Second, the policy environment had changed. Ideologically, the USA and UK 
began converging on a strongly pro-market view. Liberal economics argued 
that the slow rate of growth of national telecom sectors and the rise of global 
trade and information flows pushed for liberalization of the sector. Market 
failure literature had given way to government failure literature. Public choice 
theory suggested that state capture by interest groups limited the state’s ability 
to choose policy that would benefit the majority. Economic analysis had begun 
to focus on regulation as a means to manage market failure rather than active 
government intervention. This was reflected in policy advice and 
conditionalities imposed upon developing countries through the Washington 
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based organisations. Urey (1995) shows that the World Bank underwent a clear 
policy shift towards privatization in telecommunications in the early 90’s, and 
that this policy shift represented an ideological shift, rather than the research-
driven, ‘non-ideological’ one it was claimed to be. Roth, however, believed that 
there was sufficient evidence of the successes of privatizations and public 
private partnerships in mixed economies in the late 1980’s. Infrastructure 
industries such as telecom that were earlier considered natural monopolies 
came to be viewed as “fit for competition tempered by regulation” (Desai 2006: 
21) 
 
Finally, Mody et al (1995: 11) point to the economic pressures faced by national 
telecom industries in the 80’s. As the middle classes increased in number and 
the demand for residential lines increased, public telecom firms were unable to 
fund the investment required for expansion. These firms also struggled to fund 
investment in innovation or efficiency improvements, as their funding 
competed with wider government priorities. A government report estimated 
that the modernization of the telecom sector in India would require an outlay 
of Rs. 230 Billion, funds the government did not have (interview with Mr. 
Ramachandran). Less directly addressed in the literature were the pressures 
from global telecommunication firms keen to access potential new markets in 
the developing world. With rapidly evolving technology, the entry of the MNCs 
became the only way for a developing country to acquire it.  
 
India too, underwent a significant shift in terms of telecom policies from 1984-
1994, predating mobile telephony, and linked to wider changes in the policy 
attitude of the state towards services liberalization. McDowell (1997) provides a 
detailed analysis of the causes and stages of the policy change in India with 
regard to telecommunication. McDowell suggests that India’s marginal role in 
the global political economy, its lobbying at international organisations such as 
the WTO against the prevailing liberal order, its model of post-independence 
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state-led growth all show India’s ‘counter-hegemonic challenge’ (ibid: 60) to 
liberalization pre-1984. The key question then is why this position changed 
when it did.  
 
McDowell challenges the three main neoliberal arguments for services 
liberalization – that the state was ineffective in driving economic growth, that 
the global economy had changed and needed liberalization, and that 
liberalization was required to ensure that there was a global convergence of 
communication technology. He emphasises, instead, the external factors that 
pressured the government to change its stance on services liberalization.  He 
uses the GATT negotiations as an example to expose the changing interplay of 
hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces that led to the change in policy.  
 
Services liberalization was not on the GATT agenda in 1980. Services did not 
even come under the purview of GATT, which was set up to deal with trade 
related issues. It was first introduced by the US during negotiations in 1982 but 
the idea was initially met with resistance from the Indian negotiating team. 
India’s initial research into services liberalization was highly qualified, if not 
negative. There was certainly international pressure backing the liberalization / 
privatization agenda.  McDowell points out that not only was the Indian state 
under pressure to accept liberalization conditionalities  after their fiscal crisis, 
but also the “counter-hegemony alliance” of the non-aligned states had slowly 
begun to unravel due to their increasing debt burdens (ibid: 74-91), removing 
concerted international opposition to the change in policy. As policy across 
different international organisations became more aligned, there was less and 
less support for any alternatives to a market-driven approach.  
 
There was also pressure from within the country that began to build support for 
services liberalization. The growing importance of the service sector locally 
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(from 24% of National Domestic Product in 1952 to 39% of National Domestic 
Product in 1986 (ibid: 112) and the development of an organised voice 
representing Indian business began to push for dialogue in services 
liberalization. India’s key interests in services liberalization was the loosening 
of controls on the international migration of labour, especially unskilled and 
semi-skilled labour. This was an interest that most large developing countries 
did have in common. In contrast, the US and Japan were interested in capital 
intensive and information based services liberalization and were not willing to 
negotiate on low skilled labour migration. After concerted US pressure, in 1987, 
services liberalization was put on the GATT agenda and many developing 
countries signed on to services liberalization, albeit at a gradual pace and with 
protection for domestic interests. The USA felt that this was weak deal for them 
and finally rejected it in 1995. While Indian negotiators touted this as a victory 
for India’s sovereignty in the face of international pressure, the internal policy 
approach had also begun to shift towards services liberalization.  
 
Mukherji (2004) disagrees with the above view. He claims that the opening up 
of the sector cannot be attributed merely to pressure from International Aid 
Organizations. The Athreya Committee report on the liberalization of the 
telecom sector was available by March of 1991, before the advent of the BOP 
crisis. The Athreya committee had recommended that 3 kinds of institutions 
were required – policy making, regulatory and field-oriented institutions. The 
report specifically talked about the sequencing of mobile telephony and also 
recommended the liberalizing of the equipment manufacturing space.  
 
By the mid 1990’s India was also particularly interested in the international 
mobility of domestic software programmers. Services liberalization became 
something the government was keen to promote and the introduction of 
privatization in what was seen as a small, scale luxury mobile telephony sector 
was a non-controversial backdoor entry point into a state run sector. Public 
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opinion in Indian press veered from being suspicious of the impact of 
liberalization to being convinced that it represented India’s only hope for 
economic growth. This set the stage for the introduction of mobile telephony in 
India in the mid 1990’s. 
 
6.2.3 The Tipping Point 
 
In the final analysis, what tipped the hand of the government to finally tackle 
the privatization of telecom was the Balance of Payments (BoP) crisis that India 
suffered in 1990. It also had an impact on the route of privatization followed - 
the choice of license auctions to choose private partners. The IMF loans, 
provided to help tide over the BoP crisis, came with conditionalities that 
pushed for privatization and liberalization of a wide range of sectors, including 
Telecom. Further, the sale of spectrum to private entrants could serve as an 
important source of revenue for the state. These were also packaged as a way to 
cross-subsidize the rural penetration drives of the DoT.   
 
In July 1992, the government of India first invited private participation in 
providing cellular mobile services.  As discussed, privatization faced opposition 
– from the incumbent as well as from public opinion, which felt that exposure 
to external forces through liberalization undermined India’s sovereignty. The 
introduction of private wireless had to be ‘sold’ to the nay-sayers. While 
wireline services remained the purview of the politically and organizationally 
strong incumbent, wireless services were considered a luxury good, non-
competitive with the former and requiring high capital-intensity, hence the 
introduction of private participation and the conditions that made it necessary 
for them to have some foreign backing. Desai (2006) also points to the long 
waiting lists for telephones (1.7 million in 1990) as an argument used for private 
entry.  
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The following section traces the evolution of the sector through 6 phases that 
correspond to significant policy breaks in rent creation policies.  The phases 
are: 1995-1999, 1999-2003, 2003-2007, 2007-2009, 2009-2012 and 2012-2014. The 
first phase from 1995 to 1999 was a rather shaky beginning, with poor growth 
and low revenues and a sector that seemed doomed to fail. The Noughties 
however, witnessed a turnaround and a strengthening of the sector in 
regulatory terms, in an attempt to encourage penetration and growth of 
revenues. 2003 to 2007 saw an increase in the competitive pressures on sector 
margins, and a driving of consumer value, as well as further regulation in terms 
of universalizing the wireless licenses. There was then a stated push by the DoT 
in driving consumer value through the dropping of costs per minute. This, 
combined with an attendant surge in penetration, firmly established the 
potential of the sector. 2008 witnessed a spectrum assignment process that was 
highly irregular, which drove a large number of new entrants to the sector but 
at an official loss to the government exchequer. Later characterized as the 2G 
scam, the exposure of the details of this scam from 2010 onwards has seen 
another change in the way the telecom sector is viewed. From 2010 onwards, 
both in the eyes of the government and in popular culture, there is no doubt 
that the telecom sector represents a huge growth opportunity. There is also a 
strong awareness that the sales of spectrum represent an unmatched 
opportunity for rent extraction by the state.   
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6. 3 Phase 1: 1995-1999 
 
Bids were invited from the private sector in 1992 (for metro licenses) and again 
in 1995 (for non-metro ‘circle37’ licenses). Licenses were finalised in 1994 and 
1995with a duopoly in each circle. Ten year licenses were issued along with 2 x 
4.4 MHz (paired spectrum to accommodate uplink and downlink frequencies 
separately) of 900 MHz spectrum. 
 
Table 6.1: Spectrum Right Allocation 1995-1999 
License 
Round 
License Type Circles Method 
of 
Allocation 
Period 
of 
License 
No. of 
Licenses  
Amount 
of 
Spectrum 
Winners 
1994 – 
Phase I 
Wireless 
(GSM 
mandated) 
4 
metros 
Beauty 
Contest 
10 
Years 
8 
(2 per 
circle) 
2X4.4 
MHz of 
900 
Listed in 
Appendix 6 
1995 – 
Phase 
II 
Wireless 
(GSM 
mandated) 
18 
circles 
Single 
Stage 
Auction 
10 
years 
34 (max. 
2 per 
circle) 
2X4.4 
MHz of 
900 
Listed in 
Appendix 6 
1995 Fixed 6 
Circles 
Single 
Stage 
Auction 
15 
years 
6 2.5MHz of 
800 
bundled 
with 
license 
Reliance and 
Tata in 1 
circle each. 
Listed in 
Appendix 7 
1999 Wireless for 
BSNL/MTNL 
All Admin 
Allocation 
20 
years 
1 in each 
circle as 
3
rd
 
operator 
2X4.4MHz 
of 900 
BSNL/MTNL 
 
Key:   High Formal Rent Extraction by the state, no rents left for producers or consumers 
 Lower Formal Rent Extraction by state, higher producer and consumer rents 
Source: Data from TRAI, service provider information. Characterization of rents author’s own.
   
 
                                                 
37
 India’s circle architecture was covered in section 3.3.2 of Chapter 3. 
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In January 1992, bidding process for licenses for the four metros followed a 
process that did not make any demands on the mobile service providers beyond 
the requisite funds and foreign collaborations to bring in expertise – this 
process was based on administrative allocation (‘ a beauty contest’ as it is 
known in the literature). In July 1992, two licensees for each metro were chosen 
who needed to exhibit business plans, foreign collaborators with experience, 
but most importantly, the maximum rental price for the license(Desai 2006: 
76). It was August 1995 before the legal wrangling from the rejected bidders was 
settled in court and the first cellular operations were commenced. Appendix 6 
lists the winners of the metro licenses. Airtel won a license for Delhi and has 
since, through acquisitions, bought into Chennai and Calcutta. The other metro 
licenses show the presence of other key sector players – Aircel, Vodafone and 
Idea, either directly or through later acquisition.  
 
The license cost for the metros was structured in the following manner: for 
each metro license, there was a fixed fee payable annually for the first three 
years of operation, after which the operators had to pay either the annual 
license fee or Rs.5000 per subscriber, whichever was higher.  The fixed fee by 
metro is given in Table 6.2. 
(Note: All prices for spectrum in this chapter are given in Rupees Crores (Rs. Cr.). 
A crore is a uniquely Indian term denoting Rs.10, 000,000 (ten million rupees. It is 
the commonly used unit for currency in India, rather than millions. For most of 
the numbers, the value is also expressed as Rs. Million and US $ converted at the 
prevailing exchange rate at the time. At the end of 2014 the currency exchange 
rates stood at about Rs.63 per US Dollar (exchange rates from http://www.x-
rates.com)). 
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Table 6.2: 1995 Phase I Metro Licensing: Spectrum Prices (Rs.Cr.): 
 Delhi Mumbai Kolkata Chennai 
Year 1 2 3 1.5 1 
Year 2 3 6 3 2 
Year 3 8 12 6 4 
Years 4-6 12 18 9 6 
Ongoing 16 24 12 8 
Price /MHz 
ongoing 
16 Cr/4.4 = Rs. 
36.3 
Million/MHz 
Rs. 54.5 
Million/MHz 
Rs. 27.3 
Million/MHz 
Rs. 18.2 
Million/MHz 
In US $ $800,000/MHz $1.2 
Million/MHz 
$600,ooo/MHz $400,000/MHz 
Source:  Based on data from Desai (2006: 77). 
 
In January 1995, bids were invited for wireless licences in 21 non-metro circles 
and also for wireline (or fixed line) licences in A (richer states) and B circles. At 
this stage, much clearer bidding requirements and guidelines were established. 
While the more stringent selection criteria should have eliminated all except 
the big business houses, the criteria were somewhat loosely applied and a 
number of smaller players got licenses too(Desai 2006: 77). The list of all 
wireless licenses awarded can be seen in Appendix 6.  
 
The single stage bidding process raised around Rs. 20,000 crores (US$ 4.5 
Billion38) (Prasad and Sridhar 2014: 224-225), a ridiculously high figure for a 
nascent market in an undeveloped sector. Some of the bidders bid excessive 
and unrealistic amounts. In fact the number of licenses that could be won by a 
single party was retrospectively limited in order to bail out HFCL, who had 
indiscriminately bid on all circles and could not meet its obligations (ibid: 78). 
                                                 
38
 Exchange Rate in 1995 taken at 1$ = Rs.45. 
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Six wireline licenses were also awarded (Appendix 7), raising Rs.27,000 Cr. 
(US$ 6 Billion). 
 
While the process raised substantial bids, it appears these bids had not taken 
into account the fact that the DoT had set high interconnect charges39. This led 
to the TSPs needing to price their calls at a very high rate. The combination of 
high license fees, high cost of calls and high cost of handsets depressed market 
demand and the wireless market had grown to a paltry 1.3 million subscribers 
by July 1999.  
 
There were large-scale defaults in terms of license fee payments and firms in 
the sector were all close to bankruptcy. Prasad and Sridhar (2014: 226) 
estimated that the license fee payable till 31st July 1999 was as high as 20 times 
the annual revenue of all the mobile operators put together in 1999. Two 
studies were commissioned in 1998 on the health of the telecom sector, BICP 
(1998) and ICICI (1998). Appendix 8 summarizes some of their key findings on 
the state of the sector. With large-scale defaults on license obligations, the 
sector was on the verge of collapse, with sector firms suing the DoT and vice 
versa. There was a demand from the firms in the sector for a regulatory agency 
that was independent from the DoT. 
 
The outcome of the above turn of events on the sector was significant. An 
independent regulator, the Telecoms Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) was 
set up in 1997. A revised National Telecoms Policy (NTP 1999) recognized 
wireless communication as an essential good. The DoT recognized the failure of 
upfront auctions and negotiated a move to a revenue sharing model for the 
firms in the sector, in return for their allowing increased competition. It was 
                                                 
39
 Interconnect charges refer to the charges paid by the network that originates the call to the 
network where the call terminates. In the inception of the sector, since most lines are owned by 
the public sector incumbent, high interconnect tends to favour incumbents. 
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agreed that fixed and cellular operators would pay license fee dues up to 31st 
July 1999 as the entry fee into the new licensing regime, after which they moved 
to revenue sharing agreements with the government. All licenses were also 
extended to 20 years (starting 1994/95) from the original 10 year duration.  
 
The entry fee paid by cellular operators was approximately 30% of their original 
license bid. 70% of the value of the excessive bids on the wireless licenses was 
written off. However, fixed line operators paid even less of their original fees 
and ended up with cheaper licenses as a result. For fixed line operators, due to 
the graded structure of their license fee agreements, the entry fee was only 5% 
of their original bid amounts (Bajpai and Hans 2005: 12).  
 
The government incumbent was introduced as the 3rd player in each circle in 
1999. BSNL (in the non-metro circles) and MTNL (in Delhi and Mumbai) were 
assigned 2 x 4.4 MHz of 900 spectrum free of cost (as government incumbents). 
 
The conventional analysis of this phase of the sector’s development typically 
describes a period of “bungled privatization”, the power of the DoT and the 
need for better governance through an independent regulator. Desai (ibid: 29) 
for example suggests that “the cupidity of the DoT led to the bankruptcy of the 
operators even before they had started”. Academic analyses of the period lay the 
blame for the collapse at the door of the DoT and its attempt to fix prices rather 
than allowing market forces to regulate price levels. 
 
An examination of the distribution of rents in this period is, however, critical to 
understanding the underlying forces that culminated in this policy outcome. 
Wireless communication was still viewed very much as a “luxury” sector and 
this justified a policy framework where the rents accrued largely to the 
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government, in the form of license fees and levies. High interconnect costs 
ensured that any rent generated by the wireless operators was transferred to 
the DoT (as MTNL/BSNL were the dominant fixed line players and the nascent 
development of wireless meant most calls that originated on a wireless line 
terminated on a fixed line). This combination of policies meant that the 
economics of the wireless players had high fixed costs (rents captured by the 
government) and high variable costs (rents captured by DoT/MTNL/BSNL). 
This high extraction of rents by the state left little for the producers. 
Consumers did not benefit from this formal rent extraction by the state since 
costs per call were fixed at high levels. The state’s high levels of rent extraction 
were threatening the viability of the sector.  
 
While the political settlement underlying this distribution of rents will be 
detailed in the next chapter, suffice to say here that the large number of people 
employed by the DoT, and the characterization of this as a “luxury” good, 
worked to reinforce this distribution of rents. The near bankruptcy of the sector 
and the pressure this put on financial institutions (often owned by the 
government) who had lent them money was a critical driver in changes in 
policy direction to correct this distribution of rents. A revised National Telecom 
Policy (NTP 99) was the first move in this direction. NTP 1999 was in many 
ways an explicit recognition of the need to change this distribution of rents and 
set the stage for the next phase in the evolution of the sector. The granting of 
wireless licenses to MTNL/BSNL was the sop to DoT to enable the policy. It 
allowed the DoT to share in the potential of the sector. 
 
On the basis of this analysis, it is not clear that the sector could have rectified 
its problems with an independent regulator alone as suggested by most 
analyses of the period. The rents that were being extracted by the state needed 
to be under threat for the state to be willing to rein in the oligopolistic 
interference of the DoT. Without the support of the state, a separate regulator 
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would neither have been set up nor would have had any power to curb the 
influence of the DoT. It needed the state to realise that its rent extractions were 
threatened to be willing to negotiate rent sharing with producers and 
consumers in order to grow the size of the pie. NTP 99 and the revenue sharing 
agreement with producers was in effect an agreement by the state to reduce 
their levels of rent extraction through license fees in exchange for an agreement 
by the existing producers to allow the state to lay claim on rents through 
spectrum right assignments as a participant in the sector. Thus while the state 
reduced its rent extraction and allowed producer rents to improve, it was 
simultaneously increasing its access to rents through rights to operate in the 
sector. Table 6.1 characterises the phase as lower state extraction, but the state 
has agreed to lower its rents in anticipation of future rents as a producer in the 
sector, as well as a share of the revenue of private producers.  
 
  
217 
 
6.4 Phase 2: 1999-2003 
 
As part of their bailout package, the TSPs in the wireless sector had agreed to 
give up the duopoly that they had been promised at the time of buying their 
original licenses. The state provider (BSNL/MTNL) had been introduced to the 
wireless sector in 1999. In 2001, the government wanted to introduce further 
competition in terms of a fourth licensee in each circle, a private sector player.  
 
The allocation method was a three-stage bidding process with a sealed bid. 
Prasad and Sridhar contend that the auction procedure reduced the risk of 
overbidding and the results were evident in the more realistic spectrum prices. 
The price for pan-India license at this stage was Rs.1658 Cr. (Rs. 16.58 Billion or 
US$ 368 Million) as against Rs.20,000 Cr. (US$ 4.5 Billion) that the first auction 
had raised for 2 licences per circle. After the 1999 settlement the final price that 
the 1st and 2nd operators together had paid on a comparative all-India basis was 
Rs.7000 Cr. (US$ 1.5 Billion). 
Table 6.3 Spectrum Right Allocation 1999-2003 
License 
Round 
License 
Type 
Circles Method 
of 
Allocation 
Period 
of 
License 
No. of 
Licenses  
Amount 
of 
Spectrum 
Winners 
June 2001 wireless 21 
circles 
Admin. 
Allocation 
10 years 24 
4
th
 
operator. 
2 x 4.4 MHz 
of 
900/1800 
Winners 
listed in 
Appendix 9 
November 
2003 
Fixed 
and 
wireless 
all Change in 
License 
terms 
20 years - - UASL 
introduced 
 
Key:   Lower Formal Rent Extraction by state, higher producer and consumer rents 
Source: Data from TRAI, service provider information. Characterization of rents author’s own.
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The spectrum allocated was largely 2 x 4.4 MHz of 1800 MHz spectrum since 
900 MHz was not available in most circles. The 1800 MHz spectrum was less 
effective than the 900 MHz spectrum on voice calls since the latter had a 
greater range and required fewer towers40. The lower quality of the spectrum, 
the more realistic estimations of revenue, and the fact that the license fee had 
move to a revenue sharing method, all contributed to the lower cost of 
spectrum in this auction. 
 
Airtel bought into 8 more circles. Reliance won the license for Kolkata, finally 
getting a metro presence with 900 MHz spectrum but it was unable to get 900 
MHz spectrum elsewhere in the country (Appendix 9). By the end of 2001, 
Airtel was emerging as the clear leader in the market, with the largest presence 
– in all 4 metros and 13 other circles. By 2002, an increasing market 
concentration among the bigger players is also visible, with a largest 6 players 
accounting for 93% of the wireless licenses and 86% of all telecom licenses in 
the sector (Figure 6.1) 
 
Figure 6.1: Increasing Market Concentration 2002 
 
Note: Big Six: Bharti, Reliance, Tata, Vodafone/Essar, Aircel, And Idea.  
Source: (Telegeography 2010), TRAI Data : March 2010. 
                                                 
40
 Section 2.2.1 briefly explored the difference between 900 MHz and 1800 MHz frequencies. 
The lower the frequency the higher is the range of the signal, or the distance it can carry. The 
frequency differences will be explored in greater detail in Chapter 8.  
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In 2002, as the market began to grow, TSPs began to raise the question of 
further spectrum to meet growing demand. The DoT did not have free 
spectrum to assign but established a roadmap for how further spectrum would 
be assigned. They used the principle of Subscriber Based Norms (also referred to 
in some places as Subscriber Based Criteria SBC) where additional spectrum 
would be awarded on the basis of registered subscriber numbers. These norms 
promised the existing TSPs policy stability and continued access to spectrum. It 
was also an attempt by the state to set performance conditions on the TSPs’ 
access to further rents. 
 
The series of events that interrupted this consolidation and growth phase of the 
sector actually had their origin in the previous phase of evolution. In the late 
1990’s wireline (or fixed line) service providers had started to enter the wireless 
market in a roundabout way. The key fixed line players were the state owned 
MTNL/BSNL and large Indian business houses, Reliance and Tata. Reliance and 
Tata had not invested significantly in the wireless auctions. They won no metr0 
licenses. Tata won a single non metro license and Reliance won licenses in six 
less important market circles. Instead, they had opted for wireline or fixed line 
licenses, and had won wireline licenses at a fraction of the cost of wireless 
licenses, but had not begun operations in the wireline market.  
 
Wireline licenses were bundled with some spectrum that was originally meant 
to help reduce costs of operation in the fixed line space. With advances in 
technology they, along with the State-owned telecom company BSNL/MTNL 
began to use CDMA41 technology, (initial wireless licenses were not technology 
specific), or more specifically known in this case as Wireless in Local Loop 
(WLL), to provide limited mobility wireless services within their circles. The 
                                                 
41
 Section 2.2.2 described the differences in the technology platforms of GSM and CDMA.  
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then COAI director general (Mr.TV.Ramachandran) claimed that limited 
mobility soon morphed into full mobility, allowing WLL (M) players to illegally 
offer mobile services without having bought a wireless license in the first place 
and therefore without the debt burden that wireless players then carried as a 
result of the 1995 auctions . 
 
In 2001, the DoT overruled its own licensing policy yet again by allowing fixed 
line players to officially offer WLL services with full mobility. This 
circumventing of rules meant that these fixed line TSPs had entered the mobile 
telephony sector without the crippling license fees that hampered the rest of 
the players. In addition, incoming calls on WLL were free; giving WLL services 
a price advantage. The WLL operators were also able to use their long-distance 
call charges on fixed lines to cross-subsidize their mobile service. There is 
significant anecdotal evidence in the press that they benefited from informal 
support from the state and the regulator (Telegeography 2003).  
 
Protests from the industry (primarily through the corporate lobbying body, 
Cellular Operators Association of India, COAI) led to several rounds of 
litigation and, finally, after a protracted three year battle, the DoT accepted 
TRAIs proposal to migrate all licenses including wireline licenses to a single 
unified license, referred to as the Universal Access Service License (UASL), that 
allowed both GSM and CDMA technologies to operate in the sector. The CDMA 
technology was to continue to operate on the 800 MHz band, and GSM 
operated on 900MHz and 1800MHz bands. Fixed operators had to pay the 
difference between the fixed and wireless license fees and Reliance was also 
charged a penal interest for its unauthorized provision of wireless service.  
 
Further, apart from the one time entry fee of the UASL, all wireless operators 
had to pay a percentage of their revenue share (fixed at 10%, 8% or 6% 
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depending on the category of circle) as license fees and a separate percentage 
(fixed at 2%, 3% or 4% depending on circle category) as spectrum charges. The 
fixed line players were migrated to this license on paying an additional entry 
fee. The price differentials that WLL was able to benefit from were also changed 
with the regulation of interconnection charges and the implementation of a 
Calling Party Pays (CPP)42 regime for both wireless and WLL players in 2003. 
 
NTP 1999 saw a decisive shift in the direction of policy – the clear learning from 
the earlier phase was that the economics of the sector was not sustainable and 
there was an urgent need to redistribute the rent of the sector more in favour of 
the operators. This was successfully achieved and the outlook for producers 
improved significantly. Consolidation further reduced the fixed cost burden. 
Subscriber Based Criteria for the allocation of further spectrum reduced policy 
uncertainty with regard to spectrum assignment. Conventional analyses would 
view this as the success of an independent regulator. Such analyses would also 
view the CDMA/WLL move as a technological innovation that could add value 
to consumers (Sridhar 2006), and UASL as an attempt to create a technology-
agnostic environment that allowed the best technology to triumph (interview 
with  Mr. Arvind Kumar of TRAI).  
 
An alternative view to this is that the increasing producer rents in the wireless 
business resulted in greater interest from the state owned players 
(BSNL/MTNL) and the large Indian business houses (Tata/Reliance) who both 
owned fixed line assets and had limited wireless presence. Reliance had 
managed to win a metro license in 2001 but it was with less valuable spectrum. 
                                                 
42
 CPP is a system where the caller pays the cost of the call. It is the most common form in 
mobile markets today. The USA has RPP, where the receiver pays some of the costs of the call. 
RPP is theoretically better at ensuring allocative efficiency. The problem with the RPP system is 
that it does not allow mobile phone owners to have budgetary control over their bill and is 
believed to be detrimental to the growth of the sector. However, a CPP system allows the TSP 
to exercise market power in call termination charges and in the early stages of the sector, 
allowed TSPs the financial resources to fund customer acquisition. 
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The influence of the DoT and the big business houses on the ‘independent’ 
regulator is visible in the move to grant wireless licenses to MTNL/BSNL at no 
cost and to initially allow WLL at no incremental cost, but in fact significant 
cost advantages over GSM.  
 
Viewing this evolution of policy from a rent perspective makes it clear that as 
NTP 1999 resulted in the increasing attractiveness of the wireless sector, the key 
driver to the evolution of this policy towards UASL was not the independent 
regulator or innovation in technology but the desire to allow DoT, and the 
private firms of Reliance and Tata to participate in these increased rents. At 
least in the early stage, in the way that its powers were defined and in its 
dependence on the DoT, TRAI was seen as a pawn in the hands of the DoT and 
unable to manage an independent agenda for the sector (Sen 1994, Dossani 
2002).   
 
Thus it was not the benefit of an independent regulator that resulted in this 
policy change but the challenge from those that had been left out of the 
existing rent distributions. This challenge was met with contestation by existing 
holders of the rights as they saw their rent being eroded through increased 
competition. The state finally settled the matter by allowing its own 
participation, as well as that of key industrialists in these ever more attractive 
rent opportunities.  
 
The state’s formal rent extraction through the redesigned spectrum auction was 
reduced but the state had also opened two fronts in terms of its own 
participation in the sector – through GSM and CDMA. In addition the policy 
had bought entry for Reliance again on two fronts – GSM (although with poorer 
quality spectrum) and CDMA.  
223 
 
 
In that sense some producers benefited (Table 6.3) from the move to Universal 
Licensing, while others (the original GSM licensees) saw a reduction in their 
share of rents through increased competition. However, seeing that they were 
unlikely to be able to influence the state’s position on this policy, they agreed to 
settle the dispute and accept the policy change. They had the benefit of better 
quality spectrum and the reassurance of guaranteed spectrum allotment if they 
grew. 
 
 
 
  
224 
 
6.5 Phase 3: 2003-2007 
 
Through what was clearly a litigious phase of development for the sector, the 
sector did manage to achieve a number of changes that benefited growth. First, 
several regulatory changes and the process of negotiations resulted in the 
strengthening of the powers of the TRAI. The strengthening of TRAI meant 
that, in theory, interest groups were less likely to be able to affect sector 
outcomes. Incremental policy changes had also, by 2003, adjusted tariffs and 
concessions in the field to create balanced tariff plans to ensure that both 
technologies operating in the sector faced similar costs. Importantly, it also led 
to the recognition of the need for a uniform licensing policy to cover both 
wireline and wireless players in the sector. The uniform policy, though a change 
from earlier licensing, resulted in greater spectrum right clarity and stability. 
And finally, the strong competition between WLL and wireless players had 
resulted in a dramatic dropping of price per minute resulting in an explosion of 
subscriber volumes (Figure 6.2). These changes led to a period of 
unprecedented growth and profitability for the sector. 
 
Overall this phase was characterized by improved economics for producers, 
very strong consumer value and spectacular growth in the industry. By 2006, 
ROCE for industry leader Bharti Airtel had improved to 18%, from 0% in 2002 
(calculated from Company published Annual Reports). The industry had grown 
to $13B in revenue. Consumer prices had fallen to lower than Re.1 / minute 
(1/10th of global consumer prices). Explanations of this growth as usually put 
down to the competitive pressures on pricing and a stable regulatory regime.  
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Figure 6.2: Price per Minute vs. Subscriber Growth in Mobiles 
 
Source: (COAI 2007b: 2) 
 
However, this view does not take into account the fact that, in part, this 
increased consumer value (lower prices, better services) were driven by a forced 
dissipation of rents to the consumer by political pressure. In 2005, the post of 
telecom minister was given to a regional party (DMK in Tamil Nadu) nominee, 
Dayanidhi Maran. Maran, a party rising star, was technology savvy and was 
seen as progressive in his views for the sector. He challenged the sector players 
to drop call costs to Rs.1 per minute and saw substantial political mileage from 
this move.  
 
The increased size of the sector and the rents it was generating also began to be 
noticed by the politicians. In spite of the independent regulator, liberalized and 
stable policy and the increased competitive pressure, rent seeking also 
increased, contrary to what neo-liberal theory would lead us to believe.   
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Six years after the fact, the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) in India has 
accused Mr. Maran, as Union Telecom Minister in 2006, of misusing his office 
to engineer the sale of telecom firm Aircel to Malaysia's Maxis Group. A 
criminal case that accuses Mr Maran of corruption and conspiracy alleges that 
in exchange, Maxis paid "illegal gratification" worth more than Rs. 700 crores 
(Rs. 7 Billion or us$ 152 Million) to Marans family business interests.  Maran was 
peremptorily sacked in 2007, and replaced by Andimuthu Raja, another DMK 
nominee who was seen as being very close to the power bases within the DMK 
party  but not for reasons of political graft (Joshi 2010). The amounts allegedly 
paid by Maxis show the recognition that the size of rents had increased 
significantly and the contests for these rents showed higher levels of rent 
seeking.  
 
The conventional view also ignores the fact that even as the profitability of  
players such as Airtel improved as they benefited from economies of scale, 
those with less of an incumbent advantage continued to remain sub-scale (e.g. 
Reliance ROCE in 2006 was only 3.8%) and did not yet have a national 
footprint. These players, especially Tata and Reliance, had managed to secure 
entry into the sector but were unable to compete with the incumbents. They 
were even keener for greater access to sector rents on the back of the improved 
economics of the industry. 
 
Thus the rents analysis of this phase highlights the political mileage that 
redistributing rents towards consumers resulted in, the increasing attraction of 
this sector as a potential source of informal rents and the desires of the large 
businesses house to participate in what was now a thriving and vibrant sector. 
These trends are not visible from looking merely at the growth in sector 
volumes and profits. Thus, while the phase has traditionally been seen as one 
where the sector was growing due to the right institutional structures being in 
place and the right policies complementing these, a more nuanced rent analysis 
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shows that the increasing rents in the sector laid the foundation for greater rent 
seeking in the subsequent phase. The seeds of the 2G scam, in other words, lay 
in this growth phase of the sector’s evolution.  
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6.6 Phase 4: 2007 – 2009 
 
This phase saw the appointment of Andimuthu Raja as Telecom Minister in 
2007. It signalled the start of a period of immense regulatory change and 
uncertainty, significant informal rent extraction, rent contests by firms and a 
dramatic change in the levels of competition in the industry. Subsequently 
characterised as the 2G scam, the allocation of a further round of 2G spectrum 
in 2008 completely changed the shape of the sector. However, the factors that 
led to this event had started to take form in 2007. 
 
In 2007, Vodafone purchased Whampoa’s 67% stake in Hutchinson Essar 
Telecom (HEL) for $11.1 billion – valuing the entire entity at $18.8 billion. HEL 
was a nationwide GSM operator and this valuation established, without doubt, 
in the eyes of several players (from politicians to large business houses), the 
rent and wealth creation opportunities in the wireless industry. 
 
Yet again, the policy of spectrum assignment, and the policy view of 
competition structure in the sector, was changed in 2007. The TRAI brought 
out a set of recommendations in August 2007 (TRAI 2007) that went counter to 
their own recommendations of 2005 (TRAI 2005). In 2005, the report clearly 
stated that existing operators in India had less spectrum than their 
counterparts and that, as a scarce resource, all additional allocations of 
spectrum, even in the 3G band, should first be used to strengthen the efficiency 
of incumbent operators.  
 
In 2007, the TRAI recommendations do a complete about-face. Claiming that 
the changing dynamics of the sector necessitate a re-evaluation, the report 
makes wide –ranging recommendations on competition and spectrum usage 
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and pricing. Professing a “‘light handed’ regulatory paradigm” (TRAI 2007: 11), it 
suggests that there should be no cap on the number of entrants to wireless. 
Further, that improved spectral efficiency among incumbent private players 
showed that they were not constrained by spectrum scarcity. It recommends 
that the existing subscriber based norms be re-calculated, but in the interim, 
that the levels be raised from current.  
 
While the report also suggests that the pricing for spectrum at 2001 prices is 
unrealistic given market growth, it does recommend that spectrum in the 800, 
900 and 1800 MHz bands should continue to be administratively allocated to 
ensure a level playing field because of legacy reasons, while all spectrum not in 
this range, such as the 3G spectrum, should be competitively allocated through 
an auction. Note that 3G spectrum, which was in 2005 seen as an additional 
support for the existing 2G service, is now being referred to as a separate 
service.  
 
These recommendations first and foremost established a case for introducing 
new competition into an already crowded sector43 on the basis that prior 
introductions of competition into the sector had driven significant growth. 
Second, it suggested that new allocations of spectrum in the 2G bands should 
not be auctioned (to maintain a “level playing field” with earlier spectrum in 
the band). And finally, it reduced the access that incumbents in the GSM sector 
had to further tranches of spectrum by raising the SBNs. The DoT, under Raja 
selectively used the recommendations of this report to justify his change in 
policy on the sector.   
 
                                                 
43
 Crowded from the perspective that the number of players per circle was already 7-9, higher 
than in most other countries. 
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As part of the same ruling TRAI also recommended that a TSP could hold both 
a GSM and a CDMA license. Reliance applied for and was allocated 4.4 MHz of 
1800 GSM spectrum nationwide (the license was only for 14 circles as R Com 
already operated GSM in the other circles) for a payment of Rs.1651 crores (Rs. 
16.5 Billion, US$ 413 Million at prevailing exchange rates) under this Dual 
Technology ruling. Of note is the fact that, while several other players (notably 
Tata) applied for the same license, the processing window was closed once the 
license was granted to Reliance and all other parties had to apply as part of the 
first come, first served 2008 allocation. 
 
Table 6.4 Spectrum Right Allocation: 2007-2009 
 
License 
Round 
License 
Type 
Circles Method of 
Allocation 
Period 
of 
License 
No. of 
Licenses  
Amount 
of 
Spectrum 
Winners 
2007 
 
 
GSM 14 Administered 20 
years 
14 4.4 MHz Reliance 
January 
2008 
wireless All/ 
some 
Administered 
at 2001 prices 
20 
years 
122 
licenses 
444 MHz 
of 
800/1800  
2G Scam. 
Winners 
in 
Appendix 
10. All 
Licenses 
cancelled 
by 2012 
Feb. 
 
Key:   Largely Informal Rent Extraction, producer rents for select few 
Source: Data from TRAI, service provider information. Characterisation of rents author’s own. 
 
In January 2008, Raja suddenly announced a further auction of USLs (Universal 
Service Licenses i.e. those covering wireless and wireline services). However, 
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unlike earlier rounds of licensing, the price of these licenses for 4.4MHz of 
spectrum was administratively set at 2001 prices, Rs.1650 Crores (Rs.16.5 
Billion), far lower than their current estimated market value. The market had 
grown significantly in the intervening years and the administratively set price 
of 2001 was around a tenth of the market value of the spectrum in 2008. 
 
Further, instead of an open bid system, the licenses were awarded on a first 
come first served basis to players who did not need to prove credentials in the 
telecom space. This resulted in the awarding of new entrant licenses to players 
with no technological expertise44  and insufficient funds for operation in the 
sector. After several applications had been received, an arbitrary cut-off date for 
applications was also announced, creating a furore in the industry and press. 
122 licenses across the different circles had been awarded on this round, raising 
only Rs.12,386 Cr. (Rs. 123 Billion, US$ 3.1 billion).  
 
While the onward sale of the spectrum had been locked in for a period, new 
players were allowed to divest their business, bringing in foreign partners to 
fund their operation, resulting in windfall profits for the new entrants45. 
Existing players, Reliance and Tata, also obtained nationwide GSM licenses at 
this time, again at a fraction of the cost paid by the earlier entrants.  
 
The result of the 2008 auction was a greater crowding in of new entrants, some 
believe, unsustainably so (see Appendix 11 for a review of market players in 
2008). A shakeout resulted in some consolidation among firms in the market, 
but the average number of players per circle went up by almost 50% (Appendix 
                                                 
44
 Winners of the new licenses seemed to be firms from the real estate or building sector, 
possibly Raja’s old cronies from his previous post in the Environmental Clearances Ministry.The 
detlas of this will be discussed in Chapter 7.  
45
 For example, Unitech divested 67% of their stock to Telenor from Norway for Rs.7000 Crores, 
making a profit of Rs. 5895 Crores on their license (more than 300% on their original 
investment) within a period of months. 
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12).  In 2009, the news of the 2G scam broke in the press, leading to the 
resignation of the telecom minister Raja in 2010, and his investigation by the 
CBI on corruption charges. 
 
This round of licensing in the sector seems to be a simple tale of the negative 
influence of interest groups (in this case, a politician) on the policy decisions 
for the sector. The minister was likely engaging in rent seeking in pricing 
spectrum rights at a fraction of what they were worth in the market. The 
influence of the minister on the process indicates that the regulator was not 
sufficiently independent. As much as overly high license fees in the first round 
of licensing crippled the sector, the exceedingly low fees in the later round 
resulted in the creation of opportunities for corruption, a loss of revenue for the 
state, and uneven playing fields for existing players. Increasing regulatory 
independence would prevent this type of political rent seeking from happening.  
 
However regulatory independence seemed to have been achieved in the 
previous phase. If so why did it regress in this one? If the regulator, who was 
seemingly strengthened and insulated from political influence through 
institutional means, could be overruled by a minister, was it a problem of 
inappropriate institutional structures? An NIE approach would recommend 
reviewing institutional constraints on the operation of the regulator in order to 
further insulate it from interest group influence.  
  
A rent based view would, however, clearly identify the underlying driver to this 
seemingly whimsical shift in policy. The increasing producer rents arising from 
the reforms of the earlier phase (culminating with visible events such as the 
Vodafone acquisition), led to politicians and business houses (Tata and 
Reliance) who had been left out of the “GSM gold rush” (as referred to by an 
interviewee in the private sector) driving a restructuring of the distribution of 
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rents. Their contest over these rents was engineered through a change in the 
policy of spectrum rights assignment in the sector.  
 
Seen in this light, Mr. Raja’s moves were about carving up the pie of rents 
differently – with more being extracted informally by politicians and their 
chosen corporate allies (such as Reliance and Tata, but also new entrants such 
as Unitech, who bought the license at a low cost and then brought in a foreign 
equity partner Telenor, to generate windfall gains). The 2G scam from this 
perspective was not an isolated incident of illegal rent seeking driven by one 
individual but a move by a powerful faction of interest groups that had been 
left out of the growing rent distributions in the sector.  
 
As we have argued earlier as well, the assumption that greater isolation from 
the politics of patronage is possible and needs only a change in formal 
institutional structures such as a regulatory body is unlikely to be effective. This 
perspective ignores the underlying causes of informal rent seeking and does not 
acknowledge that the increasing rents were likely under any circumstances to 
lead to increasing contests for a share of them. Similarly, merely the removal of 
an official, who had clearly misused his power for personal gain (Mr. A. Raja), 
does not remove the likelihood of political patronage. This is not to say that 
large rent-seeking with a significant social cost did not take place, or that Mr. 
Raja was not to blame for his role in it. It just seeks to underline that the causal 
factors lie beyond individuals and their mal-intents.  
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6.7 Phase 5: 2009 to 2012 
 
In 2010, while the 2008 licenses were still in operation, but in response to the 
bad press that the 2008 allocation was getting, the government decided to 
move to auctions as an assignment mechanism for 20 MHz of 2100 MHz (3G 
spectrum) and 40 MHz of 2300 MHz (wireless broadband) spectrum.  
 
The 2G Scam and its aftermath in terms of the on-sell of the spectrum at higher 
prices had alerted the state and the general public that significant rents were 
now to be had in the allocation of spectrum and auctions would allow the state 
to extract this rent.  
 
The government had set a reserve bid price of Rs. 35 billion, but the bidding 
among 9 operators for the 3 slots in 17 circles and the 4 slots in the remaining 5 
circles for 3G spectrum was intense and far exceeded the reserve that had been 
set. The auction, which continued for 34 days, drove up bids for a pan-India 
license to Rs. 16,828 Crores (Rs. 168 billion, US$ 3.6 Billion), ensuring total 
government revenue from the auction to nearly Rs. 70,000 Crores, (or Rs. 700 
Billion, US$ 15 Billion). 
 
The BWA auction had only two lots of 20 MHz of BWA in each circle in 
addition to the state owned BSNL/MTNL who had already been allocated their 
spectrum. The BWA auction raised Rs.38,500 Crores (Rs. 385 Billion, US$ 8.3 
Billion), again far higher than estimates . Vodafone and Idea participated but 
withdrew from the bidding citing high prices. Airtel invested in BWA spectrum 
in 4 circles and Aircel in 8 but the only company that bid for and won a BWA 
licence in all 22 circles was Infotel, who was bought over and renamed Reliance 
Jio after the auction. 
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The auction was extremely successful in terms of revenue for the state - it had 
estimated a reserve price for a pan India block of 5 MHz of 2100 at Rs.3500 Cr. 
(US$ 752 Million) and a reserve price for a 20MHz block of BWA spectrum to be 
Rs. 860 Cr. (US$ 185 Million). Realized prices far exceeded the state’s 
expectations, with 5MHz of 3G spectrum selling at Rs.16,750 Cr. (US$ 3.6 
Billion) and 20 MHz of BWA  spectrum realising 12,848Cr.(US$ 2.8 Billion).  
 
Airtel, Reliance and Aircel won 3G spectrum in 13 circles each, and Vodafone 
and Idea won 9 circles each. BSNL/MTNL were assigned spectrum in all 22 
circles for free. The BWA spectrum was won by Infotel ( rebranded Reliance 
JIO46), Aircel, Airtel and others, and again, BSNL/MTNL were assigned 
spectrum free in all circles. Reliance JIO’s entry was noteworthy. The firm is 
promoted by the elder Ambani brother of the duo who has made a play to enter 
the mobile telephony market through a launch of 4G technology on the 2300 
MHz spectrum band. The list of license winners is provided in Appendix 13. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
46
 A brief note on Reliance Jio is given in Section 5.3.4 d. and e. of Chapter 5. To recap, Reliance 
Jio is the entry Reliance Industries owner, and elder brother Mukesh Ambani. He is reputed to 
have strong links with the government.  
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Table 6.5 Spectrum Right Allocation 2009-2012 
License 
Round 
License 
Type 
Circles Method 
of 
Allocatio
n 
Period 
of 
License 
No. of 
Licenses  
Amount 
of 
Spectru
m 
Winners 
May 
2010 
wireless All Auction 20 
years 
3-4 
licenses 
per 
service 
area 
4 blocks 
of 5MHz 
each of 
2100 
3G spectrum. 
Winners in 
Appendix 13 
May 
2010 
wireless All Auction 20 
years 
2 licenses 
per circle 
2 blocks 
of 
20MHz 
of 2300 
Broadband 
Wireless 
Access 
(BWA) 
spectrum. 
Winners in 
Appendix 13 
 
Key:  Formal Rent Extraction, high rents for state and consumer, lower producer rents 
Source: Data from TRAI, service provider information. Characterisation of rents author’s own. 
 
The 3G auction was hailed as a very efficient one. It was designed and 
conducted by objective third party agencies through a transparent online 
multistage bidding process. The comparison of the 2010 auction in terms of the 
process, and the revenue raised for the state, with those of the 2008 auction, 
was stark.  The conventional view of this phase is that the return to an auction-
based allocation of spectrum resulted in an efficient process with firms paying 
in line with their expectation of returns.  
 
A rents view of this phase, however, highlights the more significant 
redistribution of rent away from producers with the higher auction price of 
spectrum. Return on Capital Employed (ROCE)47 of key players declined 
substantially over this phase. Airtel ROCE moved from 30.4% in 2009 to 7.1% in 
                                                 
47
 Return on Capital Employed (ROCE) is calculated as 
ROCE = (Net Profit+Net finance cost)/ Average annual (Debt+Equity)  
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2012; Idea ROCE moved from 11.6% in 2009 to 5.2% in 2012; RCom. ROCE 
moved from 11.9% in 2009 to 3.6% in 2012.  
 
This squeeze on profits was in part caused by dropping prices - the over- 
supply, that was created through the introduction of multiple players in the 
earlier phase, put further downward pressure on pricing, as the new players 
looked to differentiate their services in a crowded market by dropping their 
prices (Do Co Mo being the standout example by launching a 1 paisa/ second 
offer – 50% lower than the prevailing Re.1/ minute) (source: interview with TSP 
employee). Merrill Lynch estimated that the effective price per minute was 
eroded by 20% between 2009 and 2010.   
 
The incumbents, with stronger balance sheets, viewed the 3G auctions as an 
opportunity to move out of this commoditization and pressure on voice 
pricing. The mobile internet ecosystem looked promising on 3G. India was seen 
as a country where poor fixed line internet meant that it was likely to be a 
“mobile first” country for internet access. This combination of pressure on voice 
pricing and the opportunity 3G offered to differentiate led the incumbents to 
bid substantial amounts for the spectrum, and this resulted in substantial 
transfer of rent to the government. The impact this had on TSP balance sheets 
was significant, as it increased debt burdens of the TSPs and reduced 
profitability.  
 
The analysis of rent distributions raises the question of whether the 3G auction 
was as efficient as it was made out to be. The excessive rent extraction by the 
state had left little leverage for the producers, and the hyper-competitive 
market eroded profitability. In a scenario where a number of new entrants were 
attempting to establish their service, this pressure was counter-productive. In 
addition the new entrants lacked expertise, and in some cases, requisite 
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funding, and were struggling to establish a viable business. The sector did not 
look attractive for the new entrants when even incumbent players struggled in 
terms of profitability.  
 
At the end of this phase, the sector was severely under pressure as incumbents 
had too much debt on their books and new entrants found entry into an 
established and already crowded sector with high levels of policy uncertainty a 
challenge. The sector was going to need a readjustment. It came in the shape of 
a Supreme Court mandated policy change. 
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6.8 Phase 6: 2012 to 2014 
 
Throughout the previous phase, there was a growing recognition that the 
allocation of 2008 had been highly irregular. Significant pressure had been 
brought to bear on the government to examine the process. In 2010, the 
Comptroller and Auditor General’s office (CAG) released a report on the 2G 
allocation alleging misallocation with intent to defraud. The case was taken up 
by the Supreme Court and all the licenses issued in 2008 were cancelled in 2012. 
This resulted in most of the new entrants withdrawing from the market. The 
next chapter reviews the evolution of the political settlement that led to this 
landmark judgement. Here we examine the changes in spectrum rights brought 
about by the court-mandated policy change.  
 
Based on the Supreme Court ruling, the spectrum from the cancelled licenses 
had to be put up for auction again. In November 2012, the 122 cancelled licenses 
of 2008 were put up for auction as blocks of 1.5 MHz of 1800 MHz spectrum 
each. Blocks of 800 MHz (CDMA) spectrum were also up for auction but found 
no takers. 102 blocks were sold, generating only Rs.9407 Cr. (US $ 1.7 Billion at 
prevailing exchange rates) in total.  
 
Only two of the new operators of 2008 whose licenses had been cancelled 
participated – Telenor and Videocon. Among incumbent groups, Idea, 
Vodafone and (very marginally) Airtel participated (Appendix 14 has the list of 
winners). Telenor (Uninor) and Videocon paid on average, twice the price that 
the incumbents paid (Rs 104 crore per MHz of spectrum, as compared to 
incumbents, who have paid Rs 46.93 crore per MHz) on average (Pahwa 2012). 
Service providers claimed that the reserve prices that were set at Rs.14,000 
Cr.(US $ 2.5 Billion ) for 5 MHz of 1800 MHz spectrum and Rs.18,200 Cr. (US$ 
3.3 Billion)for 5MHz in the 800 MHz band, were too high. 
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Table 6.6 Spectrum Right Allocation 2012-2014 
License 
Round 
License 
Type 
Circl
es 
Method 
of 
Allocatio
n 
Period 
of 
License 
No. of 
License
s  
Amount of 
Spectrum 
Winners 
Novem
ber 
2012 
Wireless 
(re-auction 
of 122 
cancelled 
licenses of 
2G scam) 
102 
block
s 
acros
s 22 
circle
s 
Auction 20 
years 
 1800 and 
800 
800 unsold. 
1800 at 
reserve 
price. 
Winners in 
Appendix 14 
March 
2013 
Wireless 
 
1800 
in 4 
circle
s, 900 
in 3 
circle
s and 
unsol
d 
800.  
Auction 20 
years 
1 1 block of 
3.75MHz 
of 800 
across 8 
circles 
No bidders 
at all for 
1800/900 
even with 
reduced 
reserve 
price. 1 
winner of 
800 - MTS 
(Appendix 
15) 
August 
2013 
Fixed and 
wireless 
 Change 
in 
License 
terms 
  Spectrum 
and license 
unbundled 
Unified 
License (UL) 
introduced 
Feb 
2014 
Wireless 
(re-auction 
of expired 
licenses 
from 1994) 
22 
circle
s for 
1800,  
3 
circle
s for 
900 
Auction 20 
years 
License 
unbun
dled 
431.2 MHz 
of 1800 and 
46 MHz of 
900 
353.2 MHz of 
1800 and all 
of 900 were 
sold. 
Winners 
attached in 
Appendix 16 
 
Key:  Formal Rent Extraction, high rents for state and consumer, lower producer rents 
Source: Data from TRAI, service provider information. Characterisation of rents author’s own. 
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The spectrum that found no takers in 2012 – 1800MHz blocks in 4 circles, 900 
MHz in 3 circles and all the 800MHz that remained unsold in 2012 was re-
auctioned in 2013 at reduced reserve prices. 1800 MHz spectrum was marked 
down by 30% at Rs.11,893 Cr. (US$ 2 Billion at prevailing exchange rates) for 
5MHz. 900 spectrum was set at twice the price of 1800 spectrum and 5MHz of 
800 spectrum was set at Rs.9100 Cr. (US $ 1.6 Billion). Even with these reduced 
reserve prices, the 2G spectrum found no takers at all in the market, and only 
one firm bought 800 MHz CDMA spectrum in eight circles (details in 
Appendix 15) 
 
The failure of the 2012 and 2013 auctions is attributed to poor pricing and hence 
auction design. Most commentators, including the TSPs (interview with Ms 
Hans), claimed that the spectrum was overpriced.   
 
However, as the previous section had pointed out, the 3G auctions had built up 
debt levels among all the established incumbent players. The cancellation of 
the licenses had affected all the new entrants to the sector in 2008, and the 
foreign firms who had bought equity in them, had barely established markets 
and were therefore not in a position to invest again. Since the foreign partners 
had paid a higher value for the spectrum than it had cost in the 2008 allocation, 
their losses on cancellation were high.  
 
The combination of the pressure 3G auctions put on the balance sheet of the 
winners and the fact the spectrum that was auctioned in 2012/2013 could only 
be used for 2G and CDMA (based on the technology at that time) resulted in 
very weak demand for the 2012/2013auctions. Despite the failure of this round 
of auctions, the 3G auctions brought in proceeds that were close to 10% of the 
fiscal deficit. The Government still believed therefore, in the potential of 
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spectrum auctions as a source of future revenue and as a route to managing the 
much monitored and reported fiscal deficit.  
 
A significant policy change in 2012 was the delinking of spectrum from the 
license. This meant that spectrum which had been assigned to service providers 
from the inception of the sector till 2010 (what was referred to ‘administrative’ 
spectrum, as against anything bought from 2010 onwards which was auction-
purchased spectrum) needed to be returned to the government at the end of 
the license period and repurchased in auction. From 2014 onwards a number of 
the early allotments of spectrum were going to come up for re-auction.  
 
In February 2014, the first tranche of 20 year administrative spectrum expired 
and was re-auctioned.  The government had mandated participation of those 
operators whose license was expiring and spectrum was up for auction if they 
wanted to continue operation in their areas. 431.20 MHz in 1800 MHz spectrum 
band was put up for auction across 22 circles at a reserve price of Rs. 882 Cr. /5 
MHz (US$ 142 Million).   353.20 MHz of this was sold at a final price of Rs. 11352 
Cr. / 5MHz (US$ 1.8 Billion). 46 MHz of 900 spectrum was auctioned for 3 
metros – Delhi, Mumbai and Kolkata, and all of it was sold at a price of 7393 
Cr./ 5MHz (US$ 1.2 Billion), nearly twice its reserve price. The government 
raised Rs.61,162 Cr. (US$ 9.5 Billion). 
 
For the state, the 2014 auction marked a reoccurrence of the spectacular returns 
that had been promised by the 2010 auctions. The poor performance of the 
2012/2013 auctions was thus overcome and it reinforced the view of the sector as 
one where significant rents had been created by spectrum rights and could then 
be extracted from the producers by the state.    
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The winners of the auction are listed in Appendix 16. Predictably, the 
incumbents Airtel, Vodafone, Idea and Aircel, whose licenses were on the 
block, were the biggest bidders. Uninor was a marginal player and Tata (TTSL) 
did not win any spectrum.  
 
The interesting new entrant to the table was Reliance Jio, who won 79MHz 
worth of 1800 MHz spectrum across non metro circles. It was speculated that 
Mukesh Ambani who had last purchased 2700 MHz 4G spectrum but was yet to 
launch his service was interested in the 1800 MHz spectrum as a back up to his 
4G launch (interview with Mr. Sheth).  
 
While again newspaper reports claimed that the 2014 auction fared better 
because of more realistic pricing(Hindu 2014, Vikas 2014), this misses an 
important reason for the high prices achieved in 2014.  
 
Prices in spectrum auctions that re-auction expired spectrum such as the 2014 
auction and future auctions in the Indian market are significantly impacted by 
the fact that some of existing players will be aiming to repurchase the spectrum 
that their current business is based on(Prasad and Sridhar 2014: 275-280). To a 
TSP who needs to buy back his expired spectrum to sustain a current business, 
that spectrum is naturally more valuable than to another who is attempting to 
enter the sector. An incumbent would value the spectrum at its market value 
plus the current value of his business that the spectrum supports. For a new 
entrant, the spectrum only has its current market value. So in the current 
format of phased re-auctioning of expired spectrum, the incumbent’s need to 
hold onto his spectrum allocation is likely to drive up spectrum prices. The 
regulatory head of Airtel estimates that this is the greatest influencer of realized 
spectrum price in the 2014 auction. According to him, this has the impact of 
over-estimating the market value of the spectrum significantly. He suggests 
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that the only way to combat this incumbent effect is either to have enough new 
spectrum available for new entrants in addition to the expired spectrum or to 
club expiry dates over a few years into one auction so that all incumbent 
players in the auction have some expiring spectrum to protect and are therefore 
not interested in over-inflating spectrum value.  In the absence of this, the 
auction will structurally drive up prices higher than the market would be 
willing to pay without this need to protect incumbency. 
 
A comparison of prices of the bands in recent auctions is given below. 
Table 6.7: Comparative Realised Prices of Spectrum Bands In Auction 
Circle 
Category 
Price in Rs. Cr. Per MHz  per Population 
800 
MHz 
900 
MHz 
1800 MHz 
2100 
MHz 
in 2013 in 2014 in 2001 in 2012 in 2014 in 2010 
Metro 118.5 262.02 23.38 56.63 123.46 257.98 
A 20.48   5.99 23.66 22.73 33.7 
B 7.14   2.85 14.28 12.84 15.55 
C     0.37 4.43 5.97 5.41 
Source: Adapted from Prasad and Sridhar (2014: 287) 
 
Prices of 1800 MHz have been driven up significantly in the 2014 auction. The 
high prices of 2100 show the over bidding that took place on the 3G auction in 
2010 and the low price of 800 MHz is related to its being locked into use with 
CDMA.   
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6.9 Spectrum Holdings at the end of 2014 
 
The company wise spectrum holdings as of end 2014 are summarized in 
Appendix 17. 800 MHz spectrum has had few takers due to the lack of a cost 
effective device ecosystem around CDMA technologies(Prasad and Sridhar 
2014). BSNL, Reliance and Tata still continue to hold around 10 MHz per circle 
between them but this spectrum can perhaps be better utilized if liberalized48 
and allowed to be traded. Advances in technology that make the spectrum band 
reusable and commercially viable on alternative technologies such as 4G could 
impact the value of this band of spectrum significantly. 
 
The incumbents, (who either received 900 spectrum administratively in the 
initial years or took over companies that did), monopolize the market for the 
900 MHz spectrum. BSNL/MTNL has the best allocation of 900 MHz spectrum. 
With at least 6.2 MHz across all circles, given their subscriber numbers, they 
are not the most efficient users of spectrum. Airtel, Vodafone and Idea have the 
best spread of this frequency pan India, while Aircel and Reliance have much 
patchier coverage at an all India level on 900 MHz.  
 
Most current players in the market currently use 1800 MHz to supplement their 
900 MHz holdings in order to get better pan Indian coverage. In spite of phases 
where the 1800 MHz band saw new entrants, they have mostly exited the sector 
by 2014. The only competitors with a presence in 1800 MHz but without a 
presence in the 900 MHz band are Tata, Uninor and Reliance Jio.  
 
Across both GSM and CDMA technologies 800 MHz, 900MHz and 1800 MHz 
are the frequency bands that can be used to support 2G services that form the 
                                                 
48
 Freed from the condition of its being used on CDMA 
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bulk of the voice traffic that is still the core business of firms in the sector in 
India. Appendix 18 shows the amount of this 2G spectrum that each operator 
held at the end of 2014. This reinforces the strength of Airtel, Vodafone and 
Idea as the players with the greatest amount of 2G spectrum overall, as well as 
the greatest holdings of 900 MHz (barring MTNL/BSNL)  
 
The 3G coverage on 2100MHz has mirrors this 2G coverage. In the 2300 MHz 
band that can today be potentially used to provide high speed mobile services 
using 4G technology, only BSNL and Reliance JIO have pan India coverage. 
Airtel and Aircel hold spectrum in some circles each.  
 
The overall picture is one of increasing concentration and national presence 
with the top three private incumbents – Airtel, Vodafone and Idea. The state 
incumbent – BSNL/MTNL is in the strongest position in terms of use rights to 
spectrum in the sector. However, they have not been able to leverage this to a 
position of market leadership.  
 
Aircel is the fourth strongest private player, but lacks a significant national 
presence. The patchy spectrum holdings of Tata, Reliance Telecom and Uninor 
make them unlikely to effectively challenge the dominance of the big three 
(Airtel, Vodafone and Idea).  
 
The interesting new seat at the table is Reliance JIO, which although is new and 
yet to launch its service, seems to have made significant spectrum right gains in 
the sector by buying pan India spectrum in the 4G space and  back up spectrum 
in 1800 MHz, even though its lack of early administrative spectrum is a 
disadvantage. Its position could be strengthened by a merger with Reliance 
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Communications, but although there is market speculation on the possibility, 
there have been no indications on such a move at the time of writing. 
 
6.10 Summary: 
 
The above analysis allows us to move beyond superficial policy prescriptions of 
greater regulatory independence or more competition to explain the path 
dependent effectiveness of these institutional structures in driving sectoral 
efficiency. The evolution of the sector from a rents perspective allows us to 
explain the policy movements better in terms of what material changes in 
spectrum rights and rents were caused by these.  It allows us to trace the 
impact of the policy change on the distribution of the rents in the sector and 
takes into account that spectrum right assignments have winners and losers, 
and that the allocations are likely to be contested by the losers. The distribution 
of the rents arising from spectrum sales is a deeply contested process. This 
means that the spectrum use right changes are never smooth and the frequent 
changes in policy direction and high levels of litigation the sector has seen are 
all the markers of this contestation.  
 
The analysis also throws up some important structural implications for the 
sector’s ongoing evolution. In spite of the phenomenal growth the sector has 
seen, it is not without its challenges. The scarcity of spectrum faced by the 
sector has gained salience as the critical factor facing the sector’s development. 
The growth of the subscriber base and the increasing demand for spectrum 
hungry uses of data have led to severely congested networks, and the release 
and sale of new spectrum will be important in improving levels of service.   
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TSPs claim the sector is still unfairly stacked against them, with high spectrum 
costs, and high duties and levies. The high cost bases of the players has already 
driven local innovations on cost structures – regulation was broadened to allow 
spin-offs of passive infrastructure (through shared tower companies) and active 
base station infrastructure (to equipment manufacturers, to be leased by the 
service providers). However additional spectrum costs may force the smaller 
players out of the market, leaving only the players with the deepest pockets. 
The sector has already seen an increasing consolidation by the largest players in 
spite of several attempts to increase competition through policy. 
 
For the State, on the other hand, the sector represents an unparalleled source of 
finances to fund budget deficits. Since 2010, the sector has assigned spectrum 
only through the auction process. This has also been mandated for all spectrum 
allocations from 2012 onwards by the Supreme Court ruling of 2012. With the 
entire lower cost administrative spectrum slated to come back to the auction 
table over the next few years, the price of spectrum, and the cost of debt for 
spectrum purchase by TSPs, is only going to increase. These structural 
implications for the sector’s evolution will be traced in Chapter 8. First 
however, the following chapter seeks to deepen our understanding of the 
drivers behind the changes in policy. 
 
While the analysis of rent flows from policy changes helps us trace the logic for 
the changes in the rights that underlie it, it doesn’t adequately explain why 
particular changes happened when they did, and what drove this change over 
another. The changes are reflective of a change in the underlying power bases 
in the industry that influence the choice of policy and that can be understood 
by looking at the outcomes of this policy on the dynamics of the underlying 
political settlement in the sector. As we have argued earlier, the creation of 
rents in the sector is both influenced by, and in turn influences, the underlying 
political settlement. The next chapter explores the political settlement in each 
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of the above phases of the sector’s evolution in order to trace its impact on 
policy creation and rent outcomes in the sector.  
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Chapter 7: The Impact of the 
Political Settlement on Policy 
Outcomes 
 
 
“Of course it is,” said the Duchess, who seemed ready to agree to everything 
that Alice said; “there’s a large mustard-mine near here. And the moral 
of that is– The more there is of mine, the less there is of yours.”   
Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland  
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Accounts of the development of telecom in India, as we have shown earlier, 
tend to view the sector’s development as handicapped by a lack of Good 
Governance. Failures were seen as arising from either bureaucratic 
incompetence or iniquitous political intervention. Greater liberalization, more 
regulatory independence and greater transparency were the policy 
prescriptions that arose from this view. 
 
The previous chapters have established first of all that conventional analyses of 
the Indian telecom sector’s performance have been limited in their explanation 
of the sector’s growth trajectory, pointing at different times to either over-
regulation or under-regulation as the principal causal factor of the sectors 
difficulties. On the flip side, all growth is attributed to either the sector’s 
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natural potential or to the beneficial effects of competition and independent 
regulation.  
 
This is an incomplete view and does not adequately explain the underlying 
reasons for changes in policy or the impact that these policy changes have on 
outcomes in the sector. This thesis argues that we can better explain the 
patterns of growth and challenges in the sector if we view spectrum allocation 
and licensing as a process of creating rights and income streams arising from 
these rights.  
 
Part of this process of rent creation is motivated by technical economic 
considerations and the bargaining of economic players but some rents are also 
created in response to political considerations and the political pressures 
directly and indirectly exercised even by economic players like 
telecommunication firms.  
 
The chapters in Part I of this thesis laid out the background to the sector and 
the factors that make a rents-based analysis relevant to understanding policy in 
the sector in general and in India in particular. We also explored the theoretical 
perspectives on rents and political settlements to establish the analytical 
framework of this paper that uses both rents and political settlements to 
explain the evolution of policy.  
 
To this end, the previous chapter applied the rents perspective to 
understanding the evolution of the sector. Based on significant shifts in rent 
creation policies, the sector’s development was divided into 6 phases and the 
rent creation and distribution examined in each phase. It explored the rent 
management strategies in each phase that determined the distribution of the 
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rents and characterised the phases in terms of the level of rent extracted by the 
state, retained by producers or dissipated to consumers.  
 
What this analysis has not done however was to explain the reason why 
particular organizations and agencies were able to influence or control the 
allocations of rents during particular periods or why these patterns changed 
over time. The analysis of rent creation and extractions showed that the state 
moved between period of low extraction and high extraction and between 
formal and informal methods of rent creation and allocation. As a corollary, 
rents left on the table for producers have also varied over the period.  
 
The reason that the analytical lens of rents alone is incomplete is that it fails to 
identify the significant contests over rent creation that underlies the creation of 
policy. Since policies that create rights also determine the distribution of rents 
from it, these policies tend to be severely contested, especially when the rent 
streams are significant. Chapter 6 was able to identify some of the contests over 
the rents but could not explain why they took the shape as they did, and what 
the underlying causes for particular rent distribution changes were. It could not 
explain why particular stakeholder groups benefit more in some time periods 
than in others, or why this changes over time.  The rents perspective does not 
explain why informal or illegal transfers dominate over some periods.  
 
In order to effectively explain the shifting patterns of rent distribution, we need 
to explore the relative bargaining power of the different types of agencies and 
organizations involved in particular types of rent creation processes. The 
political settlement describes the relevant features of the distribution of 
organizational power and the changes in this distribution over time. It is an 
analytical tool that helps to identify and describe critical characteristics of the 
structure of politics and organizations in a country that are relevant for 
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understanding these rent-seeking process, and the ways in which rent-seeking 
can modify economic policies. Chapters 4 and 5 explained the analytical 
framework of political settlements in general, and the specific use of the 
sectoral political settlement in particular, and established its possible use in the 
analysis of the telecom sector.  
 
This chapter seeks to apply this tool to our understanding of rent distributions 
and the outcomes of those distributions (what we will call ‘rent outcomes’) on 
the sector’s evolution.  It aims to synthesize the information on the official 
recorded rent distributions in each episode of rent creation with an 
understanding of the underlying political settlement to better explain the 
patterns of distribution. This will also help to establish that the changes were 
not random, but were closely related to broader organizational structures in 
society and how these were changing over time. The policy outcomes show the 
inter-relationship between rents and political settlements as the rent 
distributions in one time period in their turn reinforce or modify the political 
settlement for a subsequent period.  
 
7.2 Using Political Settlements 
 
The rents based analysis of the evolution of the sector indicated several changes 
and shifts in policy direction. It also stated that these changes in policy were 
driven by contests over rent distributions. However the changing patterns of 
rent distributions can merely hint at the underlying conflicts. Especially since 
some of these rent distributions may be informal / illegal and therefore will not 
feature in any of the official records of rent transfers. This section seeks to 
recast the recent history of the mobile telephony sector from a rents 
perspective through an analysis of the underlying political settlement at various 
points in the sector’s history.  
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Viewing the history from the perspective of rent flows embedded in an 
underlying political settlement allows us to not only better explain the reasons 
behind specific policies and their rent distributions, it also shows how the 
patterns of distribution then affect the stability of the current settlement and 
its likelihood of change. The analytical lens of the political settlement will help 
identify the reasons behind various policies and the resultant patterns of rent 
distributions. Since the outcomes of the distributions in one phase impact the 
political settlements in the next, it also helps explain the impact that the 
different rent distribution outcomes have had on the direction of development 
of the sector.  
 
To briefly recap, political settlements are defined as “a combination of power 
and institutions that is mutually compatible and also sustainable in terms of 
economic and political viability” (Khan 2010: 4). A political settlement is 
therefore a relatively stable network of individuals, firms and institutions with 
holding power that impacts the interactions within the network. We will use 
the term ‘agencies’ (borrowed from Fine and Rustomjee (1996)) to refer to these 
firms or institutions that comprise the settlement. The source of their holding 
power could be institutionally defined or have a basis in economic, political or 
organizational strength. As the analysis below will show, at different time 
periods different agencies appear to have greater relative power in the sectoral 
political settlement. Any agency with sufficient holding power that is left out of 
rent distributions will attempt to modify or change policy, or disrupt the 
system until the change occurs in its favour. The rent distributions also feed 
back into the political settlement, as access to rents result in changes in 
productive and organizational structures, which in turn change the distribution 
of holding power over time. The relative stability of a particular settlement may 
hide the fault lines that give rise to instability. The policies then change to 
change rent distributions in line with a new settlement. The stability of a 
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particular settlement is determined by how well the distributions match the 
holding power in the underlying political settlement.  
 
The aspects of a political settlement that are relevant for understanding policy-
making and implementation in a sector are specific to the organizations 
relevant for that sector. In this sense we define political settlements at the 
sectoral level for understanding sector specific developments, though the 
relative power of organizations at the sectoral level has to be understood in the 
context of the political settlement at higher levels of aggregation. Linking the 
evolution of sectoral political settlements with changes in the national and 
state level political settlements is one of the contributions of this work.  
 
The agencies that are relevant in the telecom political settlement (henceforth 
PS) operate in the policy-making, regulatory and service provider space. They 
have been described in Chapter 5 but a brief summary is provided here.  
 
The state (encompassing the wider political apparatus, including the national 
leadership as well as regional political parties) provides the key policy making 
agencies. The state does not necessarily have a coherent set of interests. At 
times the Telecom Minister has been a representative of a regional party and 
has acted in the interests of that specific party rather than that of the ruling 
coalition at the centre. The DoT is considered separate to the state apparatus to 
denote both the bureaucratic arm of the state in policy making, as well as the 
specific interests of the DoT as a service provider in fixed line or wireless (i.e. 
BSNL/MTNL). The regulator, TRAI is also considered separately.   
 
Individual private TSP firms are agencies that have sometimes worked 
specifically in their own interest but have often banded together to lobby 
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policy. The two major groupings within these are the GSM and CDMA players 
who have, for the most part, been on opposite sides of the fence on policy 
issues. The GSM players have lobbied through their association the Cellular 
Operators Association of India (COAI). The most influential of its members and 
the largest private firms in the service operator space are Bharti Airtel, 
Vodafone and Idea. The corresponding body for the CDMA players is the 
Association of Unified Service Providers of India (AUSPI). Its membership 
comprises Reliance and Tata Teleservices and more recently Sistema Shyam.  
 
There has been little organised consumer lobbying in the industry until a 
consumer driven petition on net neutrality in early 2015 but that falls beyond 
the scope of this paper. For the period considered, consumers have not 
exercised agency through any significant organizations. 
 
The rest of this chapter is divided into the same phases as have been used in the 
previous chapter: 1995 -1999, 1999-2003, 2003-2007, 2007-2009, 2009-2012, and 
2012-2014. In each of these sections, we will describe the political settlement, 
look at what the key rent contests were, the differences between the stated 
objective of the rent and its likely underlying reasons, the beneficiaries of the 
rent in each case, and the outcomes of this distribution on the direction of 
development of the sector (both intended and unintended) and on the political 
settlement itself. A table in each section summarizes the key features of each 
time period.  
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7.3 Dynamics of the Political Settlement 1995-1999: 
Money for Nothing 
 
The dominant agency driving the creation of rents in the first stage from the 
inception of the sector to around 1999 was clearly the government – both at the 
level of the political decisions by the Centre and the activities of the state 
owned Department of Telecommunications.  
 
Introducing wireless telephony through privatization was a politically bold step 
in a country that mistrusted the liberalization and privatization thrust of 
western financial institutions. The state clearly justified the move to private 
participation as limited to a small and premium sector of the market, which 
was unlikely to be relevant to the masses. Given the uncertainty of the potential 
and the fact that the cash-strapped state would be unable to support it, 
privatization was the only sensible solution. Certainly, in 1994, it was difficult 
for anyone to predict how ubiquitous mobile telephony would become in a 
couple of decades.  
 
The decision to allow private investment in a new and not well-understood 
sector at this time would prove to be a critical one, though it was driven by a 
relatively weak constellation of forces that proved effective because of very 
specific contextual reasons. It was driven by the calculations of a cash-strapped 
government that was not fully able to evaluate the rent opportunities in the 
sector and a context of domestic political flux and a growing international 
climate in support of liberalizing investments. 
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Table 7.1: Dynamics of the PS 1995-1999 
Policies driving rent  
creation and 
allocation  
Policy Objective  
 
Rent Distribution 
 
Agencies that Define 
Critical Characteristics 
of the PS 
 
Policy 
outcomes and 
economic 
effects given 
the PS 
Consequences for the 
evolution of the PS 
 Stated / Underlying Formal/informal Strong/weak   
1995 round of 
licensing  
 
 
Stated:  
Accelerate development of 
the sector in the face of 
uncertainty  
 
Underlying:  
Source of funds for the 
government.  
 
Allow development 
bypassing the incumbent 
Formal: 
State – high (Cost of license) 
DoT – high (Tariffs and interconnect 
charges) 
TSPs – low (Low volumes, high taxes, high 
cost of license) 
Consumers – Low. High policy driven price 
per call 
Informal: 
Sukh Ram and HFCL 
Dominant: DoT, State 
 
Weak:  
TSPs , TRAI, 
consumers 
Stunted 
penetration 
and growth of 
sector 
 
Operators on 
verge of 
bankruptcy 
 
TRAI set up 
Growth-constraining 
outcomes affect 
evolution of the PS 
Operators band together 
with common agenda. 
Creation of COAI. 
State fears bailout of 
bankrupt firms. Power of 
DoT declines. 
Wireline players left out of 
potential growth 
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Policies driving rent  
creation and 
allocation  
Policy Objective  
 
Rent Distribution 
 
Agencies that Define 
Critical Characteristics 
of the PS 
 
Policy 
outcomes and 
economic 
effects given 
the PS 
Consequences for the 
evolution of the PS 
 Stated / Underlying Formal/informal Strong/weak   
NTP 99 
Revenue sharing 
model 
 
3
rd
 operator license for 
DoT in 1999 
Stated:  
Prevent collapse of sector 
 
 
Underlying:  
Avoid bailout of bankrupt 
firms. 
 
Allow DoT to enter wireless 
State – low 
Notional write-offs of debt. 
Promise of future growth 
DoT – medium 
Entry into GSM 
TSPs (GSM) – medium 
Lowering of taxes, write-off of debt, 
revenue sharing 
Dominant 
State Agencies,   
COAI emerge as the 
powerful players 
DoT enters as 
third player 
DoT’s power challenged by 
COAI.  
 
TRAI strengthened. 
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As discussed in the history of the sector, the period was characterised by the 
State’s need for on-budget finances to cope with the BoP crisis engulfing the 
country. Thus, the creation of formal rents though the licensing mechanism in 
1995 was driven by the Centre’s need for fiscal resources. The increasing cost of 
the license was officially justified based on market potential but the message 
that the state was sending was certainly mixed. While, on the one hand, market 
potential estimates to investors were high, on the other, the telecom sector 
unions and internal stakeholders were being convinced that mobile telephony 
was only ever going to be a small, niche opportunity among a miniscule 
proportion of the population, and therefore could be privatised without 
threatening existing power structures.  The DoT represented the largest state 
employer after the railways, with a very strong trade union. The state was 
managing a tricky balancing act that would allow the establishment of the 
sector through private means and raise formal rents that the state could use to 
manage the fiscal crisis. The policy at this stage does not seem to have made 
any allowances for building new productive capabilities in the sector through 
strategies that created ‘learning rents’ for private investors in mobile telephony, 
which might have helped the technological development of the sector in 
particular directions.  
  
This was also a period of immense regulatory uncertainty in the sector.  No 
independent regulator existed, and the DoT was keen to maintain the reins of 
power over the wireless and potentially the wireline sectors, to protect its own 
wireline market from cannibalisation. This it did by extracting any potential 
rents in the sector by setting high taxes and interconnect charges, the key 
beneficiary of which was the DoTs’ wireline services. The DoT required the 
above to ensure that it maintained the market share of the public sector 
incumbent and to prove to the numerically strong DoT workers union that 
wireless services were destined to remain a small, luxury market in India. High 
taxes on private operators in the wireless market were also justified as required 
to subsidise the DoT’s rural penetration and service obligations.  
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However, the blatant regulatory bias towards the wireline incumbent drove up 
the cost of mobile calls and dampened demand.  An independent regulator 
(TRAI) was finally set up in 1997, but lacked any real power over decision-
making in the sector. Policy making, regulation and dispute redressal all 
remained firmly in the hands of the DoT. Importantly, the DoT also had control 
over all the key elements of the cost facing private service providers – the cost 
of spectrum, the charges and duties on the sector and the cost of interconnect. 
 
The key beneficiary of these on-budget rent strategies was the government 
exchequer. They allowed the State to raise formal funds to deal with the 
financial crisis and meet the demands of the IMF. However, for the sector, it 
meant rather stunted development with very inexperienced players. Wireless 
licences went to relatively small business houses – Bharti, Parasurampurias, 
BPL, HFCL etc.  
 
Interestingly, none of the larger business houses bought into the potential of 
the wireless sector at this stage. There were no rents to the sector in the early 
stages, to compensate for the risks involved. It is possible that the more 
politically linked larger business houses (Tata, Reliance) foresaw the risks in the 
wireless sector and therefore registered a presence in the cheaper wireline 
sector through wireline licenses. A number of foreign participants (such as 
AT&T) had also bought licenses to operate in the wireline sector. The wireline 
sector was certainly less risky, with an established demand. However, the high 
cost structures, reflecting both high costs of last mile connections as well as 
interconnect charges with the DoT, and the constraints on pricing created 
through policy by the DoT, discouraged them from actually commencing 
operation in wireline. By 1996 a number of the international players had exited 
the wireline sector citing regulatory uncertainty. In contrast, smaller business 
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houses were prepared to take the risk on the wireless sector, especially if 
backed by a ‘special relationship’ within the telecom ministry (HFCL was 
known to have a special relationship with the telecom minister, Sukh Ram).  
 
Apart from formal rents that accrued to the state and to the DoT, there is 
evidence of informal rents being pocketed by the minister for telecom, Sukh 
Ram. HFCL, a small local firm with little knowledge or expertise in telecom bid 
exorbitant amounts for licenses, possibly to block other entrants. They ended 
up winning 9 circles with a total bid amount of Rs.85,000 crores, an amount 
they had apparently not even worked out how they would honour  (Pereira 
1995). Sukh Ram, said to have close connections with the promoters of HFCL, 
came to their rescue, capping the maximum bids one could win at three, and 
even allowing HFCL to choose which bids they’d like to honour, rather than the 
three highest ones. In August 1996, the Central Bureau of Investigation in India 
(CBI) conducted a tax raid on Sukh Ram’s houses and discovered over Rs.3.5 
crores of cash, not to mention assets totally disproportionate to his earnings as 
a minister of state (Sharma and Rekhi 1996). It emerged in investigations that 
there was circumstantial evidence linking Sukh Ram to corruption with not 
only HFCL but a number of telecom equipment manufacturers (ibid). 
Newspaper articles also alleged that the bureaucrats of the DoT were often at 
odds with the minister in trying to prevent the corruption (Bhushan, Joshi, and 
Narayanan 1996, Sharma and Rekhi 1996). Sukh Ram resigned from the post of 
telecom minister and was asked to resign from the party49. Beni Prasad Verma 
took over as telecom minister from 1996-1998.  
 
The informal rents created in the sector seem to have been captured by the 
minister. Given the press coverage of the minister’s links and the subsequent 
                                                 
49
 Sukh Ram was convicted in graft cases in 2002, 2009 and 2011, but each time he managed to 
have his sentence suspended or commuted on health grounds and remained out of prison. In 
2012 the Delhi High Court upheld the lower court sentence of a 3 year prison term for Sukh 
Ram and he was finally sent to jail (PTI 2011a, 2012b, a).  
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scandal, it is likely that the Prime Minister’s office was at least aware of the 
capture if not directly authorizing it. The formal rents in this period, 
meanwhile, were extracted largely by the state or the DoT, either through 
licence charges or via the DoT through tariffs and charges on the sector. Little 
was left for producers or consumers. The State seems to have seen the sector 
simply as a source of funds at this stage – a cash cow to be milked. However, it 
appears to have over-estimated how much rent was being produced or what it 
could sustainably extract. The rent extraction of the state was exacerbated by 
high call charges fixed by the DoT. Demand fell dramatically short of 
expectations, squeezing private operators’ profits to such an extent that the 
sector was on the verge of bankruptcy by 1999. Private operators in the sector 
threatened that they would suspend operations and were defaulting heavily on 
the loans they had taken and on their license and tariff obligations to the State. 
License payments had been structured as a 3 year payback and then as a rate 
per subscriber (see section 6.3). License defaults reduced the formal rent pay-
outs to the state. The collapse of the sector threatened the viability of the 
dominant players themselves. 
 
This launch phase of mobile telephony was characterised by domestic and 
international industry watchers as almost irreparably flawed (a Bloomberg 
report refers to it as a “botched” attempt at telephone modernization 
(Bloomberg 1995, Muralidharan 1999, Thakurta 2003). However, to attribute 
many of these regulatory decisions to the incompetence of politicians or 
bureaucrats misses the story. An analysis of the PS and its effect on rent 
distribution give a more detailed and a more nuanced picture of the choice of 
policy and its implementation.  
 
As the fiscal situation improved in the late 1990’s, and the urgent need for large 
tranches of formal rents for the State had lessened somewhat, the state was 
faced with another problem. Desai (2006) shows that weak financial markets in 
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India drive most private sector players to raise debt through quasi-
governmental financial services companies like IDBI (Industrial Development 
Bank of India). The finance ministry would thus have been concerned that the 
failure of the wireless sector could cause a collapse of government-owned banks 
and financial services. Pressure did seem to have come to bear on the DoT 
through the Finance Ministry, to drive more competitive and growth-conducive 
regulations, which lends credibility to this view (Muralidharan 1999).  
  
Individual private sector players (both in wireless and wireline), no doubt, also 
used their influence on government.  They may have exerted pressure on the 
DoT through the finance ministry, which had a vested interest in seeing the 
sector succeed. The sector also used lobbying bodies – the COAI and the AUSPI 
to try and lobby the government to adopt more growth-conducive policies, 
essentially by recognizing the minimum economic viability requirements of 
investors. 
 
The political settlement in this phase thus describes a balance of power 
between the players that resulted in regulatory instability and unviable 
regulatory structures in the sector. The balance of power was tilted towards a 
few state agencies that were able to capture most of the rents but using 
strategies that prevented the viable development of the sector. The 
organizations cut out of the rent distribution, the GSM TSPs needed to band 
together and present an organised front through the COAI in order to have 
sufficient power to redistribute rents in their favour, through changing some of 
the unviable regulatory structures. This in turn implied that some of the 
specific organizational balances within the political settlement relevant for the 
sector needed to be changed.  
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The COAI began a period of litigation that aimed to attack the power of the 
bureaucrats, and therefore indirectly the power of the political organizations 
benefiting through their control over the state. The bureaucracy, under attack 
from the COAI, and being pushed by a slowly strengthening TRAI for more 
regulatory room and encouraged by the state to find a solution to the loss of 
rents finally had to give in to these pressures. Jagmohan, the Minister for 
Telecommunication from 1998-1999 had indicated that he was unwilling to 
renegotiate the contract with the TSPs. The then prime minister Atal Bihari 
Vajpayee, transferred the minister to another portfolio, took over the ministry 
himself for a period, and with his minister of state, Ram Vilas Paswan, 
personally oversaw the formulation of NTP 1999 to address the issues facing the 
industry (Muralidharan 1999). 
 
The new National Telecom Policy announced in 1999 (NTP 1999) renegotiated 
the terms of the spectrum use right agreements between the state and the 
TSPs. The excessive rent extraction from the sector was replaced with a more 
inclusive system of rent distribution. First, the state agreed to forego all dues on 
license fees from 31st August 1999.  Instead the state moved to a revenue sharing 
model with the sector. Second, the operators were allowed to enter into mutual 
agreements with each other to allow sharing of infrastructure within their 
service area, and on consultation with TRAI, in different service areas. The 
license period on cellular licenses was extended to 20 years from the original 10. 
In return for these concessions, the TSPs had to agree to remove the duopoly 
condition on their service areas that was part of their original license and allow 
a third player – the state owned but corporatized MTNL (in Mumbai and 
Delhi)/BSNL(in all other parts of the country) in all circles. BSNL/MTNL was 
given free spectrum and entry into the sector as a third player in each circle. 
This was an interesting about-face for a department that had claimed the lack 
of mass potential in the sector as a reason for privatization in the first place.  
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7.4 Dynamics of the PS 1999-2003: Exploiting Loopholes 
 
A development in the sector during the previous period became the force that 
drove policy change yet again in the sector. It was the irregular entry of 
wireleine agencies into the wireless space.  
 
Big business houses in India, Reliance and Tata had likely misread the potential 
of wireless telephony in India, as had the DoT. Having allowed smaller business 
house to take wireless licences while they focussed on wireline licenses in 1995, 
the key private sector organizations in the wireline political settlement were 
now keen to rectify this problem and enter the wireless sector. However, they 
did not hold licenses for the sector and participation was limited to 2 private 
players + the DoT in each circle. They thus had to find another way to enter the 
sector. Clearly, the potential of the wireless sector was gaining recognition.  
 
Wireline players – BSNL/MTNL, Reliance and Tata, among others had received 
2.5 MHz of 800 MHz spectrum free along with their wireline licenses. This was 
meant to be used to provide last mile access where the laying of cable was 
difficult. According to a source in the TRAI, BSNL/MTNL first discovered the 
potential to use this spectrum using CDMA50 technology to provide wireless 
access first within a circle and then using roaming features, provide some 
connectivity nationally. Reliance and Tata swiftly followed suit, but it is 
interesting that the innovation was led by the public sector which had begun to 
explore this technology before it was granted a GSM license in 1999. The private 
players soon established a wireless operation without actually holding a license 
in the wireless sector.  
  
                                                 
50
 Refer to section 2.2.2 of Chapter 2 for the difference between CDMA and GSM technologies. 
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Table 7.2: Dynamics of the PS 1999-2003 
Policies driving rent  
creation and allocation  
Policy Objective  
 
Rent Distribution 
 
Agencies that Define Critical 
Characteristics of the PS 
Policy outcomes 
and economic 
effects given the 
PS 
Consequences for the 
evolution of the PS 
 Stated / Underlying Formal/informal Strong/weak   
Entry of Wireline players 
into CDMA 
 
4
Th
 operator license in 2001 
 
 
Stated: 
Increase penetration and 
profitability of sector  
Increase competition 
Increasing investment in 
infrastructure 
Underlying:  
State wants to formalise DoT’s 
(and others) entry into CDMA 
Allow DoT to enter wireless 
Formal 
DoT – high, entry into 
CDMA 
 
TSPs(CDMA) – high 
Entry into wireless without 
spectrum cost 
 
Consumers  - no change 
Informal 
CDMA players? 
Dominant:  
State, CDMA agencies 
strengthened through political 
links 
 
COAI strong representation of 
GSM lobby 
 
Weakening DoT 
 
Growth of 
subscriber 
numbers 
 
TRAI 
strengthened 
 
TDSAT created 
 
 
Growth-enhancing PS 
Strengthening of 
regulator vis a vis DoT 
Reliance and Tata 
(CDMA) enter as 
important players 
defining the PS relevant 
for the sector  
COAI becomes unified 
voice of GSM. 
Aggressively litigates 
against DoT. 
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The CDMA operation had several advantages over the GSM operators. First, 
they had entered the sector, paying a lower license fee than wireless operators. 
They had received their spectrum therefore at much lower charges than that 
which had been paid for 900/1800 spectrum. Crucially, they also did not pay 
interconnect charges for their calls. This meant that they could afford to offer 
significantly lower consumer prices that the GSM operators. This helped drive 
CDMA growth in the sector and also exerted a downward pressure on GSM 
pricing through competitive pressure. However, the CDMA through Wireless in 
Local Loop (WLL) that was established during this period was limited by the 
fact that without a proper license, a full CDMA service could not be launched. 
The mobility worked effectively only within a circle. Any mobility outside the 
circle could only be provided by providing a new phone number to the 
customer51. Thus, it was cheap but not very consumer friendly.  
 
A fourth operator was allowed in each circle with a new round of licensing in 
2001. Even though Reliance had the opportunity to bid for GSM licenses at this 
stage it chose not to, instead buying non-metro fixed line licenses to 
complement their exiting metro fixed line licenses. While all India GSM 
licenses cost Rs.1650 Cr. (Rs. 16.5 Billion), a pan-India fixed license cost Rs. 650 
Cr. (Rs.6.5 Billion) and came bundled with 2 x 2.5 MHz of free 800 MHz 
spectrum. An industry watcher who was interviewed claimed that the industry 
was initially surprised that Reliance did not make a bid for the GSM spectrum. 
Perhaps at this stage they had decided that they were aiming to access the 
market through the much less expensive CDMA route and expected to get the 
regulatory clearances for the route in due course.  
 
                                                 
51
 WLL was still clunky to use - when you moved from one SDCA (collection of BTS's) to 
another, your number changed and so while your incoming calls could be forwarded, your 
outgoing showed a new number every time you changed SDCA.  
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The political settlement within the mobile sector in the period is characterised 
by a flattening out of the relative powers of the organizations and agencies at 
play. NTP 99 allowed rent sharing with the GSM operators, allowing them to 
strengthen their position in the sector. The operators used the rent opportunity 
to develop their organizational links with politicians and bureaucrats, boosting 
their bargaining power in subsequent rounds. While these changes weakened 
the position of the state relative to the first phase of development, the changes 
in regulatory structures that followed allowed the state to drive the growth of 
the sector and share in its returns.  
 
Importantly, it also allowed the DoT to develop and share the potential of the 
wireless sector. In turning a blind eye to CDMA advances into the wireless 
sector, the state not only protected its own CDMA offering and those of other 
private players, it also drove down prices and drove up volumes in the sector, 
ushering in the first strong period of growth in the sector. The changes brought 
about in the PS as a result of small initial changes proved to be growth inducing 
and resulted in consolidating these changes in the sectoral political settlement.  
 
The picture of smooth growth on the surface however, hides the reality of a 
frantic churn in the details underneath. Through the COAI, private incumbents 
in the wireless sector strongly protested the CDMA route that allowed some 
fixed line players to enter the mobile market (Bajpai and Hans 2005). It 
heralded a period of frantic litigation in the courts with COAI leading the 
charge for GSM operators arguing against the DoT. The sheer volume of 
litigation encouraged the setting up in 2000 of TDSAT (Telecom Disputes 
Settlement and Appellate Tribunal); a separate tribunal tasked with 
adjudicating telecom disputes in the interests of consumers.  
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The view of the DoT was that the original license terms had stipulated that any 
technology may be used to provide wireless services. While the DoT was 
interested in ensuring the continuance of CDMA for its own purposes, NTP 99 
had given it access to the GSM space and spectrum in the 900 band. The 
pressure to allow CDMA and give it access to full mobility is more likely to have 
come from the other operators – Reliance and Tata. It is rumoured that Tata 
merely followed Reliance’s lead on these matters, leaving the informal deal-
making to Reliance. Telecom Ministers Ram Vilas Paswan (1999-2001) and 
Pramod Mahajan (2001-2003) were both accused in the press of having favoured 
Reliance Infocom (Jha 2010, IndianExpress 2005, Thakurta 2003).  
 
While the litigation was taking place, Reliance began a concerted marketing 
drive to improve its market share and prove that the CDMA business was worth 
regularising. In early 2003 Reliance launched the Dhirubhai Ambani Pioneer 
offer52. It also innovated in terms of distribution and marketing reach, using the 
Amway tiered distribution channels for deeper reach.  In July 2003, it launched 
its most effective consumer acquisition programme, slashing handset package 
prices from Rs.10,000 to Rs.501. It generated one million customers in 10 days!! 
COAI cried foul and GSM operators refused to provide interconnection 
between CDMA customers and their GSM network. In response minister 
Pramod Mahajan intervened and asked MTNL/BSNL not to provide 
interconnection to Airtel and Hutchinson Max (now Vodafone). More petitions 
were filed in court.  
 
The process of extended litigation created two strong opposing organizational 
groups within the sectoral political settlement – the COAI (comprised of GSM 
players of whom Sunil Mittal’s Bharti Televentures was a market leader and an 
opinion leader), and the CDMA players (of whom, Reliance was the key power 
                                                 
52
 DAPO - pay Rs.10000 upfront, get a handset free and get 40p/min calling and incoming free 
(vs Rs.2/min as the market price and paying for incoming 
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base). The additional effect that the litigation seems to have had is a gradual 
separation out of power and responsibilities between the bureaucrats of the 
DoT and those of TRAI and TDSAT. This stability of this emerging balance of 
power was, however, threatened by the capture of a greater proportion of rents 
by the CDMA players. This pushed the GSM players to resist the settlement. In 
order to find a way out of the litigation mess and to allow CDMA players a 
legitimate way to continue operation, the DoT finally proposed changing 
licensing terms again to the UASL (Universal Access Service License).  
 
The policies that shaped this phase of the sector’s development allowed for a 
period of growth in the sector, a flatter sharing of rents among the key 
agencies, organizations and consumers, and the emergence of a relatively stable 
sectoral PS with a greater balance of bargaining power across government 
agencies and service providing organizations. The state provider’s access to the 
rents in the sector justified the DoT to support growth inducing policies like 
the reduction of pricing for wireless services and the reduction of interconnect 
charges. The DoT’s source of rent in the sector would come from volume 
growth rather than rent extraction from a constant volume of business. 
However, even within this stable growth supporting political settlement, the 
fault lines for the breakdown of the settlement were already beginning to 
emerge.  
 
The PS was under pressure since the formal distribution of rents did not match 
the distribution of organizational power within the sectoral PS (since the rents 
of the CDMA players had not yet been formalised. The organizations that had 
gained informal access to rents in the sector (the CDMA agencies) were being 
challenged by the organizations that had access to the formal rents the GSM 
agencies). On the other hand, the WLL play by CDMA agencies was not a 
scalable model. The CDMA players had gained only a partial access to rents 
without full mobility and they were keen to legalise their position and gain 
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better access to the rents in the sector. The regulatory structure needed to 
change to either remove the informal access to rents to CDMA organizations or 
to formalise their access to rents which would consolidate the emergent 
sectoral political settlement. As it happens, state agencies chose the latter 
option.   
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7.5 Dynamics of the PS 2003-2007: Consolidating Gains 
 
Following increasing protests from the lobbying body of the wireless GSM 
operators, COAI, the Supreme Court finally ruled to merge licenses for the 
sector through the announcement of Universal Access Service Licensing 
(UASL) in 2003. This allowed both GSM and CDMA to operate full mobility 
services in the country.   
  
The Prime Minister (Vajpayee) removed Pramod Mahajan and brought in Arun 
Shourie (who was Disinvestment Minister and had been involved in earlier 
tussles with Mahajan on the privatization of Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd (VSNL 
– the original public sector telecom firm prior to corporatization) as Telecom 
Minister to hammer out the agreement on UASL. It was speculated in the press 
that the speedy ruling on the UASL was designed to help legalise Reliance’s 
forays into wireless using CDMA (Thakurta 2003). Interestingly, rather than 
criticising the move by Reliance, the minister of state for telecoms was most 
complimentary about the market expansion and the sheer innovation of the 
WLL format (Economist 2003). 
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Table 6.3: Dynamics of the PS 2003-2007  
Policies driving 
rent  creation and 
allocation  
Policy Objective  
 
Rent Distribution 
 
Agencies 
that Define 
Critical 
Characteristi
cs of the PS 
Policy outcomes and 
economic effects given the 
PS 
Consequences for the 
evolution of the PS 
 Stated / Underlying Formal/informal Strong/weak   
UASL 
Formalised 
Subscriber Based 
Norms (SBN) 
Calling Party Pays 
(CPP) regime 
Introduction of 
Access Deficit 
Charge 
Sale of Hutch to 
Vodafone 
Stated: 
To regularize the licensing 
structure and rules for all 
players 
Underlying:  
To formalize the back-door 
entry of CDMA players into the 
wireless space and allow their 
full operation. 
Formal:  
CDMA and GSM firms – 
High 
State agencies – lower 
rates of rents but 
benefiting from growth 
Consumers – High 
Informal 
CDMA players? 
Maran and Maxis Telecom 
Dominant:  
CDMA firms 
GSM firms 
TRAI 
Regularising of sector rules 
towards a level playing field 
Greater infrastructure 
development 
Licence fee and tariff reform 
Falling prices for consumers, 
increasing penetration and 
high sector profitability 
Consolidation of competition 
Growth Enhancing PS 
consolidated 
Strengthening of GSM 
players’ markets shares and 
profitability strengthens 
their bargaining power 
CDMA players  growth poor 
due to lack of device 
ecosystem internationally 
and poor management – 
weakens their bargaining 
power 
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The UASL allowed CDMA operators to launch complete rather than partial 
mobility services. Reliance’s  “Monsoon Hungama” had begun a fierce price war 
in the marketplace among mobile service providers – both GSM and CDMA. 
Both GSM and CDMA subscriber bases grew, proving that the CDMA growth 
was market-expansionary rather than competitive. As discussed in Section 6.5, 
producer profitability improved both from the growth in the market as well as 
from the introduction of producer friendly policies like CPP. Consumers also 
benefited from the competitive pressure on prices and the introduction of CPP. 
The competition also drove marketing innovations in the sector and the 
consumer had never before had the vast array of choices in terms of mobile 
tariff plans. In order to differentiate their service in the face of competition, and 
with the improved profitability, TSPs were driven to invest in infrastructure 
during the period, improving the quality of services for consumers. 
 
Thus while CDMA players focussed on establishing a market, GSM players were 
forced to accept CDMA as a part of the competition and an important 
component of the sectoral political settlement and they stopped trying to 
regulate them out of the sector. Instead they focussed on protecting and 
growing their own markets. Despite competitive pressure, the market potential 
was large enough for all the players to co-exist. And the period saw a balance of 
forces that were all concentrating on driving sectoral expansion through price 
reductions and infrastructure improvements. One interviewee from the private 
sector referred to this phase as the “golden age” of telecom growth. 
 
There were a few sops for GSM players too. As discussed in Chapter 6, India 
had a peculiar system of spectrum allocation. Unlike many other developed 
countries where TSPs were given up to 2 x 15 MHz of spectrum each, the initial 
allocations of spectrum were only 2 x 4.4 MHz of spectrum in India for GSM 
TSPs. The understanding was that more spectrum would be allocated as and 
when it became available based on need, that is, future allocations would be 
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linked to the number of subscribers on the books. Subscriber-based norms53 
had been formalised in 2002 and this provided incumbent private sector 
operators a way to access more spectrum based on their market share. The 
rationale for this unusual policy was that it allowed the state to release 
spectrum as and when it was vacated by the Defence Ministry and allocated 
according to need. This was justified as a more efficient use of scarce spectrum. 
The policy had the effect of strengthening the stronger players and helping 
further consolidate the market. Airtel benefited for example, by holding up to 2 
x 6.4 MHz of spectrum in some markets.  
 
The DoT still maintained a powerful position as an agency in the sectoral 
political settlement, as evidenced by their presence of the public sector in the 
wireless space and the introduction of the Access Deficit Charge in 2003. With 
the liberalization of the DoT’s most profitable businesses, DLD/ILD, the 
department demanded that the cost and responsibility for driving rural 
penetration (which had remained solely a responsibility of the public sector 
incumbent) should be shared by private firms in the telecom space. As a result 
an Access Deficit Charge was levied on private firms in the sector theoretically 
to subsidize the rural penetration initiatives of the DoT. The decision was 
dogged by legal protests from the private sector and intervention by the newly 
strengthened regulator in favour of the DoT. 
 
Reliance meanwhile had been going through a turbulent phase in its 
development. Section 5.3.4 in Chapter 5 described the origin of the Reliance 
group. The Reliance group was split into two following a disagreement between 
the two brothers that ran it. Prior to the split, Reliance Infocom, as the telecom 
subsidiary of India’s largest business conglomerate and headed by Mukesh 
Ambani, known for his political connections, was a significant player in the 
wider national political settlement as well as the sectoral one.  In the split, elder 
                                                 
53
 See (Prasad and Sridhar 2009) for a description of SBN and changing norm levels 
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brother Mukesh Ambani retained many of the group’s core industries. Telecom 
was retained by the younger brother, Anil Ambani, and was rebranded Reliance 
Communications (RCom). Anil Ambani’s consolidated business, termed Anil 
Dhirubhai  Ambani Group (ADAG) was significantly smaller that his brother’s 
Reliance Industries.  
 
RCom’s growth was also hampered by issues relating to CDMA technology 
itself. CDMA was a proprietary technology with the license held by its 
originator Qualcomm. So handset manufacturers had to pay a license fee to 
Qualcomm on the CDMA handsets they manufactured. Further, the SIM was 
burnt into the handset54. In other words, handsets bought for one service could 
not be used on another. Also, in contrast to the closed licensed system of 
CDMA, GSM was an open standard that saw much greater innovation and 
product development. GSM could therefore begin to offer more services like 
SMS, MMS. All of this led to the global shift towards an inferior but more open 
technology (a bit like Windows vs. Apple). However, some markets like China, 
Brazil and the US continued to use CDMA.  
 
Therefore, while Reliance now had access to full mobility via CDMA and had 
grown to nearly 15% revenue share of the total market by 2006, it was still keen 
to access the GSM market for which it needed to be allowed to hold a license 
for GSM technology and be awarded GSM spectrum. In February 2006, Reliance 
appealed to the ministry for a GSM license but the decision on allowing Dual 
Technology licenses had not been made at this stage (Mitra 2011). Reliance was 
thus still unable to access the more valuable section of mobile growth – GSM. 
Reliance’s moves to withdraw from CDMA towards GSM however worried 
handset manufacturer Nokia, who started to pull their resources out of CDMA 
                                                 
54
 This worked for their main market, USA where Verizon was a dominant market leader, but in 
India where the market lay in pre-paid cards and consumers switched based on price plans 
offered, this was a drawback. 
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handset manufacturing towards GSM handsets. Reliance’s moves therefore 
pushed the already struggling CDMA market further downwards, only 
reinforcing its need to gain entry into GSM.  
 
In 2006, Dayanidhi Maran was made Telecoms minister. Maran was a candidate 
of the regional political party DMK in Tamil Nadu. The DMK’s support for the 
UPA coalition at the centre was crucial to the UPAs remaining in power. The 
awarding of the ministry of telecoms to a DMK candidate was in a sense, a pay-
back for DMKs support. Maran, popularly described as a tech-savvy progressive, 
was generally popular with the GSM service providers.  
 
During his tenure he drove the sector to reduce the price of calls down to one 
rupee per minute and was perceived by the business community as pro-growth 
and pro-business. However, in allegations that emerged only in 2011 (NDTV 
2011) Maran was accused of using his influence to force C.Sivasankaran, the 
promoter of Aircel to sell his business to Maxis (a telecom player from Malaysia 
and Indonesia), promoted by Ananda Krishnan, a Malaysian businessman 
(Gopalan 2008). It was alleged that by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) 
that in return, Ananda Krishnan made investments of nearly Rs. 800 Crores in 
Sun TV (ibid.) in Sun TV, a media channel that was owned by the Maran family 
and headed by younger brother Kalanidhi Maran that acted as the propaganda 
vehicle for the DMK (ibid).  
 
Despite this, the PS remained a growth-conducive one for the most part. The 
growth in the sector benefited both GSM and CDMA agencies, and the DoT was 
also able to share in the growth. However, towards the end of this phase the 
growth of the market and the rent potential of the sector began to receive more 
attention. In the phenomenal growth of the sector lay the seeds of disruption of 
the PS once again. 
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The consolidation in market shares and the intense competitive pressure drove 
out some of the smaller players in the market. The explosive growth had also 
made India suddenly very interesting for foreign telecom giants. With the 
lifting of the cap on the percentage of FDI holding for firms in the sector to 
74%, the sector became an attractive investment target.  
 
In February 2007, Vodafone finalised the purchase of a 67% stake in 
Hutchinson Essar for $11.1 billion in cash and absorb $2 billion in debt onto their 
balance sheets. At 22 million subscribers, Hutchinson Essar was one of the 
larger players in the sector but the magnitude of the valuation rocked the 
sector and the financial markets in India (Knowledge@Wharton 2007). 
According to a source from the private sector, the sale made people “suddenly 
sit up and take notice” (Interview with Mr. Gandhi). While the sector was 
growing significantly, the fact that Vodafone was willing to place such a high 
valuation on buying a presence in the sector indicated its huge potential. It also 
indicated that significant rents were to be had in the sector and that the source 
of these rents lay in access to spectrum. This view was reinforced by the market 
response to Idea’s share listing. Idea, hoping to raise $480 million, exceeded its 
expectations by raising $27 billion, and was oversubscribed by 57 times 
(Knowledge@Wharton 2007).  
 
It was obvious that the agencies that were benefiting from the increased rents 
of this phase were the GSM TSPs. CDMA for reasons of poor management in 
some firms and with a lack of an international device ecosystem had begun to 
get increasingly marginalised. Reliance was left out of these windfall gains that 
accrued to GSM players and was keen to gain access to more GSM spectrum. 
However there were also sections of the political apparatus that had noted the 
rent potential of the sector and were keen to participate in the rent capture.   
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Maran was replaced rather suddenly by A Raja, another DMK appointee, in May 
2007. Maran appeared to have had a falling out with Karunanidhi, the patriarch 
at the head of the regional party, the DMK. It was suggested (interview with 
Mr. Hariharan, (TNN 2011)) that the argument flared over a survey published in 
the Sun TV group publication ‘Dinakaran’ regarding Karunanidhi’s succession 
plans. The survey suggested that Karunanidhi's second son Stalin had more 
support than the eldest son Alagiri. It also suggested that Dayanidhi Maran was 
a popular minister. Alagiri’s supporters torched Dinakaran offices and in return, 
Dayanidhi Maran demonstrated his displeasure to Karunanidhi. Karunanidhi 
was furious that the report was an attempt to fracture party unity and asked 
Maran to resign (PTI 2007) and sent A Raja, a young party faithful in his place 
(BusinessStandard 2007).  Raja’s audacious attempts to overturn the PS are the 
focus of the next section. 
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7.6 Dynamics of the PS 2007-2009: Buying Political 
Support 
 
7.6.1 The Setting Up of the 2G Scam 
 
Raja’s takeover in May 2007 as the Telecom Minister signalled a change in the 
focus of the telecom ministry. Raja claimed at the outset that he would 
continue the policies of his predecessors and that his focus would be rural 
telephony and foreign investment in the sector (TOI 2007). However, as soon as 
he took over the telecom ministry, Raja appears to have put in place a number 
of moves that would help him conduct the biggest swindle that India had so far 
seen.  He needed to find ways to justify his manipulation of the rules. His first 
port of call was the regulator. 
 
TRAI brought out a set of recommendations in August 2007 (TRAI 2007) that 
went counter to their own recommendations of 2005 (TRAI 2005). In 2005, 
their report clearly stated that existing operators in India had less spectrum 
than their counterparts in other countries and that as a scarce resource, all 
additional allocations of spectrum, even in the 3G band, should first be used to 
strengthen the efficiency of incumbent operators.  
 
In 2007, the TRAI recommendations witness a complete about-face. Claiming 
that the changing dynamics of the sector necessitate a re-evaluation, the report 
makes wide –ranging recommendations on competition and spectrum usage 
and pricing. Professing a “‘light handed’ regulatory paradigm” (TRAI 2007: 11), it 
suggests that there should be no cap on the number of entrants to wireless. 
Further, it argues that improved spectral efficiency among incumbent private 
players shows that they are not constrained by spectrum scarcity. It 
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recommends that the existing subscriber based norms be re-calculated, but that 
in the interim, the levels are raised from current levels.  
 
While the report also suggests that the pricing for spectrum at 2001 prices is 
unrealistic given market growth, it does recommend that spectrum in the 800, 
900 and 1800 bands should continue to be administratively allocated to ensure 
a level playing field because of legacy reasons, while all spectrum not in this 
range, such as the 3G spectrum, should be competitively allocated through an 
auction. Note that 3G spectrum that was in 2005 seen as an additional support 
for the existing 2G service is now being referred to as a separate service.  
 
These recommendations first and foremost established a case for introducing 
new competition into an already crowded sector55 on the basis that prior 
introductions of competition in the sector had driven significant growth. 
Second, it suggested that new allocations of spectrum in the 2G bands should 
not be auctioned (to maintain a “level playing field” with earlier spectrum in 
the band). And finally it reduced the access that incumbents in the GSM sector 
had to further tranches of spectrum by raising the SBNs. Raja’s ministry 
selectively used the recommendations of this report to justify a particular 
course of action.  
 
Just four months after Raja took over the Telecom portfolio, he announced a 
fresh round of licensing. On September 24, 2007, the DoT issued a press release 
announcing that applications for new licenses in 2G would be accepted till 
October 1st 2007. A flood of 575 applications were received by the D0T in a 
matter of days.  
 
                                                 
55
 Crowded from the perspective that the number of players per circle was already 7-9, higher 
than in most other countries. 
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Table 7.4 Dynamics of the PS 2007-2009 
Policies driving 
rent  creation and 
allocation  
Policy Objective  
 
Rent Distribution 
 
Agencies that Define 
Critical Characteristics of 
the PS 
Policy outcomes and 
economic effects 
given the PS 
Consequences for 
the evolution of 
the PS 
 
2008 licensing 
(2G scam) 
Stated: 
To increase competition in the 
sector 
Underlying: 
Creating source of off budget funds 
for political parties.  
To allow Reliance entry into the 
GSM sector 
To facilitate rent capture by firms 
outside the sector that had links 
with the Minister. 
Formal:  
State – low (Low price of licenses) 
Existing TSPs – Low (Due to increased 
competition.) 
New Entrants – high (Low price of 
license. High market value at 
divestment) 
Consumers – Unclear 
Informal 
Growing rents captured by Minister, 
Reliance, cronies of ruling political 
organizations, regional political party. 
Dominant:  
Growing bargaining 
power of Reliance 
Infocom 
 
Entry of Regional 
Political party as a major 
player in sectoral political 
settlement  
Weak: 
Central government 
Existing TSPs (other than 
Reliance) 
TRAI 
Entry of new players 
 
Worries of spectrum 
scarcity 
 
Squeeze on sector 
profitability 
 
Innovation in 
infrastructure 
sharing 
 
Emergence of 
Reliance as a Pan- 
Indian player in 
GSM market  
 
 Rapidly changing 
configuration of 
sector and 
uncertainty about 
direction of 
evolution of 
sectoral political 
settlement 
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On the 19th of October, the DoT issued another press release with important 
implications for the sector (a copy of the press release is attached in Appendix 
19: the highlights added are not in the original and have been added by the 
author). The release announced that, based on TRAI recommendations, there 
would be no cap on the number of licensees in any service area. It also 
announced that in keeping with the principle of dual technology licenses and to 
improve efficiency, any CDMA subscriber that wanted to apply for a GSM 
license could do so by paying Rs. 1651 Crores (the value of an all India license in 
2001) and that they would be allotted spectrum in the appropriate band as and 
when available.  The reverse was also applicable for GSM licensees wanting to 
enter CDMA. Not surprisingly, there were no takers for the latter but Reliance 
had finally got its desired entry into GSM and at prices that were risibly low 
given the growth of the sector in the intervening 7 years.  
 
Reliance apparently offered to pay the Rs.1651 crores on the same day as the 
announcement (Mitra 2011). Given the sum of money involved, it would not be 
unfair to say that Reliance was aware in advance of the terms of the 
announcement. Tata applied for its GSM license on the 22nd of October, and 
HFCL Infotel and Shyam Telelink (now MTS) applied even earlier. Reliance and 
Tata now had approval for licenses for the GSM sector and needed the 
spectrum allocation that was promised to take place at the same time as new 
licenses were issued in the sector (ibid).  
 
Raja had set in place the steps he needed to offer the spectrum at low prices to 
‘desired’ new entrants to the sector such as Reliance and Tata. However, he 
now needed a way to restrict the number of licenses and cherry-pick the ones 
he wanted to honour. The low price of the spectrum had led to a flood of 
takers. In order to do select a desired list, the member Technology, Telecom 
Commission, K Sridhara, wrote to the Law Ministry on October 26th 2007 
seeking approval to retrospectively advance the cut-off date to September 25th 
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instead of October 1st as had been announced. The Law Ministry recommended 
that an empowered group of ministers look into the matter but Raja went 
ahead with his proposal anyway, claiming he was applying the first come first 
served principle and thereby reduced the number of approved applications to 
122 (ibid).  
 
It was clear by now to sections of the central government that the licensing 
process was irregular. Neither Raja nor any other member of the state could 
have been unaware of the low valuation of the spectrum taking place by using 
2001 prices. Even apart from the rapid market growth of the intervening years56, 
the Vodafone purchase of Hutch had made the potential of the sector amply 
clear.  
 
The Finance member of the Telecom Commission Manju Madhavan (with a 
reputation as an upright civil servant) sent a note to the ministry pointing out 
the abnormally low price of spectrum. The telecom Secretary, DS Mathur, 
supported her view. Raja apparently criticised them sharply for it and by the 
end of 2007 Madhavan applied for voluntary retirement and Mathur retired. 
Subramaniam Swamy (Swamy 2011), has since published communication 
between the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Raja and between the 
Finance Minister P Chidambaram and Raja (accessed using the Right to 
Information Act) that took place in this period, where the PM questioned Raja 
on issues of spectrum pricing and the allocation method. Raja however held fast 
to his claim that he was merely following precedent by using an earlier 
discovered price and allotment based on a first come first served policy. 
Siddharth Behura (who had been Secretary, Ministry of Environment during 
Raja’s tenure) was moved as Secretary Telecoms in January 2008. Raja had thus 
removed dissenting members of the DoT and had put his people into their 
                                                 
56
 Bhandari (2012), p. 19 points out that in 2001, the market size was 4 million subscribers. In 
2008, that had gone up to 249 Million. 
286 
 
place to ensure he had the support he needed to carry out his plans (Mitra 
2011). The stage was set for a massive politically driven rent allocation scam. 
  
7.6.2 The Process of Allocation of Spectrum 
 
On January 7Th 2008, the DoT confirmed that all those who had submitted 
licenses up to September 25th would be eligible for spectrum but the order of 
allocation of spectrum would be on a first come first served basis, not in the 
order of submission of applications (as had been indicated earlier) but in the 
order that the supporting documentation and the license draft (for Rs.1651 
Crores) were submitted in person at the DoT office, Sanchar Bhawan in Delhi 
and receive a signed letter of intent from the authorities (Mitra 2011, Bhandari 
2012). The amount of spectrum available for allocation was insufficient to cover 
all the license applications. This was a thinly veiled attempt to ensure that the 
DoT could control who got the spectrum allocations on this round.  
 
On January 10Th, at 1:47pm, the DoT first issued a press release confirming the 
cut-off date of September 25th. It followed this with another press statement at 
2:45pm (Mitra 2011, Bhandari 2012) stating that all applicants needed to report 
to the Committee Room at Sanchar Bhawan with completed paperwork and 
bank drafts worth Rs.1651 Crores by 3:30pm on the same day! That gave 
applicants 45 minutes to prepare all the relevant paperwork, issue bank drafts 
and travel through central Delhi’s well known traffic chaos in 45 minutes. 
 
According to a deposition by SE Rizvi, a DoT Undersecretary in later 
investigations, the staff at DoT was told on the morning of the 10th at 10:30 am 
that they should set up counters for the collection of applications between 3:30 
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and 5:30 pm that same day. However the announcement went out four hours 
later.  
 
The descriptions of the ensuing chaos at Sanchar Bhawan that afternoon from 
eye-witness accounts are so fantastic as to seem nearly improbable57. An 
internal source who wishes anonymity provided details of the circus on the day. 
Apparently instructions came from the minister to set up four counters for the 
simultaneous acceptance of applications. The applicants had to file their 
applications at the counters on the second floor and then go down two floors to 
submit the draft and complete the process. There were employees of the DoT 
who were blocking certain players and allowing others through at the entrance 
hall to the counters first. Mitra (2011) suggests that one person fell down and 
got a bloodied lip and another had to be escorted from the premises for unruly 
behaviour. The source claims that as people rushed to file their papers and then 
down the stairs to submit the draft, one company actually had someone on the 
ground floor positioned near a window so that he could catch the papers being 
tossed out of a second floor window and steal a march on the rest. However, he 
claimed, one firm was so much in the pockets of the minister that it actually 
went straight to the telecom secretary’s office and handed in the draft, thereby 
sidestepping the process entirely. Each processed application had the time that 
it was handed in recorded on it and apparently there were a matter of seconds 
separating the applicants.  
 
At 5:30 the counters were closed and when the dust settled, it appeared that the 
following firms had benefited from new licenses:  
1. Unitech Wireless – a firm from the real estate sector with no telecom 
experience (22 licenses).  
                                                 
57
 For a detailed review of the process, see Bhandari (2012: 9-17). 
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2. Swan Telecom, an unknown entity, promoted by Shahid Balwa of DB 
Realty and no known connections to telecom (although connections 
were to emerge later during investigations) (13 licenses). 
3. MTS, originally Shyam Telelinks that operated in only one circle. In 
September 2007 (prior to the allocation of licenses), the Russian firm 
Sistema bought a 10% stake in the business for $11.4 Million, with 
indications that they were keen to increase their stake in the business. 
Since then it was rebranded as Sistema Shyam and later as MTS (21 
licenses). 
4. Videocon - or Datacom, a firm promoted by Mahendra Nahata of HFCL. 
Nahata sold his 36% equity to the Dhoot Brothers of the Videocon group 
in early 2010 (21 licenses).   
5. Loop Mobile – believed to have been a front for the Essar group to 
apply for licenses they would not be eligible for otherwise (21 licences). 
6. Reliance Infocom – whose attempt to gain access to GSM rents was 
detailed earlier and who clearly had prior knowledge of all the 
announcements of the Minister. 
7. Tata Teleservices – who seem to have benefited again from their 
association with Reliance. Tata teleservices won 3 licenses. 
8. Stel – Owned by Sivasankaran, who had been forced to sell his firm to 
Maxis. Stel won 6 licenses. 
9. Aircel  - the firm that Maran supposedly helped transfer the ownership 
to Ananda Krishnan of Maxis, who then repaid his favours by taking a 
stake in Sun TV. 
 
The evidence of limited prior experience in the sector of most of the winners 
and their hidden links with the political process that were gradually revealed 
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shows that the list of winners was hand-picked by Raja and his associates 
within the DoT. 
 
7.6.3 The Aftermath of the Allocations 
 
Almost immediately after the 2008 round of telecom licensing, questions were 
raised about the auction process and the identity of the beneficiaries. On 14th 
January 2008, just four days after the auction had taken place, Sunil Jain, a 
columnist at Business Standard, wrote that the beneficiaries of the auction were 
all cronies of minister Raja and that they had got licenses at “bargain basement 
prices” (Jain 2008). He further predicted that the licensees would not have the 
funds required to operate in the telecom sector and would most likely resell the 
licenses. The DoT had also received protests from the service operators 
themselves about the arbitrary and changing auction procedure - Kumar 
Mangalam Birla, the Chairman of the Aditya Birla Group that owns Idea, 
registered his protest the very next day. It was also very obvious within the 
industry and to industry observers that the spectrum had been wildly under-
priced – at levels it had been sold at nearly a decade before, in the sector’s 
infancy.  
 
Initial allegations of wrong-doing in the press seem to have died down quite 
quickly after the auction. Soon after the completion of the 2G auction, the DoT 
initiated the discussion on the upcoming 3G auction. Raja claimed that 3G 
spectrum would be auctioned at higher prices. Many of the press articles that 
followed were focused on speculations about the upcoming 3G auction, first 
promised by the ministry in 2009, and ultimately conducted only in 2010. 
Attention on the 2G auction in the press and among the public waned. A 
telecom analyst interviewed also suggested that the reason Vodafone and 
Bharti, as incumbents, did not fight more vociferously against the pricing set by 
290 
 
the 2G auction was that they benefited if the price was applied to the excess 
spectrum that they were supposed to be charged for. 
 
In October 2008, Unitech Wireless sold a 67.25% stake in its company to 
Telenor of Norway for Rs.6120 Cr. (Rs.61.2 Billion, $1.2 Billion). This would value 
the company at $2 Billion without a single customer on their books. In other 
words, the valuation was based entirely on the perceived value of their 
spectrum.  In December 2008, Swan Telecom divested a 45% share of its 
company to Etisalat of the UAE for Rs.3217 Cr. (Rs 32.17 Billion, $670 Million). 
Again, this would give the company a total valuation of $2 Billion. Towards the 
end of 2008, Tata divested a 26% stake in Tata Televentures to NTT DoCoMo, 
giving it an enterprise value of $8 Billion (note that Tata had both customers 
and infrastructure on their books already). In January 2009, Stel sold a share of 
its firm to Bahrain’s Betelco. In June 2008, RCom was also in talks with South 
Africa’s MTN to divest their CDMA business but the talks fell through. Rumour 
has it that the brother Mukesh Ambani, who had the right of first refusal in 
case of a sale as per their original agreement when the Reliance business was 
split between the brothers, caused the negotiations to fail (interview with 
private TSP employee,(BusinessToday 2008, Badkar 2011)). 
 
The obvious financial gain made by licensees selling out to foreign telecom 
players seemed to reignite comment among industry watchers against the 2G 
licensing58. In November 2008, Subramanian Swamy, member of an opposition 
party (Janata Party) wrote to the prime minister seeking sanction to prosecute 
Raja for corruption. By mid-2009 the CVC (Central Vigilance Commission) had 
received complaints from other public interest litigators regarding illegalities in 
the spectrum sale to Swan Telecom and Loop Telecom. The CVC initiated a CBI 
(Central Bureau of Investigations) probe in the Telecom Sector.  The CBI, 
                                                 
58
 See for example several op-ed pieces by Sunil Jain in Business Standard from March – 
September 2008.  
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however, appeared to be dragging its feet on the investigation until pulled up 
by the Supreme Court in November 2010 (Bhandari 2012: 12). In October 2009 
the CBI lodged an FIR against unknown persons in the DoT under the 
Prevention of Corruption Act. In 2009, the Comptroller and Auditor General of 
India, Vinod Rai and his team began to prepare an audit report of the entire 
licensing process.   
 
Meanwhile in 2009, the government at the centre was up for re-election. The 
UPA II coalition that was put together to achieve a majority in parliament was 
again dependent on regional allies. The DMK was again able to pick its 
ministries. What is most surprising, however, is that despite common 
knowledge of the allegations of wrong-doing and Raja’s brazen flouting of 
norms and rules within the sector59, these facts did not stand in the way of 
Raja’s reappointment as the telecom minister with the new UPA II government 
after the 2009 elections.  
 
While the details of the corruption took a while to emerge, it was obvious that 
irregularities had taken place and that it was likely that Raja, and possibly, by 
extension, the coffers of the DMK party and other parties linked to it had 
benefitted. The creation of these informal rents for a regional party came at a 
significant loss to the exchequer in terms of formal rents that could have been 
extracted through the auction process. However, the coalition national 
government at the centre appeared to be resigned to these losses, a sign 
perhaps of their dependency on the regional political party for political support 
in order to remain in power or of the possibility that the dominant Congress 
Party had also received a share of the spoils.  Commentators in the press openly 
referred to the political need for support from the DMK for the UPAII 
government that forced Raja’s reappointment despite allegations of misconduct 
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 In fact Raja campaigned in the 2009 elections on the claim that he had dropped call rates.  
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(Jain 2009, BusinessStandard 2009). Raja seemed to have emerged unscathed 
and ready to tackle his next term as Telecoms Minister. 
 
7.6.4 The Force of Public Knowledge 
 
Three concurrent events brought the focus of the public back on the scam. The 
first was the 3G auction conducted by the Raja ministry in 2010. The details of 
the auction and its impact on the sector will be dealt with in the next section, 
but here it is sufficient to note that the 3G spectrum auctioned in June 2010 by 
the same Minister, Raja, was an exemplar in market auctions to raise revenues. 
The market price of 3G spectrum settled at Rs. 3365 crores per MHz60 ($730 
Million) as compared to a price of Rs. 375 Crores per MHz 61 ($93 Million) that 
was realized during the 2G auction in 2008.  The prices realised for spectrum 
during the 3G auction exceeded all expectations. Ironically, what the 
phenomenal success of the 3G auction did was to focus media and public 
attention on a comparison with the now very obviously under-priced auction of 
2008. 
 
Now details began to emerge in the press that the Central Bureau of 
Investigation (CBI) was already in the process of investigating several telecom 
ministry officials involved in the 2G auction as well as some of the private 
companies (ET 2010d). The picture that emerged was one of a deliberate 
attempt to subvert the law in order to benefit a few, possibly in exchange for 
pay-offs of some sort – what the Indian media began to refer to as the “2G 
scam”. 
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 i.e. Rs.16,828 Crore for a pan-India 3G license divided by 5MHz. 
61
 Rs. 1650 Crores for a pan-India license divided by 4.4MHz 
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Opposition parties began calling for Raja’s resignation from the Telecom 
Ministry. By the 10th of May 2010, under increasing pressure from the media and 
opposition parties, the DoT sent a letter to the PM defending Raja’s actions 
during the 2008 licensing round, against allegations that he had both given 
away mobile licenses at throwaway prices and that he had been influenced in 
this process by lobbyists (Philip 2010). TRAI also began to face heat from 
incumbent groups, especially Bharti and Vodafone on their recommendations 
on the use of existing 2G spectrum by incumbents. By the end of May the CAG 
had been drawn into the investigation of the 2G scam case and a Public 
Accounts Committee was being considered to probe the issue further. 
However, in spite of repeated opposition calls for action against Raja, the Prime 
Minister, Dr. Singh, reiterated that he believed that the rules had been followed 
and that he would wait for the results of the investigation.   
 
The second event was the public exposure of the ‘Radia Tapes’ that laid bare the 
wheeling and dealing that were involved in Raja’s re-appointment as the 
Telecom Minister in UPA II. While the details of the 2G Scam had begun to 
emerge in the print media, a parallel story had broken in online journals. On 
17th November 201062  Outlook and Open Online web versions of reputed Indian 
media leaked copies and transcripts of taped phone conversations63 between a 
corporate lobbyist called Niira Radia with several prominent business people, 
politicians and media people. Supposedly, Niira Radia’s phones had been 
tapped by the Income Tax Department for a period of six months in 2009 to 
collect evidence on tax evasion. They had then been submitted to the Supreme 
Court in November 2010 in relation to a tax evasion case, but the leaked 
transcripts provided an interesting sub-text to several big business-politics 
deals, including the 2G scam.  
                                                 
62
 According to Bhandari (2012), the taped conversations between Radia and Raja had been 
leaked to the media as early as May 2010. The journals claimed that it wasn’t released 
immediately as they were attempting to verify the story. 
63
 For a complete listing of all the taped conversations available publicly, go to 
http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?268214 and 
http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?268618  
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The transcripts show Radia in several conversations with political leaders and 
with prominent media persons who claimed access to the key decision makers 
within the UPA II government at the Centre, attempting to negotiate the 
reappointment of Raja as the telecom minister after the 2009 elections. Radia’s 
contacts within the DMK appear to have been Raja and Kanimozhi, daughter of 
DMK party leader Karunanidhi, who is also alleged to have had a personal 
relationship with Raja. Radia was also the official corporate lobbyist for the Tata 
group. It is obvious from the recordings that Ratan Tata, who was said to have 
misunderstandings with the previous telecom minister, Dayanidhi Maran, (who 
was also one of the contenders for the post of telecom minister in UPAII), was 
keen to promote the reappointment of Raja over Maran through the work of his 
lobbyist, Radia (Bhandari 2012: 56). Radia also seems to suggest that the CEO of 
Bharti, Sunil Mittal was lobbying to get Dayanidhi Maran back.  
 
The Radia tapes caused a wave of public opinion against the perceived nexus 
between large corporates, politicians, lobbyists and journalists. The lobbying 
itself was not illegal but the picture it painted of the country being run by and 
in the interests of a few powerful people was one the public didn't take too 
kindly to. The tapes thus served to further intensify the pressure on the UPA 
government to fully probe the 2G scam. 
 
However, the most important impetus to the recognition of the scam and to its 
consequences was the publication of the report by the CAG on the spectrum 
allocation of 2008. The CAG submitted a draft report to the Supreme Court in 
October 2010. Even before the final details were published, excerpts had been 
leaked to the press that threatened to implicate several businessmen and senior 
politicians. The CAG Report (CAG 2010) was made public on 10th November 
2010.  
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It suggested that the loss of revenue from the actions resulted in a revenue loss 
to the exchequer to the tune of Rs. 1.76 Lakh Crores or Rs. 1760 Billion 
(approximately US$ 39 Billion64), 10 times the value raised in the Jan 2008 
auctions of Rs. 16.58 Billion ($368 Million65) (ibid). The estimated revenue loss 
was based on the difference between the market value of the spectrum and its 
sale at 2001 prices, which was computed to be Rs. 1400 Billion ($31 Billion) and 
the revenue loss arising from the allocation of spectrum beyond their 
contractual limit to 9 players, which accounted for the remaining loss of Rs. 367 
Billion ($8Billion). The loss value was computed based on the prices for 
spectrum realised in the 2010 3G auction.  
 
Apart from the eye-wateringly large loss figure, the report also made a number 
of important accusations. The report was scathing about the Minister and the 
DoT not following due process in the allocation of licenses and in not accepting 
any of the recommendations of the Prime Minister, the Finance Ministry, the 
Telecom Commission or the Law Ministry. It laid the blame for the 
manipulation of due process squarely at the door of the Telecoms Minister. It 
cited the arbitrary change of date and the manipulation of the first come first 
served policy as indications of “deliberate and unhealthy haste” in favouring 
certain applicants. It claimed that critical information was leaked to certain 
applicants based on the fact that they had demand drafts for the exact amount 
prepared prior to the date of the announcement. 13 out of the 16 companies had 
drafts dated prior to the notification dates.  It also claimed that 85 out of the 122 
licenses issued went to firms that were not eligible for the licences in terms of 
other qualifications.  
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 Worked out at exchange rate taken to be $1 = Rs.45. 
65
 Worked out at exchange rate taken to be $1 = Rs.45 
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Nine of the 16 firms had not been properly registered according to DoT 
guidelines for the allocation. 6 of those belonged to the Unitech Group. The 
other firms were Allianz Infratel that was bought by Etisalat, and Shipping Stop 
Dot Com that changed its name to Loop Mobile.  Thirteen companies did not 
have the requisite amount of paid up capital on their books as per DoT 
guidelines on the date of registration. These included firms that were part of 
Unitech, Loop, Videocon and SwanTelecom. 
 
The report also made further allegations against two firms. The first was Swan 
Telecom. It showed that at the time of applying for a license, Reliance held a 
10.71% stake in Swan Telecom. No firm that was already incumbent in the 
sector was allowed to have more than a 10% stake in any other firm in the 
sector as per DoT guidelines. Instead of disqualifying Swan Telecom, it was 
given a chance to rectify its shareholding discrepancy by December 2007, and 
Swan Telecom claimed that Reliance had divested its entire stake in the 
company. However, the firm’s promoters were senior members of Reliance’s 
management team and had listed their Reliance email addresses as contacts. 
The CAG report states clearly that Swan Telecom appeared to be a front 
company for Reliance. The report also showed that Swan telecom had unfairly 
benefited in terms of licenses in two circles by excluding Idea and Spice 
Telecom on spurious grounds, allowing Swan to move up in the priority queue 
for spectrum. 
 
The report also indicated that undue benefit was shown to Reliance on other 
grounds. The Dual Licensing system was rushed through without following due 
process or getting any approvals from other ministries. The ‘in principle’ 
acceptance of Reliance’s license, along with those of two other firms (HFCL and 
Shyam Telelinks) was granted even before the press release confirming the 
policy. As discussed earlier, Reliance was ready with its payment draft on the 
very same day. Based on this ‘in principle’ approval, Reliance alone was 
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allocated start up spectrum in 14 circles ahead of all other applicants and ahead 
of the new licensees. 
 
The report thus exposes evidence of an alliance between the telecom minister 
Raja and the Reliance ADAG group, who wanted to extend their footprint in the 
wireless space to a pan-India one. Reliance received a hastily agreed license and 
spectrum allocation prior to the allocation to new players. However, in order to 
subvert monopoly restrictions on further holdings of spectrum they also 
applied through a shell company – Swan Telecom. To ensure that shareholding 
requirements were met, Swan telecom took on DB Realty as partners, who did 
not invest significantly in the company but provided a conduit to funnel payoffs 
back to the minister. In sum, the CAG Report made it clear that Raja was to 
blame and that he had unduly favoured Reliance. While the report did not 
explicitly state it, it is easily surmised from the above that Raja benefited from a 
significant consideration in return for all the favours he bestowed on his 
contacts in the real estate sector and Reliance. 
 
The report caused a furore in Parliament as opposition parties threatened a 
boycott, demanding Raja’s resignation. While Raja, with the backing of the 
DMK, bravely continued to claim his innocence in the face of mounting 
evidence, by the end of the week, public outrage forced a reluctant central 
government to act and to demand Raja’s resignation. On 14th November 2010, 
Raja was finally dropped from the central cabinet. The DMK, which had at first 
threatened to withdraw support to the UPA II government at the Centre if they 
dismissed Raja, were also forced to give Raja up given the mounting weight of 
evidence against him. On the 2nd of Febuary 2011, Raja, former telecom 
secretary Siddharth Behura and Raja’s ex-private secretary at the telecom 
ministry, RK Chandolia were charged with manipulation in the awarding of 
radio frequency, forgery and misusing official positions and were jailed awaiting 
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trial (TOI 2011). Raja remained under arrest in Tihar Jail until the 15th of May 
2012, when he was released on bail. 
 
7.6.5 Following the Money Trail 
  
The CBI charge sheets, finally filed in April 2011, implicated a number of 
operators. Swan Telecom was charged with withholding information on its 
shareholding patterns, indicating a link with Reliance Telecom. The promoter 
of Swan Telecom, Shahid Usman Balwa, was arrested for financial irregularities. 
The CBI also alleged a money trail leading from DB Realty who had purchased 
Swan Telecom to Kalaignar TV, with links to the DMK.  
 
It has emerged that Balwa- owned Cineyug Films had given an unsecured loan 
of Rs. 206 crores to Kalaignar TV in 2009, a television channel in which Dayalu 
Ammal, Karunanidhi’s second wife and Kanimozhi, his daughter, owned an 
80% stake. Following the CBI investigation, Kanimozhi was also charged in this 
case and jailed awaiting trial. Vinod Goenka of Swan Telecom, Sharad Kumar of 
Kalaingar TV, Karim Morani of Cineyug Films, Asif Balwa and Rajiv Agarwal of 
Kusegaon Realty have also been named as co-accused (TOI 2011).  In addition 
the CBI also charged and took into custody Sanjay Chandra of Unitech, and 
three executives from the Reliance Anil Dhirubhai Ambani Group (ADAG). The 
charge against Unitech (owned at the time by the DLF realty group, since 
bought over by Norwegian telecom group Telenor and renamed Uninor) relates 
to their having misrepresented their paid up capital figures at the time of 
submitting their application (Bhandari 2012: 161, Hindu 2013).  
  
The CBI investigations also highlighted the irregularities in the auction process 
discussed earlier. The announcement that licenses were to be awarded to 15 
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eligible license applicants was made suddenly, without prior notification. The 
applicants managed, almost miraculously, to be present at the appointed time 
with the appropriate fees in spite of the short notice. The applications were 
considered in the order that they met the letter of intent, rather than the order 
of receipt of original application. There appeared to have been a manipulation 
of who was allowed to submit their acceptances of the letters of intent, and 
therefore the priority in which they would be awarded spectrum. And finally, 
there was the issue of the price of the spectrum itself. All of these suggest that 
the DoT officials were attempting to privilege some applicants over others in an 
unfair manner.  
 
The second area of investigation was the ownership structure of Swan Telecom. 
In order to prevent monopolies in the sector, the license agreement barred an 
operator from holding more than 10% equity in another operator in the same 
circle.   Reliance Telecom, who was already present in the circles that Swan 
Telecom was applying in, held a 10.7% share in Swan Telecom, through 9.8% 
ownership of ordinary shares and another 0.9 % in preference shares. The 
remaining shares were held by Tiger Traders. However, the bulk of the net 
worth (more than Rs.1000 Cr. of the total Rs.1101 Cr.) was contributed by 
Reliance Telecom, with Tiger Traders only contributing Rs.98 Cr. Further Tiger 
Traders itself appeared to be a shell company, set up by Gautam Doshi (a 
President at Reliance ADAG), and two other Reliance ADAG associates, 
Surendra Pipara and Hari Nair66 (Bhandari 2012). In October 2007 DB 
Infrastructure was also brought into the shareholding of Swan Telecom, with 5 
million shares, making Reliance Telecom a minor shareholder. It is however 
unclear what equity they brought into the company. There is evidence that the 
Finance wing of the DoT raised questions on the noncompliance of the Swan 
application on the equity clause, but that the concerns were over-ridden by the 
minister(Bhandari 2012). This establishes an alleged attempt by Reliance 
                                                 
66
 Bhandari (2012), p. 165-178 shows that Tiger Traders was one of a triangular set of firms, each 
of which was created from the share-holding of the other two. 
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Telecom to subvert monopoly regulations and buy a greater stake in the sector 
with the collusion of the Minister. 
 
This allegation of bypassing monopoly rules was also investigated in the case of 
Loop Telecom. The Ruias, promoters of the Essar group of companies are 
believed to have held a 10% stake in Loop telecom (majority stake owners are 
the Khaitan Group: the Ruias are also related to the Khaitans) while already 
holding a 33% stake in Vodafone Essar at the time (Philip and Singh 2013).  
 
The CBI also presented evidence of a trail of money that linked DB Realty, key 
shareholders in Swan Telecom, and Kalaignar TV which had clear links to Raja 
and the DMK (PTI 2011b). In December 2008, Swan Telecom had sold 47% of its 
equity to Etisalat for Rs. 3200 Cr. (Rs. 32 Billion). It also received Rs. 320 Cr. 
(Rs.3.2 Billion) from a company called Genex Exim Ventures, which had just 
been incorporated. From December 2008 to August 2009, Dynamix Realty and 
two other DB group companies transferred Rs. 209 Cr. (Rs. 20.9 Billion) to 
Kusegaon Fruits and Vegetables Pvt Limited as an unsecured loan. Kusegaon 
then invested in Cineyug Pvt Limited to the tune of Rs. 200 Crores, (Rs. 20 
Billion) who then loaned Rs. 200 Cr. (Rs. 20 Billion) to Kalaignar TV. Kusegaon 
listed as its director Asif Balwa, who was a brother of Shahid Balwa, the man 
behind DB Realty. Kalaignar TV was the TV channel set up by the DMK as a 
competitor to Sun TV, the cable TV channel run by the Maran Brothers. The 
CBI further alleged that when they contacted Raja for questioning on this 
matter on the 24th of December 2010, it initiated a reverse transfer of the same 
amount, Rs. 200 Cr. (Rs. 20 Billion), back to DB Realty through Cineyug and 
Kusegaon as a cover up (Bhandari 2012 : 179-184).  
 
Investigations also focused on GenexExim Ventures, a company created (with 
paid up capital of just Rs. 100,000) just before the Etisalat sale that bought 
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shares in Swan Telecom, and further sold these shares to Etisalat Mauritius for 
Rs. 320 Cr. (Rs. 3.2 Billion), exactly the amount it had paid for its shares earlier. 
Genex is believed to be a front company for ETA Star, a large Dubai based 
conglomerate with many business interests in Tamil Nadu and whose directors 
are believed to be close to the DMK (Chaudhury 2010, NDTV 2010).  There was 
speculation in the sector that Swan Telecom was a front company for Reliance 
that would also allow Raja himself to hold a stake in it (interviews with private 
sector competitors and telecom analysts). 
 
Datacom Solutions, which sold its entire stake to Videocon 
Telecommunications is alleged to have an equity stake by a director of Reliance 
Industries Limited (from the Mukesh Ambani led arm of Reliance Industries) 
(Bamzai 2011).  
 
In return, Raja, Behura and Chandolia have also challenged the courts to probe 
the role of the Tata group in the scam. They claim that the Tatas, through their 
corporate lobbyist, Radia had agreed a deal that would bundle Kalaignar TV as 
a part of the bouquet of channels offered by TataSky, a national cable operator 
and part of the Tata group of companies. Radia was also a lobbyist for Mukesh 
Ambani in other sectors. Transcripts of her recordings show her wanting to 
bring the Tatas, Mukesh Ambani and Sunil Mittal of Bharti group together to 
coordinate a united strategy against the Anil Ambani Group.  
 
7.6.6 The Outcome:  
 
Around four years after the event, on the 12 of February 2012, the Supreme 
Court ruled on the 2G case. In a bold move, it cancelled all 122 2G licences that 
had been issued in 2008. The entire spectrum that had been issued had to be 
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vacated within 4 months and returned to the government to be re-auctioned.  
It also fined Swan Telecom and Unitech an amount of Rs.5 Crores each and 
Loop Telecom Pvt Ltd, S-Tel, Allianz Infratech and Sistema Shyam Tele Services 
Ltd Rs. 50 lakhs each. 
 
The cases against Raja, Behura, Chandolia and Kanimozhi are ongoing at the 
time of writing. However, after a maximum of 15 months in prison, all the 
accused have been released on bail pending the verdict. In fact while he still 
awaits the verdict of the trial court, Raja was fielded by the DMK as a candidate 
during the national assembly elections in 2014. He was defeated in the election 
by the opposition (ADADMK) party’s candidate, but it appears that his political 
life is far from over (Hebbar 2014). 
 
7.6.7 The Forces at Play in the Political Settlement:  
 
The roots of the policies and rent-seeking conflicts in this phase of the sector’s 
growth derived from three facts. The first was the dawning recognition of the 
sector’s potential and the value of spectrum that the Vodafone and Idea 
valuations drew attention to.  
 
The second was a factor related to the political milieu. The government at the 
centre was Congress led but having failed to achieve a majority, the Congress 
had to cobble together a group of coalition parties who had no ideological links 
to them. In order to keep the support of myriad interest groups, the ruling 
Congress (UPA I) government bought their support by promising them 
“lucrative” ministry posts in return. The posts with a greater potential to award 
contracts represented greater opportunities for graft and were much sought 
after.  When a member of the DMK was first placed as the Telecoms Minister, 
303 
 
there must have been an implicit understanding between the Congress and the 
DMK that a certain portion of the rent generated by the sector would be 
extracted by the DMK.  There may also have been a rent-sharing agreement 
between individuals in the DMK and the Congress Party that led the UPA 
coalition. Although this allegation was regularly made by the opposition, it is 
difficult to verify such a claim, though it must be regarded as a plausible 
allegation. This is a pattern that is consistent with the clientelist political 
settlement that characterises India at the most aggregated level, as discussed in 
an earlier chapter. Emboldened by this fact and the UPA’s dependence on 
DMK’s support for their majority, Raja engineered an audacious scheme to 
capture state rents.  
 
The third key factor was that Reliance had been increasingly marginalised in 
the political settlement describing the drivers of sectoral rent seeking in spite of 
their entry into the sector in 2001. It was obvious to Reliance that access to the 
lion’s share of sector rents would go to GSM agencies. Reliance needed a way to 
not only enter the GSM sector but gain a sufficient share of spectrum to make 
rapid market share gains in order to truly access the rents to be made. Some of 
the important organizational changes that characterized changes in the sectoral 
political settlement were driven by Reliance organizing new forces and alliances 
that reflected its bargaining power outside the sector, at the national level, to 
change the distribution of organizational forces that affected decision-making 
within the sector. This is an example of how political settlements at different 
levels of aggregation can interact.  
 
While allowing Reliance to enter the sector by subverting the rules, Raja was 
also happy to extend the same courtesy to others in the sector that were willing 
to accede to his terms – Loop, Videocon etc. This created a coalition of interests 
supporting the changes and made it more likely that the changes would be 
sustainable. As we have seen, the uproar that resulted, driven by opposition 
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parties at the national level, shows that this expectation was not fully met. 
Once again, configurations of power at the national level affected the attempts 
to restructure the sectoral political settlement. Raja’s strategy also helped turn a 
tidy profit for a set of firms in the real estate sector (Unitech, DB Realty) who 
had suddenly expressed an interest in the telecom sector. It is worth reiterating 
here that Raja’s previous association with them was as Minister for 
Environment where he had to provide clearances for construction projects. 
These businesses now wanted to invest in the sector even though they had no 
knowledge of or interest in continuing in the telecom sector. Their interest was 
clearly in capturing some of the spectrum rents. While they were prevented 
from selling the licenses, they quickly sold equity in their companies to a 
number of international players seeking entry into a lucrative market. Raja thus 
created rents for a number of his old friends, and it may be safely surmised that 
some of that money made its way back to him, his party and beyond through 
kick-backs. 
 
The entire set of policies leading up to the 2008 allocation was a way for 
Reliance to manage its entry into the GSM sector and for Raja to maximise rent 
capture both for personal gain as well as the benefit of his regional party and 
possibly the coalition. The DMK’s willingness to stand by Raja in the face of 
mounting evidence and to field him again as a party candidate in 2014 despite 
all that had gone before is a sign that Raja’s actions had the blessings of his 
party President, Karunanidhi, and that a significant portion of the rents 
captured made their way back to party coffers through some route. 
 
It is also obvious that several sections of the Central Government were aware of 
what was taking place. The interventions by the Law Ministry, the Finance 
Ministry and the Prime Minister show that the wider state apparatus was aware 
that the rules were being circumvented for political gain. The questions by the 
Prime Minister and the Finance Minister can be seen in this light as suggestions 
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to possibly curb the amount of graft or give it a more acceptable face. The 
insolence with which Raja ignored these interventions shows his perception of 
the strength of his organization in the political settlement at the national level. 
And his assessment was fair. There was no attempt by the centre to stop the 
process or undo it after the fact. Despite allegations of wrongdoing, the centre 
neither admitted to it nor instituted disciplinary action. The Radia tapes 
indicate that there may have been some reluctance on the part of the UPA II 
government to offer the post back to Raja but faced with pressure from the 
DMK they did so again. In fact they continued to support Raja and deny wrong 
doing until it became politically untenable for the government at the centre to 
do so and the loss of DMK support became the least of their worries. This 
change came about not because the DMK became weaker, but because the 
opposition managed to mobilize sufficient forces against the coalition 
government at the centre using the scam as one of its key rallying cries. At 
some point, the configuration of the national political settlement began to 
change, with the UPA facing significant challenges to its authority as large scale 
mobilizations against it emerged on the streets and in the media. It was only at 
this point that the costs of abandoning Raja became lower for the central 
government than the costs of continuing to cover up for his activities. However, 
even before this, the use that the opposition was making of the scam, and the 
perception that the regional party had extracted far too much rent for itself 
meant that the central government had to ensure that the 3G auction had much 
greater oversight from the finance ministry and Raja was not allowed to take 
over the process like he had done on the 2G allocation.  
 
The 2008 allocation of spectrum by Raja had the unintended consequence of 
bringing about a sudden influx of competition into the sector. The incumbents 
were now faced with potential competition from a group of new international 
telecom firms – Telenor of Norway, Etisalat of Dubai and Sistema of Russia. 
While the incumbents had an advantage in having a share of existing market 
that new entrants would have to work to build inroads into, the key concern for 
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incumbent organizations at this stage was the sheer number of players and the 
lack of a clear roadmap for spectrum allocation in the future. Prior to 2008, 
clear subscriber based norms existed that allocated additional spectrum on the 
basis of subscriber numbers. These had now been revised and a committee 
instituted for revising them so that the levels at which further spectrum could 
be issued was higher. The number of licenses that had been issued meant that 
there was already a backlog in terms of spectrum to be allocated.  
 
It was the sheer scale and audacity of the rent capture that was Raja’s downfall. 
If the level of rent extraction had been more moderate or if he hadn’t flouted so 
many rules in the most cavalier manner, it is quite likely that he may have got 
away with it. The government at the Centre was obviously unwilling to rock the 
boat, and supported Raja’s political party as long as it could. But Raja’s open 
flouting of procedure and precedent, the all-important bases of government 
policy, left him vulnerable to investigation by the CAG. 
 
The Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) also became an important player 
in the sectoral political settlement during this period. The office of the CAG, 
meant to independently audit government processes had been known to 
challenge the government only rarely in the past. Under Vinod Rai’s tenure this 
changed and the 2G report was the first big report filed by his team. The 
forthright accusations made against senior politicians and big business 
certainly caught the attention of the media and general public and forced the 
government into action.  
 
The report did face some criticism from some economists on the grounds that 
the presumptive valuation of the loss to the exchequer was too high. The CAG 
applied 4 different methodologies to calculate the loss to the exchequer.  
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The first was based on the excess price over the license value that STel offered 
to pay in an application for a license in 2007, addressed to the Prime Minister. 
On this basis, the allocation could have realised Rs.65,909 crore as against 
Rs.12,386 crore collected by the DoT, with a potential loss of Rs.53,523 Cr. (Rs. 
535 Billion).  
 
The second was the use of 3G spectrum price realised in the 2010 auction, based 
on the assumption that given technological advances, the 2G spectrum was as 
efficient at 3G spectrum. This assumption leads to the notional loss of 
Rs.1,39,652 Cr. (Rs. 1396 Billion).  
 
The third and fourth methods of valuation used the prices realised on equity 
sale of firms Swan and Uninor to foreign investors. On this basis, the allocation 
could have raised between Rs.58,000 and Rs.68,000 crores (Rs. 580-680 Billion), 
with a notional loss of between rs.46,000 and rs.56,000 crores (Rs. 460-560 
Billion). It can be seen that three methods cluster loss values of around 
Rs.50,000 Cr. (Rs. 500 Billion). The 3G method of valuation estimates the loss to 
the exchequer to be nearly three times that, at Rs.1396 Billion. This last value 
was the one chosen to be highlighted and became the number quoted in the 
press. The CAG defended allegations of sensationalism with the retort that they 
only presented a presumptive or potential loss figure.  
 
There is no doubt that the high figures did get more press attention. It is also 
undeniable that, even at the lower figure, it still represents rent capture at an 
enormous scale.  Vinod Rai became an overnight celebrity and continued to 
strengthen his image as an upright crusader against corruption in India with 
similar work on other sectors. To date, unlike many other anti-corruption 
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crusaders in India, he has shown no interest in leveraging his image into a 
career in politics (Denyer 2012).  
 
Some commentators have suggested that the public reaction to the CAG report 
on the sector was part of a broader wave of public revulsion to high profile 
corruption at least within the educated middle class in India since 2010. The 
anti-corruption movement of Anna Hazare and the renewed public interest in 
political accountability that resulted in, among, other things, the trouncing of 
the Congress government in the 2015 elections, are all part of this wave(Malik 
and Jenkins 2013). The report of the 2G scam was certainly the first of many 
other exposes that revealed the scale and consequences of the politics of 
patronage which was becoming increasingly predatory – Coalgate, the 
Commonwealth Games, to name a few. Roy (2013) argued that there was a 
significant shift from old-fashioned patronage to predatory corruption by 
coalitions of business and politics during this period. The 2G scam appears to 
follow the same pattern.  
 
The public reaction to these scams has for the moment resulted in some 
unexpected results. There are suggestions that government employees now so 
fear being charged for corruption that the result is policy paralysis (Denyer 
2012, Malik and Jenkins 2013). While that may be an overstatement, the scam 
has impacted both on how the telecom sector (both government agencies and 
businesses) are viewed by the consumer and how government policy makers 
view the sector. Specifically, it appears that the 2G scam did result in the 
hardening of the government stance towards spectrum allotment in future 
phases, if only because the political costs of appearing to condone crude 
attempts at rent capture are now clear.  
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7.7 Dynamics of the PS: 2009-2012: Laying Down the 
Law 
 
The 3G auctions held in May 2010, under Raja’s second round of leadership of 
the DoT, were in stark contrast to the 2G licensing process of 2008. By now, 
although the details of the 2G scam had not been uncovered in the Press and 
while the general public had no inkling of the scale of rent capture, the Central 
Government was aware that rents had been captured but had been diverted too 
exclusively to the regional party and to the minister himself. In order to ensure 
that this did not take place a second time, the process was overseen by the 
Finance Ministry and the Telecom Commission.   
 
The auction was designed by DotEcon, a UK based consultancy in line with a 
brief from the DoT. It was also overseen by independent audit firms. The DoT 
brief had laid out the following objectives:  
•the auction should feature an open stage where bidders can obtain information 
about the demand for the licences offered; 
•the risk of lots going unsold should be minimised; 
•bidders should not be given opportunities to submit bids they did not intend 
to honour, and potentially raise prices to discourage entry; 
•the government should raise a fair price even in the absence of competition in 
the auction or in the event that valuations from bidders were highly 
asymmetric, which in turn implied that a strict second-price rule might not be 
a good tool for capturing the value of licences as revenue; 
•entry by regional operators should be possible and encouraged; and 
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•as far as possible, aggregation risks for operators seeking a national footprint 
should be mitigated (i.e. the risk of winning licences in some, but not all key 
regions).  
      (Source:(Dot.econ 2010)) 
 
The resulting design of the auction was an ascending clock e-auction with 
modifications, where bids were placed online by pre-registered bidders in a 
secure manner. The bids were presented in an ascending manner by the 
auctioneer, and bidders had to either accept or decline, ensuring cartelization 
or collusion could not take place and allowing the greatest possible value of 
spectrum to be determined by market bidding. The auction was deemed a 
resounding success as all the available spectrum was sold and the levels of rent 
extracted were twice those that had been expected by the State (ET 2010a). 
 
The prices achieved for 3G spectrum need to be understood in terms of the 
competitive context at the time. The 2G auction had taken place and the 
market saw the introduction of a number of new entrants with FDI backing. 
Incumbent firms faced the prospect of market share wars with foreign players 
whose pockets were possibly deeper than their own. All these players were keen 
to establish a foothold in the Indian market and any gain in market share that 
they achieved was likely to come disproportionately from the largest firms. In 
addition the earlier roadmap of spectrum allocation based on subscriber norms 
had been scrapped and any future availability of spectrum would be contested 
for by a greater number of firms. Sunil Jain of Business Standard suggested that 
the high prices were caused by an artificial spectrum scarcity created by Raja 
when he doled out too many licenses in 2008. Incumbents therefore had to 
engage in a fierce bidding war to retain their advantage. It was hoped that 3G, 
with faster speeds, would help unlock the nascent data market and access the 
higher value customers with greater Average Revenues per User (ARPUs).  
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Table 7.5: Dynamics of the PS 2009-2012 
Policies driving rent  creation 
and allocation  
Policy Objective  
 
Rent Distribution 
 
Agencies that Define 
Critical 
Characteristics of the 
PS 
Policy outcomes and 
economic effects given the 
PS 
Consequences for the 
evolution of the PS 
 Stated / Underlying Formal/informal Strong/weak   
3G (2100 MHz) and BWA (2300 
MHz) auction 
Stated: To drive growth 
and extract formal rents for 
the state 
 
Underlying: To shift from 
informal to formal rent 
extraction 
Formal: 
 
State: High 
 
TSPs: Low 
 
Consumers: Low 
Dominant: 
State, CAG, 
Public 
 
Weak : All TSPs 
High competition and 
uncertainty of spectrum. 
 
High debt levels 
 
Reduced investment in 
infrastructure 
Growth-retarding phase 
 
Changes in sectoral 
political settlement 
retard sectoral growth as 
a result of the 
maximization of formal 
rent extraction 
 
Entry of global telcos. 
 
Entry of Reliance Jio 
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The operator-wise results of the spectrum allocations were discussed in 
Chapter 6. The auction was dominated by the top three market players. 
Reliance Infocom also won 13 circles. None of the new entrants won any further 
licenses in this round (Maistre 2010). Bharti Airtel had the biggest spectrum bill 
at Rs. 12,300 Cr. (Rs. 123 Billion). Airtel, Reliance and Vodafone also won the key 
metro licenses (ibid). 
 
State owned operators BSNL and MTNL had already been allocated 3G 
spectrum in all circles in 2009. However they were now charged the equivalent 
of winning bids in each circle, reflecting an explicit recognition by the 
government of the value of spectrum as a resource and as a source of 
generating state revenues. 
 
The winners of 3G spectrum exhibited 2 divergent bidding strategies. Birla-
owned Idea cellular and Aircel focused on the smaller and cheaper non-metro 
circles and therefore achieved more efficient gains, while Vodafone, Reliance 
and Airtel,  in an attempt to maintain presence in key metros, ended up paying 
significantly higher for potential rupee revenue for their spectrum (ET 2010c, 
Gupta 2010).  The incumbents had the advantage of several years of 
accumulated profits and stronger balance sheets as a result of higher rent 
retention in the preceding years based on their rights over 900 MHz spectrum 
(this will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter, Chapter 8). Reliance 
however, needed to overextend itself in order to participate in the bidding war. 
All the TSPs who participated ended up with high levels of debt but the 
incumbent firms – Bharti and Vodafone were probably best placed to manage 
the debt on their balance sheets.  
 
Two days after the conclusion of the 3G auction, spectrum in the 2300MHz 
range was also auctioned. This was meant as spectrum for Broadband Wireless 
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Access (BWA) but all spectrum bought at an auction (i.e. Spectrum from the 
2010 auction onwards) was declared to be liberalised. In other words, the 
spectrum could be used with any technology on mobile wireless 
communication.  
 
The BWA auction saw the entry of a significant player into the sectoral political 
settlement. Infotel, who won licenses in all the circles for the 2300 BWA 
spectrum, were in talks with Reliance Industries during the bidding process and 
were bought over by them immediately after the auction and renamed Reliance 
Jio (Tripathy and Narayanan 2010). Reliance Industries was the other arm of the 
original Reliance business that had stayed with the elder brother Mukesh 
Ambani, now the richest businessman in India. The non-compete agreement 
with his brother that prevented him from entering telecom had been scrapped 
only weeks previously (Hibberd 2010). 
 
The entry of Mukesh Ambani’s Reliance Jio marks an important change in the 
sectoral political settlement as it could potentially enable Mukesh Ambani’s 
very significant bargaining power in other sectors to be leveraged in bargaining 
within the telecom sector. Although at this stage Reliance Jio did not have a 
mobile telephony business and had no spectrum in any other bandwidths, his 
purchase of the countrywide BWA spectrum was speculated to be a play buy 
into 2300 MHz in anticipation of the planned new developments in technology 
(TDD-LTE or 4G) that were expected to be able to work on this spectrum band 
in the future (ibid).  
 
Telecom analysts and industry experts suggested the 3G and BWA bidding 
process and consequent huge pay-outs for the firms involved would be margin-
diluting in the short term (ET 2010b). Graham Friend, managing director of 
Coleago Consulting, said of the 3G auctions “The resulting US$ / MHz / Pop (the 
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standard benchmark) for Mumbai, for example, makes the prices paid in the UK 
and German 3G auctions look relatively good value. If the prices were adjusted for 
the relative differences in GDP per capita the Indian prices would be off the scale.” 
However he also believed that the 3G spectrum would help relieve congestion 
in 2G networks and start to earn a return quicker in India’s low cost markets 
(Middleton 2010). Meanwhile service providers claimed that the firms were 
under severe financial pressures as they were saddled with high debt levels 
(from spectrum auction costs) and revenue projections based in higher ARPUs 
were not being achieved. Cash-strapped TSPs began to cut back on investment 
in infrastructure.  
 
As discussed in a previous section of this chapter the collapse of this phase of 
the political settlement had already been put into motion after the 2G 
allotment in 2008, but the values raised in the 3G/BWA auction raised the 
pressure on the government to put in motion the actions that would change the 
sectoral distribution of organizational power, the sectoral political settlement, 
once again.  
 
The political settlement in this period had two defining characteristics. The 
first was the high levels of competition and the attendant insecurity for 
spectrum investors that the 2G licensing had caused. This had a huge and 
apparently paradoxical impact on the behaviour of the TSPs in the 3G auction, 
as it led to high levels of rent extraction by the state and high levels of debt for 
the TSPs. The consumers did not see any particular benefit during this phase as 
rents were simply being redistributed from service providers to the state 
through formal rent extraction processes. If anything, the TSPs had to cut back 
on infrastructure provision to manage their increased debt.  
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The second defining characteristic was the awareness and acknowledgement by 
the state and the general public that spectrum was a valuable natural resource.  
Spectrum came to be seen as not just a resource for the telecom sector but as a 
way for the state to formally raise funds to manage the fiscal deficit.  The 
Supreme Court judgement of February 2012 that cancelled all 122 of the licenses 
issued in 2008 changed the first of these characteristics, that of competition. 
However, the investigation into the scam intensified the second characteristic. 
State agencies and the political leadership responded to the check on informal 
rent extraction that actually left some rents with the service providers by 
moving to transparent formal auction-based rent extraction that paradoxically 
left much lower levels of rents for TSPs.  As far as can be judged from the 
media, the general public supported the change as the perception was that 
formal rent extraction by the state that fed into the country’s budget was a 
good thing since it was a sign that informal rent extraction that lined the 
pockets of a few was not taking place. All further spectrum that has been 
assigned in the sector till the date of writing has been through a formal auction 
process that aimed at maximising state revenue. 
. 
 
  
316 
 
7.8 Dynamics of the PS: 2012-2014: Akshayapatra Phase 
 
 
Akshaya patra meaning inexhaustible vessel, is an object from Hindu 
mythology. It was a wonderful vessel given to Yudhishtra by the Lord Surya, 
which held a never-failing supply of food to the Pandavas every day. 
Source:  http://www.babylon.com/definition/Akshayapatra/English  
 
The cancellation of the 2G licences by the Supreme Court had important 
implications for the investment dynamics in the sector. The license cancellation 
and the fines imposed by the court on the new entrants made them hesitant to 
continue in the sector. It was followed by a period of uncertainty as many of the 
new entrants challenged the court rulings and threatened to sue the central 
government in return (Aulakh 2012). Etisalat exited the sector in 2012 soon after 
the cancellation of the licenses. Uninor and Sistema announced plans to 
continue in India. The Supreme Court had decreed that the cancelled licenses 
be re-auctioned within 4 months of cancellation. The spectrum from the 
cancelled licenses was put up for auction in November 2012.  
 
The formal auction process of 2G in 2012 mirrored the 3G auction of 2010. 
However, as discussed in the last chapter, the high reserve prices combined 
with the debt laden balance sheets of the operators led to a dampened response 
to the spectrum. Only Uninor and Videocon, of the new operators in 2008 
participated in the auction. Of the incumbents, Vodafone and Idea were the 
key participants. Airtel participated very marginally possibly because they had 
over-extended themselves in the 3G auction. The auction was not the 
resounding success that the state had hoped for and a large part of the 2G 1800 
spectrum that was up for auction remained unsold.  
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Table 7.7: Dynamics of the PS: 2012-2014 
Policies driving 
rent  creation 
and allocation  
Policy Objective  
 
Rent Distribution 
 
Agencies that Define 
Critical Characteristics of 
the PS 
 
Policy outcomes and 
economic effects 
given the PS 
Consequences for the 
evolution of the PS 
 Stated / Underlying Formal/informal Strong/weak   
2012 cancellation 
of 122 2g licenses 
2012 auction 
(cancelled 
licenses) 
2013 auction 
2014 auction 
 
Stated: to drive sectoral growth 
 
 
 
Underlying : to maximise rent 
extraction by the state 
Formal: 
 
State: high to moderate 
 
TSPs: moderate 
 
Consumers: Low to 
moderate 
Dominant:  
State,  
TRAI 
 
Big 3 GSM operators 
Consolidation and 
strengthening of key 
players 
 
Spectrum shortages 
caused by policy 
Growth-conducive PS 
A more conducive context 
for growth  
Exit of many new entrants 
increases bargaining power 
of those who remain  
Consolidation of big 3. 
 
Reliance Jio strengthens its 
position for an entry into 
the sector 
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The auction of 2012 had the effect of eliminating the threat of further 
competition in the sector. The only new entrants that remained – Uninor and 
Videocon had not managed to buy heavily of spectrum given reserve prices and 
remained marginal players. Vodafone invested heavily during this auction, 
increasing the debt on its balance sheets too.  
 
The spectrum that remained unsold was put up for auction again in early 2013 
at reduced reserve prices. As discussed in the previous chapter the 2013 auction 
was also a failure as debt-laden companies also had an eye to the next year 
where some of their original licenses would expire and come up for re-auction. 
The only spectrum that was sold was CDMA spectrum purchased by Shyam 
Sistema (rebranded MTS). Industry observers have suggested that MTS’ 
purchase of 800 MHz spectrum may be a long term strategic play since 800 
MHz spectrum can be re-farmed to be used for 4G.  
 
Reliance Infocom did not win any bids in the auction of 2012. It did not 
participate in the 2013 auction either. The company was struggling under debt 
burdens and it was rumoured in the marketplace that it was exploring selling 
part of its stake in 2013 (Interview with Telecom Sector Analyst).  While it did 
own significant amounts of spectrum in 800, 900, 1800 and 2100 MHz bands, 
Reliance had been struggling to maintain its market share but it fell from 11.5% 
revenue share of the market to 7.8% by 2013. It had ceased to be a significant 
threat to the incumbent players in its current state.   
 
Thus by the end of 2013, the market had consolidated significantly around the 
key incumbent players of the GSM market – Airtel, Vodafone and Idea. While 
they had also accrued debt in the years between 2010 and 2013, their balance 
sheets were in a better position to take on these debt burdens. Their market 
dominance was consolidated by the end of 2013.  
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This period also saw the strengthening of the regulator. The Supreme Court 
judgement of 2012 had made clear that the DoT had erred in not accepting 
TRAI recommendations or doing so only partially. It reiterated the need for the 
DoT to operate in consultation with TRAI (BBC 2012).  
 
The failed auctions of 2012 and 2013 forced the state to temper its expectations 
of rent extraction. The restraint exercised by state agencies in rent extraction as 
a result of these experiences amounted to a more balanced distribution of 
forces within the sectoral political settlement between state agencies, the 
regulator and the TSPs, and this began to encourage a market-driven  phase of 
growth in the sector. 
 
The auction of 2014 was a critical one for some of the incumbents who had 
licenses expiring (first issued in 1995) that needed renewal. While Airtel, 
Vodafone and Idea held on to their 900 spectrum, a new entrant in the bids for 
1800 spectrum was Reliance Jio. Jio won 1800 spectrum in 14 circles across the 
country. With advances in technology, 1800 MHz 2G spectrum could now be 
re-farmed for 4G. Reliance Jio’s purchase of 1800 spectrum was meant to bolster 
its 4G capability. Reliance Jio’s proposed launch in the 4G space now posed a 
credible competitive threat to incumbent players. Thus while the 2014 auction 
served to further concentrate the market in the hands of the top three players – 
Airtel, Vodafone and Idea, the counterpoint of a Reliance Jio threat  of entry, 
with its political connections and spending power  signals a more competitive 
distribution of power within the emerging sectoral settlement. It is also likely to 
be the source of change in the sectoral political settlement in the future.  
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7.9 Conclusions 
 
Our analysis of policy formulation and implementation in the context of 
changes in the sectoral and national political settlement shows how the growth 
process has been driven by the interplay between ‘politically-driven’ rent 
creation and capture strategies and ‘economic’ calculations of investors and the 
state. State agencies, regulators, political organizations and private sector 
organizations have each participated in both types of calculations. The rapid 
growth and expansion of the sector has been impressive, but was by no means 
inevitable. There were several moments of vulnerability where the rent 
definition and allocation game came close to bankrupting important players 
and destabilizing the national political settlement. The responses and counter-
responses of important organizations changed the sectoral political settlement 
repeatedly, with consequences for economic activity in the sector. Sometimes 
the changing parallelogram of forces resulted in new spurts of investments, 
sometimes it led to the stifling of investment. This analysis of phases of rent 
creation and allocation in the telecom sector in the context of underlying 
political settlements at the sectoral and national levels serves to explain why 
the policies that created the rents arose in the form they did and why the rents 
were distributed among the different organizations and agencies in the way 
that they were in each phase. More interestingly, it also allows us to identify 
how new mobilizations and entry in response to earlier moves and economic 
results led to continuous changes in the sectoral political settlement and 
sometimes fed back into changes in the national political settlement.   
 
An important characteristic of the rent-creation strategies in the sector is that 
the central state was rarely if ever sufficiently coordinated across agencies and 
capable of enforcing rent allocations on all the players in a way that could 
enable it to lead an ‘industrial policy’ game. There were no deliberate attempts 
at using rents to generate learning and capability development by local firms. 
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However, rent capture strategies of local firms did allow some of the big 
domestic players to acquire significant capabilities and the resources to make 
the very large investments in infrastructure that are required in the sector. But 
these were fortuitous outcomes rather than deliberate ones. Once the initial 
tussle over rents had created some significant players, the sectoral political 
settlement that best supported growth was one that was characterized by a 
more even distribution of power across the major TSPs and government 
agencies. This was necessary to prevent both attempts at monopolistic rent 
extraction by private sector players or predatory extraction by state agencies. 
Any phase where a particular government agency or political organization was 
so strong as to dominate the distribution of power in the sectoral political 
settlement resulted in adverse outcomes for the sector in the longer term, even 
though these episodes did allow some private firms to engage in ‘primitive 
accumulation’ that allowed some of them to emerge as important productive 
players later. In the early phase from the inception of the sector till 1999 the 
DoT was the dominant power within the sectoral PS and was able to capture a 
greater share of the rent, but its strategies actually left sufficient rents on the 
table for emerging private players and indirectly helped the emergence of the 
sector. Similarly, in 2008, Raja was able to control policy making to divert a 
significant chunk of the sectoral rents towards his political organization and 
himself. But this process too resulted in significant rent capture by private 
sector organizations close to the politicians. Whether this would have resulted 
in the emergence of new productive activities by the organizations that had 
captured rents will never be known as the Supreme Court intervened to reverse 
this rent capture. However, the predatory nature of most of the business-
government relationships that had developed by the late 1990s makes it 
unlikely that these rents would have supported new productive capability 
development.  
 
The sectoral political settlement has not been stable over the time period we 
have studied. This is because a political settlement is stable when the rent 
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distributions as a result of policy are in line with the distribution of power 
across organizations and agencies that constitute that political settlement. The 
case study of the sector shows that the set of organizations that are relevant are 
not fixed, particularly since organizations that are powerful in the broader 
national political settlement may not yet have participated in the sector. 
However, the profitability of a sector can attract new players who are powerful 
in the broader context, and this can repeatedly reconstruct and reconfigure the 
sectoral political settlement. A good example was Reliance’s repeated attempts 
to enter the sector to share in its rents. While this organization is one of the 
most powerful at the national level as one of India’s biggest business houses 
with longstanding links with the political and bureaucratic apparatus of the 
country, they had been cut out of rents in the telecom sector. They had made a 
mistake in not pushing for success on their original bids for a GSM license in 
the sector. Their attempt to enter the sector through other means in 2003, 
again in 2007/08, and finally in 2010/2013 with 4G required the mobilization of 
political and bureaucratic forces in their favour, and resulted in periodically 
upsetting the sectoral political settlement.  
 
Finally one of the key characteristics of the sector that is highlighted by the PS 
analysis above is the important role of informal rent extraction mechanisms at 
critical phases in the history of the sector. Much of the development in the 
sector was driven by the intended and unintended consequences of informal 
rent extraction strategies and mechanisms. In very general terms, this is 
symptomatic of economic policies in countries with a clientelist PS, where the 
political establishment is unable to meet the rent demands of its clients purely 
through formal means. The high rent generation potential of the telecom sector 
made it particularly prone to informal rent extraction and informal rent-
seeking by the TSPs.  The informal links between businesses and politicians had 
important consequences for policy formulation that favoured particular 
business. In 1995, Telecom Minister Sukh Ram favoured HFCL, Paswan was 
rumoured to have favoured the Ambanis and from 2006-2009, ministers 
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Dayanidhi Maran and Raja extracted rents to support the regional party and for 
personal gain with the help of businesses that were not directly connected with 
the telecom sector. Organizations and agencies within the sector were always 
aware of these rent extraction strategies and the success or otherwise of 
particular strategies depended on the relative power of different organizations 
and agencies within the sectoral political settlement. This predominantly 
informal rent definition and extraction strategy went unacknowledged and 
tacitly accepted until 2010 when Raja’s massive rent extraction resulted in a 
backlash that changed the rules of the game. The scale of the graft got public 
attention and was successfully mobilized by the opposition to threaten the 
ruling coalition at the national level to an extent that a significant shift from 
informality to formality took place in rent extraction strategies in the sector. 
According to the expectations of standard institutional economics and good 
governance advocates, the shift to greater formality should always be better as 
it is a more transparent process with greater accountability and the rents 
extracted have to be used in accountable ways . However, the reality is more 
anomalous in countries where significant catching up remains to be done, 
capabilities need to be developed, new organizations have to be set up and 
massive infrastructure spending has to be financed. In these contexts, a partial 
move to greater formalization of the rent definition and allocation process in 
one sector can also have unpredictable effects that need to be assessed in the 
context of the pushes and pulls on policy-making within a national political 
settlement that is still largely clientelist. We see this in the period after 2010, 
when rent definition and extraction has been mostly through formal means of 
auctions and a transparent regulatory structure. However, the outcome has 
been a high level of rent extraction, which has made the emergence of new 
national players more difficult and is likely to have squeezed investments and 
capability developments in the sector. Transparency has made it politically 
difficult to leave rents for private sector players and the state has continued to 
drive up spectrum pricing through policy driven scarcity and clever auction 
design. The high extraction of rents through auctions means that firms have 
reduced their infrastructure spending to manage their debt levels. In the longer 
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run, this could well be detrimental to the development of the sector and the 
creation of social value in a developing country context where significant 
market failures exist that constrain capability development and infrastructure 
investment. The extent to which this will be a problem will depend on how the 
sectoral political settlement evolves in the sector, and whether credible 
strategies of capability development can be designed in a transparent and 
enforceable manner.    
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Chapter 8: Structural Outcomes 
and Impact 
 
“My dear, here we must run as fast as we can, just to stay in place. And if you 
wish to go anywhere you must run twice as fast as that.”   
Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland 
8.1 Introduction:  
 
The application of the perspectives of rents and political settlements to the 
analysis of policy changes in the mobile telephony sector since its inception 
have helped explain the policy shifts as being shaped by the contests over use 
right allocation in spectrum and the resulting rent distributions that flow from 
the policy. The analysis has shown that the agencies in the political settlement 
have contested the formation of rent creation policies in the sector in order to 
appropriate a larger share of the rent for themselves. The state too has, through 
the different phases of development of the sector, moved from high levels of 
rent extraction that left little rent for producers, to lower levels of rent 
extraction, allowing rents to be shared more by the producers, to high levels of 
rent extraction again in the later phases of the sectors development. 
Meanwhile, the analysis also shows that despite several policies that formally 
aimed to increase competition in the sector, the sector has progressed towards 
greater consolidation. These structural outcomes are created by the history of 
policy in the sector and the evolution of its political settlement.  
 
The patterns of rent distributions and the imperatives underlying them have 
these shaped structural outcomes in the sector. These outcomes in turn 
characterize the interaction of the various agencies of the political settlement 
326 
 
with the formulation and implementation of policy. This chapter will explore 
two structural outcomes in particular that characterize the interactions of the 
state and of the producers respectively with policy in the sector. The first is the 
growing rent extraction by the state through policy-created scarcity, and the 
second is the advantage that initial firms in the sector had in terms of access to 
Ricardian rents that allowed them to consolidate their position in the market. 
 
The previous two chapters have shown that the state has increasingly viewed 
spectrum assignment as a means to raise significant funds for its budget 
deficits. It has therefore espoused spectrum auctions as a way to maximize the 
rent extraction. The value the spectrum achieves in auction is believed to be 
what the spectrum user who most values it is willing to pay based on a rational 
calculation of his/her market return from the spectrum right. Earlier chapters 
have also established that the Indian telecom sector is spectrum starved, with 
lower average spectrum holdings per operator than any other country. As rent 
theory has argued, spectrum’s value arises from scarcity. We have argued 
earlier that there are physical components to this scarcity. However, creating 
spectrum scarcity through policy and thereby driving up price of spectrum in 
auctions could be very useful for a government seeking to maximize auction 
revenues. This chapter interrogates the nature of spectrum scarcity in India to 
explain the implications of these on the outcomes of state-run auctions.  
 
The second structural outcome that this chapter will focus on is the tendency 
for market shares to be consolidated amongst players in the sector. Again an 
earlier chapter suggested that telecom sectors, given the nature of the network 
and the economics of the sector, tend to be oligopolistic. This is a tendency we 
see in the Indian sector as well, where despite several policies that increased 
competition in the sector at various points, the sector has consolidated around 
three service provider firms. However our analysis of rents in the sector allows 
us to advance a view of what drove these particular firms to market leadership. 
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This section examines the Ricardian differential rents that exist between 
holders of different frequencies of spectrum and the reason this allowed these 
incumbent top three firms to see off competition and maintain and grow their 
share of the market.  
 
Both of the above structural outcomes – growing rent extraction by the state 
and the gains form initial allocations for incumbent TSPs, have influenced the 
creation of and the impact of policy on the sector and will continue to have an 
effect on sector outcomes. However, both are vulnerable to change with 
changing technology. The chapter will explore what impact technology change 
has on these structural outcomes.  
 
It is also obvious from the revisionist reading of the sector, that most of the 
consumer benefit in the sector has come from competitive pressures driving 
down prices. Attempts to manage rent dissipation to consumers through policy 
have been few and far between. Except in the first stage of the sectors 
evolution, where the DoT set consumer prices at a very high level there has 
been little direct interference in price setting through policy. Other rent 
management mechanisms to ensure that consumers benefit from the rent 
creation by setting performance conditions on producers have been instituted 
but not strongly enforced. In the interests of completeness this chapter will 
explore the few instances of rent dissipation to consumers and interrogate why 
these have not been more important in the sector’s evolution.  
 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. The next section explores the 
structural outcome of the evolution of policy on the state through an 
examination of spectrum scarcity. The following section establishes the 
structural outcome of policy on the top three TSPs in the sector that has aided 
their consolidation. Finally, we will also consider the lack of impact that 
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consumer needs have had on policy and the implications of this from a political 
settlements perspective.  
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8.2 Spectrum Scarcity and the State 
 
I have argued earlier that the scarcity of the key natural resource in the sector, 
airwaves or spectrum, necessitates the creation of use rights in the sector to 
govern their use. If the underlying resource in the sector, spectrum, were freely 
and infinitely available, rights limiting and specifying use would not be 
necessary.  However, the scarcity of natural resources prevents even the 
theoretical possibility of a zero-rent market. Scarcity of spectrum is driven both 
by the physical nature of spectrum and definition of rights over spectrum that 
allowed the establishment of the telecom service, as the latter would be 
inefficient and of poor quality in the absence of these exclusionary rights.  
Before we explore the underlying sources of scarcity in spectrum, the next 
section reiterates why exclusive rights are needed in the sector.  
 
8.2.1 Why do we need Exclusive Use Rights in Spectrum? 
 
To understand the need for exclusive use rights over spectrum we need to 
identify what kind of economic good spectrum is. Prasad and Sridhar (2014: 52-
70) have looked at spectrum along the axes of excludability and rivalrousness. A 
good is said to be excludable if it is possible to easily and at reasonable cost 
exclude others from the use of the good. A good is said to be rivalrous if the use 
of the good by one individual precludes the use of the good by another. Non-
excludable goods suffer from the tragedy of the commons while non-rivalrous 
goods suffer from the difficulty of determining how to charge non-rivalrous 
users for the good.  
 
Radio frequencies are in theory non excludable (unless specified by law). 
However multiple TSPs transmitting on the same frequency would cause 
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significant interference, reducing the efficiency of the good. In theory, 
coordination between TSPs could reduce the interference and could allow the 
good to be used efficiently without exclusive rights being defined on it. 
However, this coordination would be expensive and difficult, and would 
increase in complexity with every additional TSP. Thus, in order to overcome 
the tragedy of the commons that takes the shape of interference in spectrum, 
and to avoid the high transaction costs of coordination that non-excluded use 
would entail, use rights are defined to limited numbers of TSPs over spectrum. 
The creation of use rights in effect allows spectrum to become an excludable 
good. This does not remove the problem of interference, but reduces it to levels 
that can be managed by technology.  
 
Use rights in spectrum could be assigned through auctions. The auction assigns 
exclusive rights of use over a particular band of spectrum with a certain 
frequency.  That right allows the winner of the right to exclusively transmit and 
receive signals within the allotted frequency band. However radio signals suffer 
from interference – the signal from one transmitter to a receiver will be sensed 
by other receivers within a boundary that is defined by the strength of the 
transmitted signal and its frequency. For the most part, technology has 
developed devices that allow the relevant signal to be read and the interference 
to be ignored.  
 
Spectrum is a partially rivalrous good. The use of a particular frequency does 
not preclude is use by another user, within limits. The good is also non-
depletable and therefore it is non-rivalrous over time. In other words, 
frequency used by one user can be reused by another once the first use is 
completed. However, if too many users use the good at the same time it will 
lead to congestion. Spectrum assignments to specific users overcome the 
problem of congestion by internalizing it to the owner of the right. The owner 
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of the right is then responsible for overcoming congestion within his defined 
band of spectrum.  
 
Spectrum rights make the spectrum an excludable good given its partially 
rivalrous nature. These rights allow the good to be used more efficiently and 
enhance net social benefit. The rights thus created give rise to rent streams. In 
other words, rents are inevitable in the sector if efficiency is to be achieved and 
the potential problem of a tragedy of the commons is to be avoided. 
 
Mobile communication is also a network good with a need for international 
cross-border harmonization in order to maximize the benefit of the network. 
Use rights in the sector therefore not only protect the scarce resource from the 
tragedy of the commons but allow the sector to maximize social benefit by 
extending the reach of the network through a harmonization of frequencies 
across countries.   
 
8.2.2 The Scarcity of Spectrum 
 
Classical economists discussing rents were preoccupied with identifying the 
source of rents. Differences in characteristics chosen were reflective of the 
different underlying assumptions on what causes rents to arise in the first 
place.  However they shared a common agreement that the value of a rent is 
rooted in scarcity of the factor, land in the classical case, spectrum in ours. In 
contrast, in the Marxist perspective scarcity was rooted in the very definition of 
property rights. For Ricardo, since rent arose from the natural properties of the 
land, the scarcity of land ultimately caused rents. The scarcity of the factor is 
created by a limited availability of the resource and the demand for the output 
332 
 
of the resource. From this perspective, it is physical scarcity of spectrum that 
affects the rents that it can command.  
 
Since Ricardian rents in the sector are predicated on the scarcity of spectrum, 
this section discusses the nature of this scarcity and identifies the factors that 
define this scarcity, as these have an impact upon both the quantum of rent 
that the sector commands and how it is managed. Scarcity can be caused by the 
physical properties of spectrum (as in land), but temporal scarcities can also be 
created by technology constraints and by national or international policy 
governing spectrum use (OFCOM 2010) p.10-13.  
 
As discussed in an earlier chapter, mobile telephony tends to be harmonized 
across the globe and works in specific spectrum bands. These have been 
determined by two factors:- 
One, the physical attributes of the spectrum band that determine efficiency of 
propagation of the signal and its reach and  
Two, the availability of the same frequency bands worldwide for mobile 
communication so that mobile communications can take place across national 
borders.  
Mobile phone handsets and the signalling equipment in towers have been built 
to read these specific frequencies and avoid interference from other devices 
that may be signalling on other frequencies. In other words, the physical 
properties of the spectrum limit the efficient use of spectrum for 
telecommunication, but the device ecosystem67 that builds around these 
physical limitations also reinforces them.  
 
                                                 
67
 The device ecosystem is the term used to denote the collection of handsets, technology and 
the signaling equipment required to make the communication possible.  
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However, this harmonization of frequencies and device ecosystems is essential 
to build value in the sector. As such, the prescribed bands of telecom spectrum 
today are limited. What this section aims to do is to establish where exactly the 
limitations in terms of mobile frequency lie and whether the quantum of the 
resource places a genuine constraint on the operation of the sector either 
presently or in the foreseeable future. It will also identify whether the binding 
constraint on the sector is absolute scarcity based on physical limitations given 
current or foreseeable technologies or a form of inter-temporal scarcity driven 
by current limitations of the sector, but where plausible solutions to the 
constraint are foreseeable, even if not available currently.  
 
There are three possible physical sources of scarcity constraint within the 
sector. The first lies in the existence of free and available spectrum bands 
themselves. These are determined by the current use of the spectrum, 
international harmonization and the availability of cost-effective device eco 
systems.  Within each of these spectrum bands, the number of independent 
operator rights that can be supported is determined by the state of technology 
and the size of contiguous spectrum blocks needed by the technology. This is a 
physical bound on the number of players that a sector can support. It is distinct 
from the economic bound on the number of players the sector can support in 
order that each TSP makes enough rents to invest in the physical infrastructure 
that the sector needs. And finally, the number of calls or data requests that can 
be supported concomitantly by this contiguous band of spectrum held by each 
service provider is also determined by the state of the available technology and 
is measured by the spectral efficiency of the band of spectrum.   
 
In addition to the above physical factors that limit the availability of spectrum, 
a significant non-physical determinant of spectrum availability is the spectrum 
use policy of the state that determines allocation of bands and spectrum 
distribution rules. It also impacts the price that the spectrum commands.   
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The number of service providers may also be limited by policy in order to 
protect the economic viability of players – the economic bounds on the number 
of players referred to above. From this perspective policy may be about 
ensuring viability of the individual players and the sector as a whole. 
 
Each of these is considered below in order to identify which of them places a 
binding constraint and therefore impacts scarcity of spectrum in the operation 
of the sector today.  
 
8.2.3 Physical Scarcity of Spectrum 
 
The physical nature of spectrum is such the frequency of wave propagation is 
inversely proportional to the wavelength. Wavelength is directly proportional 
to range and inversely proportional to bandwidth. This means that the higher 
the frequency, the greater the bandwidth (or the amount of data that can be 
carried) but the lower the range (or the distance that a signal can travel). The 
requirements of mobile telephony are best met by a range of frequencies 
between 700 and 3000MHz. This Spectrum Sweet Spot is depicted in Figure 8.1 
below. Since voice calls are low in terms of data intensity, there is no 
appreciable difference in the bandwidth for voice calls within this range. 
However, there is a significant difference in the range and the strength of the 
signal. At the lower ends of this 700-3000 MHz spectrum, signals carry through 
walls whereas at higher ends of this spectrum,  the service requires a greater 
density of towers in a given area and signals carry less well through walls, 
causing a problem in built up areas.  
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Figure 8.1: The Spectrum Sweet Spot   
 
Source: SRSP: The revised Framework for Spectrum Pricing, Ofcom , 2010. (OFCOM 2010) Available at 
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/srsp/summary/srsp_condoc.pdf, p. 12 
 
However, while the entire band of 700-3000MHz can theoretically be used for 
mobile telephony, in practice, the bands of spectrum that are usable are 
restricted. First, even within this optimal band for mobile use, several 
competing demands for spectrum exist. Television broadcasting worldwide 
tends to use frequency within the same band. India has also ring-fenced some 
of the spectrum within this band for use in military communication.  
 
Second, the usable bands are restricted by demands of international 
harmonization and the availability of low cost device ecosystems. Handsets 
need to be programmed to operate within specific frequency bands. 
International harmonization of these bands allows for the development of 
efficient low-cost handsets. An efficient system is one that is both harmonized 
internationally and has low cost and multiple device choices for consumers. 
This is pictorially depicted in Fig 8.2. A result of this constraint is the poor 
development of CDMA as a worldwide technology due to the lack of a cost 
effective open device ecosystem.  
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Figure 8.2: Non Physical Factors Affecting the Value of Spectrum  
 
Source: SRSP: The revised Framework for Spectrum Pricing, (OFCOM 2010) p.13. Available at 
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/srsp/summary/srsp_condoc.pdf.  
 
Therefore the frequency value relationship in spectrum is not a smooth one. 
There are many discontinuities in the way spectrum can be used. Fig. 8.3 
represents the above with illustrative spectrum values.   
Figure 8.3: Discontinuities in Spectrum Usage
 
Source: SRSP: The revised Framework for Spectrum Pricing, (OFCOM 2010) Available at 
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/srsp/summary/srsp_condoc.pdf, p. 14 
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Not only is the overall amount of spectrum available limited in quantity, the 
number of service providers that can operate within this amount of spectrum is 
also limited by physical properties of the spectrum itself and the way it is 
required by the technology.  
 
First, in order to operate each service provider needs a contiguous band of a 
certain minimum amount of spectrum that is determined by the generation of 
technology in use68 (i.e. 2G vs 3G vs 4G). Each of these has a prescribed 
minimum of contiguous spectrum that is required to run an efficient service. 
The level is defined by the way the technology uses the spectrum to carry 
signals. Some of the technologies (Frequency Duplexing rather than Time 
Duplexing) also require that the spectrum assigned is paired. In other words, it 
requires the provision of a corresponding paired band of equivalent spectrum 
assigned at a separated distance on the frequency map in order to provide 
uplink and downlink69 services to and from the handset.  
 
Separate frequency bands required for each service provider because of how 
each handset talks to the mobile network in the process of a call. First each 
operator sets their local towers to read and transmit in that frequency. 
Individual handsets that contain the sim card of that operator then allow the 
handset to be discovered by the operators nearest mobile tower and ignored by 
the towers of competitive operators. It is then the operator’s responsibility to 
assign appropriate spectrum when the handset makes a call and also hand over 
the handset to the next tower in case it moves out of range. This is what we 
described earlier as internalizing the problems of congestion. The need for 
contiguity in the bands is driven by the demands of the technology, and the 
size of the contiguous band required varies by technology.  
                                                 
68
 See Chapter 2, section 2.2.2 for a quick description of the differences in operation of 2G vs 3G 
vs 4G technology. 
69
 Uplink and Down link refer to the direction of linkage between the handset and the tower. 
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Given these minimum lot sizes and a restriction on the total amount of 
spectrum available, it follows that the number of players that can be licensed in 
any circle is limited. The number of individual licenses that can be assigned 
within a band is also limited by guard bands. Individual spectrum bands need 
to be separated by guard bands in order that signals do not intercept, i.e. to 
reduce interference.  Guard bands exacerbate the problems of fragmentation of 
spectrum and reduce the number of players the spectrum can support.   
 
Appendix 17 shows the number of players by circle in India and the amount of 
spectrum they have been assigned. At the end of 2014, nine TSPs operate in the 
voice segment in India. This is an unusually large number of operators when 
compared to other countries (see Figure 8.4). A larger number of operators 
implies that there is less spectrum holding per head and that could affect the 
quality of service that they can provide. 
  
Figure 8.4: Comparison of Number of TSPs in India vs selected other 
countries (March 2011)
 
Source: (PWC 2011), p.26. 
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Given the high and growing demand for telecom services and the explosion of 
mobile data usage, the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) has 
assigned harmonized international spectrum bands based on demand estimates 
in 2005. A repeat estimation in 2011 further revised demand estimates upwards. 
The ITU is therefore expected to identify further bands over time (TRAI 2014a) 
p.32.   
 
8.2.4 National Spectrum Allocation: 
 
The current  frequency allocation bands and their national application are 
given in the National Frequency Allocation Plan 201170 (DoT 2011)  (Table 8.1). 
 
Appendix 17 gives the spectrum holdings by TSP in each circle.  
 
It can be seen that on average 8.8 - 10 MHz of 800 MHz spectrum has been 
given per TSP in the CDMA space. The maximum amount assigned in any circle 
is 12.5 MHz in Delhi.  
 
On average, about 20MHz of 900 MHz spectrum has been assigned in each 
circle. The TN and Chennai circle has the maximum amount of 900 MHz 
spectrum assigned, since this was originally 2 circles, the metro Chennai and 
the category A state – Tamil Nadu, which then was combined into a single 
circle in 2005. Delhi and Mumbai, the biggest metro circles have 22.2 MHz of 
900 spectrum allotted. The allotment of 900 MHz spectrum in each circle is 
                                                 
70
 NFAP 2011 available at  http://www.coai.com/Uploads/MediaTypes/Documents/National-
Frequency-Allocation-Plan-NFAP-2011.pdf 
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very even across circles, with the smallest circle being allotted 18 MHz. Given 
the state of technology and the market, this band is currently the most valued 
band in the sector but only 2x22.5 MHz of it has been allotted.  
 
The amount of 1800 MHz spectrum allotted by circle is both the largest 
quantum as well as the most varied by size. 56 MHz of 1800 MHz spectrum has 
been allotted in Mumbai circle as against only 20 MHz in Jammu and Kashmir 
Circle. The variation in the amounts of 1800 MHz spectrum allotted points to 
the fact that TSPs have used the 1800 MHz spectrum to cover gaps in the 
coverage of their 900 MHz spectrum. The amount of 900 MHz spectrum in the 
Indian market is limited to what was first assigned in 19995.  Since then only 
1800 MHz spectrum (in the 2G technology space) has been available. So in the 
largest circles, in addition to about 20MHz of 900 MHz spectrum, about 50 
MHz of 1800 MHz spectrum is currently being deployed to service demand.  
 
A further 20 or 25 MHz of 2100 (3G) spectrum per circle over 4 or 5 TSPs and 60 
MHz of 2300 (BWA) spectrum over 3 TSPs per circle have also been assigned so 
far. In the 2100 (3G) band only 20 out of a possible 60MHz has been assigned to 
telecom, whereas in most countries the entire 60MHz has been allocated to 
TSPs (TRAI 2014a: 37).  
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Table 8.1: Indian spectrum bands available for Mobile Communication 
Harmonized 
Frequency  
Range 
(MHz) 
Frequency Bands 
(MHz) 
(uplink/downlink – 
for paired spectrum) 
Amoun
t of 
spectru
m 
Assigned to 
Mobile 
Telephony 
Assigned to Others/ Not 
Assigned 
400 450-470 2X7 
MHz 
 2X7 MHz to other users. 
700  698-806  2X45 
MHz 
 2X15 assigned to Ministry of 
Defence (MoD) Remaining 
not assigned. 
800  824-844 /869-889 2X20 
MHz 
Between 2X5 
and 2X15 to 
CDMA TSPs 
Remaining not assigned 
900  890-915 / 935-960 2X25 
MHz 
Maximum 
2X22.5 
2X1.6 Railways  
4.8 MHz to MoD 
1800  1710-1785 / 1805-1880 2X75 
MHz 
High variation 
2X20 MHz to 
2X55 MHz 
2X20 MHz to MoD 
1800 1785-1805 and 1880-
1900 
20+20  MoD 
1900 1900-1910 /1980-1990 2X10  2X2.5 for MoD 
Remaining not allotted 
2100 1920-1980 
/2110-2170 
2X60 
MHz 
Up to 2X25 for 
3G 
Up to 2X40 for MoD 
2100 2010-2025 15 MHz  All allotted to other users e.g. 
Railways 
2300 2300-2400 100 
MHz 
40MHz 20 MHz for MoD, 20 MHz as 
inter-operator guard bands, 
20MHz not assigned 
2600 2500-2690 190 
MHz 
40 MHz 
assigned to 
BSNL/MTNL 
only 
150 MHZ assigned to 
Department of Space (DoS) 
3300 3300-3400 100 
MHz 
100MHz 
assigned to 
internet 
service. 
 
3400 3400-3600 200 
MHz 
 Currently assigned to DoS 
but can be assigned to 
mobile. 
Source: (DoT 2011), (TRAI 2014a) and service provider information. 
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Thus, while there are still spectrum bands that are commercially viable and 
internationally harmonized and available, more than half of this spectrum 
currently lies with other (non-telephony) users (see summary in table 8.2 and 
fig. 8.5). 
 
Table 8.2: Commercially Viable Spectrum not Available Today 
Band Total Amount of 
Spectrum per 
circle 
Amount of spectrum 
per circle assigned to 
other users 
Usage / Earmarked 
(in respect of 
spectrum not 
available for TSPs) 
800MHz 2 x 20 MHz - Defence / Railways 
900MHz 2 x 25 MHz 2 x 1.2MHz – 2x4.8MHz Defence / Railways 
1800MHz 2 x 75 MHz 2 x 20MHz Defence 
2100MHz 2 x 60 MHz 2 x 35MHz Defence 
2300MHz 60 MHz 20MHz Defence 
2600MHz 2 x 75 MHz 2 x 75MHz Dept. of Space (DoS) 
Total 2 x 285 MHz  2 x 143MHz Defence / DoS 
Source: TRAI data 
 
In addition to the problem of non-contiguous spectrum (due to blocks being 
used by other users), spectrum assignments in India face an additional hurdle 
that prevents efficiency. This is a legacy issue that arises from the history of the 
sector’s development. Prior to 2010 all spectrum was administratively assigned 
(rather than through a multi stage auction). This administrative spectrum was 
non-liberalized, i.e. the spectrum specified what technology it could be used 
with. With advances in technology spectrum in some bands can be reused on 
higher generations of technology, what is known in the sector as spectrum re-
farming. Non-liberalised spectrum cannot be re-farmed according to current 
policy rules. Re-farming may also require different blocks of contiguous 
spectrum than are available currently.  
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Fig 8.5: Current Spectrum Assignments in India 
 
Source: Estimates from Airtel 
 
Appendix 18 lists the total 2G spectrum assigned to each TSP by circle. The 
number of TSPs licensed in each circle ranges from 7-9. An average spectrum 
holding per operator by circle can be computed to range between 2 x 7 MHz to 
2 x 11 MHz. When compared to 2G spectrum assignments in other countries 
this is abysmally low (Figure 8.6). 
 
Figure 8.6: Comparison of Spectrum Holdings of International Telecom 
firms Vs. Indian Average 
 
Source: Estimates from Airtel 
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Given the limited spectrum assigned per operator and the number of licensed 
operators in the India market, TSPs in India tend to operate at a much higher 
efficiency than their worldwide counterparts. A report to the GSMA by Lewin et 
al of Plum Consulting in 2008 on the spectral efficiency of the Indian telecom 
sector suggests that India is operating at the spectral efficiency frontier already. 
India has more players per circle than the average (figure 8.4) and less 
spectrum per circle than the average (figure 8.6). Therefore TSPs in India are 
at a much higher spectral efficiency than average. Comparing spectral efficiency 
of busy hour traffic in Mumbai and Delhi with that of Singapore, Hong Kong 
and London, they suggest that India’s index of spectral efficiency is 7 times that 
of the comparison countries. This efficiency is achieved both by a greater 
density of towers and by the application of advanced technologies to maximize 
capacity. The report calculates that there are unlikely to be further efficiency 
gains under current technologies (Lewin 2008: 9-12). 
 
In summary, India’s map of assigned spectrum indicates a higher than average 
number of licensees and a lower average holding of spectrum per licensee. The 
dearth of spectrum as pushed TSPs to operate at much higher spectral 
efficiencies in India.  
 
However, with growing demand for spectrum hungry services such as mobile 
broadband, the scarcity in spectrum will lead to deterioration in the quality of 
service provided. Unlike many developed countries, India lacks an extensive 
network of fixed line cables. It is therefore more dependent than these 
countries for both voice and data services through the mobile network. The 
demand for mobile spectrum is therefore likely to increase faster in India than 
in a market like the U.K. with a developed fixed line network that carries a lot 
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of the data traffic. There does seem to be an urgent need for greater spectrum 
in the sector.  
 
The internationally harmonized bands that support the development of cost 
effective device ecosystems have been identified and are being expanded. 
However the national frequency allocation plan indicates that a large 
proportion of the spectrum allocated to telecom has either not been assigned 
yet to TSPs or is currently assigned to other users. The critical constraint is 
therefore not just an absolute physical limitation, but also in the legacy issues 
that limit the physical availability of spectrum. The latter could be overcome by 
the State but requires the policy will to bring more bands of spectrum to the 
auction table.  
 
8.2.5 Restrictions created by Policy 
 
The section above establishes that the way that the physical factors of the 
spectrum interact with economic efficiency requirements could cause the 
scarcity of spectrum that determines its value. However in India, as tables 8.1 
and 8.2 have established, not even all the spectrum within a band that is 
internationally harmonized and assigned to mobile telephony is made available 
to the sector. A large part of the spectrum within the bands is either allocated 
and being used by other users or is yet to be vacated by them for mobile 
telephony.  
 
The spectrum held by alternative users such as the Ministry of Defence (MoD) 
is partly in use for defence communication, but possibly in only specific parts of 
the country that are sensitive from a security perspective such as Kashmir and 
the North East, rather than over the entire country. Currently, this use is tied to 
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the specific frequency bands since it uses dated equipment built for those 
frequencies. However, according to the head of the COAI, Mr. Matthews, this 
equipment gets phased out over time and replaced and can be easily replaced 
with equipment built for other frequencies. The problem, he contends, is that 
the Defence sector, which pays nothing for this very valuable spectrum, is not 
incentivized in any way to vacate the spectrum. If they were either charged a 
notional market value for the spectrum or allowed to recoup some of the value 
of the spectrum they release, they may be motivated to clear the spectrum for 
other uses. As it is, they view their spectrum holding as a bargaining chip to 
secure benefits for the MoD and are not keen to release it.  
 
Even within the spectrum that has been released and assigned to TSPs, there 
are inefficiencies that exacerbate scarcity. A classic example is the spectrum 
efficiency of the state incumbent MTNL/BSNL. For a 6% revenue share of the 
market (refer Figure 3.10 in Chapter 3), the public sector incumbents are 
sitting on 17.78 % of the total spectrum assigned in the 800 MHz, 900 MHz and 
1800 MHz 2G bands, the highest of any TSP. This compared to the rate of 
utilization of other players in the sector shows a far lower efficiency for the 
state incumbent. Again, the public sector incumbents (BSNL/MTNL) have 
never paid for any spectrum that has been assigned to them so far. They are 
nevertheless allotted sizable blocks of spectrum at every auction and subsidies 
in operation. As employees of a government firm, MTNL and BSNL employees 
are a powerful and unionized interest group – laying off employees is an 
expensive and sensitive business for the government.  Nor are BSNL/MTNL 
allowed to commercially trade their spectrum as spectrum trading is restricted 
in India, as explained below.   
 
In fact many industry observers, including the TRAI (Interview with Mr.Arvind 
Kumar, TRAI), believe that the lack of a clear and effective spectrum trading 
policy or mergers and acquisitions (M&A) policy for the sector are amongst the 
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biggest hurdles facing spectrum availability today. As established, the sector 
has substantially more players than comparable markets and significantly less 
spectrum allotted. Even if India was able to support a few more players than the 
average because of the size of the market (Mr. Arvind Kumar, TRAI), that still 
implies that some of the existing players will probably be driven to exit over 
time, so the market can consolidate around the more efficient players, releasing 
inefficient and fragmented spectrum for consolidation as well. However this is 
prevented by the lack of an M&A policy that proscribes spectrum trading today.  
 
The M&A policy in the sector is hampered by legacy issues. All spectrum 
assigned before 2010 is considered to have been assigned at administratively 
determined rates rather than by the market through a multistage auction71. This 
is referred to in the sector as ‘administrative’ spectrum. Administrative 
spectrum was contractually linked to 20 year licenses and the last of these 
licenses expires in 2024. After 2012 spectrum assignments were de-linked from 
license allocations and the method of assignment was through the auction 
mechanism. Spectrum has become significantly more expensive in this method.   
 
TRAI recommends that non administrative spectrum can be traded. However a 
majority of the spectrum held by firms today in the 2G space is administered 
spectrum. Firms that today want to exit the sector need to hand their 
administrative spectrum allocation back to the state. The state may resell the 
spectrum to the purchaser of the firm but the purchaser would need to pay the 
market determined price of the spectrum to the state for the remainder of its 
license period in addition to whatever purchase price is agreed between the 
buyer and the seller. There is little incentive for inefficient firms to exit the 
                                                 
71
 This is not strictly true since the 1995 allocation of spectrum was through auction-based 
market pricing. However bid amounts were significantly reduced through the agreement on 
revenue sharing in NTP 1999, so these could be considered to be administratively determined 
too. Allocations from 2001 to 2010 were based on an administratively determined price of Rs. 
1650 Crores for a pan India licensee.  
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market since they will reap no benefit from their rights over their most valuable 
asset – the spectrum. Instead, they will have to sell a firm with possibly high 
debt levels and a not very profitable consumer base, while their most valuable 
asset has been stripped out. It is no wonder then, that firms like RTL and 
Uninor have not exited the sector despite several years of poor financial 
performance.  
 
While it appears that there are obvious policy solutions to the above problems 
of alternative users or inefficient users of spectrum, the policy responses are 
slow in coming. This raises the question of what slows their implementation, 
and why there is a lack of political will to make them happen.  
 
The answer to this may lie in the significant contribution of the proceeds from 
spectrum auctions for filling holes in the fiscal deficit in the last few years. As 
the analysis of rent distributions in the sector covered in chapter 6 argued, 
since the 2010 auctions, it has become abundantly clear to the government and 
to the public that the auction of spectrum rights could raise substantial funds 
for the exchequer. Auctions from 2010 to 2014 have raised in excess of US$ 26 
Billion for the state. They are the most lucrative source of funds for the central 
government in recent years. Government policy thus seems to be in no hurry to 
aid the release of greater amounts of spectrum for the sector, instead creating 
an artificial scarcity that keeps the prices of spectrum high.  
 
The political settlement analysis in the last chapter also argued that the state 
appears unable to manage more nuanced regulation that might allow the state 
to ensure that rents are retuned by producers as long as the producers deliver 
on operational conditions that would drive sector efficiency. The volatile 
sectoral PS is liable to disruption by new entry and the organisational activities 
of political, bureaucratic and private sector organizations attracted to the sector 
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by the potential rents. Therefore the state may deem it a more efficient solution 
to maximise its rent extraction rather than leave rents that are liable to capture 
or mismanagement and wastage. In practice, this outcome can also be induced 
by the actions of powerful organisations at the national level who are 
threatened by rent capture of a very high magnitude by rival organisations 
operating in the telecom sector. These organisations are likely to support rent 
extraction by the state rather than allow incumbents in the sector to capture 
very significant rents that can threaten to disrupt the national level political 
settlement.     
 
As long as formal rent extraction by the state through auctions is supported by 
powerful organisations at the national level, the state has every incentive to 
create artificial scarcities in spectrum. A source from Airtel suggests that policy 
led scarcities are the binding constraint on the sector’s growth today, rather 
than the scarcities caused by the physical constraints of spectrum. 
Ramachandran (2015) points out to the short-termism inherent in this act. He 
claims that the government would benefit more in the long run by keeping 
spectrum prices lower and driving growth in the sector. Feedback from both 
service providers directly and from their representative, the COAI, indicates 
that the TSPs see the high price of spectrum and the high levels of debt on firm 
balance sheets as a most significant constraining factor to their continued 
growth and their ability to invest in infrastructure for the sector.  
 
In spite of complaints about the impact of rising prices of spectrum on their 
balance sheets, at the last round of auctions in 2014, operators still appeared to 
be willing to pay increasingly high values for the spectrum right. In other 
words, while service providers claim that the rent extraction from auctions is 
too high, they are willing to pay substantial amounts to maintain their exclusive 
use rights and their access to rents available in the sector. We argued in the 
earlier section that the auction of 2014 may have inflated auction prices since 
350 
 
incumbents whose administered spectrum was on the auction block needed to 
bid aggressively to maintain the rights to support their existing businesses.  
 
8.2.6: The Impact of Technology: 
 
The imperatives that govern the state have resulted in structural outcomes in 
the sector from 2010 onwards that have resulted in the creation of policy-driven 
spectrum scarcity. This is reflected in the method of spectrum assignment, the 
amount of spectrum auctioned and the policies that create or modify rights in 
the sector. However, this outcome that defines the behaviour of the state can 
change with changes in technology. This section explains the impacts that 
changes in technology could have on the tendency of the state to create 
artificial policy-driven spectrum scarcity and maximise revenues through 
spectrum auctions.  
 
Technology that drives efficiency in the sector could dramatically impact the 
amount of spectrum available and the ability of the state to maintain scarcity. 
Technology developments allow TSPs to use all their spectra in different bands 
to complement each other – a feature known as carrier aggregation. Carrier 
aggregation could increase spectral efficiency by as much as 20%, releasing the 
pressure on scarce and patchy spectrum coverage. The development of digital 
systems to replace analogue systems on television and radio has resulted in the 
freeing of spectrum bands within the feasible range for mobile telephony. 
Referred to as the ‘digital dividend’, this has allowed spectrum in the 700 MHz 
range to be re-farmed in many markets. India is yet to release this frequency 
band. Developments in 4G have allowed spectrum in the 850MHz (currently 
underutilized by a marginal CDMA service) and 1800 MHz ranges to also be re-
farmed for 4G. This will make these ranges not only enjoy greater demand but 
also become more efficient.  
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Technology also increases flexibility of operation in the sector. Traditionally 
phones contained a single chipset that was set to operate within a single 
frequency band. Today, manufacturers like Qualcomm are designing chip sets 
that can read 5 different bands of spectrum. This allows scaleability on device 
ecosystems that will drive down the price of handsets and give greater 
flexibility from the constraints of international harmonisation. This in turn 
opens opportunities for more frequency bands to be considered. 
 
Finally, technology could also radically impact spectrum right structures in the 
sector by reducing the costs of coordination. To recall an earlier section, the 
individual rights in spectrum exist since the costs of coordination for open 
access spectrum are too high. However, Prasad and Sridhar (2014) have 
described changes in technology being developed today that lower the costs of 
coordination among multiple players significantly allowing the creation of a 
‘spectrum commons’. Prasad and Sridhar (ibid) differentiate between an open 
access system and a Spectrum Commons system, where the latter has a limited 
number of licensed operators much like the current system, but the spectrum is 
held in common to allow the most efficient use of all of the available resource. 
Mr. Gopalan of Airtel believes that this technology is 10 years away from its 
commercial application but Prasad and Sridhar argue that India would do well 
to plan for its possibility in terms of transitioning its legacy systems of 
spectrum licensing. Spectrum Commons, if and when introduced, would 
radically change the system of individual spectrum rights and rent creation and 
extraction that the sector had been predicated upon.  
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8.3 The Incumbent Advantage Explained 
 
The second structural outcome of the evolution of rents in the sector that we 
observed was the tendency towards consolidation in the sector. Despite 
attempts to increase competition in the sector by licensing new spectrum right 
owners and differences in rent distributions among the different producers 
during the different phases of the sectors evolution, the sector has become 
increasingly concentrated, with the top three TSPs in the sector accounting for 
72% in value terms (Figure 8.7). They also hold 45% of the resources in 2G 
spectrum (Figure 8.8). We have chosen to look at the 2G spectrum since 2G 
accounted for over 80% of TSP revenues in 2014.  
 
Figure 8.7: Growing Concentration in the Indian Market 
 
Source: Data from TRAI quarterly reports. 
 
The worldwide tendency to consolidation in the sector is explained by the 
economies of scale inherent in infrastructure investments and the network 
effects of telecommunication. Telecom requires a high up-front investment in 
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fixed infrastructure that benefits from economies of scale. Therefore larger 
service providers are able to be more competitive in terms of prices, more 
profitable, more able to take on debt, better able to make the large upfront 
investments required in infrastructure and better adapted to weather the 
longer time periods for payback.  
 
Figure 8.8: 2G Spectrum ownership of the Big 3.  
 
Source: TRAI data from March 2014. 
 
These were the same reasons that drove the fixed line service to be originally 
provided by a single monopoly player in the public sector. Mobile technology 
reduced the scale of the fixed cost investment somewhat and opened up the 
possibility of privatization but fixed costs (including the cost of spectrum) still 
comprise the largest proportion of costs facing the mobile telephony sector and 
therefore significant economies of scale still exist. The higher the consumer 
base, the greater the spread of fixed costs, the better is the margin and the 
ability of the firm to invest in infrastructure to provide a better network. The 
quality of the network is a tangible experience and operates at the level of the 
local market. Consumer buy-in in the sector is often at a local level driven by 
recommendation (interview with Mr. Gopalan, Airtel) and the greater the local 
consumer base for a brand the more likely that it will be the brand 
recommended. This virtuous cycle drives the agglomeration of a mobile brand.  
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Network effects also drive agglomeration in the sector. In closed networks, the 
larger the network, the greater is the consumer benefit of belonging to it. Since 
interconnection between networks is mandated, the telecom network is an 
open one, i.e. a person on one network can easily connect to consumers on any 
other network and in that sense, the size of the network one belongs to is 
irrelevant. However the cost of connecting to a person on another network 
maybe higher than the connection cost on the same network. Regulation on 
interconnect costs can and does narrow the gap between this cost differential, 
and over time regulation in India has reduced this cost differential 
considerably.  
 
The combined effects of network and economies of scale have driven 
consolidation of the top few players in India despite the higher levels of 
competition and fragmentation in India compared to other markets worldwide. 
The dissipation of rents through competition has paradoxically accelerated this 
process. Mobile telephony markets worldwide tend to have 3-4 profitable 
players. Fewer players would reduce the costs of coordination but would suffer 
the negatives of a lack of competition on pricing and innovation. More players 
would increase the costs of coordination between players and reduce the scale 
benefits that each player enjoys. In spite of India’s unusually high number of 8-
9 service providers per circle, the scale and network effects are visible in the 
consolidation and share gain of the three largest networks – Airtel, Vodafone 
and Idea. 
 
While these factors explain the consolidation of the top 3, it does not explain 
why these particular firms were able to establish themselves against the rest of 
the sector. I argue here that the consolidation of these particular TSPs can be 
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explained by looking at the sources of their rents in the early years of the 
sector’s evolution.  
 
Spectrum in the 900 MHz band that was allocated in first round of spectrum 
right creation in 1995 was physically superior (given prevalent technology) to 
the 1800 MHz spectrum that was distributed in the later allocation rounds in a 
predominantly voice-driven 2G market. The only group of producers who have 
remained relatively well-off through all the phases of development of the sector 
and who have managed to continuously consolidate their position in the sector 
are those that either were beneficiaries of this first round of spectrum 
allocation of the 900 MHz spectrum or, soon after, took over or merged with 
firms that were beneficiaries72. Their ownership of the 900 MHz spectrum and 
the terms under which they acquired these gave them a Ricardian rent 
advantage over the firms that entered later and were assigned 1800 MHz 
spectrum. It is this rent advantage that has allowed these firms to establish 
their market dominance and drive consolidation despite several subsequent 
spectrum right changes. To establish this hypothesis, the next section examines 
the basis for this Ricardian rent advantage and the effect it had on the TSPs’ 
profitability.  
 
While the rent advantage going to recipients of 900 MHz spectrum helped 
shape the structural outcomes in the market, these advantages are being 
eroded by changing technology. The subsequent section will examine the 
impact that technology changes have on this structural advantage that the top 3 
players have been able to build.  
 
                                                 
72
 The ruling that firms needed to pay market value to the state for administrative spectrum 
trading or sale was only relevant after market valuation of spectrum was established in the 2010 
auction.  
356 
 
 
8.3.1 Differential Rents 900 MHz vs. 1800 MHz 
 
Ricardian rent refers to the differential income that arises when different 
qualities of an input (land in the case of Ricardo’s analysis) are brought into 
play as a result of high levels of demand. For Ricardo, rent arises from returns 
to the indestructible and original properties of land that is of superior quality to 
land at the margin of cultivation. Due to the physical properties of spectrum 
and its suitability for the transmission of wireless signals, different frequencies 
of spectrum also have varying efficiency when it comes to their use for mobile 
telephony. Therefore higher ‘quality’ spectrum would afford a Ricardian rent 
over lower ‘quality’ spectrum, where the quality of the spectrum is determined 
by the spectral efficiency of the particular spectrum band and the costs of 
operating a network on it.  
 
Unlike land, the quality difference in these bands is non-contiguous because of 
the nature of international harmonization and handset development but 
differential quality and differential pricing of these bands are discernible by 
considering the costs and efficiency of use of each of these bands. This section 
argues that the differential qualities of the 900 MHz vs. 1800MHz bands gave 
rise to a differential rent, and access to this differential rent can explain the 
persistence of the original incumbent firms despite changes in rent 
distributions over the period of development of the sector.  
 
For ease of analysis, this calculation is restricted to the spectrum in the 900 
MHz and 1800 MHz bands for 2G GSM coverage. We analyse the data for voice 
calls alone (not data) to reflect the majority of usage over the period of study. 
While this is not the total of all rents made from spectrum during this period 
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by the 3 largest players, it is argued here that this differential rent was the 
critical determinant to market consolidation.  
 
The 1800 MHz spectrum differs from the 900 MHz band in terms of its physical 
properties. The physical properties of airwaves are such that at as frequency 
increases, the bandwidth (or the amount of data that the frequency can carry) 
increases but the range (or the distance that the waves carry) decreases. At very 
low frequencies, the bandwidth is low but the range is high and this 
relationship is reversed at higher frequencies. Thus 1800 MHz spectrum has a 
higher bandwidth than 900 MHz but a lower range. The difference in 
bandwidth between 900MHz and 1800MHz  has a lower impact on voice calls 
(since voice calls do not demand the bandwidth that data does) and is less 
material to the quality difference between the two spectrum bands. However 
the difference in range has a significant impact on the quality differential since 
900 MHz band spectrum has a range of 18 sq. metres against an average range 
of 8 sq. m for the 1800 MHz spectrum (range estimates from interview with Mr. 
Sheth, Airtel). In other words, a network using the 1800 MHz band of spectrum 
needs twice as many towers to cover the same area as one using 900 MHz 
spectrum. 
 
A rough costing of running a network on 900 MHz vs. 1800 MHz spectrum has 
been created in Appendix 20 (adapted from Tirumalai and Shah (2012: 17), 
Figure 22). It shows that the network operating costs on an 1800 MHz  network 
double because of the number of towers that are needed for the same coverage 
(>2x number of towers needed for 900 MHz spectrum). The total annual 
operating costs of the 1800 MHz business including amortization of spectrum 
costs remains at twice that of the 900 MHz network, despite the higher cost of 
900 MHz spectrum. However at the cost per voice call level the difference 
disappears since the higher number of towers can support a higher number of 
calls. This would be true however only when the network is capacity 
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constrained within a limited area. In other words, the difference would 
disappear in the crowded inner city spaces within the metros but in other parts 
of the network, the network is not pushed to capacity on voice calls alone. Here 
the cost per voice call metric is less relevant than the metric on total operating 
costs. Note that this analysis is not based on actual call volumes but on the 
carrying capacity of the line. The actual call volumes and revenue are also 
biased towards the 900 MHz spectrum as detailed below.  
 
The existence of 900 MHz spectrum also gives a clearly perceptible quality 
advantage in the network over 1800 MHz spectrum. The higher range of the 
signal results in a stronger signal and lower problems with connectivity. 
Increasing the number of towers for a network is difficult not just from a cost 
perspective, but also because getting permissions from local authorities for 
tower sites is a complicated bureaucratic process. Where the number of towers 
is less than optimal, customers are able to clearly perceive a difference in the 
network quality of a 900 MHz network over an 1800 MHz network. This is 
reflected in the fact that in almost all the circles, the TSP with the 900 MHz 
spectrum is the market leader (Appendix 21).  
 
The market share and revenue calculations made the following simplifying 
assumptions: 1. All revenue figures were Gross Revenue taken from TRAI Full 
Year 2014/15 Q1 Quarterly Report.  
2. Spectrum holdings of all TSPs were based on pre Feb 2014 auctions 
3. An operator was classified as a 900 MHz operator if it held > =4.4 MHz of 900 
in the circle, even if it also held 1800 MHz as a capacity layer above that. 80 - 
85% of the spectrum holding of these players is in the 900 MHz range. 
4. Revenue/MHz for 900 operators was calculated based on their total spectrum 
holdings in 2G i.e. 900 MHz + 1800 MHz.  
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5. MTNL/BSNL revenue and spectrum holdings were removed from the 
calculations since they received their significant spectrum tranches free and do 
not utilize them as effectively and so would skew the results. 
 
Table 8.3 summarizes the findings on the market share and revenue 
comparisons between 900 MHz and 1800 MHz spectrum.  The detailed tables 
are given in Appendix 21. 
 
Table 8.3: Revenue and Share Comparisons for 900 MHz operators vs. 
1800 MHz operators 
Circle Category Metros  A Circles B Circles C Circles All India 
900 Operators Revenue Share 57% 68% 66% 61% 65% 
900 Operators Revenue Share excl 
MTNL/BSNL 54% 63% 59% 54% 59% 
900 Operators Share of 900 + 1800 Spectrum 
excl MTNL/BSNL 34% 38% 32% 33% 34% 
% 900 Operators spectrum that is 1800 16% 19% 17% 15% 17% 
900 Operators excl MTNL rev/quarter/mhz 74 105 70 33 71 
1800 Operators excl MTNL rev/quarter/mhz 46 45 25 18 31 
            
900 Rev/Mhz:1800 Rev/Mhz Ratio 161% 231% 278% 186% 231% 
Source: Data from TRAI. Calculations authors own. 
 
The analysis shows that across all categories of markets, the operators that have 
900 MHz spectrum hold the position of market leadership, with market shares 
of around 60%. For this analysis we have considered a TSP as a 900 operator, if 
it holds 80% or more of its spectrum in the 900 MHz band in the circle, even if 
it has some 1800 MHz in addition, and as an 1800 operator otherwise. 
 
The revenue per MHz that the operators with 900MHz spectrum are able to 
achieve is also more than twice that of the revenue per MHz received by 1800 
operators.  This difference in efficiency of revenue generation of the 900 MHz is 
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the least in Metro markets, which is in line with our expectations from earlier 
discussions of the reduced advantage of 900 MHz over 1800 MHz in densely 
populated areas.  
 
Table 8.4 looks at these results only for the metros. These results are more 
diluted in the metros as in the more dense areas the advantage of 900 MHz 
band over 1800 MHz is overshadowed by the increased voice capacity of the 
1800 MHz network, and the advantage in the carrying distance of the 900 MHz 
signal is less perceptible in the densely populated areas. However, the 900 MHz 
operators still show a clear revenue advantage over the 1800 MHz operators in 
the market.  
 
Table 8.4: 900 vs. 1800 Revenue Shares - Metros 
  
 Revenue/Qtr./MHz 
  
Price paid as multiple of 
quarters revenue 
Circles 
900 
Operators 
1800 
Operators 
900 
Operators 
1800 
Operators 
Delhi 108 69 6.9 5.3 
Mumbai 69 58 8.2 4.7 
Kolkata 38 17 5.1 4.3 
Source: Authors own 
 
 
 
The calculations show the share and revenue advantages of the 900 MHz 
spectrum. Another way to evaluate whether there is a differential rent is to 
compare recent valuations of the two bands of spectrum. Price discovery 
through an auction is considered the most reliable estimate of true market 
value of the spectrum. Since there is no recent auction involving 900 MHz and 
1800 MHz spectrum across circles in India, this analysis will restrict itself to 
pricing for the two bands in the 3 metro cities of Delhi, Mumbai and Calcutta, 
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where the 2014 auction established recent market determined prices for 900 
MHz and 1800 MHz.  
 
Table 8.5 gives the prices of each of the spectrum bands for the metros73. Prices 
for the 900 and 1800 bands of spectrum are derived from the prices paid during 
the re-auction of expired metro licenses in February 2014. The prices for the 
2100 and 2300 bands of spectrum are based on the auctions in April/May 2010. 
These have been used as the most recent and therefore the best approximation 
of current market value of these bands. 
 
It can be seen from Table 8.5 that in all the metros 1800 MHz spectrum is less 
than half the price of 900 MHz spectrum. In fact the 900 MHz  spectrum band 
seems the most valuable across markets. There is also a difference in value 
across metros, with Delhi being the most expensive and Kolkata the least across 
spectrum bands, reflective of the size of market and earnings potential 
differences between metros. However our specific interest lies in the price of 
1800 MHz vs 900 MHz in individual circles, which is less than 50% of the 
latter’s price. This is indicative of a difference in the rent that the 900 MHz 
generates in comparison to the 1800.  
 
 
 
                                                 
73
 Note that Chennai has now been incorporated into the TN circle and is not licensed 
separately. The 3 metros considered therefore re Delhi, Mumbai and Kolkata. 
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Table 8.5  Price Per Mhz for spectrum in the metros74 
 
Rs Cr. Per MHz 900 1800 2100 2300 
Delhi 741 364 663 224 
Mumbai 563.1 272 649 229 
Cal 194.6 73 109 52 
 
 
Indexed to 900 Mhz pricing in the 
city 
  Per Mhz Index 900 1800 2100 2300 
Delhi 100% 49% 90% 30% 
Mumbai 100% 48% 115% 41% 
Cal 100% 38% 56% 27% 
 
Indexed to 900 Mhz pricing in Delhi 
  Per Mhz Index 900 1800 2100 2300 
Delhi 100% 49% 90% 30% 
Mumbai 76% 37% 88% 31% 
Cal 26% 10% 15% 7% 
 
 
Thus the 900 MHz spectrum seems to be twice as valuable in terms of market 
price and more than twice as efficient at generating revenue per megahertz. 
The costs of running a 900 MHz network on 2G were also seen to be 
significantly lower because of the lower need for tower infrastructure.  
 
                                                 
74
 900 and 1800 MHz prices based on Feb 2014 auction   
2100 and 2300 MHz prices based on April/May 2010 Auctions   
2300 MHz calculated based on 10 MHz as 20Mhz unpaired sold as TDD 
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Figure 8.9: Percentage Holding of 900 MHz Spectrum by Operator 
(2014) 
 
Source: Operator data. 
 
The majority of this 900 MHz spectrum is held by the top 3 operators – Airtel, 
Vodafone and Idea (Figure 8.9). The public sector firm (BSNL/MTNL) has the 
largest share of the spectrum but as was argued earlier, does not use it 
efficiently so has been removed from the analysis of differential rent creation so 
as not to bias the results. Airtel, Vodafone and Idea hold 55% of the spectrum. 
The only other private telecom service providers with any 900 MHz spectrum 
are Reliance and Aircel but their holdings are small.  
 
This entire 900 MHz spectrum had been assigned at the point of inception of 
the sector in 1995. Although the amounts bid on the initial auction were high, 
the subsequent change in pricing brought in by revenue sharing in NTP 1999 
meant that TSPs only paid around 30% of the original bid value for the 
spectrum. At the time of writing, most of this spectrum was administratively 
allocated spectrum and had not been purchased at an auction at market 
determined rates (except the metro spectrum we considered earlier). Thus the 
BSNL/MTNL, 32% 
Airtel, 22% 
Vodafone, 18% 
Idea, 15% 
Rcom/RTL, 9% 
Aircel, 5% 
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top three players, who had either won this spectrum with licenses in 1995 or 
had subsequently, acquired it when they bought over companies that had, are 
the only firms with significant, all-India holdings of 900 MHz spectrum that 
afforded them a rent over the lower quality 1800 MHz spectrum that was 
assigned after 1995. The pricing and assignment mechanism was such that a 
large part of this rent was not extracted by the state at spectrum sale but 
remained with the producers. The advantage that this gave the top 3 firms is 
briefly considered in the next section. 
 
While our analysis has focussed only on the GSM bands for comparability, the 
rent advantage of 900 MHz spectrum over 850 MHz spectrum used on CDMA 
was also high but arose from the lack of market development on CDMA, 
predicated on the poor development of the device ecosystem for CDMA 
devices.  
 
8.3.2 Translating the Rent into Economic Advantage:  
 
The above analysis showed that the revenue generated by 900 MHz was twice 
that of 1800 MHz. The costs of operating the 900 MHz network were also 
significantly lower since the number of towers needed to cover the same area is 
lower for a 900 MHz network. These advantages resulted in significant rents for 
the holders of the use rights on 900 MHz spectrum as evidenced from the fact 
that they were willing to pay twice the price of 1800 MHz spectrum for 900 
MHz spectrum in the market. However, each of these top 3 firms actually 
received their 900 MHz spectrum through administrative allocation and did 
not pay market price for it. In other words, the rents that the better quality 
spectrum afforded were not extracted by the state but left in the hands of the 
top three firms. Especially in the early years of development of the sector, this 
gave these firms a significant advantage over competitors.  
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The top 3 firms are the only market players other than the public sector 
incumbent to own substantial tranches of 900 MHz across a number of circles. 
Between them, the three hold the top two share positions in almost all markets. 
The other private sector holders of 900 MHz spectrum have very small amounts 
of it and do not have a national coverage with 900 MHz spectrum. Thus while 
their 900 MHz advantage may have given them market leadership in one 
market (e.g. Aircel in Tamil Nadu), they are unable to leverage this benefit at a 
pan-India level. The public sector incumbent, despite holding the largest 
spectrum allocations across all frequency bands in all circles (and not having 
paid for them) has been unable to translate this significant rent potential into 
market leadership. They are inefficient users of their spectrum and are a 
smaller market player across all circles.  
 
The rent advantage that the 900 MHz spectrum gave was crucial in the sectors 
development before 2010. It allowed the top three players to achieve higher 
margins, invest in infrastructure, aggressively compete on price and grow the 
market as we have discussed when we reviewed the evolution of the sector.  It 
has also allowed the top three players to have relatively stronger debt-equity 
ratios and the ability to withstand debt that has been critical to survival in this 
sector. Table 3.3, Figures 3.20, 3.21 in Chapter 3 demonstrated the profitability 
of the sector. The comparative profitability figures are unavailable for Vodafone 
since it only presents consolidated accounts for its worldwide business in its 
annual reports. However ROCE levels of 5-10% for Airtel and Idea in 2014 and 
debt equity ratios of 1.2 are probably similar to levels in Vodafone. While 
Return on Capital Employed (ROCE) levels have come down since 2012, the 
levels in the mid 2000’s were at a healthy 30-35% for the top three players and 
EBITDA margins were also in excess of 30%. This meant that the top three 
players were uniquely placed to invest in further spectrum and to build strong 
networks through improved infrastructure.  
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This explains in part why the continuous attempts by Reliance to break into the 
lucrative GSM market that we detailed in the Political Settlements analysis in 
the previous chapter failed to achieve the desired outcome. The huge rent 
advantage afforded by the early administrative allocation of 900 MHz spectrum 
was hard to overcome in the later stages of the sectors evolution despite later 
spectrum right allocations in Reliance’s favour. 
 
The rent advantage that the process of spectrum allocation allowed the 
producers to retain would be eroded when the licenses expire and the 
administratively allocated spectrum comes up for re-auction. The 
administrative spectrum will all be re-auctioned over the years 2014-2024. The 
first few years will see much of the 900 MHz spectrum go back to the auction 
block. Since this will be at market determined prices, much of the rent 
advantage of the 900 MHz spectrum will be extracted by the state with 
differential pricing if the auctions have the same characteristics as they do 
currently. The Ricardian rent advantage that the incumbents had is therefore 
likely to be reduced over the coming years. However the market dominance in 
terms of revenue share, subscriber base, brand dominance and infrastructure 
that the incumbents have managed to build up since the sector’s inception will 
be much harder to challenge. 
 
8.3.3 Impact of Technological Change on the Incumbent 
Advantage 
 
The incumbents have built up a considerable advantage in terms of market 
dominance, once that is not going to be easy to challenge at this stage, despite 
the likely extraction of the rent differential in the future by the state. However, 
this differential in Ricardian rent that the 900 MHz spectrum affords today is 
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itself under threat from changes in technology that change the efficiency 
advantage of 900 MHz spectrum over other ranges.  
 
First, the market itself is evolving towards greater data use on mobile 
technology. Data today accounts for nearly 20% of the revenue share of the top 
3 firms and is its fastest growing segment. As discussed earlier, the lack of fixed 
line infrastructure in India points to rapid growth of mobile data usage in the 
coming years. The range and signal quality advantages of 900 MHz vs. 1800 
MHz become less relevant for data and the 1800 MHz’s additional carrying 
capacity becomes more relevant. This squeezes the rent advantage of 900 MHz 
from both directions.  
 
More importantly, technology has made 4G technology usable on other parts of 
the spectrum range. 4G technology can be deployed on 1800 MHz spectrum 
and 850MHz spectrum in addition to the 2300 MHz spectrum that has been 
sold for 4G in the Indian market during the 2010 auction. This suddenly makes 
the 1800 MHz spectrum much more attractive. Firms with significant 1800 MHz 
spectrum now have a market advantage in already owning spectrum that can be 
re-farmed on 4G technologies. 900 MHz can be re-farmed on 3G technology 
but cannot be deployed on 4G at this stage. 850 MHz CDMA spectrum can also 
be re-farmed on 4G. This spectrum that has remained under-utilized on a 
slowly declining CMDA business could suddenly become very important in 
determining spectrum rents.  
 
These technological developments affect all the top 3 dominant players since 
the current strength of their spectrum portfolio lies in the spectrum that drives 
the 2G voice market but the growth areas of the market play to the weaknesses 
in their portfolio. In contrast the TSP who is likely to benefit most in terms of 
current spectrum portfolio holdings is Reliance Infocom, which holds spectrum 
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in the 850 MHz CDMA as well as the 1800 MHz GSM ranges. Reliance Infocom, 
run by the younger Ambani brother Anil Ambani, has therefore a perfectly 
complementary spectrum portfolio to Reliance Jio, run by the older Ambani 
brother, Mukesh Ambani. While their feud from 2006 was well documented as 
fierce, peace has been made between the warring brothers in the last couple of 
years. There is no talk of a merger between the two firms at the time of writing 
this thesis, but one cannot but speculate on its possibility since a combined 
Reliance’s spectrum portfolio would put it a very strong position to challenge 
the incumbents’ market dominance with the development of 4G.  
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8.4 Rents Dissipated to Consumers 
 
We have so far looked at spectrum right assignments in the sector that have 
created rents for the producers in the sector. In theory, the allocation of rents 
to service providers can have dynamic efficiency advantages for consumers if it 
results in investments and extensions of service provision in areas that would 
otherwise not have happened. However, some benefits can be more immediate, 
and can take the form of rent dissipation, by which we refer to the price setting 
by the regulator that results in some of the notional rents that could have been 
captured by the producers or the state being ‘dissipated’ to consumers. In fact, 
we find that this has rarely taken place as evidenced by our discussion of the 
evolution of the sector. The reason for this absence of rent dissipation to 
consumers is largely the lack of effectively consumer lobbying organisations in 
the India telecom sector. Consumer interests therefore do not feature as an 
organisational player in the sectoral political settlement. 
 
Through the TRAI Act (established in 1997 and amended in 2000), the regulator 
is authorized to ensure that some of the rents potentially created by policy are 
passed on to consumers. Theoretically, the means of passing benefits on to 
consumers include regulations on pricing, mandating services to regions or 
consumer groups that would not otherwise be profitable or mandating 
parameters on the quality of service provided. While the TRAI has been 
somewhat active on the latter, it has no authority on price setting and therefore 
the only interventions on price in the sector have come from politicians who 
have used price movements in the sector for political mileage and therefore 
indirectly constrained price setting. The following sections look briefly at 
India’s history of consumer rent dissipation before examining what could 
change this scenario.  
.  
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8.4.1 Price Setting 
 
While consumer prices have seen a steep fall over the last two decades of 
mobile telephony in India, this has been driven more by the competitive 
dynamics of the sector rather than the activity of consumer organizations 
contesting a share of the rents generated in the sector. When significant rent 
dissipation to consumers has happened, this has typically been driven by 
politicians seeking to generate mileage by emerging as consumer champions or 
TRAI’s intervention in response to a rising tide of complaints generated by 
individual consumers. 
 
While the TRAI is authorized to provide pricing guidelines, it practices 
“forbearance” (TRAI 2012a) when it comes to mandating exact prices, which it 
allows private TSPs to set as long as they fall within some overall guidelines and 
are not anti-competitive. TRAI mandates price caps on some services such as 
roaming charges. In other areas, it allows the TSPs to set prices but maintains a 
downward pressure on pricing though moral pressure on the TSPs and the 
threat of evaluation of pricing that seems anti-competitive. They also enact 
regulatory policies to drive costs of TSPs downwards, allowing competition to 
push pricing downwards.  
 
Political intervention in pricing has been driven by  politicians seeking political 
mileage from the act. They have typically used MTNL/BSNL as the “battering 
ram” for the implementation of the pricing change they propose in the 
knowledge that the competitive market will force the private sector to follow 
suit. However, as these organizations (MTNL/BSNL) have weakened in the 
market, their ability to play this role has been compromised.  
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Perhaps the most successful political intervention that enabled dissipation of 
rent to consumers was Dayanidhi Maran’s announcement, with much fanfare, 
of the One India Plan in 2006 (PTI 2006). Under this plan, from March 1, 2006, 
MTNL and BSNL would charge a maximum of Re. 1 per minute for a call to any 
place in India – prior to this announcement the average cost was Rs. 1.20 within 
a circle and Rs. 2.40 across circles. While MTNL/BSNL put up a brave face at 
the announcement, commentators at the time estimated that this move would 
lead to a Rs 4,000 -7000 cr. cut in their profitability (Purkayastha 2006). In part 
this was because to enable the One India plan interconnection rates (a 
significant source of revenue for the dominant fixed line players) were reduced 
by TRAI. This move by a significant market player at the time was a trigger to 
other competitors to drive down pricing and certainly played a role in rents 
being dissipated to the consumer. However, as the financial and market 
strength of BSNL/MTNL has weakened the ability of the politicians to use them 
as a way to drive dissipation of rents to the consumer has been compromised. 
For instance, on June 15th, 2015 the Telecom Minister announced that BSNL 
would make national roaming free but no significant national player followed.  
 
8.4.2 Service Parameters:  
 
TRAI, as part of its mandate has authority on tariffs, Quality of Service (call 
centre service and complaints as well as network parameters such as call drop 
rates), consumer protection and interconnection. In theory this mandate allows 
the state (through its regulatory arm, TRAI) to set conditions on performance 
of the private firms in the sector. Ideally the rents that the firms in the sector 
can access should be predicated on meeting these service provision conditions. 
If the rents were correctly calibrated, firms that invested in meeting the service 
conditions should still get some incremental rents to create the right 
incentives. This requires both a calibration of the rents with the conditions the 
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state wants to achieve as well as adequate monitoring and enforcement 
capacities on the part of the state. It would also require a distribution of power 
that would enable TRAI to enforce conditions, backed perhaps by strong 
consumer organizations. These background conditions were entirely missing.  
 
The most significant interventions by TRAI were more in the nature of ad hoc 
responses to consumer complaints. One example was the regulation on dual 
consent for Value Added Services (VAS) provided by TSPs in 2012/13. TSPs 
provide several VAS service such as caller tunes, astrology/cricket/Bollywood 
updates etc. Each of these services typically comes at a low unit cost. By 2012/13, 
TRAI received a growing number of complaints suggesting that TSPs were 
deducting payments (from the prepaid balance) for services customers did not 
subscribe to and hence the TRAI mandated a dual consent process (i.e. the 
customer had to confirm twice that they had opted for the service before the 
TSP could charge for it). This resulted in 2-3% loss of revenue to the industry 
(analyst estimates suggest VAS revenue dropped by 30-50% after this change 
and VAS accounted for 5-7% of industry revenue in 2012).  
 
Other than this, TRAI has focused largely on annual audits of Quality of Service 
(QoS) and Billing and Metering. QoS regulation was introduced in 2000 and 
subsequently revised in 2005 and 200975. The parameters are monitored 
through a three-pronged approach. The first is a Quarterly Performance Report, 
self-reported by service providers and published quarterly by TRAI. Network 
quality and customer satisfaction are also assessed independently by third party 
agencies quarterly and half-yearly respectively, and the results are published in 
newspapers and publicly available. TRAI also obtains Point of Interconnection 
(POI) congestion reports on monthly basis from the service providers. 
 
                                                 
75
 The parameters that are mandated are listed in Appendix 22. 
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By and large, the impact of these audits have been limited and restricted to 
press releases highlighting gaps. Interviews with TSP senior executives confirm 
that the extent to which this has resulted in significant benefits to customers 
has been marginal. There have also been sporadic regulatory interventions on 
tariff structures (e.g. Special Tariff Voucher guidelines in 2012) but these have 
been focused on marginal alterations in communication and disclosure to 
customers rather than an activist intervention to drive rent dissipation. 
 
8.4.3 Implications for the State’s Ability to Manage the Growth 
Process 
 
The theoretical framework of rents used in our analysis views the rents 
generated in the sector as potentially beneficial for sectoral development as 
long as they can be linked to overcoming specific market failures and 
contingent on performance. The sector’s high upfront investment costs, the 
regulatory uncertainty and the high risks of technological change have been 
challenges for the development of the sector at various phases in its evolution. 
This is evidenced by the rising levels of debt in the sector and knock-on effects 
of reduction in infrastructure investment. The Digital Divide between urban 
and rural India remains in spite of advances in mobile telephony. Rents that the 
sector generates could thus be used to target the market failures that constrain 
the extension of service provision to new areas and consumer groups.  
 
However, our discussion of the evolution of the sector driven by the powerful 
organizations that constitute the sectoral political settlement show that the 
state is unable to effectively manage and enforce any conditions on TSP 
performance. QoS conditions are not rigorously enforced and the regulator 
lacks the power to impose penalties on non-performance. Even the non-
performance by the public sector provider is condoned in spite of the hugely 
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inefficient use of the biggest portfolio of spectrum in a spectrum-starved sector. 
As we discussed in the theoretical analysis of the political settlement, the 
factional nature of the national and the sectoral political settlements makes the 
state unable to act authoritatively to manage rent conditions. Neither is the 
state able to prevent informal rent capture by the agencies in the PS. 
 
Under the circumstances, the state has come to extract all the available rent 
through formal means. Since it cannot identify and enforce the finer conditions 
that it would need to manage in a more nuanced regulatory structure that 
would allow the rents to be used to drive sectoral growth and consumer value, 
it has come to resort to a blunt instrument instead – maximising the formal 
extraction of sector rents through auctions. This is a sub-optimal solution as 
the effective management of the rents would give the sector the ability to 
overcome key market failures. However, the forces of the political settlement 
have rendered this option implausible and have driven the choice of formal 
rent extraction as a second-best strategy that claims to optimise efficiency. 
 
8.4.4 Can Consumer Impact on the Political Settlement Change? 
 
Social Media provides a platform for the mobilisation of dispersed consumer 
groups. A very recent example of this was the popular mobilisation of 
consumers protesting purported violations of net neutrality by telecom service 
providers in India. The mobilisation was effected entirely through social media 
and garnered 100,000 consumer signatures supporting the campaign. The 
campaign gained public exposure on mass media and forced the D0T to 
institute a committee to study the problem. While the phenomenon is still 
numerically small and urban-centric, it shows the possible future direction of 
technologically driven mobilisations.   
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8.5 Conclusions: 
 
The impact of the rent distributions driven by the sectoral political settlement 
has resulted in specific structural imperatives on the actions of the state and 
the big private sector firms that drive outcomes in the sector. We examined two 
key structural imperatives in this chapter.  
 
The first relates to the tendency by the state to drive artificial spectrum scarcity 
through policy in order to meet its financial objectives. This has an impact on 
future spectrum right allocations in the sector and private operators may need 
to re-examine their economic strategies as the spectrum auctions will put 
further pressure on their balance sheets through an increasing debt burden.  
 
The second is the persistence of the market dominance of the 3 biggest private 
sector operators in the sector, which we argued arose from the Ricardian 
differential rents they were able to access because of their early 
administratively-allocated spectrum rights in 900 MHz spectrum. This might 
well explain the inability of Reliance to achieve market significance despite 
several subsequent spectrum right allocations that it benefited from.  While 
that rent advantage might be eroded, it is arguable that the advantage in terms 
of market  share and infrastructure that the top 3 firms now have in the market 
will be hard to challenge. 
 
Finally, we also explored the lack of an effective consumer voice in the sectoral 
political settlement. As a result of this absence, the dissipation of rents in terms 
of immediate benefits to consumers in the sector has been sporadic and driven 
by occasional political interventions by populist politicians. I have argued that 
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in the absence of credible mechanisms to manage rents with appropriate 
conditions that can drive consumer value, the state has been pressured to 
revert to methods of formal rent extraction as the more efficient but sub-
optimal solution. 
 
However, this analysis has to be conditioned with the recognition that this is a 
sector with very fast-changing technologies. Technological changes that are 
already on the horizon of possibility could radically alter some critical 
technological characteristics of the sector defining rents and thereby affect 
outcomes significantly. Changes to both the pricing of spectrum and its 
allocation mechanisms or to the strengths of different firms’ spectrum 
portfolios will also reflect in a dynamically altered sectoral political settlement, 
as will the introduction of effective consumer voice through social media. 
 
These possible changes reiterate the need to view the sectoral PS as fluid and 
dynamic. Any future analysis of the sector’s evolution will need to consider the 
effect of these technological changes on the sectoral PS and the impact of the 
changed sectoral PS on policy direction in the sector.  
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Chapter 9: Conclusions 
 
 
“When we asked Pooh what the opposite of an Introduction was, he said "The 
what of a what?" which didn't help us as much as we had hoped, but luckily Owl 
kept his head and told us that the Opposite of an Introduction, my dear Pooh, 
was a Contradiction; and, as he is very good at long words, I am sure that that's 
what it is.”  
 
 A.A. Milne, The House at Pooh Corner. 
 
The growth of mobile telephony in India, in the two decades from its inception 
in 1995, is nothing short of remarkable. It has grown from a service that 
connected one in every 3400 Indians to one that today can boast of nearly 100% 
penetration. In a country the size of India, and with its socio-economic 
demographic, this is indicative of the value consumers perceive in the service 
and its importance in their day-to-day lives.  
 
The progress of the sector has been tremendous but tumultuous. The rapid 
growth has taken place in a context of significant policy and regulatory 
instability, and has been accompanied by high levels of corruption. The 
conventional explanations of this contradiction lie in failures of ‘Good 
Governance’, blaming bureaucratic incompetence, or more often, bureaucratic 
ineffectiveness to discipline political duplicity. Solutions to these have been 
sought in greater regulatory credibility and independence on the one hand and 
greater deregulation of spectrum rights in the sector on the other.  
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I have argued in this thesis that viewing licensing as the assignment of 
spectrum rights in the sector and therefore the policy –created income flows 
from those rights as rents allows us a more nuanced understanding of the 
motivations behind the creation of policy and the effectiveness of its outcomes. 
It can also explain why rent seeking of different forms is widespread in the 
sector, and why in the developing country context of India, it is not surprising 
that some of this rent seeking takes the form of corruption. The important 
question for policy is therefore not how to ensure the absence of rents but to 
recognize the inherent presence of rents in the sector, the possibility that some 
rent allocations and conditions can drive potentially progressive and value-
enhancing outcomes, so that regulation and rent-management can be explicitly 
designed to increase the probability of these positive outcomes.  
 
The telecom sector is particularly amenable to an analysis from the perspective 
of rents and rent seeking since access to the critical resource in the sector, 
spectrum, needs the creation of exclusive rights in order to be efficiently used. 
The prevailing view on the best method to assign these rights is through an 
auction that assigns the rights to those who value it the most and auctions are 
also believed to allow the true value of the right to be discovered through the 
market. This method of assignment also allows the state to extract through the 
price of the spectrum rights a significant share of the rents that the right has 
the potential to generate.  
 
India’s experience with auctions has been mixed. The first auction led to a 
significant over-pricing of spectrum as it did not take into account the 
regulatory failures induced by the public sector incumbent whose monopoly 
rents were being threatened. Once the state had found a way to take a share of 
the significant rents in the new sector, it then used administrative allocation to 
allocate rents and used a combination of formal and informal mechanisms to 
extract a share of these rents. This left a greater share of the rents in the hands 
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of the producers and drove spurts of rapid growth and investment, but also 
resulted in significant episodes of unproductive rent capture by the private 
sector and by political organisations and individuals. Since 2010, the state 
switched to an increasingly formal auction process that extracted much of the 
rents from service providers. This reduced informal rent extraction and 
corruption, but threatened the viability of the productive firms and had 
negative impacts on infrastructure investment and the emergence of new firms 
and capabilities.  
 
The potential of the Indian telecom market in terms of size and revenue makes 
spectrum rights in the sector very valuable. Due to particular structural features 
of the Indian telecom sector and due to policies that have at various points in 
the sectors evolution driven competition, the telecom market in India has 
become hyper-competitive and fragmented, with a greater number of service 
providers than in most other markets worldwide, but the lion’s share of the 
market has consolidated in the hands of the top three players.  The sector also 
operates at very high spectral efficiency as it has lower assignments of spectrum 
per operator than many other comparable markets across the world. The 
scarcity of spectrum is a result of legacy issues in the availability of free 
spectrum ranges as well as policy-driven regulation of spectrum availability. 
This combination of high levels of competition and low spectrum availability 
means that spectrum rights carry significant rents, and the allocation of these 
rights are therefore fraught with contestations over policies. This explains the 
high levels of rent seeking and corruption that have marked many phases of the 
sector’s evolution: the rights create significant rents and the rents are subject to 
contestation over their distribution.   
 
Thus the analysis of rent flows in the sector needs to be augmented with an 
exploration of the contests over the rent, the forces that influence these 
contests and their outcomes in order to robustly explore and explain the links 
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between rent seeking and policy. This thesis has used the analytical tool of 
Political Settlements to describe the relative power and interests of the set of 
organisations that seek to influence the distribution of rents in the sector. The 
sectoral political settlement during the period studied was volatile, reflecting 
the significant rents in the sector and the continuous entry of new 
organizations in the rent contests. The identity of these entrants and their 
relative power could in turn be better understood by looking at their origins in 
the broader society, and here higher level political settlements at the national 
or state level are important for understanding the relative power and 
capabilities not only of existing players in the sectoral political settlement, but 
also of the new entrants. Thus, changes in the sectoral political settlement were 
driven in part by changes in technology that changed the relative power of 
existing players, but also in part by the dynamics of new entry and 
contestations over rents by new firms and organizations who were powerful at 
the state or national level political settlements but had been left out of the rent 
distributions in the sector.    
 
This analysis developed the concept of a sectoral political settlement that 
operates at the sector-specific level but is affected  by higher level political 
settlements when the sectoral rents become high enough for organizations that 
are powerful at the national or state levels to begin to contest the sectoral 
political settlement. The value of mapping a sector-level political settlement is 
that it allows us to distinguish the sector specific power dynamics that drive  
policy at the sectoral level, but which clearly operates within the context of a 
national political settlement based on wider power structures that are normally 
not relevant for explaining or understanding sectoral dynamics. These 
interdependencies also explain why the political settlement at different levels 
can be fluid and dynamic as different parts of a political and economic system 
are always interacting. An application of this approach to other contexts may 
help to develop a better understanding of the interactions between national 
and sectoral political settlements.  
381 
 
 
Applying this dual analytical lens of rents and political settlements could thus 
help to explain both the influences at the sector level that shape policy, and 
how the rent outcomes of these policies can in turn shape the evolution of the 
sector by consolidating or disrupting the sectoral political settlement. The 
application of this framework has allowed the development of a revisionist 
reading of the evolution of the sector through six phases defined by significant 
shifts in the policies driving rent creation in the sector: 
 
1995-1999: Policy on rent creation was driven by a relatively powerful DoT, 
which dominated the sectoral political settlement at the time. Private sector 
organizations were weak, and the DoT determined the number of new entrants 
and spectrum pricing.  The excessive rent extraction by the state, and the 
private sector’s inexperience with the sector and its potential, as well the 
regulatory challenges it faced, led to the near collapse of the sector. The 
collapse threatened rent distributions to the state agencies, which were 
therefore forced to renegotiate the policies of rent distribution in order to 
enable sectoral development. However, spectrum rights issued at this stage 
gave the private sector incumbents a Ricardian rent advantage over all future 
entrants to the sector for several years.  
 
1999-2003: The growing potential for rents in the sector attracted private sector 
organisations that were powerful at the national level, but had been left out of 
the rent distributions in the sector. These organisations used a variety of 
methods to begin accessing the rents and influenced the state to formalise their 
access to the rents through policy revisions.  
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2003-2007: The sector went through a phase of relative stability in the sectoral 
political settlement that was conducive to growth. The power of the public 
sector incumbent waned and that of the private sector grew. The state, which 
shared in the growth of the rents going to the private sector, was content to 
leave rents on the table for the service providers as it drove investment and 
growth in the sector. However, the growing sector came to represent growing 
potential for rent generation, and the consolidation of the private sector 
incumbents based on their access to Ricardian rents made challenging their 
market dominance through formal regulatory routes more difficult.  
 
2007-2009: The evolution of the sectoral political settlement led to the 
hatching of an audacious attempt at rent capture by private sector firms who 
had become significantly more powerful in the sectoral political settlement. By 
developing coalitions with political organizations that were hungry for rents 
required for distribution to their political clients, and using new private firms as 
fronts that could develop informal and potentially corrupt links with these 
politicians and political organizations, a coalition of powerful interests drove a 
bid for rent capture on an unprecedented scale.  
 
2009-2012: The scale of the rent capture at the sectoral level threatened to 
destabilize the political settlement at the national level. Left unchallenged, the 
rent flows generated at the sectoral level would very likely have altered the 
balance of forces at the national level. In the event, powerful organizations at 
the national level intervened to reverse the spectrum rights allocations at issue. 
The sector was thrown into a state of uncertainty and flux until the sectoral 
political settlement re-stabilized with the exit of several of the new entrants. 
The older private sector incumbent firms from the earliest phase of the sectors 
development were able to weather the storm due to the advantage that the 20 
years of exclusive access to Ricardian rents that their initial allocations 
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provided them. But several new players suffered significant losses and the front 
organizations were wiped out.  
 
2012-2014: The regulatory and enforcement capacity of the state had by now 
been shown to be inadequate for allocating rights in such a way that rents 
could be left for service providers with effective conditions for investments and 
capacity building. Occasionally, rents for private service providers achieved 
very productive outcomes through serendipitous combinations of conditions, 
but rents for service providers were just as often wasted or informally extracted 
by political organizations. The state was unable to formally or informally 
impose deliberate value-enhancing conditions on private rent recipients. Its 
earlier strategies of leaving rents for private service providers was therefore 
coming under strong public pressure and scrutiny, even though in various 
phases and for accidental reasons these rents had driven much of the growth 
and investment in the sector. The pressure from powerful organizations at the 
national level who were threatened by the informal rent capture at the sectoral 
level now drove formal rent extraction by the state through spectrum auctions. 
At the same time, the pressure on margins and the emergence of spectrum-
hungry data transmission technologies have led to increasing spectrum scarcity 
in the sector. This fitted in with the state’s interests of maintaining an artificial 
scarcity of spectrum in order to maximise rent extraction. As a result, auctions 
resulted in increasing indebtedness of firms in the sector, and only the ones 
that had bolstered their balance sheets with the Ricardian rents from the early 
days of the sector were able to deal with these pressures in a viable manner. 
The result was a growing consolidation of the sector in the hands of three 
dominant private sector players. 
 
The sector is today poised at an interesting point it its evolution. The structural 
imperatives that drive the actions of the state, the service providers and the 
consumers are all susceptible to changes driven by technologies that are either 
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imminent possibilities or already commercially available. These changes could 
destabilize the current political settlement or even require a radical redefinition 
of the structure of the sector.  
 
A long period of Ricardian rents captured by Airtel, Vodafone and Idea based 
on their access to 900Mhz spectrum, gave these firms a powerful incumbent 
advantage as they were able to build up their balance sheets. Their early 
capture of this part of the spectrum was important because technologically, this 
spectrum was ideal for an industry where most of the revenue came from voice 
calls (rather than data) and from an increase in category penetration. As 
discussed earlier the 900Mhz spectrum was the most appropriate for indoor 
coverage and in rural areas. The sector in India today has grown to over $25B 
and industry revenue growth has slowed from the heady days of 30-50% per 
annum to a steady 10-12%. The metro and category A circles account for more 
than 50% of this revenue and these markets are largely urban. As internet 
adoption (largely on the mobile) grows, these markets will become even more 
significant since mobile internet adoption will happen in these markets first.  
As a result, the structural advantage in the sector will increasingly be driven by 
access to spectrum that enables a better mobile internet experience. It is in this 
context that technology is beginning to erode the incumbent advantage.  
 
4G or LTE (Long Term Evolution) is currently the most efficient way of 
delivering mobile internet. Across the globe, the largest deployments of 4G LTE 
have happened on 1800 MHz (Europe and China), 800 MHz (Korea), 700 MHz 
(US) or 2300 MHz (China). This has meant that the device ecosystem has 
evolved to support these spectrum bands. 800 MHz in India has largely been 
used for CDMA and 1800 MHz has so far been a “disadvantaged” part of the 
spectrum portfolio. The 900 MHz LTE ecosystem is very nascent, and as a 
result, very few devices support it. Hence, the valuable spectrum rights (and 
hence the contestation of rents) will move increasingly towards the hitherto 
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disadvantaged spectrum bands – CDMA 800 MHz, 1800 MHz and 2300 MHz. 
700 MHz (released by the ‘Digital Dividend’ of moving from analogue to digital 
TV) is expected to be auctioned in India in 2016 and will bring in an entirely 
new band of spectrum to the auction table. The incumbent advantage driven by 
superior voice spectrum (900 MHz) will therefore erode with time. 
 
The evolution of technology in the context of rapid growth of the mobile 
internet will also have an impact on the government’s ability to keep spectrum 
prices high, through limiting supply. It is estimated that close to 50% of the 
growth in smartphone sales from 2013-2018 will come from India and China. It 
is also forecasted that India will overtake the US and become the 2nd largest 
market for smartphones sales by 2016 (eMarketer.com). The impact this shift 
has had on the direction of technological research and innovation in the sector 
is significant.  
 
Earlier, R&D in the sector was driven by the needs of developed markets that 
were not spectrum constrained (by population densities and legacy issues) like 
the developing markets. Research was focussed on maximising speed rather 
than optimising bandwidths. Further, the smaller subscriber numbers meant 
that cost effective device ecosystems could only develop around one or two 
spectrum bandwidths. However, future market growth and significant volumes 
will come from spectrum hungry nations, who also have legacy issues 
constraining their choice of bandwidths. This has shifted to the focus of R&D in 
the sector to address these issues of constrained spectrum availability, and 
widen the band of spectrum for which cost effective device ecosystems can be 
developed.  
 
This has already resulted in device and chipset manufacturers investing in 
innovation that is focussed on spectrum bands available in India and China and 
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in optimising their devices to deal with spectrum scarce environments.  
Increasingly, the device ecosystem is being driven by spectrum available in 
India (and China), rather than in the US and Europe. Device and chipset 
manufacturers are, for example, beginning to build LTE devices that operate on 
700 MHz, as this spectrum band will have abundant supply in India after the 
2016 auction. Developments such as new generations of Qualcomm Snapdragon 
chipsets now support 4-5 bands of spectrum (vs. 2-3, historically) and this 
means handsets are increasingly able to support multiple bands and allow 
spectrum to be used more efficiently.  
 
R&D in the sector is also focussed on being able to use fragmented spectrum 
more effectively. Technologies are evolving that allow TSPs to provide LTE with 
as little as 1.5-3.5 MHz of spectrum against the current requirement of 5 MHz of 
contiguous spectrum.  In addition, more futuristic technologies such as “White 
Space” (technology that makes use of the gaps and guard bands between 
spectrum bands) are being developed by large players such as Microsoft. 
Spectrum commons based innovation (based on technologies that reduce the 
coordination costs between players and allowing multiple players to use the 
same bands) is also being funded to address the growing demand-supply gap in 
spectrum starved countries such as India. As more of this innovation is 
commercialised, spectrum constraints will become less significant. 
 
In addition to the technology innovation, the dominant political settlement is 
also beginning to focus on driving greater digital adoption – Digital India is one 
of the Modi government’s headline initiatives. As all of this innovation gathers 
pace and the government’s need to demonstrate progress on “democratisation 
of the internet” increases, the current bias of revenue extraction through 
limiting supply will become less sustainable and effective. 
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Perhaps the significant accelerator to the process of declining incumbent 
advantage, and the declining extraction bias as a result of the growth of the 
internet, is the re-entry of Reliance Industries (RIL) and Mukesh Ambani into 
telecommunications. Reliance Jio (a unit of RIL) has laid out an ambitious plan 
to build a 100% LTE based network across all of India and invested $14B in 
spectrum and infrastructure over the last 5 years. The fact that Jio is yet to 
launch is proof of the strength of the current incumbent advantage, but once 
launched, it could pose a significant threat to the dominance of the top 3 
players.  
 
RIL is, moreover, a significant force in the current national political settlement 
and is beginning to have a significant effect on the sectoral settlement. This is 
visible in the evolution of policy in the sector. Many industry observers believe 
that the 2014 reduction in inter-connect charges was influenced by Jio as it 
reduced the incumbent advantage. With the $14B investment, Jio has also 
created a step change in available capacity in the industry – the 2015 MVNO 
announcement by TRAI was a substantial change in direction on policy and will 
assist Jio in utilising this capacity (MVNO are Mobile Virtual Network 
Operators – players who do not invest in the network themselves but pay a 
variable cost to existing players, who have excess capacity). A week before the 
submission of this thesis, the new Spectrum Trading guidelines were approved 
by the Cabinet. These guidelines allow a TSP to sell part or all of its spectrum in 
a circle to another TSP, provided this spectrum has been purchased at an 
auction or the seller pays the government the market value pro-rated for the 
remaining term of the spectrum. These could be seen as policy moves that 
particularly benefit Reliance Jio in enabling its access of the complementary 
spectrum portfolio held by Reliance Infocom.   
Historically the consolidation of firms in the sector has been limited by two 
factors – the fact that the seller in any such consolidation is likely to have 
significant debt on their balance sheets, well in excess of the value of their 
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spectrum, and the fact that the M & A guidelines required that any 
administrative spectrum sold on had to be liberalised by paying the market 
determined price to the government pro-rated for the remaining term of the 
spectrum. In ensuring that the spectrum still has to be liberalised, the Trading 
guidelines ensure that the government still extracts revenue and is not seen as 
biased. However, in allowing some or all of the spectrum in a circle to be sold 
the guidelines allow Jio to overcome the last element of its structural 
disadvantage – access to low frequency spectrum to support voice on its service. 
Research analysts speculate that, given these changes, R Com is likely to 
liberalise its CDMA spectrum and then trade this with Jio so that the latter can 
use this for providing voice services. The Ambani brothers, who appear to have 
reconciled differences since 2010 will now have a way to cross-utilize the 
complementary bands of spectrum held across the two firms. This will make 
Reliance Jio a significant organizational player in the sectoral political 
settlement, enabling it to deploy its significant power at the national level.  
 
What is clear is that the technological evolution supporting moves towards 
greater internet consumption and LTE will have a significant impact on the 
structure of the industry over the next 5-10 years. The analytical framework of 
rents and political settlements will remain significant in providing a framework 
for analysing the possible ways in which new structures of spectrum rights will 
influence the creation and allocation of rents. We can already see that there 
will be a greater bias towards spectrum that supports data revenue. We can also 
predict that organizations and influences that are powerful at the level of the 
national political settlement (like RIL, or the Modi government’s support for 
Digital India) will have an impact in changing the sectoral political settlement 
over time and driving rent policy in ways that are advantageous to them. 
 
The last twenty years of the evolution of this industry in India provides very 
useful policy learnings  through the lens of rents and political settlements. 
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Firstly, the sector has had an independent regulator (TRAI) for fifteen of these 
twenty years. The policy recommendation that most analysts of the sector focus 
on has been the importance of an independent regulator. The political 
settlements analysis shows why there has been rampant rent capture 
throughout much of this period, and in particular during 2007-09 when the 
sectoral political settlement was out of alignment with the national political 
settlement. While independent regulation may be desirable, an understanding 
of the underlying political settlement shows that it is unlikely to occur simply 
by changing formal institutional structures. Regulation did become more 
effective after this period, but only because the national power structure was 
inimical to policy that left rents in the hands of incumbents in the sector. The 
latter were not powerful enough at the national level when the contestation 
shifted to that level. The more profound point is that this was a particular type 
of regulation, one that extracted rents to the state through formal auctions and 
enforced rules consistent with this rent structure. A regulatory regime that 
could deploy rents within the sector for a public purpose did not emerge.  
 
Secondly, and related to the previous point, the ability of the state to manage 
nuanced policies and regulations that allows it to allocate rents purposively and 
to enforce performance conditions on the sector to drive growth appears to be 
low. Under such conditions, a powerful coalition of forces at that national level 
has enforced the maximization of rent extraction and the enforcement of 
market-supporting regulation. However, this has had a negative impact on the 
sector’s ability to invest, especially in the context of significant technological 
change, and has instead opened up the possibility of the emergence of a tiny 
number of players with significant holding power at the sectoral level. An 
interesting and potentially worrying possibility over the next period is the 
alignment of holding power at the national and sectoral level supporting the 
dominance of a very small number of private sector players. If technological 
changes reduce the value of the spectrum, the state will in any case not have 
the economic ability to extract significant rents through auctions and 
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regulators may well lack the power at the national political settlement to 
effectively regulate prices and conditions in a sector dominated by players who 
are powerful at the national level. This is an extreme scenario, but some 
directions of technological and political evolution may lead in that direction. If 
so, the political settlement analysis can forewarn other constituencies of the 
importance of organizing consumer and political coalitions to check such 
possibilities.  
 
The traditional, simplistic view of resource allocation tends to view auctions as 
the guarantor of efficient resource allocation. This is based on a simplistic 
underlying model of a market that ignores the possibility that dynamic 
efficiency may require a state to have the ability to leave rents for private 
players and manage the conditions of rent allocation through an effective 
regulation of conditions attached to these rents. Auctions as a tool for efficient 
resource allocation assume that full rent extraction by the state is necessary and 
sufficient for static and dynamic efficiency. When auctions have been used in 
India, in line with a belief that they are the most efficient way to allocate 
resources, TSP viability and consequently the quality of service and 
infrastructure expansion has actually suffered. The most stable, high growth 
and high investment phases have been when the key private organizations and 
state agencies relevant at the levels of the sectoral and national political 
settlements have had access to rents in the sector, and the characteristics of the 
political settlements created opportunities and compulsions for investments 
and expansion. If the state is serious about its Digital India initiative, it may 
need to review its spectrum assignment policies to ensure that rents can be 
effectively used to drive growth in the sector under evolving technological 
conditions. 
 
Finally, if there is one thing that this thesis establishes, it is that this is a sector 
that is transforming with great rapidity. Changes are driven by technology and 
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these changes are reflected in shifting power alignments within the sector. 
While this thesis has characterized the growth of the sector in the last twenty 
years using a specific analytical lens, the value of the use rights, the rent 
distributions and the underlying political settlements are all likely to change 
radically over time. The usefulness of the analytical framework is that it 
provides a robust way to continue to analyse these changing trends and to 
provide a framework for policy discussions that can incorporate the 
technological, economic and political aspects of policy feasibility. This is a more 
complete and robust way to explain policy evolution in dynamic contexts.    
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Appendix 1: List of TSPs and Area of Operation 
 
Number of service providers (GSM and CDMA) operating as on 30th Sept 2014 
 
 
Source: TRAI (2014b)Quarterly Report July-Sept 2014. 
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Appendix 2: Cost Break ups of TSPs 
(All costs expressed as a percentage of Gross 
Revenue)       
  Airtel Idea Vodafone 
Gross revenue (Rs. Million)   265189 356101 
% 100 100 100 
Revenue Splits       
Voice 77 83 77 
                   Outgoing  61     
                    Incoming 16     
Data 16 10 9 
Value Added Services (VAS) 7 7 14 
        
Cost Breakdown       
Total Operating expenses 62 69   
Network expense and outsourcing cost 26 25   
License fee and WPC charges 12 11   
Roaming and Access charges i.e. interconnect 11 16   
Sales and Distribution 4 7   
Advertising and business promotion 1 2   
Other overheads 8 7   
        
EBITDA Margin 38 31 30 
        
Depreciation and Amortization 14 17   
        
EBIT Margin 24 14   
        
Interest 4 3   
        
PBT 20 11   
        
Tax 4 4   
        
PAT 16 7   
        
CAPEX (%of gross revenue) 15 17 13 
SPECTRUM LICENSE PURCHASE (Rs. Million)   104,242   
        
Source: Company Annual Reports 2013-14. Note Vodafone does not report India results 
separately. 
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Appendix 3: List of Interviewees 
  
Organisation Contact Person Designation Topics Covered 
Mercer Oliver 
Wyman, New 
York 
Mr. Laurent 
Bensousson 
Managing Partner, 
Telecoms 
Telecom Industry structure 
worldwide, Profitability in 
telecoms, Spectrum valuation 
and auctions. 
Analysis Mason, 
Singapore 
Mr. Amrish 
Kacker 
Head, Operator 
Strategy 
Consulting,  Asia–
Pacific 
Network technology, spectrum 
scarcity, industry structure, 
future directions 
 Mr. VS 
Hariharan 
Private Equity 
Investor 
Political Settlement in Indian 
telecom, financial performance 
of Indian telecom 
Airtel, India Mr. Karthik 
Sheth 
Senior Manager ( 
Data and Devices) 
Network technology, spectrum 
scarcity 
Assocham Mr. TV 
Ramachandran 
 
Ex-Regulatory 
Director, Vodafone 
India, Ex-Director 
General COAI 
History of Indian Telecom 
Sector, Regulatory and policy 
features, political settlements 
in Indian Telecom 
TRAI Mr. Arvind 
Kumar 
Advisor (Network, 
Spectrum and 
Licensing) 
History of Indian Telecom 
Sector, Regulatory issues, 
spectrum scarcity, telecom 
industry structure, growth 
challenges for the sector 
Vodafone India Ms. Anjali Hans VP, Policy and 
Regulation 
Regulatory history of Indian 
telecom, political settlement 
features. 
COAI Mr. Rajan 
Matthews 
Director General Industry structure, challenges 
facing TSPs, spectrum auctions  
and policy, growth challenges 
for the sector  
Airtel, India Mr. Ravi Gandhi Chief Regulatory 
Officer (Policy) 
History of the sector, network 
economics and pricing, 
regulatory and policy issues in 
spectrum, auctions, spectrum 
scarcity, political settlement 
features 
Airtel India Mr. Srinivasan 
Gopalan 
Director 
(Marketing) 
Network Technology, 
Regulatory Policy, Spectrum 
scarcity, industry structure and 
competition 
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Diamond Cluster 
Consulting 
Mr. Vinod Nair Partner Telecom structure dynamics, 
regulatory history, political 
settlement features 
Edelweiss Equity 
Analysis 
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Appendix 4: List of Telecom Ministers 1990-2014 
 
 
Note:  
1. This only lists the telecom ministers between 1990 and 2014. 
2. All Telecom Ministers important for this thesis have been marked using a bold 
typeface. 
 
Source:  data from http://www.dot.gov.in/about-us/former-ministers , Department of 
Telecommunications. Table authors own. 
 
 
  
Sno. Telecom Minister From To Years Ruling Party Prime Minister From To Years
63 Kapil Sibal 15-Nov-10 26-May-14 3.5 yrs
62 Manmohan Singh 15-Nov-10 15-Nov-10 1 day
61 A. Raja 16-May-07 14-Nov-10 3.5 Yrs
60 Dayanidhi Maran 23-May-04 15-May-07 3.0 yrs
59 Arun Shourie 29-Jan-03 22-May-04 1.4 yrs
58 Pramod Mahajan 2-Sep-01 28-Jan-03 1.40 yrs
57 Ram Bilas Paswan 13-Oct-99 1-Nov-01 1.0 yr
56 Atal Behari Vajpayee 8-Jun-99 13-Oct-99 4 mths
55 Jagmohan 6-Dec-98 8-Jun-99 6 mths
54 Atal Behari Vajpayee 11-Oct-98 6-Dec-98 2 mths
53 Ms. Sushma Swaraj 20-Apr-98 11-Oct-98 6 mths
52 Atal Behari Vajpayee 19-Apr-98 20-Apr-98 1 day
51 Buta Singh 21-Mar-98 19-Apr-98 1 mth
50 Atal Behari Vajpayee 19-Mar-98 21-Mar-98 2 days
Independent charge to 
Ministers of State
49 B Beni Prasad Verma 10-Jul-96 19-Mar-98 1.9 yrs Janata Dal I.K. Gujral 21-Apr-97 19-Mar-98 1 yr
49 A Beni Prasad Verma 1-Jun-96 10-Jul-96 1.1 mth
Janata Dal 
(S) H.D. Deve Gowda 1-Jun-96 21-Apr-97 1 yr
48 Atal Behari Vajpayee 16-May-96 1-Jun-96 BJP
Atal Behari 
Vajpayee 16-May-96 1-Jun-96 16 days
47 Sukh Ram 17-Jan-93 16-May-96 3.5 yrs CONGRESS P.V. Narasimha Rao 21-Jun-91 16-May-96 5 years
46 Rajesh Pilot 21-Jun-91 17-Jan-93 1.5 yrs
45 Dr. Sanjay Singh 22-Nov-90 21-Jun-91 7 mths Janata Dal Chandra Shekhar 10/Nov/90 21-Jun-91 7 mths
44 Chandra Shekhar 10-Nov-90 22-Nov-90 12 days
Atal Behari 
Vajpayee     ( Re-
elected: 13 Oct 1999)
19-Mar-98 22-May-04 6.2 yearsBJP
CONGRESS 22-May-04 26-May-14
10.0 
years
Manmohan Singh   
( Re-elected: 22 
May 2009)
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Appendix 5: International Tele-density Comparisons in 1996 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Dash 2006, p.20,  
Citing: TRAI, Consultation Paper No.99/1 
  
Country Per Capita GDP 
Year 1995 US$ 
Teledensity Year 
1996 
 
India 
Indonesia 
Philippines 
Brazil 
Chile 
Malaysia 
Spain 
Australia 
UK 
Germany 
France 
USA 
 
365 
1038 
1098 
4591 
4714 
4339 
14260 
19210 
18975 
29489 
26496 
27569 
 
1.54 
2.13 
2.49 
9.57 
15.59 
18.32 
39.25 
51.88 
52.76 
53.84 
56.36 
63.99 
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Appendix 6: Winners of Duopoly Licenses in 1995 
 
Service Area Operator 1 Operator 2 
 Mumbai BPL Telecom (Now Loop Mobile) Maxtouch ( Now Vodafone) 
Delhi Bharti Cellular (Now Bharti Airtel) Sterling (Now Vodafone) 
Calcutta Usha Martin (Now Vodafone) Modi Telstra (Now Bharti Airtel) 
Chennai SkyCell (Now Bharti Airtel) RPG Cellular (Now Aircel) 
AP J.T. Mobile (Now Airtel) TATA cellular (Now IDEA) 
Gujarat Birla AT&T (Now IDEA) Fascel (Now Vodafone) 
Karnataka Modicom (Now Spice Comm.) J.T. Mobile (Now Airtel) 
Maharashtra Birla AT&T (Now IDEA) BPL Cellular (Now Vodafone) 
Tamil Nadu BPL Cellular (Now Vodafone) Srinivas Cellcom (Now Aircel) 
Haryana Aircel Digilink (Now Vodafone) Escotel (Now IDEA) 
Kerala BPL Cellular (Now Vodafone) Escotel (Now IDEA) 
 M.P. RPG Cellcom (Now IDEA) Reliance Telecom 
Punjab Modicom (Now Spice Comm.) JT Mobile (Now Airtel) 
Rajasthan Aircel Digilink (Now Vodafone) Hexacom (Now Airtel) 
UP(E) Koshika Telecom (later cancelled) Aircel Digilink (Now Vodafone) 
UP(W) Escotel (Now IDEA) Koshika Telecom 
 W.B. Reliance Telecom - 
Assam Reliance Telecom - 
Bihar Koshika Telecom (later  cancelled) Reliance Telecom 
H.P. Bharti Telenet (Now Airtel) Reliance Telecom 
Orissa Koshika Telecom (later cancelled) Reliance Telecom 
North East Hexacom (Now Airtel) Reliance Telecom 
 
Source: Service Provider information  
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Appendix 7: Summary of Licenses issued until 1999 
 
Company Wireless Wireline Total 
 Metro A B C A B  
Reliance   2 5 1  8 
Rai 1  2 2   5 
Sterling 1 1 3    5 
BPL 1 2 1    5 
Bharti 1   1  1 3 
Escorts    3   3 
Modi 1 1 1    3 
Parasurampur
ias 
 2 1    3 
RPG 1  1  1  3 
Shyam   1 1  1 3 
Birla  2     2 
Tata  1   1  2 
Essar      1 1 
Hutchison 1      1 
Maloo-Nahata  1     1 
Ispat     1  1 
Thapar 1      1 
TOTAL 8 10 15 9 4 3 49 
 
Source: Desai (2006: 80) 
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Appendix 8: The Health of the Indian Telecom Sector in 1998 
 
BICP Study 1998 
Telecom Economics in the Metros 
Firm Network 
Operating 
Costs Depreciation Interest Loss 
Hutch Mumbai 19% 47% 14% 20% 32% 
BPL Mumbai 16% 46% 10% 27% 19% 
RPG Chennai 9% 40% 26% 26% 56% 
Skycell Chennai 13% 34% 27% 27% 60% 
 
Of the 13 operating firms in the telecom space studied, 4 had negative IRRs and 
4 had IRRs of less than 10%.  
 
ICICI Study (1998) 
1. Of the 22 operators studied, only one (Bharti Telecom) made a profit in 
1997-98. 
2. 17% of cellular subscribers made no calls at all and 37% of subscribers 
had a monthly bill of less than Rs. 500.  
3. License Structure: Rs.5000/line/year was charged as minimum license 
fee from Year 4 of operation but the maximum that could be charged by 
the firm to the consumers as license fees was Rs. 1870/year. In other 
words, 60% of license costs for firms had to be made from call charges.   
By 1997, 6 cellular operators were in default of their license service 
obligations. By 1998, 8 cellular operators were in default.  
   
 
Source: Desai (2006) p.80-84. 
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Appendix 9: Winner of the Single License per Circle in 2001  
 
 
S No. Circle Name 
Price of spectrum in 2001 
(for 20 years) ( In Crores) 
Operator 
1  Delhi   170.7 Birla AT & T (now Idea) 
2  Kolkata  78.01 Reliance 
3  A.P.  103.01 Hutchison (now Vodafone) 
4  H.P  1.1 ESCOTEL (now Idea) 
5  NE  2   
6  Punjab  151.75 ESCOTEL (now Idea) 
7  Karnataka  206.83 Hutchison (now Vodafone) 
8  Rajasthan  32.25 ESCOTEL (now Idea) 
9  Gujarat  109.01 Bharti Airtel 
10  Haryana  21.46 Bharti Airtel 
11  Kerala  40.54 Bharti Airtel 
12  MP  17.45 Bharti Airtel 
13  Maharashtra  189 Bharti Airtel 
14  Mumbai  203.66 Bharti Airtel 
15  TN in CHN  233 Bharti Airtel/Hutchison 
16  UP(W)  30.55 Bharti Airtel 
17  Assam  5   
18  Bihar  10   
19  J & K  2   
20  Orissa  5   
21  UP (East)  45.25 ESCOTEL (now Idea) 
22  WB  1   
   Total  1,658.57   
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Appendix 10: Winners of Licenses in 2008 
 
Company Telecom regions 
# of 
licenses 
Remarks 
Adonis Projects 
Haryana, Himachal 
Pradesh, Jammu & 
Kashmir, Punjab, 
Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh 
(East) 
6 
Adonis Projects, Nahan 
Properties, Aska Projects, 
Volga Properties, Azare 
Properties & Hudson 
Properties were acquired by 
Unitech. 
Since Unitech Infrastructure 
and Unitech Builders & 
Estates were subsidiaries of 
Unitech Group, in 2008 
Unitech had 22 2G licenses.  
Later that year, Telenor 
bought a majority share in 
the telecom company from 
the Unitech Group. 
Nahan Properties 
Assam, Bihar, North 
East, Orissa, Uttar 
Pradesh (east), West 
Bengal 
6 
Aska Projects 
Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, 
Karnataka 
3 
Volga Properties 
Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, 
Maharashtra 
3 
Azure Properties Kolkata 1 
Hudson 
Properties 
Delhi 1 
Unitech Builders 
& Estates 
Tamil Nadu (including 
Chennai) 
1 
Unitech 
Infrastructures 
Mumbai 1 
Loop Telecom  
Bihar, Gujarat, Himachal 
Pradesh, Kerala, Kolkata, 
Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttar 
Pradesh, West Bengal, 
Andhra Pradesh, Delhi, 
Haryana, Karnataka, 
Maharashtra, 
Odisha(Orissa), Tamil 
Nadu (including 
Chennai), Assam, Jammu 
& Kashmir, Madhya 
Pradesh 
 
 
 
 
 
21 
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Datacom 
Solutions 
Andhra Pradesh, Assam, 
Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, 
Himachal Pradesh, 
Jammu & Kashmir, 
Karnataka, Kerala, 
Kolkata, Madhya 
Pradesh, Maharashtra, 
Odisha, Rajasthan, Tamil 
Nadu (including 
Chennai), Uttar Pradesh, 
West Bengal, Delhi, 
Mumbai 
21 
Operates as Videocon 
Telecom 
Shyam Telelink 
Madhya Pradesh, Kerala, 
Kolkata, Punjab, Uttar 
Pradesh, West Bengal, 
Andhra Pradesh, Delhi, 
Haryana, Karnataka, 
Maharashtra, Odisha, 
Tamil Nadu (including 
Chennai), Assam, Jammu 
& Kashmir, North East 
17 
Shyam Telelink & Shyani 
Telelink have a combined 
21 licenses. In late 2008 
Russia-based Sistema 
bought a majority share in 
the company, which now 
operates as MTS India. 
Shyani Telelink 
Mumbai, Bihar, Gujarat, 
Himachal Pradesh 
4 
Swan Telecom 
Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, 
Haryana, Karnataka, 
Kerala, Maharashtra, 
Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil 
Nadu (including 
Chennai), Uttar Pradesh, 
Delhi, Mumbai 
13 
In 2008, Swan merged with 
Allianz Infratech; late in the 
year Abu Dhabi's Etisalat 
bought about 45 percent of 
the company, renaming it 
Etisalat DB Telecom. 
Allianz Infratech Bihar, Madhya Pradesh 2 
Idea Cellular  
Assam, Punjab, 
Karnataka, Jammu and 
Kashmir, North East, 
Kolkata, West Bengal, 
Odisha(Orissa), Tamil 
Nadu (including Chennai) 
9 
Since Idea Cellular bought 
Spice Communications in 
2008 for ₹27 billion 
(US$410 million), of the 
122 spectrum licenses sold 
in 2008 Idea owned 13 Spice 
Communications 
Delhi, Andhra Pradesh, 
Haryana, Maharashtra 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
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S Tel 
Assam, Jammu and 
Kashmir, Odisha(Orissa), 
North East, Bihar, 
Himachal Pradesh 
6 
In January 2009, Bahrain 
Telecommunications agreed 
to buy 49 percent of S Tel 
for $225 million. C 
Sivasankaran owns the 
remaining . In May 2009, 
Sahara Group bought an 
11.7-percent share in S Tel 
Tata 
Teleservices  
Jammu and Kashmir, 
Assam, North East 
3 
In late 2008 Tata sold a 26-
percent share to the NTT 
DoCoMo for about ₹130.7 
billion (US$2.0 billion), or 
an enterprise value of 
₹502.69 billion 
(US$7.6 billion).  
 
Source: Built from various news reports from the period and verified with telecom sector 
consultants and service providers. The TRAI and DoT websites do not provide the list of 
awarded licenses in 2008 as they have subsequently been cancelled. 
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Appendix 11: Over-Crowded Market in 2008 
 
 
 
Horizontal Axis: Number of Licensed Operators in the market 
Note: Includes operators for whom spectrum was assigned or promised but had 
not begun operation. 
Operators with cdma and gsm are counted as two operators. 
Source: (Lewin 2008) p.7, built from data from COAI and media reports. Available from GSMA 
website. 
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Appendix 12: Increasing Competition 2010 
 
Service Providers 
Licenses 
Held Licenses Held 
 
Q4 2005 Q1 2010 
BSNL/MTNL 23 23 
Bharti 23 23 
Reliance 23 23 
Tata Teleservices 20 23 
Hutch/ Vodafone 
Essar 13 23 
Aircel 9 18 
Idea 8 23 
BPL / Loop 4 1 
Spice 2 
 HFCL 1 1 
Shyam 1 11 
Escorts 3 
 Unitech 0 8 
S Tel 0 3 
Videocon 0 2 
Etisalat 0 9 
Total 130 191 
 
Note: Players in Red: sold stake to Idea Players in Blue: new entrants to the market 
 
No. of 
Players 
No. of 
Players 
All India 3 6 
15-20 circles 1 1 
10-15 circles 1 1 
5-10 circles 2 2 
< 5 circles 5 4 
Number of players 12 14 
Circles/ player 10.8 13.6 
Players/circle 5.7 8.3 
 
Source: (Telegeography 2010), TRAI data 
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Appendix 13: License Winners in 2010 
 
Circle wise and operator wise spectrum allocation in April/May 2010 3G/BWA Auction 
 
 
  
Service Areas
Amount
Paid in `
Crs.
Airtel Vodafone Reliance Idea Tata Aircel Stel 
BSNL/
MTNL
Delhi 3,316.93 3G 3G 3G         3G
Mumbai 3,247.07 3G 3G 3G         3G
Maharashta 1,257.82   3G   3G 3G     3G
Gujarat 1,076.06   3G   3G 3G     3G
Andra Pradesh 1,373.14 3G     3G   3G   3G
Karnataka 1,579.91 3G       3G 3G   3G
Tamil Nadu 1,464.94 3G 3G       3G   3G
Kolkata 544.26   3G 3G     3G   3G
Kerala 312.48       3G 3G 3G   3G
Punjab 322.01     3G 3G 3G 3G   3G
Haryana 222.58   3G   3G 3G     3G
UP (E) 364.57   3G   3G   3G   3G
UP (W) 514.04 3G     3G 3G     3G
Rajasthan 321.03 3G   3G   3G     3G
Madhya Pradesh 258.36     3G 3G 3G     3G
West Bengal 123.63 3G 3G 3G     3G   3G
Himacha Pradesh 37.23 3G   3G 3G     3G 3G
Bihar 203.46 3G   3G     3G 3G 3G
Orissa 96.98     3G     3G 3G 3G
Assam 41.48 3G   3G     3G   3G
North East  42.3 3G   3G     3G   3G
Jammu & Kashmir 30.3 3G   3G 3G   3G   3G
13 9 13 11 9 13 3 22
Total Amount in `
Crs.
16,750.58 12,295.46 11,617.86 8,585.04 5,768.59 5,864.29 6,499.46 337.67 16,750.58
Total Amount in `
Crs.
67,718.95
3G Spectrum Allocation 
3G Spectrum allocation in
circles
408 
 
 
 
Note: Infotel, who won BWA spectrum in all circles, has been rebranded 
Reliance JIO 
 
Source: DoT website, verified with Service provider information 
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Appendix 14: License winners in 2012 
Circle wise and operator wise spectrum allocation in Nov 2012 Auction (1800 MHz) 
Service Area 
Provisional Winning 
Price per block (in Rs. 
Cr.) 
Airtel Idea Telenor Vodafone Videocon 
Andhra Pradesh  286.91 
               
-    
               
-    
4                -                   -    
Assam  8.67 1 4                -    2                -    
Bihar  46.43 
               
-    
1 4 2 4 
Delhi  0 
               
-    
               
-    
               -                   -                   -    
Gujarat  224.84 
               
-    
               
-    
4                -    4 
Haryana  46.52 
               
-    
               
-    
               -    2 4 
Himachal 
Pradesh  
7.78 
               
-    
               
-    
               -    1                -    
Jammu & 
Kashmir  
6.33 
               
-    
4                -    2                -    
Karnataka  0 
               
-    
               
-    
               -                   -                   -    
Kerala  65.3 
               
-    
               
-    
               -    1                -    
Kolkata  113.72 
               
-    
4                -                   -                   -    
Madhya Pradesh  53.99 
               
-    
               
-    
               -    2 4 
Maharashtra  262.81 
               
-    
               
-    
4 1                -    
Mumbai  0 
               
-    
               
-    
               -                   -                   -    
North East  8.84 
               
-    
4                -    2                -    
Orissa  20.27 
               
-    
4                -    2                -    
Punjab  67.28 
               
-    
               
-    
               -    1                -    
Rajasthan  0 
               
-    
               
-    
               -                   -                   -    
Tamil Nadu  306.09 
               
-    
4                -                   -                   -    
Uttar Pradesh 
(East)  
76.17 
               
-    
               
-    
4 1 4 
Uttar Pradesh 
(West)  
107.41 
               
-    
               
-    
4 2 4 
West Bengal  25.84 
               
-    
5                -    2                -    
Total Payout (in 
Rs. Cr.) 
  8.67 
             
2,031  
             
4,018  
               
1,128  
              
2,221  
 
Source: Service provider information. 
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Appendix 15: License Allocation in 2013 
 
Circle wise and operator wise spectrum allocation in March 2013 Auction (800 MHz) 
Service Area 
Provisional Winning 
Price per block 
MTS 
Delhi 450.49 3.75 
Gujarat 146.15 3.75 
Karnataka 214.58 3.75 
Kerala 42.45 3.75 
Kolkata 73.92 3.75 
Tamil Nadu 198.96 3.75 
Uttar Pradesh (West) 69.82 3.75 
West Bengal 16.79 3.75 
Total Payout 3639.48 
 
 
Source: (Prasad and Sridhar 2014: 268-269) 
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Appendix 16: Spectrum Allocation 2014 
Circle wise and operator wise spectrum allocation in Feb 2014 Auction (900/1800 MHz) 
Circles 
Winning 
Price 
Spectrum Sold (MHz) 
Rs. 
Cr./MHz 
Airtel Vodafone 
Reliance 
JIO 
Idea Aircel Uninor RCOM Total 
900 MHz                   
Del 741 6 5             -    5             -                -                -    16 
Mum 563.1 5 11             -    
            
-    
            -                -                -    16 
Kolkata 194.6 7 7             -    
            
-    
            -                -                -    14 
1800 MHz                         -                -      
Del 364 7 8 5.4 0.6             -                -                -    21 
Mum 272 6 8.2 6.6 2             -                -    0.6 23.4 
Kolkata 73 5 8 5 
            
-    
            -                -                -    18 
KK 155 8.8 5 5 5             -                -                -    23.8 
TN+CHN 208 5             -    6.2 
            
-    
            -                -                -    11.2 
AP 163 8.8 0.6 5.8 6             -    1.4             -    22.6 
PB 54 8.2 0.6             -    8             -                -                -    16.8 
Gujarat 237.8 
            
-    
4.4 6 1.6             -                -                -    12 
Maharashtra 290.4 
            
-    
            -    5 9             -                -                -    14 
RAJ 26 8.2 0.8             -    
            
-    
1.6             -                -    10.6 
OR 16 5             -    5 
            
-    
            -                -                -    10 
NE 7 7             -    6.4 5 1.8             -                -    20.2 
AS 36.1 
            
-    
            -    5.4 
            
-    
            -    6             -    11.4 
Ker 52 5 7 5 10             -                -                -    27 
WB 24.6 4.4             -    5.6 
            
-    
1.2             -                -    11.2 
HP 6 10.2             -                -    
            
-    
            -                -                -    10.2 
MP 50.4 5.8             -    6.4 7             -                -                -    19.2 
HAR 27 
            
-    
2.4             -    6             -                -                -    8.4 
BH 43.1 
            
-    
            -                -    
            
-    
            -    2.2             -    2.2 
UPE 64 
            
-    
4             -    
            
-    
1.8 1.8             -    7.6 
UPW 95 
            
-    
            -                -    
            
-    
            -    2             -    2 
JK 6.1 2.6             -                -    
            
-    
1.8             -                -    4.4 
TOTAL   115 72 78.8 65.2 8.2 13.4 0.6 353.2 
Source: Service Provider Information 
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Appendix 17: Summary Spectrum Holdings by Operator 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary Spectrum Holdings by Circle and Operator (As of 31st Dec 2014)
800 800 800 800 900 900 900 900 900 900 900
S No Circle BSNL/MTNL Rcom/RTL Tata TOTAL BSNL/MTNL Airtel Vodafone Idea Rcom/RTL Aircel TOTAL
1 A.P. 3.8 5.0 2.5 11.3 6.2 7.8 0.0 6.2 0.0 0.0 20.2
2 Assam* 2.5 2.5 0.0 5.0 6.2 1.8 0.0 0.0 6.2 4.4 18.6
3 Bihar 2.5 5.0 2.5 10.0 6.2 6.2 0.0 0.0 6.2 0.0 18.6
4 Delhi 3.8 5.0 3.8 12.5 6.2 6.0 5.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 22.2
5 Gujarat 2.5 3.8 2.5 8.8 6.2 0.0 7.8 6.2 0.0 0.0 20.2
6 H.P 2.5 2.5 2.5 7.5 6.2 6.2 0.0 0.0 6.2 0.0 18.6
7 Haryana 2.5 3.8 2.5 8.8 6.2 0.0 6.2 6.2 0.0 0.0 18.6
8 J & K 2.5 2.5 0.0 5.0 8.0 6.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.4 18.6
9 Karnataka 2.5 5.0 2.5 10.0 6.2 7.8 0.0 6.2 0.0 0.0 20.2
10 Kerala 3.8 5.0 2.5 11.3 6.2 0.0 6.2 6.2 0.0 0.0 18.6
11 Kolkata 2.5 5.0 2.5 10.0 6.2 7.0 7.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.2
12 Maharashtra 2.5 5.0 2.5 10.0 6.2 0.0 6.2 7.8 0.0 0.0 20.2
13 MP 2.5 5.0 2.5 10.0 6.2 0.0 0.0 6.2 6.2 0.0 18.6
14 Mumbai 2.5 5.0 3.8 11.3 6.2 5.0 11.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 22.2
15 NE 2.5 2.5 0.0 5.0 6.2 4.4 0.0 0.0 4.4 4.4 19.4
16 Orissa 2.5 3.8 2.5 8.8 6.2 6.2 0.0 0.0 6.2 0.0 18.6
17 Punjab 2.5 3.8 2.5 8.8 6.2 7.8 0.0 7.8 0.0 0.0 21.8
18 Rajasthan 2.5 3.8 2.5 8.8 6.2 6.2 6.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.6
19 TN in CHN 2.5 5.0 2.5 10.0 6.2 6.2 6.2 0.0 0.0 7.8 26.4
20 UP (East) 2.5 5.0 2.5 10.0 6.2 6.2 6.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.6
21 UP(W) 2.5 5.0 2.5 10.0 6.2 0.0 6.2 6.2 0.0 0.0 18.6
22 WB 2.5 3.8 2.5 8.8 6.2 4.4 4.4 0.0 4.4 0.0 19.4
Grand Total
58.8 92.5 50.0 201.3 138.2 95.4 78.6 64.0 39.8 21.0 437.0
1800 1800 1800 1800 1800 1800 1800 1800 1800 1800 TOTAL
S No Circle BSNL/MTNL Airtel Vodafone Idea Rcom/RTL Aircel Tata Uninor Reliance Jio TOTAL 2G Spectrum
1 A.P. 3.8 11.0 6.8 7.8 4.4 4.4 4.4 6.4 5.8 54.8 86.3
2 Assam* 3.8 5.7 6.9 5.0 0.0 1.8 0.0 6.0 5.4 34.6 58.2
3 Bihar 3.8 3.0 6.9 5.7 1.8 4.4 4.4 7.2 0.0 37.2 65.8
4 Delhi 6.2 7.0 8.0 8.6 4.4 4.4 0.0 0.0 5.4 44.0 78.7
5 Gujarat 1.2 6.2 6.4 1.6 4.4 4.4 4.4 5.0 6.0 39.6 68.6
6 H.P 3.8 10.2 5.7 4.4 0.0 4.4 4.4 0.0 0.0 32.9 59.0
7 Haryana 3.8 6.2 4.9 6.0 4.4 4.4 4.4 0.0 0.0 34.1 61.5
8 J & K 0.0 2.6 6.9 5.0 4.4 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.7 44.3
9 Karnataka 3.8 11.0 13.0 5.0 4.4 4.4 4.4 0.0 5.0 51.0 81.2
10 Kerala 3.8 11.2 8.3 11.8 4.4 4.4 4.4 0.0 5.0 53.3 83.1
11 Kolkata 3.8 5.0 8.0 5.0 6.2 4.4 4.4 0.0 5.0 41.8 72.0
12 Maharashtra 3.8 8.2 1.3 11.0 4.4 4.4 4.4 5.0 5.0 47.5 77.7
13 MP 3.8 12.0 6.9 8.8 0.0 4.4 4.4 0.0 6.4 46.7 75.3
14 Mumbai 6.2 15.2 8.2 6.4 5.0 4.4 4.4 0.0 6.6 56.4 89.9
15 NE 3.8 8.8 6.9 10.0 1.8 1.8 0.0 0.0 6.4 39.5 63.9
16 Orissa 3.8 6.8 6.9 5.0 0.0 4.4 4.4 0.0 5.0 36.3 63.7
17 Punjab 0.0 8.2 8.1 8.0 4.4 4.4 4.4 0.0 0.0 37.5 68.0
18 Rajasthan 1.8 10.2 0.8 6.2 4.4 6.0 4.4 0.0 0.0 33.8 61.2
19 TN in CHN 3.8 8.0 1.0 5.0 4.4 2.0 4.4 0.0 6.2 34.8 71.2
20 UP (East) 3.8 1.0 7.3 6.2 4.4 6.2 4.4 6.8 0.0 40.1 68.7
21 UP(W) 3.8 6.2 2.5 1.8 4.4 4.4 4.4 7.0 0.0 34.5 63.1
22 WB 1.8 6.2 4.3 6.3 1.8 5.6 4.4 0.0 5.6 36.0 64.1
Grand Total 74.2 169.9 135.8 140.5 73.8 91.2 79.2 43.4 78.8 886.7 1525.0
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Note:  
All figs in MHz 
BWA allocations of Qualcomm in Delhi, Mumbai, Haryana and Kerala have been shown under Airtel. Some BWA 
Spectrum held by BSNL/MTNL was assigned earlier and not obtained through auction. The validity of the BWA 
spectrum is 20 years.  
 
Source: TRAI, DoT data.  
2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100
S No Circle BSNL/MTNL Airtel Vodafone Idea Rcom/RTL Aircel Tata STEL TOTAL
1 A.P. 5 5 5 5 20
2 Assam* 5 5 5 5 20
3 Bihar 5 5 5 5 5 25
4 Delhi 5 5 5 5 20
5 Gujarat 5 0 5 5 5 20
6 H.P 5 5 5 5 5 25
7 Haryana 5 0 5 5 5 20
8 J & K 5 5 5 5 5 25
9 Karnataka 5 5 5 5 20
10 Kerala 5 0 5 5 5 20
11 Kolkata 5 0 5 5 5 20
12 Maharashtra 5 0 5 5 5 20
13 MP 5 0 5 5 5 20
14 Mumbai 5 5 5 0 5 0 20
15 NE 5 5 5 5 20
16 Orissa 5 0 5 5 5 20
17 Punjab 5 0 5 5 5 5 25
18 Rajasthan 5 5 5 5 20
19 TN in CHN 5 5 5 0 0 5 0 0 20
20 UP (East) 5 0 5 5 5 20
21 UP(W) 5 5 5 5 20
22 WB 5 5 5 5 5 25
Grand Total 110 65 45 55 65 65 45 15 465
2300 2300 2300 2300 2300 2300 2300
S No Circle BSNL/MTNL Airtel Reliance Jio Aircel Tikona Augere TOTAL
1 A.P. 20 20 20 60
2 Assam* 20 20 20 60
3 Bihar 20 20 20 60
4 Delhi 20 20 20 60
5 Gujarat 20 20 20 60
6 H.P 20 20 20 60
7 Haryana 20 20 20 60
8 J & K 20 20 20 60
9 Karnataka 20 20 20 60
10 Kerala 20 20 20 60
11 Kolkata 20 20 20 60
12 Maharashtra 20 20 20 60
13 MP 20 20 20 60
14 Mumbai 20 20 20 60
15 NE 20 20 20 60
16 Orissa 20 20 20 60
17 Punjab 20 20 20 60
18 Rajasthan 20 20 20 60
19 TN in CHN 20 20 20 60
20 UP (East) 20 20 20 60
21 UP(W) 20 20 20 60
22 WB 20 20 20 60
Grand Total 440 160 440 160 100 20 1320
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Appendix 18:  Total 2G Spectrum holding by operator 
 
800/900/1800 MHz 2G Spectrum Held by TSP by Circle 
 
 
Note: All figs in MHz. Spectrum holding will be 2X above figs to account for uplink/downlink 
in paired spectrum. 
 
Source: TRAI data 
 
  
2G Spectrum Holdings Of Each Service Provider by Circle (Mar 2014)
S No Circle
Airtel Aircel Vodafone Rcom RTL Idea BSNL Tata Uninor MTNL Reliance JIO TOTAL
No. of  
TSPs AVG
1 A.P.          18.80           4.40             6.80           9.40                -           14.00         13.75             6.90             6.40                 -                5.80 86.25       9 9.58
2 Assam*            7.45           6.20             6.90                -             8.70           5.00         12.50                   -               6.00                 -                5.40 58.15       8 7.27
3 Bihar            9.20           4.40             6.90           5.00           8.00           5.65         12.50             6.90             7.20                 -                      -   65.75       9 7.31
4 Delhi          13.00           4.40          13.00           9.40                -           13.60                 -               3.75                  -           16.15              5.40 78.70       8 9.84
5 Gujarat            6.20           4.40          14.20           8.15                -             7.80            9.90             6.90             5.00                 -                6.00 68.55       9 7.62
6 H.P          16.40           4.40             5.65           2.50           6.20           4.40         12.50             6.90                  -                   -                      -   58.95       8 7.37
7 Haryana            6.20           4.40          11.10           8.15                -           12.20         12.50             6.90                  -                   -                      -   61.45       7 8.78
8 J & K            8.80           6.20             6.90           6.90                -             5.00         10.50                   -                    -                   -                      -   44.30       6 7.38
9 Karnataka          18.80           4.40          13.00           9.40                -           11.20         12.50             6.90                  -                   -                5.00 81.20       8 10.15
10 Kerala          11.20           4.40          14.45           9.40                -           18.00         13.75             6.90                  -                   -                5.00 83.10       8 10.39
11 Kolkata          12.00           4.40          15.00           5.00           6.20           5.00         12.50             6.90                  -                   -                5.00 72.00       9 8.00
12 Maharashtra            8.20           4.40             7.45           9.40                -           18.80         12.50             6.90             5.00                 -                5.00 77.65       9 8.63
13 MP          12.00           4.40             6.90           5.00           6.20         15.00         12.50             6.90                  -                   -                6.40 75.30       9 8.37
14 Mumbai          20.20           4.40          19.20        10.00                -             6.40                 -               8.15                  -           14.90              6.60 89.85       8 11.23
15 NE          13.20           6.20             6.90                -             8.70         10.00         12.50                   -                    -                   -                6.40 63.90       7 9.13
16 Orissa          13.00           4.40             6.90           3.75           6.20           5.00         12.50             6.90                  -                   -                5.00 63.65       9 7.07
17 Punjab          16.00           4.40             8.05           8.15                -           15.80            8.70             6.90                  -                   -                      -   68.00       7 9.71
18 Rajasthan          16.40           6.00             7.00           8.15                -             6.20         10.50             6.90                  -                   -                      -   61.15       7 8.74
19 TN in CHN          14.20           9.80             7.20           9.40                -             5.00         12.50             6.90                  -                   -                6.20 71.20       8 8.90
20 UP (East)            7.20           6.20          13.45           9.40                -             6.20         12.50             6.90             6.80                 -                      -   68.65       8 8.58
21 UP(W)            6.20           4.40             8.70           9.40                -             8.00         12.50             6.90             7.00                 -                      -   63.10       8 7.89
22 WB          10.60           5.60             8.70           3.75           6.20           6.25         10.50             6.90                  -                   -                5.60 64.10       9 7.12
Grand Total   265.25  112.20    214.35  149.70    56.40  204.50   240.10    129.20      43.40     31.05       78.80 
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Appendix 19: DoT Press Release of 19/10/2007 
 
Department of Telecommunications 
PRESS RELEASE 
“Given the central aim of NTP 99 to ensure rapid expansion of tele-density” and the 
objective “to transform in a time bound manner, the telecommunications sector to a 
greater competitive environment in both urban and rural areas providing equal 
opportunities and level playing field for all players”, the recommendations of TRAI that 
there should be no cap on the number of access provider in any service area has been 
considered by the Government and has been accepted. 
The Unified (Telecom) Access Services (UAS) licenses are technology neutral and the 
licensees are required to provide access services and meet the stipulated roll-out 
obligations using wireline and / or wireless technologies by utilizing network 
equipment that meets the prescribed standards. The allocation of radio-spectrum and 
grant of Wireless License shall be subject to availability. In case UAS Licensee is not 
allocated spectrum due to non-availability, the Licensee shall endeavor to roll out 
services using wireline technologies. It has also been decided that the roll out for 
wireless services shall be reckoned from the date of spectrum allocation. This will also 
apply to those licensees who are awaiting initial spectrum allotment. 
TRAI had recommended to enhance the subscriber link criterion for allocation of 
frequency spectrum to UAS/CMTS licensees and to set up a committee to study 
further allocation of spectrum. Government has accepted the TRAI’s recommendation 
of enhanced subscriber linked criterion for frequency allocation and has set up a 
committee in Telecom Engineering Centre (TEC) to further study and give a report to 
the Government. 
In order to further enhance the penetration of access services for rapid expansion of 
teledensity, it has also been decided that the existing private UAS Licensees may be 
permitted to expand their existing networks by using alternate wireless technology i.e. 
the present UAS Licensee who is using GSM technology for wireless access may be 
permitted to use CDMA technology and vice-versa. The spectrum for the alternate 
technology, CDMA or GSM (as the case may be) shall be allocated in the applicable 
frequency band subject to availability after payment of prescribed fee. Allocation of 
spectrum for the alternate technology may be done to private UAS Licensees on 
payment of prescribed fee, which will be an amount equal to the amount prescribed as 
entry fee for getting a new UAS licence in the same service area. The existing UAS 
Licensees, who have already applied for allocation of spectrum for the alternate 
technology shall also be considered for allocation of spectrum in alternate technology 
from the date of payment of prescribed fee. BSNL and MTNL being incumbent 
operators shall be permitted usage of alternative technology and allocated spectrum 
for the alternate technology without paying the prescribed fee. For the purpose of 
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payment of licence fee and spectrum charges, the stream wise revenue of different 
technologies shall be considered. 
At the time of further allotment of spectrum in any technology, allotment will be 
subject to the condition that in case the eligibility of the licensee for allocated 
spectrum in other technology falls below the criterion set for spectrum allotment in 
the specified technology for the last consecutive six months then corresponding chunk 
of spectrum in that technology will be surrendered by the licensee before any further 
allotment of spectrum is considered. 
The Access Services providers shall endeavor to use more efficient methods and 
optimum technologies for spectrum utilization. In order to encourage Licensees to use 
all available methods for efficient spectrum utilization, the “Spectrum Enhancement 
Charge”, in addition to annual spectrum charges based on revenue share, may be 
levied at the time of additional spectrum allotment to licensees beyond 10MHz for 
GSM and 5MHz for CDMA. For each additional 1 MHz or part thereof “Spectrum 
Enhancement Charge” @ Rs 16 Crore, 8 Crore, 3 Crore for Metro/ Category ‘A’, 
Category ‘B’, Category ‘C’ service areas respectively may be charged. 
SACFA clearance should be given in a stipulated time frame of 60 days unless there are 
circumstances to the contrary. For the Substantial equity holding in the UAS/CMTS 
Licensee Company, there is no change in the existing criterion. 
For failure to meet roll out obligation within prescribed time schedule, the existing 
stipulation of termination of license under Clause 35.2 of UAS Licence Agreement shall 
continue. In addition, Performance Bank Guarantee (PBG) may also be forfeited and 
the service provider may be asked to resubmit PBG of the same amount. No additional 
spectrum may be allocated to licensees without fulfilling the roll out obligations. In 
case of spectrum auction, a Licensee, who has not met roll-out obligation against an 
existing licence, should not be eligible to participate in any spectrum auction till the 
roll out obligation is met. Any proposal for permission for merger shall not be 
entertained till the roll out obligation is met; however, request for permission for 
acquisition may be entertained. Roll out for each licensed service area is to be dealt 
separately. In case of violation of roll out conditions, government may consider 
termination of license in certain cases. 
Self certification scheme for completion of roll-out obligation is already in place and 
shall continue. The authorized testing party of the Licensor shall issue the required 
test certificate of compliance within 120 days from the date of submission of self 
certificate which is correct and complete in all respect.  
Merger & Acquisition guidelines will be issued separately. 
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Appendix 20: Comparative Costings for 900 vs. 1800 MHz on 2G 
  2G @ 900MHz  2G @ 1,800MHz  
      
Spectrum allocation (MHz) [A]  5 5 
Intersite distance (m)  4,508 2,962 
Coverage area (sq km) [B] 18 8 
2G: No. of channels of 200kHz [C = Ax1000 / 200] 25 25 
      
Bandwidth requirement for voice call  7 calls supported 7 calls supported 
  per channel of200khz per channel 
of200khz       
No. of simultaneous calls supported per site2 [D]  175 175 
      
Cost of 3-sector site (Rs)  660000 660000 
Life of equipment (years) 15 15 
Annual depreciation (Rs) 44,000 44,000 
      
Network opex per site (Rs/month)  45,000 45,000 
Network opex per site (Rs/year) 540,000 540,000 
      
Total annual operating cost per site (incl. depreciation)(Rs.) E 584,000 584,000 
      
Total inhabited land area in India (sq km) 2,159,870 2,159,870 
70% of area (sq km) [F] 1,511,909 1,511,909 
      
No. sites required to cover 70% inhabited area [G = F / B] 85,904 198,935 
      
Voice capacity of network (mn simultaneous calls) [H = G X D] 15 35 
      
Total annual operating cost for network to cover 70% area (Rs 
mn) [I = E x G] 
50,168 116,178 
      
Spectrum cost per MHz (for 20 yrs) (Rs mn) [EGoM / 2010 
auctions] 
60000 30000 
      
Amortisation cost for allocated spectrum over 20 yrs (Rs mn) 
[J] 
15000 7500 
      
Total annual operating costs including spectrum amortisation 
(Rs mn) [K = I + J] 
65168 123678 
Vs 2G @ 900MHz 100% 190% 
      
Total operating cost per unit voice capacity (Rs) [L = K / H] 4,335 3,553 
vs 2G @ 900MHz 100% 82% 
Source: Adapted from (Tirumalai and Shah 2012), sourced from telecom analyst. 
418 
 
Appendix 21: Market shares of 900 MHz TSPs vs 1800 MHz TSPs 
 
Circle Category A C C M A B C
AP Assam Bihar Delhi Gujarat Haryana Himachal
Circle total revenue 3328 777 2383 3440 2533 964 326
900 Operators Revenue (Rs cr) 2275 327 1359 2278 1617 619 224
900 Operators Revenue Excl MTNL/BSNL 2085 268 1283 2151 1518 543 185
1800 Operators Revenue 1052 449 1023 1163 916 345 103
900 Operators 900 + 1800 Spectrum 28 22 27 32 23 25 22
MTNL/BSNL 900 Spectrum 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
MTNL/BSNL 1800 Spectrum 4 4 4 6 1 4 4
900 Operators 900+1800 Spectrum excl MTNL 18 12 17 20 16 15 12
900 Operators 1800 spectrum (excl MTNL) 4 2 5 4 2 3
1800 Operators 900 + 1800 Spectrum (excl MTNL) 24 19 31 17 29 24 19
1800 Operators 900 Spectrum Holding (excl MTNL)
2
Key Metrics
900 Operators Revenue Share 68% 42% 57% 66% 64% 64% 69%
900 Operators Revenue Share excl MTNL/BSNL 63% 35% 54% 63% 60% 56% 57%
900 Operators Share of 900 + 1800 Spectrum excl 
MTNL/BSNL 34% 30% 29% 41% 30% 30% 30%
% 900 Operators spectrum that is 1800 18% 13% 22% 17% 11% 14% #VALUE!
900 Operators excl MTNL rev/quarter/mhz 116 22 75 108 95 36 15
1800 Operators excl MTNL rev/quarter/mhz 43 23 33 69 31 14 5
Airtel effect
900:1800 Rev/Mhz Ratio 269% 93% 229% 155% 305% 258% 275%
Circle Category C A B M B A M
J & K Karnataka Kerela Kolkata MP MaharashtraMumbai
Circle total revenue 493 3202 1869 1103 2197 3681 2730
900 Operators Revenue (Rs cr) 391 1973 1415 673 1221 2288 1186
900 Operators Revenue Excl MTNL/BSNL 338 1792 1156 644 1110 2112 1119
1800 Operators Revenue 102 1229 454 429 976 1393 1545
900 Operators 900 + 1800 Spectrum 20 26 25 27 24 27 29
MTNL/BSNL 900 Spectrum 8 6 6 6 6 6 6
MTNL/BSNL 1800 Spectrum 4 4 4 4 4 6
900 Operators 900+1800 Spectrum excl MTNL 12 16 15 17 14 17 16
900 Operators 1800 spectrum (excl MTNL) 2 2 3 4 2 3 2
1800 Operators 900 + 1800 Spectrum (excl MTNL) 16 21 19 25 29 26 27
1800 Operators 900 Spectrum Holding (excl MTNL)
Key Metrics
900 Operators Revenue Share 79% 62% 76% 61% 56% 62% 43%
900 Operators Revenue Share excl MTNL/BSNL 69% 56% 62% 58% 50% 57% 41%
900 Operators Share of 900 + 1800 Spectrum excl 
MTNL/BSNL 34% 34% 34% 33% 27% 32% 29%
% 900 Operators spectrum that is 1800 13% 12% 16% 18% 11% 16% 11%
900 Operators excl MTNL rev/quarter/mhz 27 111 75 38 78 122 69
1800 Operators excl MTNL rev/quarter/mhz 6 58 23 17 34 53 58
900:1800 Rev/Mhz Ratio 436% 191% 319% 221% 230% 232% 120%
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Circle Category C C B B A B B
NE Orissa Punjab Rajasthan TN UP East UP West
Circle total revenue 476 932 1624 2272 3667 2896 1969
900 Operators Revenue (Rs cr) 393 569 1028 1565 3045 1858 1179
900 Operators Revenue Excl MTNL/BSNL 348 462 927 1448 2810 1683 1081
1800 Operators Revenue 83 363 596 707 622 1038 790
900 Operators 900 + 1800 Spectrum 29 23 22 22 41 27 27
MTNL/BSNL 900 Spectrum 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
MTNL/BSNL 1800 Spectrum 4 4 2 4 4 4
900 Operators 900+1800 Spectrum excl MTNL 19 13 16 14 31 17 17
900 Operators 1800 spectrum (excl MTNL) 5 1 2 11 4 4
1800 Operators 900 + 1800 Spectrum (excl MTNL) 12 21 25 25 14 31 31
1800 Operators 900 Spectrum Holding (excl MTNL)
Key Metrics
900 Operators Revenue Share 83% 61% 63% 69% 83% 64% 60%
900 Operators Revenue Share excl MTNL/BSNL 73% 50% 57% 64% 77% 58% 55%
900 Operators Share of 900 + 1800 Spectrum excl 
MTNL/BSNL 46% 30% 33% 30% 57% 29% 29%
% 900 Operators spectrum that is 1800 23% 7% #VALUE! 12% 26% 20% 20%
900 Operators excl MTNL rev/quarter/mhz 19 34 59 101 90 101 65
1800 Operators excl MTNL rev/quarter/mhz 7 18 24 28 45 33 25
900:1800 Rev/Mhz Ratio 268% 197% 250% 361% 200% 304% 257%
Circle Category B
West BengalAll India Metros A B C C excl Assam
Circle total revenue 1483 44345 7273 16410 15275 5387
900 Operators Revenue (Rs cr) 1162 28645 4137 11198 10047 3264 2937
900 Operators Revenue Excl MTNL/BSNL 1088 26150 3914 10317 9035 2884 2616
1800 Operators Revenue 321 15699 3136 5212 5228 2123 1674
900 Operators 900 + 1800 Spectrum 29 580 88 146 201 144 122
MTNL/BSNL 900 Spectrum 6 138 19 31 50 39 33
MTNL/BSNL 1800 Spectrum 2 74 16 16 23 19 15
900 Operators 900+1800 Spectrum excl MTNL 21 367 53 99 129 86 74
900 Operators 1800 spectrum (excl MTNL) 8 73 10 22 26 15 13
1800 Operators 900 + 1800 Spectrum (excl MTNL) 22 510 69 115 207 118 99
1800 Operators 900 Spectrum Holding (excl MTNL)
2 0 0 0 2 0
Key Metrics
900 Operators Revenue Share 78% 65% 57% 68% 66% 61% 64%
900 Operators Revenue Share excl MTNL/BSNL 73% 59% 54% 63% 59% 54% 57%
900 Operators Share of 900 + 1800 Spectrum excl 
MTNL/BSNL 41% 34% 34% 38% 32% 33% 33%
% 900 Operators spectrum that is 1800 27% 17% 16% 19% 17% 15%
900 Operators excl MTNL rev/quarter/mhz 52 71 74 105 70 33 35
1800 Operators excl MTNL rev/quarter/mhz 15 31 46 45 25 18 17
900:1800 Rev/Mhz Ratio 351% 231% 161% 231% 278% 186%
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 Appendix 22: Quality of Service Parameters for TSPs 
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The following needs to be monitored by the service provider but need not be 
reported to TRAI 
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